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
THE
HISTORY OF ROME.

VOL. II.

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THE



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BY

WILHELM IHNE.



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FOURTH BOOK.

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FOURTH BOOK.

STRUGGLE FOR THE
ASCENDANCY IN THE WEST.



CHAPTER I.

CARTHAGE.

OPPOSITE to the far-spreading peninsulas and deep indented shores of Europe and her numerous islands, stretches in a long and uniform line the stony coast of Africa, the most compact part of the old as well as of the new world. No more marked contrast can be found, in such immediate proximity, upon the surface of the globe, than the two continents which form the abodes of the black and white races of man. The solid mass of land in the sultry south, the primeval seat of unmitigated barbarism, has remained closed to the present day against the refinement of a higher civilisation, whilst Europe early received the seed of culture and unfolded the richest and most varied forms of intellectual, social, and political life. On the east of Africa the narrow valley formed by the Nile is indeed separated from the heart of the African continent, and on the north the cheerless wastes of the interior bound a belt of land of varying breadth along the coast which is capable of much cultivation. These regions differ, however, essentially from the sea-girt islands and peninsulas of Europe, where a milder sun and a greater variety of climate have brought about gentler manners and richer forms of social and political life.

The Mediterranean Sea, on whose shores the stream of migration from east to west was arrested and divided, turned the Semitic races to the north coast of Africa and the Indo-Europeans or Aryans to the countries of Europe; and although its waters could not prevent the hostile encounters and alternating invasions of these two radically

CHAP.
I.

Differences
of soil and
climate
between
Europe
and Africa.

Migrations
of the
Semitic
and Aryan
tribes.

BOOK
IV.

different peoples, still it has formed, during the lapse of centuries, an immovable barrier between them, dividing the civilised lands of Christian Europe from those of the Mohammedan Barbaresks who have again sunk almost into savagery.

Phœnician
colonisa-
tion in
Africa.

We have but uncertain information with respect to the original population of the countries which extend from Egypt to the Atlantic Ocean and from the desert to the shores of the Mediterranean Sea. One single race of people, the Libyans, divided into various branches, of which the Numidians, the Mauritanians, and the Gætulians are the most important, have had possession of these regions from the earliest times; and in spite of migrations and mixing of races, the present Berbers may be considered the direct descendants of the original population. The nature of the soil caused considerable difference in the mode of life and in the character of the population. In the fruitful border-lands of the sea-coast, the Libyans led an industrious agricultural life; the shepherd hordes of the Numidians and Mauritanians ranged through the steppes and deserts; and in the recesses of the Atlas, the Gætulians dragged on a miserable existence. None of these tribes possessed in themselves the elements of a higher cultivation. This cultivation came to them from without. During a period of many centuries, the Phœnicians, a people distinguished by ingenuity and enterprise, made the north coast of Africa the object of their voyages, and there they planted numerous colonies. It would appear that the course of these earliest explorers and founders of cities was at first directed more to the north of the Mediterranean; but encountering the Greeks on the shores and islands of the Ægean Sea, they retired before the greater energy of that people, in order to find on the coast of Africa and the western part of the Mediterranean an undisturbed territory for the development of their commercial and colonial policy. Thus numerous Phœnician settlements were formed on the coast of Africa, in Spain, and in many of the western islands.

CHAP.
I.

Points of
difference
between
the Phœ-
nician and
Roman
colonies.

The Phœnician colonies did not essentially differ from the Greek. Unlike the Roman colonies, they were not established by the mother country, in order to further her political aims, to extend and strengthen her dominion, and to be kept in dependence upon her. On the contrary, their foundation was the result of a spirit of enterprise in the emigrants, of internal quarrels at home, or of commercial projects; and only a weak bond of affection or interest united them with each other and with the mother country. Nevertheless the isolated and at first independent Phœnician cities in the west gradually grew into one powerful united state; and this small Semitic people succeeded by their concentrated and well-regulated force in ruling for centuries over numerous populations composed of differing races, and in stamping upon them an impression which was recognisable ages after the fall of the Phœnician dominion.

Rapid
growth
and power
of Car-
thage.

This union of the widely-spread Phœnician communities into one state was the work of Carthage. No domestic or foreign historian has explained to us by what happy circumstances, by what political or military superiority on the part of the Carthaginians, or by what statesmen or generals, this union of scattered elements was brought about. The ancient history of Carthage has disappeared even more completely than that of her great rival Rome, and in its place we find only idle stories and fables. Dido or Elissa, the Tyrian princess, who is said to have emigrated from her native country in the ninth century before our era, at the head of a portion of the discontented nobility, and to have founded Byrsa, the citadel of Carthage, appears in the light of historical investigation to be a goddess. The stories of the purchase of a site for the new city, of the ox-hide cut into strips, and of the rent which for many years had to be paid for the land to native princes, are legends of as much worth as those of the Roman asylum, or the rape of the Sabines. Carthage was at first, like Rome, an unimportant city, whose foundation and early history could not have aroused the attention of

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contemporary writers. She was but one among the many Phœnician colonies, and not even the oldest Phœnician settlement on the African coast. But the happy situation of Carthage appears to have promoted the early and rapid growth of the city; which, asserting her supremacy over her sister cities, placed herself at the head of all the settlements belonging to the Phœnician race. She made conquests and founded colonies, and gained dominion over the western seas and coasts by her commercial influence and by the strength of her forces in war.

Nature of
the Car-
thaginian
empire.

The Carthaginian empire was in its constitution not unlike that of Rome. Both had grown out of one city as their centre; both ruled over allies of alien and of kindred race; both had sent out numerous colonies, and through them had spread their nationality. But with all this resemblance there were causes existing which impressed upon the two states widely different characteristics and determined their several destinies.

Elements
of weak-
ness in the
Carthagi-
nian state.

We dare not decide whether Rome was richer than Carthage in political wisdom and warlike spirit. Both these qualities distinguished the two peoples in the highest degree, developed their national strength, and made the struggle between them the longest and most chequered that is known in ancient history. Even we, who draw our knowledge of the Carthaginians only from the questionable statements of Greek and Roman writers, can arrive at a full conviction that they were at least worthy rivals of the Romans. The decision in the great contest did not depend upon superiority of mind or courage. No Roman army ever fought more bravely than that under Hamilcar Barcas on Mount Eryx, or than the garrison of Lilybæum, or than the Carthaginians in their last desperate conflict with Scipio the Destroyer. The wisdom of the Roman senate, which we cannot rate too highly, did not accomplish more than the senate of Carthage, which for 600 years governed the greatest commercial state in the old world without a single fundamental revolution. What, then, was the decisive force which, after the long trembling

of the balance between Rome and Carthage, turned the scale? It was the homogeneity of the material out of which the Roman state was constructed, as compared with the varied elements which formed the Carthaginian.¹ The Romans were Latins, of the same blood as the Sabines, the Samnites, the Lucanians, and the Campanians, and all the other races which formed the principal stock of the population of Italy. They were related in blood even with their Grecian allies, and they harmonised in a great measure with the Etruscans in their mode of life, in political thought and religious rites. But the Carthaginians were strangers in Africa, and they remained so to the end. The hard soil of Africa produced an unimpressible race, and the Semitic Phœnicians were exclusive in their intercourse with strangers. Though the Carthaginians and Libyans lived together in Africa for many centuries, the difference between them never disappeared. With the Romans it was different. They could not help growing into one people with their subjects. Difference of race rendered this impossible to the Carthaginians. If they had been numerous enough to absorb the Libyans, this fact would have been less prejudicial. But their mother country, Phœnicia, was too small to send out ever-fresh supplies of emigrants. The roots of their power had not therefore struck deep enough into the soil of their new home, and the fearful storm which broke upon them in the Roman wars tore them up.

Geographical dangers.

To this element of national weakness was added a second. Italy is a compact, well-defined land. Large enough to hold a numerous population, it is not broken up by mountains nor deeply indented by arms of the sea, like Greece. It is surrounded on almost all sides by water, and consequently not much exposed to the danger of foreign encroachments. If we compare this with the Carthaginian territory, we shall find that the long stretch

¹ Polybius (i. 65, § 7) points out this contrast by comparing the ἤθη σύμμικτα καὶ βάρβαρα of the Carthaginians with those of the Romans, ἐν παιδείᾳ καὶ νόμοις καὶ πολιτικοῖς ἔθεσιν ἐκτετραμμένα.

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IV.Agriculture and
trade of
Carthage.

of coast from Kyrênê to the ocean, her uncertain frontier towards the interior of the African continent, her scattered possessions beyond the sea, in Sicily, Sardinia, Malta, the Balearic Isles and in Spain, formed a very unsafe basis for the formation of a powerful and durable state.

These were the weak parts of Carthage. It has indeed been said that the Carthaginians were merely a nation of traders, bent on gain, animated by no warlike spirit, and that therefore they were doomed to succumb in the struggle with Rome.¹ But this assertion is untrue, and the inference is unjust. The Carthaginians were by no means exclusively a commercial and trading people. They practised agriculture no less than the Romans. Their system of tillage was even more rational and more advanced than the Roman. They had writings on husbandry which the Roman senate caused to be translated expressly for the instruction of the Roman people. If, therefore, peasants possess more than the people of towns the requisite qualities of good soldiers, (which may, however, be doubted), still this fact would be no argument for denying that the Carthaginians excelled in war. And indeed how could a people have been wanting in warlike spirit who braved the storms and rocks of every sea, who established themselves on every coast, and subdued the wildest and boldest races? If the Carthaginians formed their armies out of hired foreign troops and not out of citizens, the cause is not to be found in their want of courage or deficient patriotism. The men, and even the women, of Carthage were ever ready to sacrifice their lives for the defence of their homes; but for their foreign wars they counted the blood of citizens too dear. A mercenary army cost the state less than an army of citizens, who were much too valuable as artisans or merchants, as officials or overseers, to serve as

¹ Compare the just remarks of Vincke (*Der zweite punische Krieg*, 1841, p. 94) on the warlike qualities of commercial states: 'The merchants of Carthage were no more mere shopkeepers than those merchants on the Zuydersee and the Thames who seized the government of India.' Vincke ought to have added: 'and who fought victoriously with the greatest military powers of Europe—with Spain under Philip II., and with France under Napoleon.'

common soldiers. Military service is sought only by rude and poor nations as a means of subsistence. The Samnites, the Iberians, the Gauls, and the Ligurians, and, among the Greeks especially, the Arcadians and the rest of the Peloponnesians, served for hire, because they were needy or uncultivated. Love of the military service as a profession and occupation of life is never found in the mass of an advanced people where the value of labour ranks high. We must not on this account reproach such a nation with cowardice. The English are surpassed by no people of Europe in bravery; and yet in England, except the officers, none but the lowest classes adopt a soldier's life, because it is the worst paid. Of course in times of national enthusiasm or danger it is different. Then every member of a healthy state willingly takes up arms. So it was among the Carthaginians, and therefore we are not justified in crediting them with less capacity for war than the bravest nations of the old world.

In speaking of the Carthaginian people we must strictly include only the Punians, that is to say, the population of pure Phœnician descent. These were to be found only in the city of Carthage and in the other Phœnician colonies, and were very few in proportion to the mass of the remaining population. The aboriginal African race of the Libyans inhabited the fruitful region south of Carthage to the lake Tritonis; these the Phœnician settlers had reduced to complete dependence and made tributary.¹ They were now the subjects of Carthage, and their lot was not enviable. It is true that they were personally free; but they formed no part of the Carthaginian people, and they had no rights but those which the

Dependents and tributaries of Carthage.

¹ It is very improbable that, as Justin states (xix. 2), the Carthaginians, down to the time of Darius Hystaspis, paid a ground-rent to the Libyans for the land on which their town was built. (Compare Heeren, *Ideen*, ii. 1-34.) But granted even that this statement were true, it would not follow that (as Mommsen says, *Röm. Gesch.* i. 493) they were deficient in political capacity. No one will venture to accuse the English people of such a defect. Yet the East India Company continued up to the year 1827 to acknowledge the Great Mogul as the nominal sovereign of India, and allowed him to keep a mock court at Delhi until 1857.

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generosity or policy of the Carthaginians granted them. The amount of the services which they had to render to the state was not fixed and determined by mutual agreement, by stipulation or law, but depended on the necessities of Carthage; and on this account they were always ready to join with foreign enemies whenever the soil of Africa became the theatre of war.

The Liby-
Phoeni-
cians.

During the 600 years of Carthaginian supremacy, a certain mingling of the races of the Libyans and Carthaginians naturally took place. A number of Carthaginians, citizens of pure Phœnician blood, settled among the Libyans, and thus arose the mixed race of the Liby-Phœnicians, who probably spread Carthaginian customs and the Phœnician language in Africa in the same way as the Latin colonies carried the Latin language and Roman customs over Italy. From these Liby-Phœnicians were principally taken the colonists who were sent out by Carthage to form settlements, not only in Africa, but also in Spain, Sicily, Sardinia, and the other islands. We have no very accurate information about the Liby-Phœnicians. Whether they were more animated by the Phœnician spirit, or whether the Libyan nationality prevailed, must remain undecided. It is, however, probable that, in course of time, they assumed more and more of the Phœnician character.

The Car-
thaginian
state.

The Carthaginian citizens, the native Libyans, and the mixed population of the Liby-Phœnicians constituted therefore, in strictness of speech, the republic of Carthage, in the same way as Rome, the Roman colonies, and the subject Italian population formed the body of the Roman state. But the wider Carthaginian empire included three other elements; the confederate Punic cities, the dependent African nomadic races, and the foreign possessions.

Acknow-
ledgment
of Cartha-
ginian su-
premacy.

It is a sure sign of the political ability of the Carthaginians that, so far as we know, no wars arising from jealousy and rivalry took place between the different Phœnician colonies, like those which ruined the once flourishing Greek settlements in Italy and Sicily. It is

true that the Phœnicians were careful to exclude other nations from the regions where they had founded their trading establishments, and Carthage may also have endeavoured to concentrate the trade of her African possessions in Carthage itself.¹ But there were no wars of extermination between different cities and the Phœnician race. All the Tyrian and Sidonian colonies in Africa, on the islands of the western Mediterranean Sea, and in Spain, which had in part been formed before Carthage, gradually joined themselves to her, and acknowledged her as the head of their nation. How this union was effected is hidden in the darkness of the early Carthaginian history. We may perhaps assume that the common national and mercantile interests prompted the isolated settlements of the far-sighted Phœnicians to a peaceful union and subordination to the most powerful state.² Thus it was possible for a handful of men of a foreign race³ to establish in a distant part of the world an extensive dominion over scattered tracts of land and wild barbarian populations.

The most important city of these Phœnician confederates was Utica, situated at no great distance north of Carthage at the mouth of the river Bagradas. In the public treaties which Carthage concluded, Utica was generally mentioned as one of the contracting parties.⁴ It was therefore rather an ally than a subject of Carthage, holding to her the same relationship which Præneste and some other Italian cities bore to Rome. We have very little information about the remaining Phœnician cities on the

Phœnician
cities of
northern
Africa.

¹ Movers, *Phönizier*, ii. 2, 488. Yet it is not probable that the Carthaginians, as Movers suspects, destroyed the port of Great Leptis. If they had done so, the export of goods from Great Leptis to Carthage would have been confined to the long and tedious road by land, which of course would have resulted in a loss to the Carthaginian traders. Many of the famous ports of antiquity were silted up in the course of ages, and among them, no doubt, that of Great Leptis, without the interference of man.

² At least nothing is known of a forcible subjection of the smaller Phœnician settlements to Carthage.

³ The English dominion in India is to some extent analogous; but the Anglo-Indians have the whole power of the mother country to back them.

⁴ Polybius, iii. 24.

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The Numidians.

north coast of Africa. None of them were of such importance as to be placed in the same rank with Carthage and Utica. They were bound to pay a fixed tribute and to furnish contingents of troops, but they enjoyed self-government and they retained their own laws.

On the south and west of the immediate territory of the Carthaginian republic lived various races of native Libyans, who are commonly known by the name of Numidians. But these were in no way, as their Greek name ('Nomads') would seem to imply, exclusively pastoral races. Several districts in their possession, especially in the modern Algeria, were admirably suited for agriculture. Hence they had not only fixed and permanent abodes, but a number of not unimportant cities, of which Hippo and Cirta, the residences of the chief Numidian princes, were the most considerable. Their own interest, far more than the superior force of the Carthaginians, bound the chiefs of several Numidian races as allies to the rich commercial city. They assisted in great part in carrying on the commerce of Carthage with the interior parts of Africa, and derived a profit from this forwarding trade. The military service in the Carthaginian armies had great attractions for the needy sons of the desert, who delighted above all things in robbery and plunder; and the light cavalry of the Numidians was equalled neither by the Romans nor by the Greeks. A wise policy on the part of Carthage kept the princes of Numidia in good humour. Presents, marks of honour, and intermarriage with noble Carthaginian ladies, united them with the city, which thus disposed of them without their suspecting that they were in a state of dependence. That, however, such an uncertain, fluctuating alliance was not without danger for Carthage—that the excitable Numidians, caring only for their own immediate advantage, would join the enemies of Carthage without scruple in the hour of need, Carthage was doomed to experience to her sorrow in her wars with Rome.

Foreign

Besides her own immediate territory in Africa, the

allied Phœnician cities, and the Numidian confederates, Carthage had also a number of foreign possessions and colonies, extending her name and influence throughout the western parts of the Mediterranean Sea. A line of colonies had been founded on the north coast of Africa as far as the Straits of Gibraltar, and even on the western shore of the continent, *i.e.* on the coasts of Numidia and Mauritania; but these were intended to further the commerce of Carthage, not in any way to assist her in her conquests. In like manner, the earliest settlements in Spain and the islands of the Mediterranean, in Malta, the Balearic and Lipari Isles, in Sardinia, and especially in Sicily, were originally trading factories, and not colonies in the Roman sense. But where commerce required the protection of arms, these establishments were soon changed into military posts, like those of the English in the East Indies; and the conquest of larger or smaller tracts of land and of entire islands was the consequence. It is evident that for several centuries the Carthaginians in Sicily were not bent on conquest. They avoided encountering the Greeks, they gave up the whole south and east coast, where at first there had been numerous Phœnician colonies,¹ and they confined themselves to a few small strongholds in the extreme west of the island, which they required as trading and shipping stations. They appear only in the fifth century to have made an attempt to get military possession of the greater part of Sicily. But after the failure of this attempt by the defeat at Himera (480 B.C.) we hear of no further similar undertakings till the time of the Peloponnesian war.

Sardinia, on the other hand, seems early to have come into the power of the Carthaginians, after the attempt of the Greeks of Phokaia to make a settlement there had been thwarted by the Carthaginian fleet. Sardinia was not, like Sicily, a land that attracted many strangers. It was not the eternal apple of discord of contending neigh-

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I.
possession of
Carthage.

¹ Movers, *Phönizier*, ii. 2, 324 ff. Thucydides, vi. 2.

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bours, like the richer sister island, and so it seems that, as the Carthaginians found no rival there, it was acquired without much effort on their part.

Gades and
other
settlements
in Spain.

Gades, the earliest Phœnician colony in Spain, and the other kindred settlements in the valley of the Bætis, the old land of Tartessus,¹ appear to have stood in friendly relations to Carthage. The African and Spanish Phœnicians carried on an active intercourse with each other without jealousy or mutual injury, and in war they aided each other. At a later period, when Carthage was extending her conquests in Spain, Gades and the other Punic places seem to have stood to her in the same relationship as Utica.

Constitu-
tion of
Carthage.

Thus the Carthaginian state was formed out of elements differing widely from one another in origin and geographical position. The constitution and organisation of the state were admirably fitted for times of peace, and for commercial and industrial development. By the activity of the Carthaginian merchants, the varied productions of the several districts found their markets. The different peoples mutually supplied their wants, and could not fail to recognise their common interest in this intercourse with one another, and in the services rendered by Carthage. But for the strain of a great war such a state was too slightly framed. From the nature of things it was hardly to be expected that it could undertake any war with success, or survive a great reverse. But Carthage, notwithstanding, came out victoriously from many a struggle; and for centuries she maintained herself as the first state in the western sea, before she sunk under the hard blows of the Roman legions. This result was brought about by a wise political organisation of the state, which bound the heterogeneous elements into one solid body.

Points of
likeness
between
the

Our information about the constitution of Carthage comes to us indirectly through Greek and Roman authors, and many points with respect to it remain obscure and

¹ Movers, *Phönizier*, ii. 2, 594 ff.

unintelligible in consequence, more especially its origin and progressive development; but its general character is tolerably clear, and we cannot hesitate to rank it, on the authority of Aristotle and Polybius, among the best of ancient constitutions. A striking phenomenon may here be noted. In spite of the radically different national character of the Semitic Carthaginians, their political institutions, far from presenting a decided contrast to the Greek and Italian forms of government, resembled them strongly, not only in general outline but even in detail. This similarity led Aristotle¹ to compare the constitution of Carthage with that of Sparta and Crete, while Polybius² thinks that it resembled the Roman. This likeness may be partly explained by the fact that these foreign observers were inclined to discover analogies in Carthage to their own native institutions, and that they were strengthened in this view by the employment of Greek and Roman names, just as they were constantly recognising the Hellenic deities in the gods of the barbarians. But without a correspondence of outline in the constitution of these states, such a comparison would not have been possible, and so we are compelled to infer that in political life the Carthaginians were not Asiatics but Occidentals, or else had become so through the force of circumstances.

Carthage had from the very commencement this feature in common with the Greek and Roman republics, that the state had grown out of a city and preserved the municipal form of government. In consequence a republican administration became necessary, that is to say, there took place a periodical change of elected and responsible magistrates, the people being acknowledged as the source of all political power.

The first officers of state, who were called Kings or Suffetes (a term identical with the Hebrew Shofetim, judges), were chosen by the people out of the most distinguished families. If we had more particulars about

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I.

Carthaginian and other constitutions.

Municipal government of Carthage.

The Suffetes.

¹ Aristotle, *Polit.* ii. 8, 1.

² Polybius, vi. 51.

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the gradual growth of the constitution of Carthage, we should probably find that these officers were at first invested with comprehensive powers, but that in the course of time, like the corresponding authorities in Athens, Sparta, Rome, and other places, they became more and more restricted, and had to resign to other functionaries a part of their original authority. At a later period, the suffetes appear to have discharged only religious and other honorary functions, such as the presidency in the senate; and perhaps they also took some part in the administration of justice. It is remarkable that we cannot state with certainty whether one or two suffetes held office at the same time; but it would seem probable that there were always two, as they were compared to the Spartan kings and the Roman consuls. Still more uncertain is the duration of their term of office. It may perhaps be taken for granted that, if the dignity was originally conferred for life, it was afterwards limited to the period of a year.

The command of the army.

The most important office, though perhaps not the highest in rank, was that of the military commander. This was not limited to a fixed time, and seems generally to have been endowed with extensive, in fact almost dictatorial power, though subject to the gravest responsibility. In the organisation and employment of this important dignity, the Carthaginians proved their political wisdom, and chiefly to this they owed their great successes and the spread of their power. While the Romans continued year after year to place new consuls with divided powers at the head of their brave legions, even when fighting against such foes as Hannibal, the Carthaginians had early arrived at the conviction that vast and distant wars could be brought to a successful issue only by men who had uncontrolled and permanent authority in their own army. No petty jealousy, no republican fear of tyranny, kept them from intrusting the whole power of the state to the most approved generals, even if they belonged, as repeatedly happened, to an eminent family, and succeeded to the command as if by hereditary right. For a whole

century members of the Mago family were at the head of the Carthaginian armies, and Carthage owed to their prudence and courage the establishment of her dominion in Sicily and Sardinia. This feature of the constitution of Carthage stands out in boldest relief in the war of Hannibal, when, according to the common view, the most flourishing age of the state was already over. Hamilcar Barcas, the heroic father, was followed by his heroic son-in-law, Hasdrubal; and Hamilcar's fame was only surpassed by that of his more glorious sons. None of these men ever attempted to destroy the freedom of the republic, while in Greece and Sicily republican institutions were always in danger of being overthrown by successful generals, a fate which Rome herself suffered at a later period. The Carthaginian commanders-in-chief, like the generals of modern history, were uncontrolled masters in the field, but always subject to the civil authority of the state. The statesmen of Carthage sought to obtain their end by a strict subordination of the military to the civil power, and by the severe punishment of offenders; not by splitting up the chief command, or limiting its duration. They instituted a civil commission, consisting of members of the select council, who accompanied the generals to the field, and superintended any political measures, such as the conclusion of treaties.¹ Thus every Carthaginian army represented in a certain degree the state in miniature; the generals were the executive, the committee of senators were the senate, and the Carthaginians serving in the army were the people. How far such a control of the generals was unwise or the punishments unjust, we have no means of deciding with our scanty means of information. But the fact that the best citizens were always ready to devote their energies and their lives to the service of their country speaks well for the wisdom of the control and the justice of the sentences.

¹ Polybius, vii. 9.

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ginian
timocracy.The Car-
thaginian
senate.

In addition to the suffetes and generals, other Carthaginian officers are occasionally mentioned, and these are designated by corresponding Latin names, such as prætors and quæstors. In a powerful, well-ordered, and complicated political organism, like the Carthaginian republic, there were of course many officials and many branches of the administration. To hold an office without salary was an honour, and consequently the administration was in the hands of families distinguished by birth and riches.

These families were represented, everywhere among the ancients, in the senate, which in truth was the soul of the Carthaginian state, as it was of the Roman, and which really conducted the whole foreign and domestic policy. In spite of this conspicuous position, which must always have attracted the attention of other nations, we have no satisfactory information about the organisation of the Carthaginian senate. It would seem that it was numerous, containing one or two special committees, which in the course of time became established as special boards of administration and justice. The criminal and political jurisdiction was intrusted to a body of 100 or 104 members, who probably formed a special division of the senate, though we are by no means certain of it. According to Aristotle,¹ they were chosen from the 'Pentarchies,' by which we are perhaps to understand divisions of the senate into committees of five members each. At least it is impossible that the Carthaginian senate could have remained at the head of the administration if the judicial office had passed into other hands. But if the Hundred (or Hundred-and-four) were a portion of the senate, and were periodically renewed from among the greater body, they could act as their commissioners. Through these the senate controlled the entire political life, keeping especially the generals in dependence on the civil authority.² The Corporation of

¹ Aristotle, *Polit.* ii. 8, § 4.

² This constitutes the similarity of the Body of One Hundred with the Spartan Ephors, mentioned by Aristotle (*Polit.* ii. 8, § 2).

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the Hundred, which had at first been renewed by the yearly choice of new members, assumed gradually a more permanent character by the re-election of the same men, and this may have led to their separating themselves as a distinct branch of the government from the rest of the senate.—A second division of the great council is mentioned, under the name of select council.¹ This numbered thirty members, and seems to have been a supreme board of administration. No information has come down to us with respect to the choice of members, the duration of their office, or their special functions. Our knowledge, therefore, of the organisation of the Carthaginian senate taken altogether is very imperfect, though there can be little doubt about its general character and its power in the state.

The influence of the people seems to have been of little moment. It is reported that they had only to give their votes where a difference of opinion arose between the senate and the suffetes.² The assembly of the people had the right of electing the magistrates. But that was a privilege of small importance in a state where birth and wealth decided the election. The highest offices of state were, if not exactly purchasable, as Aristotle declares,³ still easily attained by the rich and influential, as in all countries where public offices conferring interest and profit are obtained by popular election.

The
people.

In the Greek republics the people exercised their sovereignty in the popular tribunals still more than in the election of magistrates. The choice of the magistrates could, in a fully developed democracy, be effected by lot, but only the well-considered verdict of the citizens could give a decision affecting the life and freedom of a fellow-citizen. These popular tribunals, which, as being guided and influenced by caprice, prejudice, and political passions, caused unspeakable mischief among the Greek states,

Criminal
jurisdiction.

¹ *Sanctius concilium*.—Livy, xxx. 16. The *γεροβουλία* as distinct from the *σύγκλητος*.—Polybius, x. 18, § 1.

² Aristotle, *Polit.* ii. 8, § 3.

³ *Polit.* ii. 8, § 6.

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were unknown in Carthage.¹ The firmness and steadiness of the Carthaginian constitution was no doubt in a great measure owing to the circumstance that the judicial Board of the Hundred (or Hundred-and-four) had in their own hands the administration of criminal justice.

Cartha-
ginian aris-
tocracy.

The Carthaginian state had in truth, as Polybius states, a mixed constitution like Rome. In other words, it was neither a pure monarchy nor an exclusive aristocracy nor yet a perfect democracy; but all three elements were combined in it. Yet it is clear that one of these elements, the aristocracy, greatly preponderated. The nobility of Carthage were not a nobility of blood, like the Roman patricians; but this honour appears, like the later nobility in Rome, to have been open to merit and riches, as was to be expected in a commercial city. The tendency towards plutocracy draws down the greatest censure which Aristotle passes upon Carthage. Some families were conspicuous by their hereditary and almost regal influence. But, in spite of this, monarchy was never established in Carthage, though the attempt is said to have been made twice. No complete revolution ever took place, and there was no breach with the past. Political life there was in all its fulness, and consequently also there were political conflicts; but these never resulted in revolutions stained with blood and atrocities, such as took place in most of the Greek cities, and in none more often than in the unhappy city of Syracuse. In this respect, therefore, Carthage may be compared with Rome; in both alike the internal development of the state advanced slowly without any violent reaction, and on this account Aristotle bestows on her deserved praise.² This steadiness of her constitution, which lasted for more than 600 years, was due, according to Aristotle,³ to the extent of the Cartha-

¹ Aristotle, *Polit.* iii. 1, § 7.

² *Polit.* ii. 8, § 1: σημείον δὲ πολιτείας συντεταγμένης τὸ τὸν δῆμον ἔχουσιν διαμένειν ἐν τῇ τάξει τῆς πολιτείας καὶ μήτε στάσιν ὅ τε καὶ ἄξιον εἰπεῖν, γεγενῆσθαι μήτε τύραννον.

³ *Polit.* ii. 8, § 9.

ginian dominion over subject territories, whereby the state was enabled to get rid of malcontent citizens and to send them as colonists elsewhere.¹ But it is mainly due, after all, to the firm and wise government of the Carthaginian aristocracy.

CHAP.

I.

¹ The same advantage is enjoyed at the present time by the United States, and the Puritan emigrations from England had the same tendency of removing the elements of discontent away from home.

CHAPTER II.

SICILY.

BOOK
IV.

Historical
geography
of Sicily.

THE island of Sicily seems destined by its position to form the connecting link between Europe and Africa. Whilst almost touching Italy in the north-east, it stretches itself westwards towards the great African continent, which appears to approach it from the south with an outstretched arm. Thus this large island divides the whole basin of the Mediterranean sea into an eastern and a western, a Greek and a barbarian half. Few Greek settlers ventured westward beyond the narrow straits between Italy and Sicily. Etruscans and Carthaginians were the exclusive masters of the western sea, and in those parts where their power was supreme they allowed no Greek settlement or Greek commerce. The triangular island had one of her sides turned towards the country of the Greeks in the east; while the other two coasts, converging in a western direction, extended into the sea of the barbarians, and almost reached the very centre of Carthaginian power. Thus it happened that the east coast of the island and the nearest portions of the other two coasts were filled with Greek colonies; while the western part, with the adjacent islands, remained in possession of the Phœnicians, who, it seems, before the time of the Greek immigration, had settlements all round the coast. The greater energy of the Greeks seemed destined to Hellenise the whole island. No native people could obstruct their progress. The aborigines of Sicily, the Sikeli or Sikani,¹ no

¹ The supposed difference between Sikeli and Sikani, assumed by Thucydides (vi. 2), Strabo (vi. 2, 4), and Dionysius (i. 22), is not real. They are clearly

doubt a people of the same race as the oldest population of Italy, were cut off by the sea from their natural allies in a struggle with foreign intruders, and, being confined to their own strength alone, they could never become dangerous, as the Lucanian and Bruttian barbarians were to the Greeks in Italy. Only once there arose among them a native leader, called Duketius, who had the ambition, but not the ability, to found a national kingdom of Sicily. On the whole, Sicily was destined, from the beginning of history to modern times, to be the battle-field and the prize of victory for foreign nations.

The origin and the development of the Greek towns in Sicily belong, properly speaking, to the history of Greece. Their wars also with Carthage, for the possession of the island, have only an indirect relation with the history of Rome. We cast on them, therefore, only a passing glance. It will suffice for us to see how, in consequence of the unsteady policy of the quarrelsome Greeks and the aimless, fitful exertions of the Carthaginians, neither the one nor the other attained a complete and undisputed sovereignty over the island, and how each successively had to succumb to the judicious policy and the persevering energy of the Romans.

Greek and Carthaginian power in Sicily.

In the west of the island the Carthaginians had ancient Phœnician colonies in their possession, of which Motye, Panormus, and Solus were the most important. The Greeks had ventured on the south side as far as Selinus, and on the north as far as Himera, and it seemed that, in course of time, the last remaining Punic fortresses must fall into their hands. Carthage desired a peaceful possession for the purposes of trade and commerce, and until the fifth century before our era had not entered upon any great warlike enterprise. At the time of the Persian war, however, a great change took place in the policy of Carthage. Taking advantage of the internal dissensions of

Defeat of the Carthaginians at Himera.

either one people, or branches of one people, as Sabini and Sabelli, and the difference in the names is dialectic or accidental. See Forbiger in Pauly's *Real-Encyclopädie*, vi. 1159. Lewis, *Credibility of Early Roman History*, i. 273.

BOOK
IV.

the Greeks,¹ they sent for the first time a considerable army into Sicily, as if they contemplated the conquest of the whole island. This attack on the Greeks in the west happened at the time when there was every prospect of their mother country falling a victim to the Persians. But at the very time when Greek freedom came out victorious from the unequal struggle at Salamis, the Sicilian Greeks, under the command of Gelon, the ruler of Gela and Syracuse, defeated the great Carthaginian army before Himera, and thus put an end for a considerable time to the Carthaginian plans of conquest.²

Preponderance of
Syracuse.

Syracuse from this time became more and more the head of the Greek cities. The rulers Gelon and Hiero, distinguished not less by their military abilities than by their wise policy, understood how to curb the excitable, active, and restless Greeks in Sicily, and to govern them with that kind of steadfast rule which alone seemed salutary for them. As soon, however, as the firm government of the tyrants gave place to what was called freedom, all wild passions broke loose within every town in the confederacy of the Sicilian Greeks. The empire of Syracuse, which under princes as vigorous as Gelon and Hiero might probably have been extended over the whole of

¹ Himera, Selinus, Messana, and Rhegium sided with the Carthaginians.

² Gelon's victory at Himera was a favourite topic for the vainglorious Greeks. The Sicilian colonists naturally wished to rival the great exploits of the mother country, and they found in the attack of the western barbarians upon Sicily a welcome pendant to that of the Persians upon Greece proper. (Diodorus, xi. 20.) If Mardonius led 300,000 men into battle at Plataea, the Carthaginian army at Himera could not amount to less. For the same purpose the fiction was invented that the battle at Himera took place on the same day with that of Thermopylae or of Salamis. In later times it was even alleged that the Persians and Punians made a combined attack in the east and in the west, for the extinction of the Greek nation. The king of Persia, it was said, embraced in his schemes of conquest Sicily as well as Greece, and as sovereign of Phœnicia ordered the Carthaginians, the Phœnician colonists in Africa, to attack the Sicilian Greeks. Herodotus (vii. 165) says nothing of such plans. According to him, the war between Greeks and Carthaginians in Sicily arose from local causes. Moreover, Carthage was far too independent, by her geographical position and by her power, to be determined in her policy by the wishes of her mother country, or by the dictates of the Persian monarch. Compare Dahlmann, *Forschungen zu Herodot.* 186.

Sicily, was broken up. Every town again became independent. The arbitrary measures of the Syracusan princes were upset, democracy re-established, the expelled citizens brought back, and the friends of the tyrants banished. In spite of these revolutions, involving confiscation of property and confusion of all kinds, Sicily enjoyed great prosperity¹ for half a century, and the Carthaginians made no attempt to extend the bounds of their dominion in the island. It was only after the unhappy termination of the Athenian expedition against Syracuse, when this town, victorious but exhausted, and distracted by internal dissensions, continued the war against Athens in the Ægean Sea, that the Carthaginians, seventy years after their great defeat at Himera, again made a vigorous attack on the Greek cities of Sicily.

Segesta, which was only partially Greek, and had already caused the interference of the Athenians in the internal affairs of the island, invoked Carthaginian aid in a dispute with the neighbouring town Selinus. Hamilcar, the grandson of the Hannibal who had fallen at Himera, landed in Sicily with a large army, and conquered in quick succession Selinus and Himera, destroying them with all the horrors of barbarian warfare. But the greatest blow for the Sicilian Greeks was the fall of Akragas or Agrigentum, the second town of the island, whose glorious temples and strong walls were overthrown, and whose rich works of art were carried away to Carthage. Since the taking of Miletus by the Persians, such a dreadful misfortune had happened to no Hellenic town. The Punic conquerors pushed on irresistibly along the southern coast of the island towards the east.

The Syracusans had tried in vain to arrest them at Agrigentum. The failure of their undertaking caused an internal revolution, which overthrew the republic and gave monarchical power to the elder Dionysius. But even Dionysius was not capable of stemming the further

Destruction of
Agrigentum.

Tyranny of
the elder
Dionysius.

¹ Curtius, *Griech. Gesch.* ii. 487 ff.

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IV.

progress of the Carthaginians. Gela fell into their hands and Camarina was forsaken by its inhabitants. The whole of the south coast of the island was now in their power, and it seemed that Syracuse would experience the same fate. At length Dionysius succeeded in concluding a treaty, whereby he gave over to them all the conquered towns, being himself recognised by them as governor of Syracuse. The Carthaginians now permitted the exiled inhabitants and other Greeks to return to the towns that had been destroyed. It seems never to have occurred to them that it was desirable to garrison the fortified places which they had taken, or to colonise them in the manner of the Romans. Probably they fancied that, having entirely broken and humbled their enemies in the field, they would be able, from their maritime stronghold of Motye, to overawe the conquered districts and to keep them in subjection.

Victories of
Dionysius.

But they had estimated the energy of the Greeks too low. Dionysius, established in his dominion over Syracuse, prepared himself for a new war against Carthage, and in 397 B.C. suddenly invaded the Carthaginian territory. His attack was irresistible. Even the island town of Motye, in the extreme west of Sicily, the chief stronghold of Carthaginian power, was besieged and finally taken by means of an artificial dam which connected it with the mainland.

Siege of
Syracuse.

The conquests of the Greeks, as those of the Carthaginians, in Sicily, were but of short duration. Dionysius retaliated for the destruction of Greek towns by laying waste Motye and severely punishing the surviving inhabitants; but when he had done this he withdrew, to occupy himself with other schemes, as if Carthage had been thoroughly humbled and expelled from Sicily. In the following year, however (396 B.C.), the Carthaginians again, with very little trouble, retook Motye,¹ and advanced with

¹ The dams by which Dionysius had joined the island town with the mainland of Sicily had probably destroyed the advantages of its insular position. Consequently the Carthaginians did not restore Motye. They made Lilybæum

a large army and fleet towards the east of the island, where they conquered Messana, and, after driving Dionysius back, besieged him in Syracuse.

CHAP.
II.

So changeable was the fortune of war in Sicily, and so dependent on accidental circumstances, that the question whether the island was to be Greek or Carthaginian was almost within the space of one year decided in two opposite ways, and the hopes of each of the two rivals, after having risen to the highest point, were finally dashed to the ground. The victorious career of Carthage was arrested by the walls of Syracuse, just as, twenty years before, the flower of the Athenian citizens had perished in the same spot. A malignant distemper broke out in the army of the besiegers, compelling Himilco, the Carthaginian general, to a speedy flight and to the disgraceful sacrifice of the greater part of his army, which consisted of foreign mercenaries. Dionysius was now again, as with one blow, undisputed master of the whole of Sicily, and he had leisure to plan the subjection of all the Greek towns to the west of the Ionian Sea. He undertook now his piratical expeditions against Caulonia, Hipponium, Croton, and Rhegium, which brought unspeakable misery on these once-flourishing cities at the very time when they were being pressed by the Italian nations, the Lucanians and the Bruttians. The bloody defeat which the Thurians suffered from the Lucanians, and the conquest of Rhegium by Dionysius,¹ accompanied with the most atrocious cruelty, were the saddest events of this period, so disastrous to the Greek nation. If Dionysius had pursued a national policy, and, instead of allying himself with the Lucanians to attack the Greek cities, had marshalled the Greeks against Carthage, he would most probably have become master of all Sicily. But the faint-hearted manner in which he carried on the war against

Piratical
expeditions
of Diony-
sius.

their chief stronghold, and changed it from an open and insignificant place into a fortress of the first magnitude. See Schubring über Motye-Lilybæum in *Philologus*, 1866.

¹ At the time of the burning of Rome by the Gauls.

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IV.

the enemies of the Greek race stood out in strong contrast with the perseverance which he exhibited in enslaving his own countrymen. After short hostilities (383 B.C.), he concluded a peace with Carthage, in which he ceded to her the western part of Sicily as far as the river Halycus. Then, after a long pause, he attempted, for the last time, an attack on the Carthaginian towns, conquering Selinus, Entella, and Eryx, and laying siege to Lilybæum, which, after the destruction of Motye, had been strongly fortified by the Carthaginians and was now their principal stronghold in Sicily. After he had been driven back from Lilybæum, the war ceased, without any treaty of peace. Dionysius died shortly afterwards.

The
younger
Dionysius
and Timoleon.

The Carthaginians took no advantage either of the incapacity of his son, the younger Dionysius, or of the feebleness of Syracuse in the Dionian revolution, to extend their dominion further. It was only when Timoleon of Corinth ventured on the bold scheme of restoring the freedom of Syracuse that we find a Carthaginian army and fleet before the town, with the intention of anticipating Timoleon and of conquering Syracuse for Carthage after the overthrow of the tyrant Dionysius. Never did they seem so near the accomplishment of their long-cherished hope. Being joined with Hiketas, the ruler of Leontini, they had already made themselves masters of the town of Syracuse. Their ships had taken possession of the harbour. Only the small fortified island Ortygia, the key of Syracuse, was still in the hands of Dionysius, who, when he could no longer maintain his ground, had the choice to which of his enemies he would surrender, to Timoleon or to the Carthaginians and Hiketas. The good fortune¹ or the wisdom of Timoleon carried the day. He obtained by agreement the possession of Ortygia and he sent Dionysius, with his treasures, as exile to Corinth. Again the Carthaginians saw the prize of all their efforts snatched from their hands. They feared treason on the

¹ The expedition of Timoleon is remarkable for the unusual number of supernatural events. Plutarch's biography is a continuous story of miracles.

part of Hiketas, their Greek ally; and their general Mago sailed back to Africa. There he escaped by a voluntary death the punishment which the Carthaginian senate inflicted only too often on unfortunate generals. His body was nailed to the cross.

CHAP.
II.

Timoleon crowned his glorious work of the deliverance of Syracuse and the expulsion of all the tyrants of Sicily by a brilliant victory over a superior Carthaginian army on the river Krimesus. This defeat was disastrous to Carthage because they lost in it a select body consisting of citizens from the first families. Yet the result of this much lauded victory was by no means the expulsion of the Punians from Sicily. It seems not even to have produced a change in the respective strength of the two belligerents or an alteration of boundary between the Greek and Carthaginian territory.

Barren
victories of
Timoleon.

Between the overthrow of the second Dionysius and the dominion of Agathokles, the most noxious and most hateful of her tyrants, Syracuse enjoyed, for twenty-two years, democratic government and comparative rest, as well as peaceful intercourse with the Carthaginians and with the other Sicilian Greeks. But the worthless Agathokles had hardly seized the monarchical power which seemed to have been put down for ever in Syracuse by the noble Timoleon, than the national war between Greeks and Punians again broke out, and was carried on with a violence and animosity hitherto unknown. After one decisive victory over Agathokles, the Carthaginians for the third time besieged Syracuse with an army and fleet, and for the third time they seemed on the point of gaining the last stronghold of Greek independence in Sicily. Agathokles then, with true Greek ingenuity and with the recklessness of despair, ventured upon an enterprise which thwarted all the calculations of the Carthaginians. He burst forth with his ships out of the blockaded harbour of Syracuse, and landed an army on the coast of Africa. Attacked in their own country, the Carthaginians were compelled to relinquish all thoughts of conquering

Tyranny of
Agathokles.

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IV.

Syracuse. For four years Agathokles conducted the war in Africa with extraordinary success. He not only conquered many of the country towns of the Carthaginians, and lived in luxury from the rich spoils of that fruitful and flourishing land, but he took possession also of the most important Phœnician towns under the dominion of Carthage, such as Thapsus, Hadrumetum, and even Utica and Tunis, in the immediate neighbourhood of Carthage. Internal foes joined themselves to the foreign enemy, who attacked the state in its most vulnerable part. The treachery of the general Bomilcar, and the revolt of subjects and allies, reduced the proud Punian town almost to ruin. There was now no longer any trust in the power of money or their foreign mercenaries. The citizens of the town themselves, and the men of the noblest blood, were called out and courageously sacrificed. The perseverance of Carthage prevailed. Agathokles escaped with difficulty to Sicily, and two of his sons, with his whole army, fell as victims to a recklessness which had not sufficient power to back it. Thus failed an undertaking on which Regulus ventured in the first Punic war with a similar result, and which succeeded only in the second war with Rome after the strength of Carthage was so completely exhausted that even a Hannibal could not restore it.

Later expeditions
of Agathokles.

The expedition of Agathokles had no influence on the relative position of the Carthaginians and Greeks in Sicily. After many fruitless struggles the treaty of peace left the Carthaginians in possession of the western portion with the dominion over Selinus and Himera. Agathokles, like his predecessors Hiero and Dionysius, now formed other schemes than that of the conquest of all Sicily. He made several expeditions into Italy and into the Adriatic Sea, conquered even the island of Corcyra, causing destruction and ruin wherever he appeared, without gaining a single permanent conquest. When at length, at a great age, he was murdered by his grandson, new dissensions broke out, as was usually the case after the fall of a tyrant. Sicily, now thoroughly exhausted, and retaining less and less of

her Greek nationality, sought a protector from Pyrrhus, king of the semi-barbarous Epirots. How this last attempt to unite the Sicilian Greeks and to free the island from Carthaginians failed has been already related.¹

The freedom of the Greeks in the mother country had already perished. In Sicily, too, its days were numbered. But the prize for which the Carthaginians had contended so long was not to be gained by them. A new competitor appeared. The conquerors of Pyrrhus followed in his footsteps with more energy and success, and, after a long and changeful struggle, gave to the afflicted Sicilians peace and order, in exchange for their lost independence.

¹ See vol. i. ch. xvi.

CHAPTER III.

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR, 264-241 B.C.

*First Period.—To the capture of Agrigentum, 262 B.C.*BOOK
IV.Fortunes
of Zankle
or Mes-
sana.

IN no country inhabited by Greeks had the national prosperity suffered more than in Sicily by violent and destructive revolutions, by a succession of arbitrary rulers and atrocious tyrants, by the destruction of towns, and by the transplantation or butchery of their inhabitants. Even the older and milder rulers of Syracuse, Gelon and his brother Hiero, practised, with the greatest recklessness, the Asiatic custom of transporting whole nations into new settlements, and the confiscation and new division of land. Their successors—especially the first Dionysius and the infamous Agathokles—vied with the Punic barbarians in cruelties of the most revolting kind. All towns in the island experienced, one after another, the horrors of conquest, plunder, devastation, and the murder or slavery of their inhabitants. The noble temples and works of art of a former age sank in ruins, the walls were repeatedly pulled down and built up again, and the fruitful fields laid waste. We can scarcely imagine how it was that Greek civilisation and even a remnant of prosperity could survive these endless calamities; and we should welcome any evidence which might tend to prove that historians depicted in too glaring colours the troubles which were experienced in their own time. But the gradual decline of Greek power in all parts of the island, the growth of barbarism, and the helplessness of the people, are too clearly to be discerned to leave any doubt of the truthfulness of the picture as a whole.

There was no town in the island which during three centuries had been visited by greater calamities than Messana.¹ Messana had been originally a Chalcidian colony, but was seized by a band of Samians and Milesians, who, being expelled from their homes by the Persians, went to Sicily and drove away or enslaved the old inhabitants of the town. Shortly after this the town fell into the hands of Anaxilaos, the tyrant of Rhegium, who introduced new colonists, especially exiled Messanians, and changed the original name of Zankle into Messana. In that devastating war which the Carthaginians carried on with the elder Dionysius, and in which Selinus, Himera, Agrigentum, Gela, and Camarina were destroyed, Messana suffered the same fate, and its inhabitants were scattered in all directions. Rebuilt soon after (396 B.C.), and peopled with new inhabitants by Dionysius, the town seemed in some measure to have recovered, when it fell (312 B.C.) into the power of Agathokles. It shared with all the other towns of the island the fate which this tyrant brought on Sicily; yet in spite of the many blows it suffered, it appears to have reached a certain degree of importance and prosperity, which must be attributed in part at least to its unrivalled position in the Sicilian straits. After the fall of Agathokles a new misfortune befell it, and Messana ceased for ever to be a Greek colony. A band of Campanian mercenaries, who called themselves Mamertines, that is, the sons of Mars, and who had fought in the service of the Syracusan tyrants, entered the town, on their way back to Italy, and were hospitably entertained by the inhabitants. But, instead of crossing over to Rhegium, they fell upon and murdered the citizens, and took possession of the place.²

Messana was now an independent barbarian town in Sicily. Shortly after, a Roman legion, consisting of

Capture of
Rhegium

¹ Hermann, *Griech. Staatsalterthümer*, § 83.

² A similar act of infamous barbarity had been perpetrated before by the tyrant Dionysius the elder. Having taken Catana by treason, and having plundered and destroyed it, he sold the inhabitants as slaves, and handed over the place to a band of Campanian mercenaries.—Diodorus, xiv. 15.

BOOK
IV.by Roman
mutineers.

Campanians, fellow-countrymen of the Messanian freebooters, imitated their example, and by a similar act of atrocity took possession of Rhegium on the Italian side of the straits.¹ United by relationship and common interests, the pirate states of Messina and Rhegium mutually defended themselves against their common enemies, and were for a time the terror of all surrounding countries, and especially of the Greek towns.

Hiero,
tyrant of
Syracuse.

After Rhegium had been conquered by the Romans,² the day of punishment seemed to be approaching also for the Mamertines of Messina. Apart from the consideration that the possession of Messina would be a great acquisition to the state of Syracuse, that city, as the foremost Greek community in Sicily, was called upon to avenge the fate of the murdered Messanians, and to exterminate that band of robbers, which made the whole island unsafe. Hiero, the leader of the Syracusan army, was sent against them. He began by ridding himself of a number of his mercenaries who were troublesome or whom he suspected of treason. He placed them in a position where they were exposed to a hostile attack from the enemy, and left them without support, so that they were all cut down.³ He then enlisted new mercenaries, equipped the militia of Syracuse, and gained a decisive victory over the Mamertines in the field, after which they gave up their predatory excursions and retired within the walls of Messina. The success of Hiero made him master of Syracuse, whose citizens had no means of keeping a victorious general in subjection to the laws of the state. Fortunately, Hiero was not a tyrant like Agathokles. On the whole, he governed as a mild and sagacious politician, and succeeded, under the most difficult circumstances, when placed between the two great belligerent powers of Rome and Carthage, in maintaining

¹ Vol. i. p. 518.² Vol. i. p. 540.

³ It was not the first time that mercenary troops were exposed to such treason at the hands of Syracusan generals. During the siege of Syracuse by the Carthaginians, the first Dionysius had acted in the same manner (Diodorus, xiv. 72). Afterwards, the Carthaginians, and even the Romans, did the same. —Plutarch, *Fab. Mar.* 22.

CHAP.
III.FIRST
PERIOD,
264-262
B.C.

the independence of Syracuse, and in securing for his native town during his reign of fifty years a period of reviving prosperity. First of all, he aimed at expelling the Italian barbarians from Sicily, and at establishing his power in the east of the island by the conquest of Messina. The Mamertines had taken the part of the Carthaginians during the invasion of Pyrrhus in Sicily, and with their assistance had successfully defended Messina. The attack of Hiero, who in some measure was at the head of the Greeks, as the successor of Pyrrhus, forced the Mamertines to seek aid from a foreign power, after their most faithful confederates, the mutineers of Rhegium, had perished by the sword of the Romans or the axe of the executioner. They had only the choice between Carthage and Rome. Each of these states had its party in Messina. The Romans were further off than the Carthaginians, and perhaps the Mamertines were afraid to ask for protection from those who had so severely punished the Campanian freebooters of Rhegium. A troop of Carthaginians under Hanno was therefore admitted into the citadel of Messina, and thus the long-cherished wish of Carthage for the dominion over the whole of Sicily seemed near its fulfilment.

Of the three strongest and most important places in Sicily, they had now Lilybæum and Messina in their possession, and thus their communication with Africa and Italy was secured. Syracuse, the third town of importance, was very much reduced and weakened, and seemed incapable of any protracted resistance. Carthage had long been in friendly relations with Rome, and these relations had during the war of Pyrrhus taken the form of a complete military alliance. Carthage and Rome had, apparently, the same interests, the same friends, and the same enemies. On the continent of Italy, Rome had subjected to herself all the Greek settlements. What could be more natural or more fair than that the fruits of the victory over Pyrrhus in Sicily should be reaped by Carthage? The straits of Messina were the natural boundary between the commercial city, the mistress of the seas and islands, and the

Relations
of Car-
thage to
Rome.

BOOK
IV.

Jealousy
of Rome
for Car-
thage.

continental empire of the Romans, whose dominion seemed to have found its legitimate termination in Tarentum and Rhegium.

But the friendship between Rome and Carthage, which had arisen out of their common danger, was weakened after their common victory and was shaken after the defeat of Pyrrhus at Beneventum. It was by no means clear that Carthage was free from all desire of gaining possessions in Italy. The Romans at least were jealous of their allies, and had stipulated in the treaty with Carthage, in the year 348 B.C.,¹ that the Carthaginians should not found or hold any fortresses in Latium or indeed in any part of the Roman dominions. They showed the same jealousy when in the war with Pyrrhus a Carthaginian fleet entered the Tiber, ostensibly for the assistance of Rome, by declining the proffered aid. When a Carthaginian fleet showed itself before Tarentum in 272 B.C., and seemed about to anticipate the Romans in the occupation of this town, they complained formally of a hostile intention on the part of the Carthaginians.² The Carthaginians denied having this intention, but the Romans nevertheless had good reason to be on their guard, and to entertain fear of Carthaginian interference in the affairs of Italy as well as jealousy of their powerful neighbour, who had now got a firm footing in Spain and governed all the islands of the Sardinian and Tyrrhenian seas.³ While this feeling was prevalent in Rome, an embassy came from the Mamertines, commissioned to deliver over to Rome Messana and the territory belonging to it,⁴ a present which indeed involved the necessity of first clearing the town of the

¹ This oldest commercial treaty between Rome and Carthage is erroneously placed by Polybius (iii. 22) in the year 509 B.C. See Mommsen's *Chronologic*, 320 f. The treaty was a kind of international navigation act, intended to keep down foreign competition. The second treaty shows this intention still more clearly.

² It seems that the Romans looked upon or pretended to look upon this interference of the Carthaginian fleet as a breach of the treaty of friendship between the two nations, and that they made use of it to justify their war against Carthage. Livy (xxi. 10) makes Hanno say, in the Carthaginian senate:

³ Tarento, id est, Italia non abstineramus ex fœdere.

⁴ Polybius, i. 10, § 8.

⁵ Polybius, i. 10, § 2.

Carthaginians and then of defending it against them.¹ The Carthaginians, it appears, had made themselves obnoxious since they had had possession of the citadel of Messana, and the Roman party felt itself strong enough to take the bold step of invoking the aid of the Romans.

But for Rome the decision was a difficult one. There could hardly be any doubt that to grant the request of the Mamertines would be to declare war against Carthage and Syracuse, and that such a war would tax the resources of the nation to the utmost. In addition to this the proposal of the Mamertines was by no means honourable to Rome. A band of robbers offered dominion over a town which they had seized by the most outrageous act of violence; and this offer was made to the Romans, who so recently had put to death the accomplices of the Mamertines for a similar treachery towards Rhegium. Moreover, the assistance of the Romans was called in against Hiero of Syracuse, to whom they were indebted for aid in the siege of Rhegium, and at the same time against the Carthaginians, their allies in the scarcely terminated war with Pyrrhus. Long and earnest were the deliberations in the Roman senate; and when at length the prospect of extension of power outweighed all moral considerations, the people also voted for an undertaking which seemed to promise abundant spoils and gain.²

CHAP.

III.

FIRST
PERIOD,
264-262
B.C.

Resolution
of the
Romans to
aid the
Mamer-
tines of
Messana.

¹ According to Zonaras (viii. 9), the Mamertines had first applied to the Romans for aid, and had not received the Carthaginians into their town until they despaired of assistance being sent from Rome. There are great discrepancies in the accounts of Polybius and Zonaras, from which it is evident that they followed different authorities. Zonaras, or rather Dio Cassius, whom he copied, perhaps followed Philinus, whilst Polybius made use of this writer chiefly for the purpose of testing the diverging statements of Fabius Pictor. The two historians, Philinus and Fabius, had written the history of the First Punic War respectively from the Carthaginian and the Roman point of view, and had thereby become one-sided and partial. Polybius was more independent in his judgment; still we may reasonably doubt that he always succeeded in disentangling the truth from the conflicting evidence which was accessible to him.

² Polybius (i. 11) reports that the senate did not finally resolve upon war, but left the decision to the people. This statement is unintelligible, for according to the constitutional law and practice the final decision always rested

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However, if the decision was not exactly honourable, neither could it, from the Roman point of view, be condemned. The surprise of Messana by the Mamertines was, as far as Rome was concerned, different from the act of the Campanian legion in Rhegium; the latter, being in the service of the Romans, had broken their military oath, and had been guilty of mutiny and open rebellion. On the other hand, the Mamertines in Sicily were, as regarded the Romans, an independent foreign people. They had wronged neither Rome nor Roman allies or subjects. However atrocious their act had been, the Romans were not entitled to take them to account for it, nor called upon to forego any political advantages merely because they disapproved of the deed. The unblushing desire for extension and conquest needed no excuse or justification in antiquity; and Rome in particular, by reason of her former history and organisation, could not stop short in her career of conquest, and pause for moral scruples at the Sicilian straits.

Change
in the
character
of Roman
history.

A new era begins in the history of Rome with the first crossing of the legions into Sicily. The obscurity which rested on the wars of Rome with Sabellians and Greeks disappears not gradually but suddenly. The Arcadian Polybius, one of the most trustworthy of ancient writers, and at the same time an experienced politician, has left us a history of the First Punic War drawn from contemporary sources, especially Philinus and Fabius Pictor, written with so much fulness that now, for the first time, we feel a confidence in the details of Roman history which imparts true interest to the events related and a real worth to the narrative.

Relative
strength of

The first war with Carthage lasted twenty-three years,

with the people. In no case could the senate resolve upon war without the consent of the people. Polybius does not say that the majority of the senate was against the war. He wished only to convey the impression that the discredit, inseparable from the Roman policy, was attributable not to the senate, but to the people. It is the old story over again. The dirty work is to be done by the lower class of people, not by the nobility. Compare vol. i. p. 229.

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III.FIRST
PERIOD,
264-262
B.C.Rome and
Carthage.

from 264 to 241 B.C. The long duration of the struggle showed that the combatants were not unequally matched. The strength of Rome lay in the warlike qualities of her citizens and subjects. Carthage was immeasurably superior in wealth. If money were the most important thing in war, Rome would have succumbed. But in the long war, which dried up the most abundant resources, the difference between rich and poor gradually disappeared, and Carthage was sooner exhausted than Rome, which had never been wealthy. The difference in the financial position of the two states was the more important, as the war was carried on not only by land but also by sea, and the equipment of fleets was more expensive than that of land armies, especially for a state like Rome, which now for the first time appeared as a maritime power. It must not, however, be forgotten that the naval and financial strength of all the Greek towns in Italy, and also of Syracuse, was at the disposal of the Romans. If they are less frequently mentioned in the course of the war than might be expected, it is due to the usual custom of historians, who, out of national pride, pass over in silence the assistance rendered by subordinate allies. The prize of the war, the beautiful island of Sicily, was gained by the victorious Romans. But this was not the only result. The superiority of Rome over Carthage was shown, and the war in Sicily, great and important as it was, was only the prelude to the greater and more important struggle which established the dominion of Rome on the ruins of Carthage.

The carrying out of the decree to give the Mamertines the desired assistance was intrusted to the consul Appius Claudius Caudex, while the second consul was still in Etruria, bringing to an end the war with Volsinii.¹ Appius proved himself equal to the task in the council as well as in the field. Although the war with Carthage and Syracuse was, by the decision of the Roman people,

Occupation of
Messana
by the
Romans.¹ See vol. i. p. 479.

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practically begun, no formal declaration was made.¹ Appius dispatched to Rhegium his legate C. Claudius, who crossed over to Messina, with the ostensible object of settling the difficulty that had arisen, and invited the commander of the Carthaginian garrison in the citadel to a conference with the assembled Mamertines. On this occasion, the Roman honour did not appear in a very advantageous light by the side of the much abused Punic faithlessness. The Carthaginian general, who had come down from the citadel without a guard, was taken prisoner, and was weak enough to give orders to his men for evacuating the fortress. The Roman party had clearly gained the upper hand in Messina, since they felt assured of the assistance of Rome.

Landing of
the
Romans in
Sicily.

Thus Rome obtained possession of Messina, even before the consul and the two legions had crossed the straits. It was now the duty of the Carthaginian admiral, who was in the neighbourhood with a fleet, to prevent their landing in Sicily. But Appius Claudius crossed during the night without loss or difficulty, and thus, at the very beginning of the war, the sea, on which hitherto Carthage had exercised uncontrolled dominion, favoured the Romans. The experience of the war throughout was to the same effect. On the whole, Rome, though a continental power, showed itself equal to the maritime power of Carthage, and was in the end enabled by a great naval victory to dictate peace.

Ineffectual
league of
Hiero with
the Car-
thaginians.

In possession of Messina, and at the head of two legions, Appius followed up his advantage with ability and boldness. Hiero and the Carthaginians had been obliged, by the decisive act of the Romans, to make common cause together. For the first time after 200 years of hostility, Syracuse entered into a league with her hereditary enemies the Greeks. But the friendship was not to be of

¹ When this was done, we do not know. According to the old sacred law and international practice, it was necessary to declare war in due form. The Roman *fetialis*, however, was not obliged to travel all the way to Carthage to do this. He could throw his spear over the hostile frontier in the immediate vicinity of Rome. See vol. i. 556.

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PERIOD,
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long duration, thanks to the rapid success of Rome. No sooner had Appius landed than he attacked Hiero, and so terrified him that he immediately¹ lost courage, and hurried back to Syracuse. Thus the league was practically dissolved. Appius then attacked the Carthaginians, and the result was, that they gave up the siege. After Messana was in this manner placed out of danger, Appius assumed the offensive. With one blow the whole of Sicily seemed to have fallen into his power. On the

¹ Polybius (i. 11, 12) minutely examines the contradictions in the reports of Fabius Pietor and Philinus. According to the latter, Appius Claudius was worsted in his encounter with Hiero and also in that with the Carthaginians. Polybius rejects this statement, because he cannot on this supposition understand the retreat of the allies. According to Zonaras (viii. 9), who perhaps indirectly reproduces the account of Philinus, the advantage was upon the whole on the side of the Romans, but their two victories were by no means decisive or unattended with loss, a fact which is apparent even from Polybius (i. 16, § 9). The Roman cavalry was routed by that of the Syracusans, but as their infantry was victorious, Hiero broke up and returned to Syracuse. In their attack upon the Carthaginians, the Romans made an attempt to storm their camp. On their repulse, the Carthaginians made a sally, and followed up their advantage, but were driven back into their camp. Such battles, in which gain and loss are divided on both sides, are most naturally claimed as victories by both parties. The conclusion arrived at by Polybius, that the Romans must have been decidedly victorious, because both the Carthaginians and the Syracusans retreated, does not seem altogether certain. We know what happens in the military operations of allies, especially when they have not full confidence in one another. The Carthaginians and the Greeks had always been hereditary enemies, and were now for the first time making common cause to repel a common enemy. Hiero could not persuade himself that the Romans had crossed the straits without the connivance or assistance of the Carthaginians (Diodorus, xxiii. ff. 4); and when he found himself unexpectedly attacked by them on the very morning after their landing, and left without assistance by his allies, he lost courage, though for the moment he had maintained his position. The Carthaginians, on the other hand, could see no cause for Hiero's precipitate retreat but treason or cowardice; and they were not far wrong in such a supposition, for soon after they found Hiero changed into an ally of the Romans. They did not therefore venture to take the offensive, but remained in their camp in the neighbourhood of Messana, without however being further molested by Claudius after his first attack had failed. If Claudius could have boasted of any decided victory during this campaign, he would no doubt have been rewarded with a triumph. But his mad advance against Syracuse ended in discomfiture and loss, and the Romans found it necessary to double the strength of their army in Sicily for the ensuing campaign. All these considerations tend to show that, though Polybius is on the whole a trustworthy and conscientious guide, we are still far removed from the historical certainty which can be obtained only from contemporary witnesses.

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one side he penetrated as far as Syracuse, and on the other to the Carthaginian frontier. The Roman soldiers were doubtless rewarded with rich spoils; and this seemed to justify the decision of the people, who had consented to the war partly in the hope of such gain. But Syracuse, which had gloriously resisted so many enemies, was not to be taken at a run. Appius Claudius was obliged to return to Messana, after experiencing great dangers, which he could escape only by perfidy and cunning. The conquest of this town, therefore, was the only lasting success of the first campaign which Rome had undertaken beyond the sea.

Second
campaign
in Sicily,
263 B.C.

In the following year, the war in Sicily was carried on with two consular armies, that is, four legions, a force of at least 36,000 men, consisting in equal parts of Romans and allies. This army seems small when we compare the numbers which are reported to have been engaged in the former wars of Carthaginians and Greeks in Sicily.¹ It is said that at Himera (480 B.C.) 300,000 Carthaginians were engaged; Dionysius repeatedly led armies of 100,000 men into the field, and now there was a force of only four legions against the combined army of Carthaginians and Greeks. We shall do well to test the huge exaggerations of the earlier traditions by the more credible account given by Polybius of the Roman military force. The Greeks were, it is true, in the third century much reduced, and their force was probably only a shadow of their early armies; but the Carthaginians were now at the very zenith of their power, and had certainly reason to pursue the war in Sicily in good earnest.

Alliance of
Hiero with
Rome.

On the appearance of the Roman army, the Sicilian cities, one after another, deserted the cause of Hiero and the Carthaginians, and joined the Romans, so that the latter, without a struggle, obtained possession of the greater part of the island,² and now turned against Syracuse. Then Hiero saw that, in concluding an alliance with Carthage, he had made a great mistake, and that

¹ See above, p. 24, note 2. ² Polybius, i. 16, § 3; Zonaras, viii. 9.

it was high time to alter his policy. His subjects shared his desire for peace with Rome, and therefore it could not be a difficult task to arrive at an agreement, especially as it was in the interest of the Romans to break up the alliance between Carthage and Syracuse, and, by friendship with Hiero, to have the chief resources of the island at their disposal. Hiero accordingly concluded a peace with Rome for fifteen years,¹ engaged to deliver up the prisoners of war, to pay the sum of a hundred talents, and to place himself completely in the position of a dependent ally. The Romans owed a considerable part of their success to the faithful services rendered by Hiero during the whole course of the war. He was never tired of furnishing supplies of all kinds,² and thus he relieved them of part of their anxiety for the maintenance of their troops. Nor was the Roman alliance less useful to Hiero. It is true he reigned over Syracuse only by the permission and protection of Rome, and the city suffered grievously from the long continuation of the war. Nevertheless, it recovered from its declining state; and Hiero, emulating his predecessors Gelo, Hiero, and Dionysius, could display before his countrymen all the magnificence of a Greek prince, and appear as a candidate for the prizes in the Greek national games.³

The Carthaginians could not maintain their advanced position in the neighbourhood of Messana, in front of the two Roman consular armies, although no engagement seems to have taken place.⁴ The towns also, which had

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PERIOD,
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B.C.

Decline of
the Car-
thaginian
power in
Sicily.

¹ Diodorus, xxiii. ff. 5.

² Diodorus, xxiii. ff. 9.

³ Polybius, i. 16, φιλοστεφανῶν καὶ φιλοδοξῶν εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας.

⁴ Neither Polybius nor Zonaras mention a battle in which the Roman consuls engaged the united forces of the Carthaginians and Syracusans. According to the narrative of these historians, the Sicilian towns fell one after another into the hands of the Romans without a struggle. On the other hand, Pliny reports (*Hist. Nat.* vii. 60), that in the year 263 B.C. Marcus Valerius Messala caused a picture to be put up in the Curia Hostilia, which represented his victory over Hiero and the Carthaginians. We have here an example of the barefaced and boundless falsification of history of which the noble families of Rome were guilty. Relying on the evidence of Polybius, we can affirm without hesitation that the alleged victory of M. Valerius Messala is a fiction. But even the boldest family panegyrists could not venture to misrepresent events outright before contemporary witnesses. It was necessary to wait awhile, until

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hitherto been on their side, joined the Romans. Even Segesta, the old and faithful ally of Carthage in Sicily, made use of its alleged Trojan origin, to ask favourable conditions from Rome, and killed the Carthaginian garrison as a proof of its attachment to its new ally. Thus, in a short time, and without much exertion, the Romans gained a position in Sicily which the Carthaginians had for centuries aimed at in vain.

Probable
causes of
the success
of the
Romans.

Compared with the rapid and successful action of the Romans in the beginning of the war, the movements of the Carthaginians appear to have been singularly slow and weak. Before the breaking out of hostilities, the advantage had been decidedly on their side. They had military possession of Messina; with their fleet they so completely commanded the straits that in the conscious pride of their superiority their admiral declared that the Romans should not without his permission even wash their hands in the sea.¹ The resources of almost the whole of Sicily were at their disposal, and the communication with Africa was at all times secure. Whether the important city of Messina was lost by the incapacity or timidity of Hanno, who paid with his life for his evacuation of the citadel, or through an exaggerated fear of a breach with Rome, or by confidence in Roman moderation, it is not possible to decide. Nor do we know how the Romans

the memory of events had faded away, and until fiction had gradually acquired credence enough, by dint of frequent repetition in the family circle, to venture into publicity. There cannot be any doubt, therefore, that the date given by Pliny for the public exhibition of the picture is false. Pliny thought he could not go wrong in naming the year of the consulship of Valerius as that in which the picture was painted, and put up in the senate-house; and he showed here, as on many other occasions, his want of judgment. His statement is of no value whatever for the history of art. Like the lying epitaph of Scipio Barbatus (see vol. i. p. 459), this alleged historical painting originated many years after the death of the man whose glory it was intended to perpetuate. It is one of the proofs of the worthlessness of the Capitoline fasti, that they record a triumph of Valerius over the Punians and Hiero, king of the Siculi. After this proof of the unscrupulous vanity of the Valerii it is no matter of surprise that they ascribe the first application of the name Messala to the consul of the year 263, though he neither took the place nor (as Seneca says: *De Brevitate Vitæ*, 13) had the honour of defending it.

¹ Zonaras, viii. 9.

were able, in the face of a hostile fleet, to cross the straits with an army of 10,000 men, and in the year after with double that number. It seems that this could not have been easy even with the assistance of the ships of Rhegium, Tarentum, Neapolis, Locri, and other Greek towns in Italy, for even the assembling of these ships in the straits might have been prevented. The small strip of water which separates Sicily from Italy was sufficient in modern times to limit the French power to the continent, and, under the protection of the English fleet, to save Sicily for the Bourbons. How was it that the same straits, even at the first trial, caused the Romans no greater difficulties than any broad river? Was the Carthaginian fleet too small to prevent their crossing by force? Was it the result simply of negligence, or of one of the innumerable circumstances which place warlike operations by sea so far beyond all calculation? Apparently, Carthage did not expect a war with Rome, and was wholly unprepared for it. This may be inferred with tolerable certainty, not only from the result of their first encounter with the Romans in Messina, but also from the fact that in the second year of the war they left Hiero unsupported, and thus compelled him to throw himself into the arms of the Romans.¹

The gravity of their position was now apparent, and induced them to make preparations for the third campaign on a more extensive scale.² For the basis of their operations they chose Agrigentum. This town, which since its conquest and destruction by the Carthaginians in the year 405, had alternately been under Carthaginian and Syracusan dominion, had by the aid of Timoleon acquired a precarious independence, but had never recovered its

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PERIOD,
264-262
B.C.Renewed
effort of
the Car-
thaginians,
262 B.C.

¹ One cause of their weakness we learn accidentally from Zonaras (viii. 9). On the breaking out of hostilities, the Carthaginians caused the Italian mercenaries who served in their army to be massacred. We are not informed of the strength of this body of troops. If the Punic garrison of Messina consisted of such men, who, as countrymen of the Mamertines, were favourably disposed towards them, the loss of Messina is easily explained. At any rate, the position of the Carthaginian generals was very precarious if they had recourse to such a desperate measure as the massacre of their own troops.

² Polybius, i. 17, § 3.

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former splendour. Situated on a rocky plateau surrounded by steep precipices at the confluence of the brooks Hypsos and Akragas, it was naturally so strong as to appear impregnable at a time when the art of besieging cities was so little advanced; but as it was not immediately on the coast¹ and had no harbour, it was impossible to supply it with provisions by sea. It is therefore strange that the Carthaginians should choose just this town for their basis, instead of their strongest fortress, Lilybæum. Probably, the choice was determined by the closer vicinity of Syracuse and Messana, the conquest of which they had by no means ceased to hope for.

The
Romans
besiege
Agrigen-
tum.

The consuls for the year 262, L. Postumius Megellus and Q. Mamilius Vitulus, marched with all their forces² against Agrigentum, where Hannibal was stationed for the protection of the magazines with an army of mercenaries so inferior in numbers that he could not hazard a battle. They set to work in the slow and tedious mode of attack which they had learnt in Latium and Samnium, and which, when they had superior numbers at their command, could not fail eventually to lead to success.³ Outside the town they established two fortified camps in the east and the west, and united these by a double line of trenches, so that they were secured against sallies from the besieged as well as from any attacks of an army that might come to relieve the town. After they had cut off all communications,

¹ See Haltaus, *Röm. Gesch.* i. 160. Siefert, *Akragas und sein Gebiet*, 1845.

² The army must have consisted of two consular armies or four legions, although after the conclusion of the peace with Hiero in the preceding year the Romans had hoped that two legions would suffice for carrying on the war in Sicily (Polybius, i. 17, § 1). Moreover, we may presume that all their allies, especially the Syracusans and Mamertines, sent auxiliaries. To blockade so large a town as Agrigentum a much larger force was necessary than four legions. According to the Agrigentine historian Philinus (quoted by Diodorus, xxiii. ff. 7), the army of the Romans and their allies consisted of 100,000 men.

³ Four years later, at the siege of Camarina, the Romans tried their own national mode of attack, and when this failed, they employed Greek engines of siege, supplied by Hiero, and thus succeeded in taking Camarina.—Diodorus, xxiii. ff. 9.

they quietly awaited the effects of hunger, which could not fail soon to show themselves. By the prompt assistance of their Sicilian allies, especially of Hiero, they were amply supplied with provisions, which were collected by them in the neighbouring town of Erbessus.

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B.C.

But when, after five months' siege, a Carthaginian army under Hanno marched from Heraclea to relieve the town, the situation of the Romans began to be serious, especially after Hanno had succeeded in taking the town of Erbessus with all the stores in it. The besiegers now experienced almost as much distress as the besieged. They began to suffer want and privation, although Hiero did all that was possible to send them new supplies. An attack on the town promised as little success as one on the army of Hanno, who had taken up a strong position on a hill in the immediate neighbourhood of the Romans. The consuls already thought of raising the siege, which had lasted almost seven months, when fire signals from the town, giving notice of the increasing distress of the besieged, induced Hanno to offer battle. With the courage of despair, the Romans accepted it, and obtained a decisive and brilliant victory. The Carthaginians, it appears, now for the first time made use of elephants, which they had learnt to apply to the purposes of war during either the invasion of Agathokles in Africa or of Pyrrhus in Sicily. But these animals seem on this occasion, as on many others, to have done more harm than good. Almost all fell into the hands of the Romans. The fragments of the Carthaginian army fled to Heraclea, leaving their camp, with rich spoils, to the victorious army.

Defeat of
Hanno.

In the night following this victory, Hannibal took advantage of the exhaustion and confusion in the Roman army secretly to leave Agrigentum and to slip away unnoticed over the Roman lines. In this manner, he saved at least a part of his army, after it had been materially weakened by hunger and desertion. But the miserable inhabitants of the town, who doubtless had unwillingly shared in the struggle and in the horrors of a seven

Escape of
the Car-
thaginian
garrison
under
Hannibal.

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months' siege, were doomed to pay the penalty for the escape of the Carthaginians. They were all¹ sold as slaves, and so for the second time the splendid city of Agragas perished, after it had nearly recovered from the devastation caused by the Carthaginians. But new settlers soon gathered again on this favoured spot. Even in the course of the same war, Agrigentum became again the theatre of some hardly-contested struggles between Carthaginians and Romans; and not until it had been conquered and laid waste in the wars with Hannibal for the third time did it cease to exist as a Greek town. With such persistent energy did the Greeks cling to the spots where they had set up their household hearths and their temples, and where they had intrusted to the mother earth the ashes of their dead.

Historical
value of
the narra-
tive.

The siege of Agrigentum is the first event in the military history of Rome which is historically authenticated not only in its final result but to some extent also in the details of its progress.² The earlier descriptions of

¹ According to Diodorus (xxiii. ff. 9), 25,000 in number.

² Nevertheless, much remains obscure, and the numbers especially are by no means to be trusted. That the Romans employed not one but two consular armies is certain beyond dispute, as it is admitted that both consuls took part in the siege. Yet Polybius does not distinctly state this, and even suggests the contrary by saying (i. 17) that the senate had resolved to carry on the war in Sicily with only one consular army. He omitted to relate that this resolution was subsequently modified. He also neglects altogether to mention the Sicilian auxiliaries of the Romans, who, according to Diodorus (xxiii. ff. 7), swelled the whole army to 100,000 men. Moreover, we cannot ascertain the strength of the Carthaginian garrison of Agrigentum under Hannibal. Polybius (i. 18), speaking of the sufferings caused by famine, says that not less than 50,000 men were shut up in the town. Did he include in this number the inhabitants of Agrigentum, or only the men capable of bearing arms? or did he estimate the Carthaginian garrison alone at this figure? The army of Hanno, which came to the relief of the town, numbered, according to Philinus (quoted by Diodorus, xxiii. ff. 8), 50,000 foot and 6,000 horse; according to Orosius (iv. 7), only 30,000 foot and 1,500 horse. Polybius says that but few escaped of this army, while according to Diodorus its loss amounted only to 7,200 men. These discrepancies, which betray their origin in the writings of Philinus and Fabius Pictor respectively, cannot now be reconciled. We should like also to be authentically informed of the extent of the Roman losses, which Diodorus (xxiii. ff. 9) no doubt exaggerates by making them amount to 30,000 foot and 540 horse.

battles are altogether fancy pictures. Even of the battle of Heraclea, the first in the war with Pyrrhus which is related intelligibly, we cannot tell for certain how far the narrators made use of the notes of Pyrrhus or of other contemporaries and how much they actually invented. Hence we may measure the amount of benefit to be obtained from studying the details of Roman military operations in the Samnite or Volscian wars, and the innumerable descriptions of sieges and battles given by Livy.

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III.FIRST
PERIOD,
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B.C.

The Romans had sat down before Agrigentum in the early part of summer. At the end of the year the consuls returned to Messana. Their losses in the battles, and from privations and sickness during a tedious siege, had been very great; but a glorious success had been gained. Sicily, with the exception of only a few fortresses, was entirely subdued; and the Romans, it would seem, now began for the first time to aim at a higher object than that which they had had in view at the beginning of the war.¹ Their ambition was now no longer restrained to keeping the Carthaginians out of Messana. The prospect was opening before them of acquiring the whole of Sicily; and the prize which after centuries of bloody wars was not attained by their haughty rival, which the rulers of Syracuse and lastly the King of Epirus had vainly aimed at, appeared after a short conflict about to fall into the hands of the Roman legions as the reward of their courage and perseverance.

Extended
designs
the
Romans.

Second Period, 261-255 B.C.

THE FIRST ROMAN FLEET. MYLÆ. ECNOMUS.

REGULUS IN AFRICA.

The war in Sicily was, in the following year, pursued with all possible vigour. The two consuls of 261, L. Valerius Flaccus and T. Otacilius Crassus (cousin and brother of the consuls of 273), conquered many places in

Maritime
supremacy
of Car-
thage.

¹ Polybius, i. 20, § 1.

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IV.

the island. But the incidents of this campaign proved more and more that the Romans without a large fleet could not defend such an island as Sicily, with its vast extent of coast, against the Carthaginians who were undisputed masters of the sea. If the towns in the interior of the country were at the mercy of the Romans, those on the coasts, which were far more important, were continually exposed to the unexpected attacks of the Carthaginians by sea. In addition to this, the Carthaginians made use of their naval strength to send ships from Sardinia and other of their possessions, for the purpose of harassing the coast of Italy. It was easy for them, in this way, to keep large portions of Roman territory in continual excitement and serious danger. They would suddenly land on the undefended coast, plunder the open country, destroy farm-houses and plantations, carry off the inhabitants into slavery, and retire to their ships before a force could be collected to march against them.¹ The maritime power of the Romans and their Greek allies was not able to put an end to such proceedings. It seemed that the war so boldly undertaken, far from leading to a permanent acquisition of new territory, was beginning to endanger their old possessions.

Determina-
tion of
the
Romans to
cope with
Carthage
by sea.

Under these circumstances, the Romans boldly resolved to meet the enemy on his own element; and indeed, there was no other alternative, if they did not intend to retire from the contest with disgrace. Rome was obliged to encounter Carthage at sea, not merely if she wished to overthrow and humiliate her rival, but if she meant to hold her own ground.

The success which attended the first great naval engagement of the Romans, and which surpassed all expectations, inspired them with an enthusiasm which imparted fresh strength to their national pride. New honours

¹ See vol. i. p. 421. To ward off such attacks upon the coast the Romans had established their maritime colonies, which generally consisted of Roman citizens. These are the forts (*φρουραί*), mentioned by Zonaras (viii. 10), as lining and protecting the coasts of Italy.

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PERIOD,
261-255
B.C.

and a permanent monument commemorated the victory which restored the wavering fortunes of war even on that element on which the Romans had never before ventured to meet their enemies nor to hope for success. For this reason the resolution of the Romans to build a large fleet, and their first naval victory, were favourite topics for the patriotic historians, and exaggerated accounts were the consequence. To make the effort of the nation still more conspicuous, it was asserted that the Romans had never ventured on the sea before,¹ that they had not possessed a single ship of war, and were wholly and entirely ignorant of the art of building ships, or of fitting them out and using them for military purposes. That this is a great error it is hardly necessary to say. Though Rome originally had no fleet worth mentioning, and left to the Etruscans the trade as well as the dominion at sea, still, by the conquest of Antium she acquired ships and a serviceable harbour. Since the treaty with Naples,² in the second Samnite war, she had Greek seamen and Greek ship-builders at her disposal. At the same time she sent out ships to make hostile invasions in Campania.³ In the year 311 two Roman admirals are mentioned,⁴ and, as we have seen, the war with Tarentum had been caused by the appearance of a Roman fleet before the harbour of that town. The assertion that the Romans were utterly ignorant of maritime affairs becomes thus unintelligible.⁵ The error is quite evident, and warns us against accepting without examination the other accounts of the building and the manning of the first Roman fleet.

The truth which lies at the root of the narrative is this, Late

¹ Polybius, i. 20, § 9: 'Then the Romans first undertook to build ships, . . . and, without having any appliances for ship-building or having ever thought of the sea, they conceived the plan then for the first time, and went to work with such spirit that, without a previous trial, they ventured to attack the Carthaginians at sea, who were of old the first naval power, without a rival,' &c.

² Compare Livy, xxxv. 16: 'Neapolitani . . . a quibus (vos Romani) naves ex foedere exigitis.' Livy, xxvi. 39: 'Postremo ipse a sociis Rheginisque et a Velia et a Pæsto debitas ex foedere exigendo (sc. naves) classem viginti navium effecit.'

³ See vol. i. p. 421.

⁴ See vol. i. p. 412.

⁵ Even Polybius is here guilty of exaggeration.

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develop-
ment of the
Roman
navy.

that the Romans in the beginning of the war in Sicily had neglected their navy. They were never fond of the sea. While the mariners of other nations challenged the dangers of the high seas with enthusiasm, the Romans never trusted themselves without trembling to that inconstant element, on which their firm courage did not supply the want of skill and natural aptitude. They had therefore failed to take advantage of the opportunity which the possession of the harbour of Antium offered to them of keeping up a moderately respectable fleet. They probably laid the burden of the naval wars as much as they could on their Greek and Etruscan allies, and they may have hoped at the beginning of the Punic war that they would never need a fleet for any other object than for crossing over to Sicily. The impossibility of entertaining such an idea any longer was now proved, and they were obliged to make up their minds to meet the masters of the sea on their own element.

The build-
ing of the
fleet.

The narrative of the building of the first Roman fleet is hardly less a story of wonder than those of the regal period; and had the incident been recorded a few generations earlier, benevolent gods would have appeared, to build ships for the Romans and to guide them on the rolling waves. But Polybius was a rationalist. He believed in no divine interference, and he relates the wonderful in a manner that excites astonishment, but does not contradict the laws of nature. The decision of the Roman senate to build a fleet was not carried out, it is said, without the greatest difficulty.¹ The Romans were utterly unacquainted with the art of building the quinqueremes—large ships of war with five benches for rowers, one above the other, which formed the strength of the Carthaginian fleets. They knew only triremes—smaller ships with three benches for rowers, such as formerly had been used among the Greeks. They would, therefore, have been obliged to give up the idea of building a fleet, if a stranded Carthaginian quinquereme had not fallen into their hands, which

¹ Polybius, i. 20, 21.

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they used as a model.¹ They set to work with such zeal that, within two months² after the felling of the wood, a fleet of one hundred quinqueremes and thirty triremes was ready to be launched. They were manned by Roman citizens and Italian allies who had never before handled an oar, and in order to gain time these men were exercised on the land to make the movements necessary in rowing, to keep time, and to understand the word of command. After a little practice on board the ships, these crews were able to go out to sea, and to challenge the boldest, the most experienced, and most dreaded seamen of their time.

We cannot help receiving this description with some hesitation and doubt. That it was utterly impossible to build within the short space of sixty days a ship capable of holding three hundred rowers and one hundred and twenty soldiers,³ we will not exactly maintain, as we know too little of the structure of those ships, and as old historians who did know it thought that the feat was wonderful, and even hardly credible,⁴ but not positively impossible. It is, however, surely a different thing when the story asserts that an entire fleet of one hundred and twenty ships

Improbabilities of the story.

¹ Polybius, i. 20, § 15. The same anecdote is repeated with little variation in the narrative of the siege of Lilybæum in the year 249, the fifteenth year of the war. Zonaras, viii. 16: Κλαύδιος τριήρεις πληρώσας συνέλαβε δι' αὐτῶν Ἀγνώνα τὸν Καρχηδόνιον ἐκπλέοντα πεντήρει· καὶ παράδειγμα τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις τῆς παρασκευῆς τῶν νεῶν ἐγένετο. Polybius, in a later passage (i. 59, § 8), tells a similar story again, referring to the very last year of the war. It is difficult to see how such a fable could be invented, or find credence, for it is well known that the building of quinqueremes had been understood and practised in Syracuse for at least a century and a half (Diodorus, xiv. 41, 42). Supposing therefore, what is not at all probable, that none of the Greek towns in Italy, not even Tarentum, had become acquainted with the build of these vessels, yet the Romans, if they wanted a model, could surely get it easily from their allies, the Syracusans, without waiting for the chance of a stranded Carthaginian vessel.

² Pliny, *Hist. Nat.* xvi. 39. Florus, ii. 5.

³ This was the number on board the Roman vessels in the battle of Ecnomus.

⁴ Polybius (i. 38, § 6), speaking of the construction of a Roman fleet in *three* months, in 254 B.C., says 'that it is not easy to believe it.' Yet the Romans by this time had considerable experience in shipbuilding, and the time they took was longer by one-half. We may therefore, *à fortiori*, apply the expression of Polybius to the first feat of the Romans, and say 'that it is not easy to believe it.'

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was built in so short a time. Extensive dockyards, and the necessary number of skilled ship-carpenters, might perhaps be found in a town like Carthage, where ship-building was practised and carried on on a large scale all the year round. These conditions did not exist in Rome; and we may therefore well ask whether it is probable that all the ships of the new fleet were now newly built and built in Rome, and, further, whether in the Etruscan towns, in Naples, Elea, Rhegium, Tarentum, Locri, and, above all, in Syracuse and Messina, there were no ships ready for use, or whether it was impossible to build any in these places. Surely this would be in the highest degree surprising. We know that the Romans availed themselves without scruple of the resources of their allies,¹ and we see no reason why they should have done so less now than at the breaking out of the war, when they made use of the Greek ships for crossing over to Sicily.

Composi-
tion of the
Roman
navy.

We believe, therefore, in spite of the account of Polybius, that the greater portion of the ships of the Roman fleet came from Greek and Etruscan towns, and were manned by Greeks and Etruscans. The latter supposition is even more forced upon us than the former. A few rowers may have been drilled in the way indicated, and mixed up with old, experienced seamen; but how anyone can possibly imagine that the ships were entirely manned by crews who had learnt rowing on land is incomprehensible. We should have to consider the art of navigation of the ancients as in the highest degree contemptible; we should not be able to understand how the historians could speak of naval powers and of a dominion of the sea; how her

¹ Next to the naval service, the cavalry service was least congenial to the Romans, and of this, therefore, they threw by far the greater burden on their allies. The name for the crews was 'socii navales,' a term which shows that the allies principally had to furnish them. The Greek towns were not obliged to send contingents to the land army, but they had to furnish ships and sailors instead (Livy xxvi. 39, xxxvi. 42). As we have previously observed (vol. i. p. 275), the Roman historians systematically omitted to mention the assistance of their allies; yet Zonaras (viii. 14) reports that Hiero of Syracuse supplied the consul C. Aurelius Cotta (252 B.C.) with ships. Compare also Diodorus, xxiii. fr. 9, above, p. 51, note 2.

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fleet could be said to constitute the glory, security, and greatness of Carthage, if it had been possible for a continental power like Rome, without any preparation or assistance, in two months to find ships, captains, and sailors who on their first encounter were more than a match for the oldest naval empire. If we bear in mind that it was a common practice among the Roman historians to appropriate to themselves the merits of their allies,¹ we shall with the less hesitation doubt the boastful stories which tell us how the first fleet was built, and we shall in the end venture to suspect that a greater, and perhaps much the greater, part of the credit belongs to the Etruscans and to the Italian and Sicilian Greeks.

The first undertaking of the Roman fleet was a failure. The consul Cn. Cornelius Scipio sailed with a detachment consisting of seventeen ships to Sicily, and was incautious enough to enter the harbour of the small island of Lipara, which had been represented to him as ready to revolt from Carthage. But a Carthaginian squadron which lay in the neighbourhood, and blocked up the harbour in the night, took the consul's ships and their crews, and, instead of the expected glory, Scipio obtained only the nickname of *Asina*.²

Capture of
the fleet of
Cn. Corne-
lius Scipio.

This loss was soon after repaired. The Carthaginian admiral, Hannibal, the defender of Agrigentum, emboldened by this easy success, sailed with a squadron of fifty ships towards the Roman fleet, which was advancing along the coast of Italy from the north. But he was suddenly surprised by it, attacked, and put to flight, with the loss of

Battle of
Mylæ.

¹ Vol. i. p. 276.

² Polybius, i. 21. Macrobius, *Sat.* i. 5. See Niebuhr, *Röm. Gesch.* iii. 677; English translation, iii. 579. Some Roman writers so represented this incident as to make the Carthaginians appear guilty of treachery and perjury (see Zonaras, viii. 10). They related that Boodes, the Carthaginian admiral, fearing to drive the Romans to despair, invited Scipio and his officers to come on board his ship for the purpose of negotiating, and then seized them all, whereupon the Roman crews lost courage and surrendered. It is needless to say that this attempt to clear Scipio of the charge of rashness and to accuse the Carthaginians of treachery is futile and childish. Polybius says nothing even of a stratagem of the Carthaginians.

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the greater part of his ships. After this preliminary trial of strength, the Roman fleet arrived in the harbour of Messina; and as the consul Scipio, who was to have taken the command of the fleet, was made prisoner, his colleague, Caius Duilius, gave the command of the land army to his subordinate officer, and without delay led the Roman against the Carthaginian fleet, which was devastating the coast in the neighbourhood of Pelorus, the north-eastern promontory of Sicily. The enemies met off Mylæ, and here was fought the first battle at sea, which was to decide whether the Roman state should be confined to Italy, or whether it should gradually extend itself to all the islands and coasts of the Mediterranean—a sea which they were now to prove themselves entitled to speak of as emphatically ‘their own.’¹ It is said that the Carthaginian fleet, under the command of Hannibal, consisted of one hundred and thirty ships. It had therefore ten more ships than the Roman. Each of these was without doubt far superior to the Roman ships in the manner of sailing, in agility and speed, but more especially in the skill of the captains and sailors, even though, as we suppose, a great number of the Roman vessels were built and manned by Greeks. The tactics of ancient naval warfare consisted chiefly in running the ships against the broadside of the hostile ships, and either sinking them by the force of the collision, or brushing away the mass of bristling oars. For this purpose the prows had under the water-line sharp iron prongs called beaks (*rostra*), which penetrated the timbers of the enemy’s ships. It was, therefore, of the greatest importance for each captain to have his ship so completely under his control as to be able to turn about, to advance, or retreat with the greatest rapidity, and to watch and seize the favourable moment for the decisive rush. To fight from the deck with arrows and other missiles could, in this species of tactics, be only of subordinate importance, and therefore there was only a small number of soldiers on board the ships by the side of the rowers.

¹ ‘Mare nostrum.’

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naval tac-
tics.

The Romans were well aware of the superiority of the Carthaginians in maritime tactics. They could not hope to vie with them in this respect. They therefore hit upon a plan for supplying their want of skill at sea, by a mode of fighting which should place not ship against ship, but man against man, and which in a certain way should make the sea-fight very much like a battle on land. They invented the boarding-bridges.¹ On the fore part of the ship, against a mast twenty-four feet high, a ladder thirty-six feet long was fixed, twelve feet above the deck, in such a manner that it could be moved up and down as well as sideways. This drawing up and down was effected by means of a rope which passed from the end of the ladder through a ring at the top of the mast on to the deck. How the horizontal movements were produced does not appear from the account of Polybius, who fails also to explain how the lower end of the ladder, which was fixed to the mast twelve feet above the deck, could be reached. Perhaps there was a second part to the ladder fixed to it with hinges, leading from the deck up towards the mast, and serving at the same time to move the ladder all round the mast. The ladder was so broad that two soldiers could stand abreast on it. Railings right and left served as a protection against missiles and against the danger of falling. At the end of the ladder was a strong pointed hook bent downwards. If the enemy approached near enough, they had only to let go the rope which held the ladder upright. If it fell on the deck of the hostile ship, the hook penetrated the timbers and held the two ships together. Then the soldiers ran from the deck along the ladder to board, and the sea-fight became a hand-to-hand engagement.²

When the Carthaginians under Hannibal perceived the Defeat of

¹ It is not stated who was the real inventor. We should like to know whether it was a Roman or a Greek.

² The description which Polybius (i. 22) gives of the boarding-bridges is the only one which we have, and it is not sufficiently clear and complete, so that doubts remain concerning some parts of the apparatus. See Haltaus, *Gesch. der Römer*, Beilage, pp. 607-628.

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Roman fleet, they bore down upon it and began the battle, confident of an easy victory. But they were sadly disappointed. The boarding-bridges answered perfectly. Fifty Carthaginian vessels were taken or destroyed, and a great number of prisoners were made. Hannibal himself escaped with difficulty and had to abandon his flag-ship, a huge vessel of seven rows of oars, taken in the late war from King Pyrrhus. The remainder of the Carthaginian vessels took to flight. If the joy at this first glorious victory was great, it was fully justified. The honour of a triumph¹ was awarded to Duilius; and the story goes that he was permitted to prolong this triumph throughout his whole life by causing himself to be accompanied by a flute-player and a torch-bearer whenever he returned home of an evening from a banquet.² A column, decorated with the beaks of conquered ships and with an inscription celebrating the victory,³ was erected on the Forum as a memorial of the battle.

Relief of
Segesta.

This decisive victory of the Romans happened just in time to restore the fortune of war, which had seriously gone against them in Sicily. Most of the towns on the coast and many in the interior had fallen, as we have seen, during the preceding year, into the hands of the enemy. The Carthaginians were now besieging Segesta, to revenge themselves for the treachery of the Segestans, who had murdered the Carthaginian garrison and given the town over to the Romans.⁴ During the consul's absence from the army the military tribune C. Cæcilius had attempted to assist the town, but was surprised and suffered much loss.⁵ The greater part of the Roman army in Sicily lay in Segesta. It was, therefore, very fortunate that Duilius was able, after his victory at Mylæ, to take

¹ Livy, epit. 17. This was the first triumphus navalis.

² Cicero, *De Senectute*, 13. Valerius Maximus, iii. 6, 4.

³ The fragments of this inscription which are still extant appear to be parts of the column restored by Tiberius, and not of the original monument. See Platner and Ulrich's *Rom*, p. 234.

⁴ See above, p. 44.

⁵ Zonaras, viii. 11. Of this defeat no mention is made by Polybius, i. 14.

the soldiers from the ships and relieve this town. With the army thus set free, he was able to conquer some towns, as for instance Macella, and to put other friendly cities in a state of defence.

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Operations
of Hamil-
car.

Since the fall of Agrigentum, the command of the Carthaginian troops in Sicily had been in the hands of Hamilcar—not the celebrated Hamilcar the father of Hannibal,¹ but a man not unlike his namesake in enterprising spirit and ability. It was probably owing to him that during these years the Carthaginians did not lose Sicily. He succeeded in so far counteracting the effect of the Roman victories at Agrigentum and Mylæ as to make it doubtful to which side the fortune of war was turning. These exploits of Hamilcar cannot be given in detail, as the report of Philinus, who wrote the history of the war from the Carthaginian point of view, has been lost,² and as the order of time in which the events succeeded each other is also doubtful.³ Still, the grand form of Hamilcar stands out in such bold relief that we recognise in him one of the greatest generals of that period. In the outset he sacrificed a part of his mutinous mercenaries after the manner which we have already seen applied by Dionysius and Hiero. He sent them to attack the town of Entella, after having first warned the Roman garrison of their approach, and thus attained a double advantage, inasmuch as he got rid of the inconvenient mercenaries, and, as despair made them fight bravely, he inflicted considerable injury on the Romans. This faithless proceeding, which, as we have seen, was by no means unheard of or exceptional, shows how dangerous for both sides was the relation between mercenaries and their commanders. On the one side, instead of patriotism, faithfulness, and devotion, we find among the soldiers a spirit of rapacity,

¹ Zonaras (viii. 10) erroneously supposes him to be the father of the great Hannibal.

² We derive our information chiefly from the confused fragments of Diodorus (xxiii. fr. 9). Polybius passes over a good deal in silence, either for the sake of brevity, or from partiality for the Romans.

³ Diodorus (*loc. cit.*) seems to refer everything to the year after the conquest of Agrigentum, which is certainly a mistake.

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Hamilcar.

hardly restrained by military discipline; on the other we observe cold calculation and heartlessness, which saw in a soldier no kinsman, citizen, or brother, but an instrument of war purchasable for a certain sum, and worthy of no considerations but those which called for the preservation of valuable property.

With quite as much harshness, though with less cruelty, Hamilcar treated the inhabitants of the old town of Eryx. This town of the Elymi, at first friendly to the Punians and then subject to them, appears to have been exposed to the attacks of the Romans because it was not situated immediately on the coast. Hamilcar razed it to the ground, and sent the inhabitants away to the neighbouring promontory, Drepana, where he built a new fortified town, which, with the neighbouring town of Lilybæum, formed as it were a common system of defence, and subsequently proved its strength by a long-continued resistance to the persevering attacks of the Romans. Of the venerable town of Eryx there remained only the temple of Venus, the building of which was attributed to Æneas, the son of the goddess.

Victory of
Hamilcar
at Thermæ.

After Hamilcar had thus covered his retreat, he proceeded to the attack. We have already heard of the siege of Segesta. The victory of the Romans at Mylæ saved Segesta, after it had been driven to the utmost distress. But in the neighbourhood of Thermæ,¹ Hamilcar succeeded in inflicting a great blow. He surprised a portion of the Roman army, and killed 4,000 men.² The consequences of the victory at Mylæ appear to have been confined to the raising of the siege of Segesta. The Romans did not succeed in taking the little fortress of Myttistratum (now

¹ Thermæ was a town built by the Carthaginians near the site of the ancient city of Himera, which they had destroyed (Diodorus, xiii. 59 ff. 79).

² According to Diodorus, (xxiii. fr. 9), 6,000 men. Polybius (i. 24, §§ 3, 4) excuses and extenuates the defeat of the Romans. He says that the allies suffered the loss, not the Roman legions; for a dispute had broken out between these two classes of troops concerning the place of honour, and the allies had taken up a separate position, where they were surprised and cut to pieces by the Carthaginians.

called Mistrella) on the northern coast of Sicily. In spite of the greatest possible exertions, they had to retreat, at the end of a seven months' siege, with heavy losses.¹ They lost, further, a number of Sicilian towns, the greater part of which, it appears, went over voluntarily to the Carthaginians. Among these is mentioned the important town of Camarina in the immediate neighbourhood of Syracuse, and even Enna, in the middle of the island, the town sacred to Ceres and Proserpina (Demeter and Persephone) the protecting goddesses of Sicily. The hill Camicus, where the citadel of Agrigentum stood, fell also again into the power of the Carthaginians, who would indeed, according to the report of Zonaras, have again subdued the whole of Sicily if the consul of 259, C. Aquillius Florus, had not wintered in the island, instead of returning to Rome with his legions, according to the usual custom after the end of the summer campaign.

In the following year fortune began once more to smile on the Romans. Both consuls, A. Atilius Calatinus and C. Sulpicius Patereulus, went to Sicily. They succeeded in retaking the most important of the places which had revolted, especially Camarina² and Enna, together with Myttistratum,³ which had just been so obstinately defended.

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Renewed
successes
of the
Romans.

¹ Polybius (i. 24, § 11) mentions only the final conquest of Myttistratum two years later, after it had, as he says, stood a protracted siege. Diodorus alone (xxiii. fr. 9) states that a previous siege ended with the retreat of the Romans from the place. Polybius betrays here as elsewhere a partiality for the Romans, which is no doubt due, at least in part, to the authorities whom he consulted.

² At the siege of Camarina the Roman army ran great risk of being annihilated or captured. It was saved by the self-devotion of a military tribune and 400 men (Livy, epit. 17; Zonaras, viii. 12; Gellius, iii. 7). Cato, who, in his historical work *Origines*, compares the exploit of this tribune to that of Leonidas at Thermopylae, laments that the Roman hero earned but scanty praise, while the deed of Leonidas was celebrated all over Greece by historians, poets, sculptors, and the whole nation. The brave tribune has indeed been hardly treated, for we do not even know his name. Whilst Cato calls him Q. Cædicius, the annalist Claudius Quadrigarius calls him Laberius, and Livy Marcus Calpurnius. Camarina resisted all the attacks of the Romans until at length Hiero supplied his allies with engines for the siege (Diodorus, *loc. cit.*). It is noteworthy that Polybius says nothing of all this.

³ Polybius, i. 24, §§ 9-12. Littana (Diodorus, xxiii. fr. 9).—probably identical

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At the conquest of this town, which had cost them so much, the resentment among the Roman soldiers was such that, after the secret retreat of the Carthaginian garrison, they fell on the helpless inhabitants, and murdered them without mercy, until the consul put an end to their ferocity by promising them, as part of their spoil, all the men whose lives they would spare. The inhabitants of Camarina were sold as slaves. We do not read that this was the fate of Enna; but this town could not expect an easier lot, unless it redeemed its former treason by now betraying the Carthaginian garrison into the hands of the Romans. From these scanty details we can form some idea of the indescribable misery which this bloody war brought upon Sicily.

Expedition
of Scipio to
Corsica.

The successes of Hamilcar in Sicily, in the year 259, were, it appears, to be attributed in part to the circumstance that the Romans after the battle of Mylæ had sent L. Cornelius Scipio, one of the consuls of the year 259, to Corsica, in the hope of driving the Carthaginians quite out of the Tyrrhenian sea. On this island the Carthaginians had, as far as we know, no settlements or possessions. Still they must have had in the town of Aleria a station for their fleet, whence they could constantly alarm and threaten Italy. Aleria fell into the hands of the Romans, and thus the whole island was cleared of the Carthaginians. From thence Scipio sailed to Sardinia; but here nothing was done. Both Carthaginians and Romans avoided an encounter, and Scipio returned home.¹ This expedition to Corsica and Sardinia, which Polybius, probably on account of its insignificance and its failure, does not even mention, was for the Cornelian house a sufficient occasion to celebrate Scipio as a conqueror and hero. They were justified in

with Hippana, mentioned by Polybius, (i. 24, § 10)—was likewise taken, as also the hill Camicius near Agrigentum, and the town of Erbessus. An attempt of the consul Atilius to seize the island of Lipara failed. How little the later compilers of historical compendaries are to be trusted may be seen from the statements of Aurelius Victor (39) and Florus (ii. 2), that Drepana and Lilybæum were taken by the Romans.

¹ Zonaras, viii. 11.

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saying that he took Aleria; and as the expulsion of the Carthaginians from Corsica followed, he might be regarded as the conqueror of Corsica, though in truth Corsica was not occupied by the Romans till after the peace with Carthage. Accordingly these exploits are noticed on the second grave-stone in the series of monuments belonging to the family of the Scipios, with the first of which we have already become acquainted.¹ From this modesty, which confined itself to the real facts, we cannot help inferring that the inscription was composed shortly after the death of Scipio, when the memory of his deeds was fresh, and a great exaggeration could hardly be ventured upon. If it had not been so, and if the inscription had had a later origin, there is nothing more certain than that in this, as in that of the father, great untruths would have been introduced. This becomes quite evident from the additions which we find in later authors, and which can have originated only in the family traditions of the Scipios. Valerius Maximus, Orosius, and Silius Italicus² mention a second campaign of Scipio in Sardinia, in which he besieged and conquered Olbia, defeated Hanno, the Carthaginian general, and displayed his magnanimity by causing his body to be interred with all honours.³ He then gained possession without difficulty of a number of hostile towns by a peculiar stratagem, and finally, as the Capitoline fasti testify,

¹ See vol. i. p. 459. The following is the epitaph (Orelli, *Inscript. Latin. Select.* n. 552):—

Hunc oino plourume consentiunt R(omae)
Duonoro optumo fuisse viro
Luciom Scipione. Filios Barbati
Consol censor aidilis hic fuet a(pud vos)
Hee cepit Corsica Aleriamque urbe
Dedet tempestatibus aide merito.

Compare Ritschl, *Rheinisches Museum*, 1854.

² Valerius Maximus, v. 1, 2. Orosius, iv. 7. Silius Italicus, vi. 671.

³ Traits of generosity and a chivalrous disposition seldom met with among the Romans we shall frequently find in the history of the Scipios. They are quite characteristic of this particular family, and their insertion into the history of Rome seems to be owing to a writer of poetic imagination. Perhaps we can here trace the hand of the poet Ennius, who was a client of the Scipios.

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celebrated a magnificent triumph.¹ These additions, of which neither the epitaph of Scipio, nor Zonaras, nor Polybius know anything, are nothing more than empty inventions. Moreover, we see from Polybius and Zonaras, that, in the year before Scipio's consulate, Hannibal, not Hanno, had the command in Sardinia. When the former, in the year following (258), had been blocked up in a harbour in Sardinia by the consul Sulpicius, and, after losing many of his ships, had been murdered by his own mutinous soldiers, Hanno received the command of the Carthaginians in Sardinia, and could not therefore have been conquered, slain, and buried by Scipio the year before.²

Battle of
Tyndaris.

The year 258 had restored the superiority of the Romans in Sicily. They had conquered Camarina, Enna, Myttistratum, and many other towns, and driven back Hamilcar to the west side of the island. The expeditions which they had undertaken against Corsica and Sardinia had also been on the whole successful. The power of Carthage in the Tyrrhenian sea was weakened, and Italy for the present secure against any hostile fleet. To these successes was added in the following year a glorious battle by sea (257 B.C.) at Tyndaris, on the northern coast of Sicily. It was no decisive victory, for both parties claimed an advantage. Still it inspired the Romans with new confidence in their navy. It induced them to enlarge their fleet, and to prosecute the naval war on a larger scale. It prompted the bold idea of removing the seat of war into the enemy's country, and of attacking Africa instead of protecting Italy against the Carthaginian invasions. Whether their hopes went further, whether they had

¹ We have often had occasion to notice the worthlessness of the Capitoline fasti as historical documents. Circumstantial lies engraved on marble slabs are very imposing; nevertheless the following document must be rejected as entirely fictitious:

Cornelius L. f. Cn. n. Scipio Cos.	An. cdxci.
De Poenis et Sardinia Corsica	V. id. Mart.

² Polybius, i. 24, § 6. Zonaras, viii. 12. Livy, epit. 17.

already conceived the scheme which Scipio succeeded in carrying out at the end of the second war with Carthage, viz. that of aiming a deadly blow at the very centre of Carthaginian power, and so bringing the struggle to a conclusion, would be difficult to prove. In that case they would have estimated the strength of Carthage much too low, and their own powers too high?

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SECOND
PERIOD,
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B.C.

Efforts were now made in Rome to fit out an armament. A fleet of 330 ships of war sailed to Sicily, took on board an army of about 40,000 men, consisting of two consular armies, and sailed along the south coast of Sicily westwards, under the command of the two consuls, M. Atilius Regulus and L. Manlius Vulso. Between the promontory of Ecnomus and the town of Heraclea the Romans met a Carthaginian fleet still stronger than their own, under the command of Hamilcar and Hanno, whose object was to obstruct their way to Africa. If we may rely on the accounts of Polybius, there was here an army of 140,000 Romans, opposed to 150,000 Carthaginians. But it is hardly credible that the Carthaginian ships should have had an army on board equal to that of the Romans, as the latter intended a descent on Africa, and had their whole land force, *i.e.* four double legions, with them. The Carthaginians would have had no object in encumbering their ships to that extent, especially as their tactics did not consist so much in boarding as in disabling their enemies' ships, and as they endeavoured in every way to avoid the Roman boarding-ladders. We have no Carthaginian authority to test the report of Roman witnesses that the fleet of Hamilcar consisted of 350 ships. There is, then, no choice left but to follow Polybius, who has described the battle at Ecnomus with such clearness and accuracy of detail that nothing more can be desired.¹

Movements
of the fleet
under
Regulus
and
Manlius
Vulso.

The Carthaginian fleet advanced from the west in a single long extended front, which stretched from the coast

Battle of
Ecnomus.

¹ Polybius, i. 26-28.

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far out into the sea, and only on the left wing formed an angle, by one detachment being placed rather in advance. The Roman fleet, consisting of four divisions, formed with three of them a hollow triangle, the point of which, headed by the consuls in person, was directed against the Carthaginian line. The quinqueremes, which formed the base of the triangle, had the ships of burden in tow, while the fourth division formed the rear in one line of war-ships, which carried the veteran troops, the triarians of the legions. If this wedge-like form of the Roman fleet was suited to breaking through the Carthaginian line, the long line of the latter was on the other hand calculated to surround the Romans. This disposition determined the issue of the battle. The consuls broke through the line of Carthaginian vessels without trouble. By their advance the two lines of Roman ships which formed the sides of the triangle were separated from the base. Against this remainder were now directed the attacks of both the Carthaginian wings. The great naval battle resolved itself into three distinct parts, each of which was sufficiently important to rank as a battle by itself. The Roman ships with the transports were hard pressed and obliged to slip their cables, to sacrifice the transports, and to retreat. The reserve, with the triarians, was in the same distress. At length, when the consuls, giving up the pursuit of the Carthaginian centre, came to the assistance of their own main body, the victory turned to the side of the Romans. The boarding-ladders seem again to have rendered important service. Thirty Carthaginian ships were destroyed, sixty-four were taken. The loss of the Romans was at the outside twenty-four ships.

Landing of
the
Romans on
Carthagi-
nian terri-
tory.

After such a decided victory the way to Carthage was open to the Romans. But to our astonishment we read that they returned to Messana for the purpose of taking in supplies, and repairing their damaged vessels.¹ From this

¹ Zonaras, viii. 12. There is also a report of negotiations of peace, by which Hamilcar wished to gain time. On this occasion a silly story is related, which exhibits the barefaced mendacity and childish vanity of the later collectors of

we may conclude that the losses of the Romans were also considerable, and must have fallen heavily especially on the transport ships, which carried the provisions, a circumstance of which our narrator makes no mention. After a short time the fleet again set sail, and without any opposition reached the African coast near the Hermæan promontory (Cape Bon) east of Carthage. The Romans then sailed eastwards along the coast as far as Clypea, which they took and fortified.

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From this point they made expeditions into the most fertile part of the Carthaginian dominions, which in the fifty years since the devastating invasion of Agathokles had recovered themselves, and presented to the eyes of the Italians a picture of unimagined riches and luxurious fertility.¹ The industry and skill of the inhabitants had converted the whole of those districts into a garden.

Ravages of
the Roman
army in
Africa.

anecdotes. When Hanno, we are told, appeared as negotiator in the Roman camp, the consuls were advised to seize him, in retaliation for the treacherous imprisonment of Scipio off the island of Lipara (see above, p. 55). Hanno was in imminent danger, but saved himself by the remark that 'if the Romans acted in this manner, they would be as bad as the Carthaginians.' The consuls thereupon felt too proud to retain as a prisoner a hostile general who had come on a message of peace, trusting to the protection of the law of nations. It seems strange that any Roman writer could (like Valerius Maximus, vi. 6, 2) find in this proceeding an occasion for glorifying Roman integrity and honour, even if it were true that Cornelius Scipio was treacherously seized by the Carthaginians five years before. But it is too bad to make a Carthaginian general flatter the Roman people at the cost of his own and his country's abasement. Of such indirect self-laudation of the Romans we have frequent instances. We have noticed it on the occasion of the war with Pyrrhus (vol. i. pp. 496, 524). Polybius says nothing of the whole incident.

¹ This fertility indirectly contradicts the absurd story of the monstrous serpent which (as appears from Livy, epit. 18, and Valerius Maximus, i. 8, 19) occupied a prominent place in the later narratives of the war, but which is not referred to by Polybius. Near the river Bagradas, it is said, the Roman army encountered a gigantic serpent, which devoured the soldiers that approached incautiously and which kept the whole army at a distance from the river. No missile could pierce its skin. A detachment was sent against it, and it was at last crushed by huge stones which were discharged by ballistæ. Its putrefying body infected the air, and forced the Romans to leave the neighbourhood. We have a measure of the credulity and the credibility of Roman historians in their references to alleged evidence in the assurance that the skin of this serpent, measuring one hundred and twenty feet in length, was brought to Rome and exhibited there down to the time of the Numantine war, *i.e.* 133 B.C. (Pliny, *Hist. Nat.* viii. 14).

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Agriculture flourished among the Carthaginians in the highest degree; more especially they understood how to render that rich but hot and dry soil productive, by conducting over it, in innumerable canals, an ample supply of water, the most needful of all requisites. The country, which still in the time of the emperors was the granary of the Romans, was under the Carthaginians in the most flourishing state. It was covered with numberless villages and open towns, and with the magnificent country residences of the Punic nobility. Carthage, as mistress of the sea, feared no hostile invasions, and most of the towns were unfortified. No chain of fortresses, like those of the Roman colonies on the coast or in the interior of the country, offered places of refuge to the distressed inhabitants, or contained a population able and ready to fight, like the Roman colonists, who could oppose the predatory marches of the enemy. The horror and distress therefore of the African population were great when, all of a sudden, 40,000 rapacious foes overran their country, exercising the fearful rights of war which delivered into the hands of the conquerors the life, possessions, and freedom of every inhabitant. The Carthaginians had in the course of the war disturbed the coast of Italy, burnt houses, destroyed harvests, cut down fruit-trees, carried away spoil and prisoners. They now suffered in Africa an ample retribution, and the Roman soldier indemnified himself thoroughly for the dangers he had undergone, and the terrors with which his imagination had filled the unknown bounds of the African continent. We read of 20,000 men torn from their homes and sold as slaves. The spoils were all sent to the fortress of Clypea. Thither some time afterwards orders were sent from Rome that one of the two consuls with his army and with most of the ships and spoils should return to Italy, while the other consul with two legions and forty ships should remain in Africa to carry on the war. This resolution of the Roman senate would be unintelligible if the expedition to Africa had been intended to answer any purpose other than that of a vigorous diversion. It could not have been sup-

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posed in Rome that two legions, which were not sufficient in Sicily to keep the Carthaginians in check, could carry on the war effectually in Africa and overthrow the power of the Carthaginians in their own country. If Regulus had confined himself to enterprises on a small scale, the success would have been adequate to the sacrifice. But elated, it seems, by his unexpected good fortune, he raised his hopes higher and aspired to the glory of terminating the war by a signal victory.¹

The battle at Ecnomus and the landing of the hostile army on their coast had entirely disconcerted the Carthaginians. At first they were afraid of an attack on their capital, and a portion of the fleet had sailed back from Sicily to protect it. There were clearly no great forces in Africa, as a hostile invasion was not apprehended. Now the Romans had effected a landing, thanks to their victory at Ecnomus; and the Carthaginians were not in a position to defend the open country against them. In their anxiety for the safety of the capital they at first concentrated their troops near it; and in this fact we find an explanation of the great successes of Regulus. He was enabled not only to march through the length and breadth of the country without danger, but to maintain his advantage when the Carthaginians ventured to attack him. He is said to have won a decided victory because the Carthaginians, out of fear, would not venture on the level ground, but kept on the heights, where their elephants and horse, their most powerful arms, were almost useless. Mention is also made of a revolt of Numidian allies or subjects, which caused to the Carthaginians a greater loss than that of signal defeat. They were therefore disposed to peace, and tried to negotiate with Regulus, who on his side wished to end the war before he was superseded in the command by a successor. But the conditions which he offered were such as could be accepted only after a complete overthrow. He insisted that they should resign

Exorbitant
demands of
Regulus as
conditions
of peace.

¹ Polybius, i. 31, § 4.

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Sicily, pay a contribution of war, restore the prisoners and deserters, deliver up the fleet and content themselves with a single ship, and, finally, make their foreign policy dependent on the pleasure of Rome.

The negotiations were therefore broken off, and the war was carried on with redoubled energy.

Defeat of
Regulus.

In the meantime the year of the consulship of Regulus had expired. He remained, however, as proconsul in Africa, and his army seems to have been strengthened by Numidians and other Africans.¹ The Carthaginians also increased their forces. Among the Greek mercenaries whom they now got together was a Spartan officer of the name of Xanthippus, of whose antecedents we know nothing, but who, if all that is related of his exploits in the African war be true, must have been a man of great military ability. It is said that he directed the attention of the Carthaginians to the fact that their generals were worsted in the war with Regulus because they did not understand how to select a proper ground for their elephants and their powerful cavalry.² By his advice, it is said, the Carthaginians now left the hills and challenged the Romans to fight on the level ground. Regulus, with too much boldness, had

¹ This is evident from the circumstance that in the next battle, so fatal to the Roman arms, Regulus had a force of 30,000 (according to Appian, viii. 3) or 32,000 men (according to Eutropius, ii. 21, and Orosius, iv. 9).

² It seems very strange, as Mommsen justly remarks (*Röm. Gesch.* i. 529, Anm.; English translation, ii. 44), that the Carthaginian generals should have had to learn this from a stranger. Is it possible that the jealousy of the Roman historians grudged the Carthaginians the credit of having gained the victory by their own ingenuity and strength? Perhaps the chief merit of Xanthippus consisted in the proper use of the elephants. The employment of these animals in war originated in Asia, and had passed into the tactics of the Greeks by the successors of Alexander the Great. From them the Carthaginians had learnt it, either in their war with Pyrrhus, or even before, from Greek mercenaries. But they appear not to have been thorough masters of this new engine of war. In the battle of Agrigentum the elephants had been of no use and had even contributed to the defeat of the Carthaginians (see above, p. 47). But at Tunes, where Regulus was routed, they decided the victory. If, as is most likely, Xanthippus was an officer from the school of Alexander the Great, it was perhaps due to him that the elephants were this time handled properly. This conjecture receives an indirect confirmation by the issue of the battle of Panormus (see below, p. 77), where the Carthaginian army was defeated chiefly owing to the unskilfulness of Hasdrubal in the use of the elephants.

advanced from Clypea, the basis of his operations, and had penetrated into the neighbourhood of Carthage, where he had taken possession of Tunes. Here he could not possibly maintain himself. He was obliged to accept a battle on the plain, and suffered a signal defeat, which, owing to the great superiority of the Carthaginian cavalry, ended in the almost complete annihilation of the Romans. Only about 2,000 escaped with difficulty to Clypea; 500 were taken prisoners, and among these Regulus himself. The Roman expedition to Africa, so boldly undertaken and at first so gloriously carried out, met with a more miserable fate than that of Agathokles, and seemed indisputably to confirm the opinion that the Carthaginians were invincible in their own country.¹

It was necessary now, if possible, to save the remainder of the Roman army, and to bring them uninjured back to Italy. A still larger Roman fleet than that which had conquered at Ecnomus was accordingly sent to Africa, and obtained over the Carthaginians at the Hermæan promontory a victory which, judging by the number of Carthaginian vessels taken, must have been more brilliant than the last.² If the Romans had intended to continue the

Victory of
the
Romans at
the Her-
mæan pro-
montory.

¹ We cannot credit the reports according to which the Carthaginians treated Xanthippus with ingratitude and caused him to be murdered on his return to his own country, in order to expunge the humiliating memory of their great obligations to him (Valerius Maximus, ix. 6, 1; Zonaras, viii. 13; Appian, viii. 4). Polybius had heard of these or similar charges, but he rejected them, and related (i. 36, § 2) that Xanthippus left Carthage shortly after his victory, from the fear of exposing himself to jealousy and calumny.

² According to Polybius (i. 36, § 11) not less than 114 Carthaginian vessels were taken with their crews. But the statements concerning this victory are very conflicting. Instead of 114 captured vessels, Diodorus (xxiii, fr. 14) mentions only 24, not to speak of the numbers given by Eutropius and Orosius. Haltaus (*Gesch. der Römer*, i. 308, Anm.) proposes to change the number *ἐκατὸν δεκατέσσαρας* of Polybius into *εἴκοσι καὶ τέσσαρας*, and thus to make the statements of Polybius and Diodorus agree with one another. This ingenious conjecture is highly commendable. If we adopt it, we shall no longer see anything strange in the narrative of Polybius, who tells us that the Romans drove back the Carthaginians with ease and at the first onset (*ἐξ ἐφόδου καὶ ῥαδίως τρεψάμενοι*), an expression which would hardly be appropriate, if 114 vessels had been taken. Such a number of captured vessels would make the victory near the Hermæan promontory a more brilliant one than that of Ecnomus; and it would,

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war in Africa till they had utterly overthrown Carthage, they would have been able now to carry their plan into execution, though not under such favourable circumstances as before the defeat of Regulus. The fact, however, that they did not do this, and that they sent no new army to Africa,¹ strengthens the inference suggested by the withdrawal of half of the invading army after the landing of Regulus, viz., that the expedition to Africa was undertaken only for the sake of plundering and injuring the land, and for dividing the Carthaginian forces. The only use made of the victory at the Hermæan promontory was to take into their ships the remnant of the legions of Regulus and the spoils which had been collected in Clypea.

Destruction of the Roman fleet off the coast of Sicily.

The Roman fleet sailed back to Sicily heavily laden. But now, after so much well-merited success, a misfortune overtook them on the southern coast of Sicily from which no bravery could protect them. A fearful hurricane destroyed the greater number of the ships, and strewed the entire shore, from Camarina to the promontory Pachynus, with wrecks and corpses. Only eighty vessels escaped destruction, a miserable remnant of the fleet which, after twice conquering the Carthaginians, seemed able from this time forward to exercise undisputed dominion over the sea.

to say the least, be surprising that Polybius should dispose of it in three lines, whilst he devotes as many chapters to the battle of Ecnomus. Zonaras (viii. 14), in his description of the battle near the Hermæan promontory, differs widely from Polybius. Dion Cassius, whom Zonaras abridged, had evidently drawn his information from another source, possibly from Philinus. According to this account the battle was long doubtful, and was at last decided in favour of the Romans when those Roman vessels which had wintered in Clypea advanced and attacked the Carthaginians in the rear. This is another instance which shows that the detail of descriptions of battles deserves as yet little credit.

¹ Polybius says nothing of a landing of Roman troops in Clypea, and of a battle with the Carthaginians, reported by Zonaras (viii. 14), in which (according to Orosius, iv. 9) 9,000 of them were killed. This alleged victory was probably gained only on paper by some patriotic Roman annalist, as a set-off against the defeat of Regulus.

Third Period, 254-250.

THE VICTORY AT PANORMUS.

It was among such reverses as these that Rome showed her greatness. In three months a new fleet of 220 ships joined the remnant of the disabled fleet in Messana, and sailed towards the western part of the island, to attack the fortresses of the Carthaginians, who, little expecting such a result, were fully engaged in Africa in subduing and punishing their revolted subjects. Thus it happened that the Romans made a signal and important conquest. Next to Lilybæum and Drepana, Panormus was the most considerable Carthaginian stronghold in Sicily. Its situation on the north coast, in connexion with the Punic stations on the Liparæan Islands, made it easy for an enemy to attack and ravage the Italian coast. The place, which, under Punic dominion, had reached a high state of prosperity, consisted in a strongly fortified old town and a suburb or new town, which had its own walls and towers. This new town was now attacked by the Romans with great force both by land and sea, and after a vigorous resistance it fell into their hands. The defenders took refuge in the old town, which was more strongly fortified; and here, after a long blockade, they were forced by hunger to surrender. They were allowed to buy themselves off each for two minæ. By this means 10,000 of the inhabitants obtained their freedom. The remainder, 13,000 in number, who had not the means to pay the sum required, were sold as slaves.¹ This brilliant success was gained by Cn. Cornelius Scipio, who six years before had been taken prisoner in Lipara, and had since then gained his freedom either by ransom or exchange.

The undisturbed blockade of the important town of Panormus, in the neighbourhood of Drepana and Lilybæum,

CHAP.
III.THIRD
PERIOD,
254-250
B.C.Capture of
Panormus
by Cn.
Cornelius
Scipio.Failure of
the second

¹ The ransom must have been paid either by the Carthaginian state, or by friends or relatives of the captives, not living in Panormus, for according to the laws of war all the money and valuables contained in Panormus fell into the hands of the Romans.

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Roman ex-
pedition to
Africa.

shows that at that time the Carthaginians had not a sufficient army in Sicily, as otherwise they would certainly have tried to deliver Panormus.¹ They were fully engaged in Africa. The Romans accordingly ventured in the same year to attack Drepana, and though their enterprise failed, they attempted in the following year to take even Lilybæum, and then made a second expedition into Africa, most probably in order to take advantage of the difficulties of the Carthaginians in their own country. This undertaking, which, like the former invasion, was intended to be only a raid on a large scale, utterly failed, producing not even the glory which crowned the first acts of Regulus. The great Roman fleet, with two consular armies on board, sailed towards the same coast on which Regulus had landed, east of the Hermæan promontory, where lay the most flourishing part of the Carthaginian territory. The Romans succeeded in landing in different places, and collecting spoil; but nowhere, as formerly in Clypea, could they obtain a firm footing. At last the ships were cast on the sand banks in the shallow waters of the lesser Syrtis (Gulf of Cabes), and could only be got afloat again with the greatest trouble, on the return of the tide, and after everything had been thrown overboard that could be dispensed with. The return voyage resembled a flight, and near the Palinurian promontory on the coast of Lucania (west of Policastro) the ships were overtaken by a terrible storm, in which a hundred and fifty of them were lost. The repetition of such a dreadful misfortune in so short a time, the loss of two magnificent fleets within three years, quite disgusted the Romans with the sea. They resolved to relinquish for the future all naval expeditions, and, devoting all their energies to their land army, to keep equipped only as many ships as might be needed to supply the army in Sicily with pro-

¹ It is stated that in this year the Carthaginians retook Agrigentum, and that they would have reconquered the whole of Sicily if they had not been informed of the arrival of both consuls (Zonaras, viii. 14). The latter assertion is an unmeaning phrase, and as to Agrigentum, it is hardly probable that after its repeated captures that town can have been a place of much importance or military strength.

visions, and to afford all necessary protection to the coast of Italy. We may fairly feel surprised at finding in the Capitoline fasti the record of a victory of the consul C. Sempronius Blæsus over the Punians.¹ If such a triumph really was celebrated after such an utter failure, it would follow that under certain circumstances the honour was easily obtained.

CHAP.
III.

THIRD
PERIOD,
254-250
B.C.

The two years of the war which now followed were years of exhaustion and comparative rest on both sides. The war, which had now lasted twelve years, had caused innumerable losses, and still the end was far off. The Romans had, it is true, according to our reports, been conquerors in almost every engagement, not only by land, but, what was prized far higher and gave them far greater satisfaction, by sea also. The defeat of Regulus was the only reverse of any importance which their army by land had experienced. In consequence of that reverse they had to leave Africa; but in Sicily they had gradually advanced further westward. The towns which at the beginning of the war had been only doubtful possessions, inclining first to one side and then to the other, were all either in the iron grip of the Romans, or were destroyed and had lost all importance as military stations. In the west the limits of the territory where the Carthaginians were still able to offer a vigorous resistance were more and more contracted. From Agrigentum and Panormus they had fallen back upon Lilybæum and Drepana, and even towards these the Romans had already stretched out their hands. Still more, Rome had contended for the mastery over the sea with the greatest maritime power in the world, and had been victorious in each of the three great naval engagements. But they were not at home on that element, and in the two tremendous storms of the years 255 and 253 they lost, with the fruits of their heroic

Exhaustion of both sides.

¹ That the Capitoline fasti are utterly unworthy of credit we have already seen (i. 280 *et seq.*; 528, note 2). In the present instance the alleged triumph of C. Sempronius Ti. f. Ti. n. Blæsus Cos de Poenis is no doubt a forgery, imported into the public annals through the mendacity of the Sempronian family.

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IV.

perseverance, even their confidence and their courage. The greatest burden of the war fell on the unfortunate island of Sicily, but Italy suffered also by her sacrifices of men and materials of war, by the predatory incursions of the enemy, and by the interruption of her trade. It may therefore easily be explained how both belligerents were satisfied to pause awhile from any greater enterprise, and thus gain time to recover their strength.

Capture of
Lipara by
the Ro-
mans.

But the war did not cease entirely. In the year 252 the Romans succeeded in taking Lipara, with the aid of a fleet which their faithful ally Hiero, of Syracuse, sent to their assistance,¹ and Thermæ (or Himera), the only place on the north coast of Sicily which was left to the Carthaginians after the loss of Panormus. That the Carthaginians should quietly allow this, without making any attempt to ward off the attack, is very surprising. In the annals which have come down to us, the history of the war is unfortunately written so decidedly from a Roman point of view that we know nothing at all of the internal affairs of the Carthaginians, and of what they were doing when not engaged against the Romans. We may suppose they had still enough to do in quelling the insurrection of their subjects, and so were compelled to leave the Romans in Sicily to act unopposed.

Victory of
the Ro-
mans at
Panormus.

At length, in the year 251, they sent a fleet of 200 ships under Hasdrubal, and a strong army of 30,000 men into Sicily, with a detachment of 140 elephants.² These animals, known to the Romans since the time of Pyrrhus, had again become objects of fresh terror after the defeat of Regulus, of which they had been the principal cause, and the greatest timidity reigned in the army of the proconsul.³ Cæcilius Metellus shut himself up in Panormus with only a consular army, and evaded the engagement. In the meantime Hasdrubal laid waste the open country and drew near to the town, where, between the walls and the

¹ Zonaras, viii. 14. Diodorus, xxiii. fr. 14. Trontin. *Strateg.* iv. 12.

² Orosius, iv. 9.

³ Polybius, i. 39, § 11.

river Orethus,¹ he had no room either for drawing up his forces—especially the elephants and the horse—or for retreating in case of a reverse. Confident of success, and intent only on drawing the enemy out of the town and getting them to accept a battle, he failed to take the common precaution of covering himself with mounds and trenches.² On the other side, Metellus, who could at any time retreat, formed his column inside the gates, and sent a number of light-armed troops to harass the Carthaginians and draw them nearer to the town. When the elephants had driven back the Roman skirmishers as far as the town trench, and were now exposed to their missiles and unable to do anything further, they fell into great disorder, became unmanageable, turned round on the Carthaginian infantry, and caused the utmost confusion. Metellus availed himself of this moment to burst forth out of the town, and to attack the enemy in flank. The mercenaries, unable to keep their ground, rushed in wild flight towards the sea, where they hoped to be taken in by the Carthaginian vessels, but the greater part perished miserably. Metellus gained a brilliant and decided victory. The charm was broken, the Romans were themselves again,³ Panormus was saved, and the Carthaginians were compelled henceforth to give up all thoughts of an aggressive war, and to confine themselves to the defence of the few fortresses which they still possessed in Sicily. Having lost Thermæ in 252,⁴ and still earlier Solus or Soluntum, Kephælædion and Tyndaris, they now abandoned Selinus, transplanting the inhabitants to Lilybæum. The incompetent Hasdrubal on his return paid for his defeat the penalty of crucifixion. The captured elephants, the number of which, according to some writers, was about 120,⁵ were led in triumph to Rome and

¹ This small river flowed into the sea not far from the town on the south side. See Schubring, *Topographie von Panormus*. Lübeck, 1870, p. 24.

² Diodorus, xxiii. fr. 14.

³ Polybius, i. 40, § 16.

⁴ Polybius, i. 39, § 13; Diodorus, xxiii. fr. 14; Zonaras, viii. 14.

⁵ Livy, epit. 19; Zonaras, viii. 14. The number varies, however, and is given by different writers as 60, 100, 104, 120, and 142. According to Polybius (i. 40, § 15), only ten were taken during the battle; the rest fell into the hands of the Romans when the battle was over. Their number is not stated by Polybius.

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Alleged
mission of
Carthagi-
nian
envoys to
Rome.

there hunted to death in the circus. Never had a Roman general merited or celebrated a more splendid triumph than Metellus,¹ who, with two legions, had defeated and annihilated an army of double the strength of his own.² The elephants on the coins of the Cæcilian family preserved, until late times, the memory of this glorious victory.

The battle of Panormus marks the turning-point in the war, which had now lasted thirteen years. The courage of the Carthaginians seemed at length to be quite broken. They decided to enter into negotiations for peace, or to propose at least an exchange of prisoners. The embassy dispatched to Rome for this purpose has become famous in history, especially because, as it is related, the captive Regulus was sent with it in order to support the proposals of the Carthaginians with his influence. The conduct of Regulus became the subject of poetical effusions, the echo of which we find in Horace³ and Silius Italicus.⁴ Closely connected with this is the tradition of the violent death of Regulus, which is so characteristic of the Roman historians that we cannot pass it over in silence.

The story
of Regu-
lus.

Five years had passed since the unhappy battle in the neighbourhood of Tunes, which consigned Regulus and 500

¹ Polybius, i. 40, § 10.

² Metellus was alive many years after this victory; he was made once more consul, then master of the horse and dictator, and lastly pontifex maximus. As such he saved, from the burning temple of Vesta, the sacred Palladium, the statue of the tutelary deity of Rome, at the risk of his life, and with the loss of his eyesight, and for this exploit he obtained leave to use a chariot when he wished to attend the meetings of the senate. Pliny (*Hist. Nat.* vii. 45) mentions the laudatory speech which the son of Metellus delivered at the funeral of his father and committed to writing, and in which he said 'that he had accomplished the ten best and greatest things which wise men spend their lives to obtain: that he had wished to be a first-rate warrior, a good orator, a brave general; that he wished to conduct the highest state affairs, to enjoy the greatest honour, to possess great wisdom, to be esteemed the first among the senators, to acquire great wealth honestly, to leave behind many children, and to be the most distinguished man in the community.' From this specimen we may form an opinion of the nature and quality of the family documents which were the chief source from which the earliest Roman annalists composed their so-called history of Rome.

³ Horace, *Od.*, iii. 5.

⁴ Silius Italicus, *Punic*, vi. 346-385.

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III.THIRD
PERIOD,
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of his fellow-soldiers to captivity. Now when the Carthaginians decided, after their defeat at Panormus, to make an exchange of prisoners, and, if possible, to conclude peace with Rome, they sent Regulus with the embassy, for they considered him a fit person to advocate their proposals. But in this expectation they were signally disappointed. Regulus gave his advice not only against the peace, but also against the exchange of prisoners, because he thought it would result only in the advantage of Carthage. He resisted all the entreaties of his own family and friends, who wished him to stay in Rome; and when they urged him, and the senate seemed disposed to make the exchange, he declared that he could no longer be of any service to his country, and that, moreover, he was doomed to an early death, the Carthaginians having given him a slow poison. He refused even to go into the town to see his wife and children, and, true to his oath, returned to Carthage, although he knew that a cruel punishment awaited him. The Carthaginians, exasperated at this disappointment of their hopes, invented the most horrible tortures to kill him by slow degrees. They shut him up with an elephant, to keep him in constant fear; they prevented his sleeping, caused him to feel the pangs of hunger, cut off his eyelids and exposed him to the burning rays of the sun, against which he was no longer able to close his eyes. At last they shut him up in a box stuck all over with nails, and thus killed him outright. When this became known in Rome, the senate delivered up two noble Carthaginian prisoners, Bostar and Hamilcar, to the widow and the sons of Regulus. These unhappy creatures were then shut up in a narrow cage which pressed their limbs together, and they were kept for many days without food. When Bostar died of hunger, the cruel Roman matron left the putrefying corpse in the narrow cage by the side of his surviving companion, whose life she prolonged by spare and meagre diet in order to lengthen out his sufferings. At last this horrible treatment became known,¹ and the

¹ This treatment was the more atrocious as the captive Hamilcar had

BOOK
IV.

The silence
of Poly-
bius.

heartless torturers, escaping with difficulty the severest punishment, were compelled to bury the body of Bostar, and to treat Hamilcar with humanity.

This is the story as it is found related by a host of Greek and Roman authors.¹ Among these, however, the most important is wanting. Polybius mentions neither the embassy of the Carthaginians, nor the tortures of Regulus, nor those of Bostar and Hamilcar; and he observes, as we have seen, the same significant silence with regard to the alleged ingratitude and treachery of the Carthaginians towards Xanthippus.² Moreover, Zonaras, who copied Dion Cassius, refers to the martyrdom of Regulus as a rumour.³ Besides, there are contradictions in the various reports. According to Seneca and Florus the unhappy Regulus was crucified;⁴ according to Zonaras, Regulus only pretended he had taken poison, whilst other authorities say that the Carthaginians really gave it him. Apart from these contradictions the facts reported are in themselves suspicious. That the Romans should not have agreed willingly to an exchange of prisoners is hardly credible; they did it two years later,⁵ and it is highly probable that Cn. Scipio was thus released from his captivity.⁶ And can we imagine that the Carthaginians tortured Regulus in so useless and foolish a manner, at the same time challenging the Romans to retaliation? Were they really such monsters as the Roman historians liked to picture them?

Probable
origin of
the story.

Such questions and considerations have for a long time been called forth by the traditional story of the Carthaginian embassy and the death of Regulus. The account of

befriended Regulus in Carthage, as appears to be intimated by Diodorus (xxiv. fr. 90, Tauchn.)

¹ Cicero, Livy, Valerius Maximus, Gellius, Seneca, Florus, Eutropius, Aurelius Victor, Dion Cassius, Appian, Diodorus, Zonaras.

² See above, p. 71, note 1.

³ Zonaras, viii. 15.

⁴ Hence poison, hunger, deprivation of sleep, and other tortures were not sufficient to put an end to the life of Regulus; he must also undergo the ignominious punishment of slaves.

⁵ Zonaras, viii. 16.

⁶ See above, p. 73.

the martyrdom of Regulus has been almost universally regarded as a malicious invention, and the suspicion has arisen that it originated within the family of Regulus itself.¹ This view is recommended by its internal credibility. The noble Carthaginian prisoners were given up probably to the family of the Atilii, as a security for the exchange of Regulus. But Regulus died in imprisonment before the exchange could be made. Thinking that cruel treatment had hastened his death, the widow of Regulus took her revenge in the horrible tortures of the two Carthaginians, and, to justify this, the story of the martyrdom of Regulus was invented. But the government and the Roman people as such took no part in the tortures of innocent captives; on the contrary they put an end to the private revenge as soon as the fact became known. The senate was not capable of defiling the Roman name by unheard-of cruelties towards prisoners, and of thus giving the Carthaginians an excuse for retaliation.² Only to the revengeful passion of a woman, not to the whole Roman people, may be attributed such utter contempt of all human and divine law as is represented in the cruelties practised towards the Carthaginian prisoners. If we take this view of the story we shall find it improbable that Regulus took a part in the embassy of the Carthaginians,³ whatever we may think of the authenticity of the embassy itself.

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III.

THIRD
PERIOD,
254-250
B.C.

Fourth Period, 250-249 B.C.

LILYBÆUM AND DREPANA.

The brilliant victory at Panormus had inspired the Romans with new hopes, and had perhaps raised their demands. They determined to complete the conquest of Sicily,⁴ and to attack the last and greatest strongholds of

Effects of
the victory
of Panor-
mus,

¹ This was surmised as early as the sixteenth century by Palmer (*Exercit. in Auctor. Græc.* p. 151). See Niebuhr, *Röm. Gesch.* iii. 705; English translation, iii. 599.

² Diodorus, xxiv. p. 91 (Tauchn.)

³ Polybius' silence seems to be almost conclusive.

⁴ Polybius, i. 41, § 2.

BOOK
IV.

Attack on
Lilybæum
by the
Romans.

the Carthaginians in that island, namely Lilybæum and Drepana.

Lilybæum (the modern Marsala), situated on a small strip of land, terminated by the promontory of the same name, was founded after the destruction of the island town of Motye, and had been since that event the chief fortress of the Carthaginians.¹ Besieged by Dionysius in the year 368 B.C., and by Pyrrhus in 276 B.C., it had proved its strength, and had remained unconquered. Nature and art had joined hands in making this fortress invincible, if defended with Punic fanaticism.² Two sides of the town were washed by the sea, and were protected, not only by strong walls, but more especially by shallows and sunken rocks, which made it impossible for any but the most skilful pilots or the most daring sailors to reach the harbour. On the land side the town was covered by strong walls and towers, and a moat one hundred and twenty feet deep and eighty feet broad. The harbour was on the north side, and was inclosed with the town in one line of fortifications.³ The garrison consisted of the citizens and 10,000 infantry, mostly mercenaries, not to be relied on, and a strong division of horse.⁴ It was impossible to take such a maritime fortress without the co-operation of a fleet. The Romans were obliged to make up their minds to build a new fleet, in spite of their

¹ See above, p. 26, note 1.

² See Schubring on 'Motye-Lilybæum' in the *Philologus* of 1866. The site of the ancient Lilybæum is partially covered by the modern Marsala.

³ This port is now silted up and useless, and where the Carthaginian galleys rode there are now saltworks. But during the whole of antiquity the port of Lilybæum was highly esteemed. It was here that in the first year of the Hannibalian war, the consul Sempronius collected a fleet for his intended expedition to Africa; from this port Scipio sailed, and in later times it was a station for part of the Roman fleet. The Arabs called it Mars Alla, the haven of God, whence the modern name of Marsala. The total destruction of the port was probably effected by Don Juan of Austria, who wished to make it useless for the Barbareesk pirates. The modern port of Marsala is on the south side of the town, and formed by an artificial mole.

⁴ According to Diodorus (xxiv. fr. 1) the cavalry amounted to 7,000, and the infantry, including the inhabitants capable of bearing arms, to 60,000 men. Both statements seem vastly exaggerated.

resolution three years before.¹ The two consuls of the year 250, C. Atilius Regulus and L. Manlius Vulso, of whom one was a kinsman, the other the colleague, of M. Regulus of the year 256, sailed towards Sicily with two hundred ships, and anchored before the harbour of Lilybæum, partly to cut off the town from supplies, and partly also to prevent the Carthaginian fleet from interrupting the landing of necessities for the large besieging army.²

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III.

FOURTH
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The Roman land army consisted of four legions, which, with the Italian allies, made together about 40,000 men. In addition to these, there were the Sicilian allies, and the crews of the fleet, so that the report of Diodorus does not seem improbable, that the besieging army amounted altogether to about 110,000 men. To supply such an immense number of men with provisions, at the furthest corner of Sicily, and to bring together all the implements and materials for the siege, was no small labour; and as the task extended over many months, this undertaking alone was calculated to strain the resources of the republic to the very utmost.

Number of
the besieg-
ing force.

The siege of Lilybæum lasted almost as long as the fabulous siege of Troy, and the hardly less fabulous one of Veii, with this difference only, that Lilybæum resisted successfully to the end of the war, and was delivered up to the Romans only in accordance with the terms of peace. We have no detailed account of this protracted struggle, but it is on the whole pretty clearly narrated in the masterly sketch of Polybius, which possesses a greater interest for us than any part of the military history of

Duration
of the
siege.

¹ Polybius, i. 39.

² It is not probable, nor attested by any ancient writer, that, as Mommsen supposes (*Röm. Gesch.* i. 533; English translation, ii. 49) the Roman fleet sailed right into the harbour of Lilybæum. On this supposition it would be unintelligible why the Romans three times endeavoured to block up the entrance to the harbour. Probably the anchoring-ground in the harbour was so near to the walls that ships stationed there were exposed to be attacked or even fired from the walls. Again in the last year of the war, when the Roman ships occupied the harbour of Drepana, they did not venture into that of Lilybæum (Polybius, i. 59, § 9), but remained in the neighbouring bays and roadsteads.

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IV.

Rome of the preceding periods. We see here exemplified not only the art of siege, in its most important features, as practised by the ancients, but we discern in it clearly the character of the two belligerent nations, the bearing of their strong and their weak points on the prosecution of the war; and we shall feel ourselves rewarded therefore by bestowing a little more attention on this memorable contest than we have given to any previous events in the military history of Rome.

Modes of
siege in
ancient
warfare.

In the art of besieging towns the Romans were but little advanced before their acquaintance with the Greeks, and even among the Greeks it was long before the art reached the highest point of perfection that it was capable of attaining in antiquity. Trenches and walls were the material difficulties with which besiegers had to contend. Before the walls could be attacked, the trenches must be filled up, and this was done with fascines and earth. As soon as the trenches were so far filled up as to allow a passage, wooden besieging towers and rams were pushed forward. These towers consisted of several stories, and were higher than the walls of the town. On the different stories soldiers were placed, armed with missiles, for the purpose of clearing the walls, or of reaching them by means of drawbridges. The rams were long beams, with iron heads, suspended under a covering roof, and were swung backwards and forwards by soldiers to make breaches in the walls. These two operations were the most important. They were supported by the artillery of the ancients—the large wooden catapults and ballistæ, a kind of gigantic crossbows, which shot off heavy darts, balls, or stones against the besieged. Where the nature of the ground permitted, mines were dug under the enemy's fortifications, and supported by beams. If these beams were burnt, the walls above immediately gave way. Against such mines the besieged dug countermines, partly to keep off the advance of the underground attack, and partly to undermine the dam and to overthrow the besieging towers that were standing on it.

All these different kinds of attack and defence were resorted to at Lilybæum. The Romans employed the crews of their ships for the works of the siege,¹ and by the aid of so many hands they soon succeeded in filling up part of the town trench, while by their wooden towers, battering-rams, protecting roofs, and projectiles, they approached the wall, destroying seven towers at the point where it joined the sea on the south, and thereby opening a wide breach. Through this breach the Romans made an attack, and penetrated into the interior of the place. But here they found that the Carthaginians had built up another wall behind the one which had been destroyed. This fact, and the violent resistance opposed to them in the streets, compelled them to retreat. Similar attempts were often made. Day after day there were bloody combats, in which more lives were lost than in open battle.² In one of these, it is said, the Romans lost 10,000 men.³ The losses on the Carthaginian side were probably not less. Under such circumstances, the ability of the besieged to resist had diminished considerably. Enthusiasm and patriotism alone can inspire courage in a reduced and exhausted garrison. But enthusiasm and patriotism were just the qualities least known in the Carthaginian mercenaries. Above all others the Gallic soldiers were the most vacillating and untrustworthy.⁴ They were inclined to mutiny;⁵ some of their leaders secretly went over to the Romans and promised them to induce their countrymen to revolt. All would have been lost, if Himilco had not been informed of the treachery by a faithful Greek, the Achæan Alexon. Not venturing to act with severity, he determined by entreaties, by presents, and by promises to keep the mercenaries up to their duty. This scheme succeeded with the venal barbarians. When the deserters approached the walls and

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Obsti-
nacy of
the siege
of Lily-
bæum.

¹ Polybius, i. 49, § 1.

² Polybius, i. 42, § 13.

³ Diodorus, xxiv. fr. 1. This evidently exaggerated statement seems traceable to Philinus.

⁴ Polybius, ii. 7, § 5.

⁵ Polybius, i. 43. Zonaras, viii. 15.

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IV.

Move-
ments of
Adherbal
and the
Cartha-
ginian
fleet.

invited their former comrades to mutiny, they were driven back by stones and arrows.

Many months had passed since the beginning of the blockade. While the Roman army had inclosed the town on the land side by a continuous circumvallation and trenches which extended in a half circle from the northern to the southern shore, the fleet had blockaded the harbour and endeavoured to obstruct all entrance by sinking stones.¹ Lilybæum was thus shut off from all communication with Carthage, and was left to itself and the courage of its garrison. But it was neither forgotten nor neglected. It might be supposed in Carthage that a town like Lilybæum would be able to hold out for some months without needing aid, and it had been well supplied with provisions before the siege began. It was well known also that if it were necessary to break through the blockade, the Roman ships would not be able to hinder it. Probably the greater part of their ships were drawn up on shore, while the rowers were employed in filling up the moat. Some few ships might be out at sea, or might be lying at anchor, ready to sail, in well-protected roadsteads; but the violent storms, and the still more dangerous shallows of that coast, rendered it impossible for the Roman captains to make the blockade of Lilybæum effective. The Carthaginian fleet which was stationed at Drepana, under the command of Adherbal, instead of attacking the Roman fleet before Lilybæum, made use of the time to scour the coasts of Italy and Sicily, and to hinder the conveyance of provisions for the supply of the immense besieging army.

Relief of
Lilybæum
by
Hannibal.

Meanwhile an expedition was fitted out in Carthage for reinforcing and victualling the garrison of Lilybæum. An enterprising admiral called Hannibal, a man not unworthy of this great name, sailed with fifty ships and 10,000 men from Africa² to the Ægatian Islands, west of Lilybæum. Here he lay, quietly hoping for a favourable

¹ Diodorus, xxiv. fr. 1. Fifteen ships laden with stones were sunk.

² Polybius, i. 44, § 2. According to Diodorus (xxiv. fr. 1), the force

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wind.¹ At last it blew strong from the west; Hannibal now unfurled all sail, and without paying attention to the Roman ships, but still fully equipped for an encounter, steered through the difficult channels between cliffs and sandbanks towards the entrance of the harbour, where the stones which the Romans had sunk had long since been washed away by the storms. The Romans, seized with astonishment and admiration, dared not obstruct the way of the Carthaginian vessels, which shot past them heavily laden, and with their decks crowded with soldiers, ready for battle.² The walls and towers of Lilybæum were lined with its valiant defenders, who, with mingled fear and hope, looked on at the grand spectacle. The harbour was gained without loss. The complete success of this undertaking inspired the besieged with fresh hope and courage, and gave the Romans warning that Lilybæum was not likely soon to be in their power.

Himilco determined to avail himself of the enthusiasm which Hannibal's arrival had stirred up. Sallying out on the following morning, he made an attempt to destroy the machines for the siege. But the Romans had anticipated this, and offered obstinate resistance. The battle was long undecided, especially near the Roman works, which the Carthaginians tried in vain to set on fire. At length Himilco saw the futility of his attempt, and commanded a retreat. In this manner the Roman soldiers were compensated for the vexation which the superiority of their enemies at sea had caused them on the previous day.

Unsuccessful
attempt of
Himilco to
destroy the
Roman
works.

amounted to 40,000 men. He relates some interesting details, but on the whole his narrative is confused and inaccurate.

¹ It has been asked (Haltaus, *Gesch. der Römer*, i. 384) why the Romans did not attack him. The reply to this question is contained in what has been stated in the text. Most of the Roman ships were drawn ashore, the crews were employed at the siege-works, and a great number of the men had already perished.

² According to Polybius (i. 44, § 4), the Romans feared to be drifted into the harbour. This shows clearly that the harbour was untenable for Roman ships. See above, p. 83, note 2.

BOOK
IV.Departure
of Hanni-
bal with
his fleet.

The night following, Hannibal sailed away again with his fleet. He went to Drepana, taking with him the horsemen, who till now had lain in Lilybæum, and were of no use there, while in the rear of the Roman army they could do excellent service, partly in harassing the enemy, and partly in obstructing the arrival of provisions by land.¹

Capture
of the
Rhodian
Hannibal.

The bold exploit of Hannibal had proved that the port of Lilybæum was open to a Carthaginian fleet. From this time even isolated vessels ventured in and out, and defied the slow Roman cruisers, who gave themselves useless trouble to intercept them. A Carthaginian captain, called the Rhodian Hannibal, made himself specially conspicuous by eluding the Romans in his fast-sailing trireme, slipping in between them and purposely allowing them almost to reach him, that he might make them the more keenly feel his superiority. The Romans, in their vexation, now sought again to block up the mouth of the harbour. But the storms and the floods mocked their endeavours. The stones, even in the act of sinking, Polybius says, were thrown on one side of the current;² but in one place the passage was narrowed, at least for a time, and, luckily for the Romans, a quick-sailing Carthaginian galley³ ran aground there, and fell into their hands. Manning it with their best rowers, they waited for the Rhodian, who, coming out of the harbour with his usual confidence, was now overtaken. Seeing that he could not escape by dint of speed, Hannibal turned round and attacked his pur-

¹ Diodorus (xxiv. fr. 1) relates that 7,000 horse, which in the beginning of the siege formed part of the garrison, were afterwards sent to Drepana because they were of no use in Lilybæum. He does not state the time when this was done. The inference contained in the text seems obvious. The cavalry could not leave Lilybæum by land, as the Romans, in the very beginning of the siege, had drawn a ditch and mound all along the land side of Lilybæum from sea to sea. The first opportunity for dispatching the cavalry by sea to Drepana presented itself when Hannibal left the port of Lilybæum, and could as easily take the men and horses as ballast.

² Polybius, i. 47, § 4.

³ This fast galley was a τετρήρης (quadriremis), i.e. a vessel with four rows of oars.—Polybius, i. 47, § 5.

suers; but he was unequally matched in strength, and was taken prisoner with his ship.

Trifling encounters like these could have but little influence on the progress of the siege. Slowly, but securely, the Roman works proceeded. The dam which levelled the filled-up moat became broader and broader; the artillery and battering-rams were directed against the towers which still remained standing; mines were dug under the second inner wall, and the besieged were too weak to keep pace with the works of the Romans by counter-mines. It appeared that the loss of Lilybæum was unavoidable unless the besieged should receive some unlooked-for aid.

In this desperate situation Himilco determined to repeat, under more favourable circumstances, the attempt which had once so signally failed.¹ One night, when a gale of wind was blowing from the west, which overthrew towers and made the buildings in the town tremble and shake, he made a sally, and this time he succeeded in setting fire to the Roman siege-works. The dry wood was at once kindled, and the violent wind fanned the flame into ungovernable fury, blowing the sparks and smoke into the eyes of the Romans, who in vain called up all their courage and perseverance in the hopeless contest with their enemies and the elements. One wooden structure after another was caught by the flames, and burnt to the ground. When the day dawned, the spot was covered with charred beams. The labour of months was destroyed in a few hours, and for the present all hope was lost of taking Lilybæum by storm.

The consuls now changed the siege into a blockade, a plan which could not hold out any prospect of success so long as the port was open. But it was not in the nature of the Romans easily to give up what they had once undertaken. Their character in some measure resembled that of the bull-dog, which when it bites will not let

CHAP.
III.

FOURTH
PERIOD,
250-249
B.C.

Distress of
the garri-
son of
Lilybæum.

Destruc-
tion of the
Roman
siege-
works.

Persever-
ance of the
Romans.

¹ Polybius, i. 48.

BOOK
IV.

Their
special
difficulties.

go. The circumvallations of the town were strengthened,¹ the two Roman camps on the north and south ends of this line were well fortified; and, thus protected against all possible attacks, the besiegers looked forward to the time when they might resume more vigorous operations.

For the present this was not possible. The Roman army had suffered great losses, not only in battle, but in the labours and privations of so prolonged a siege. The greatest difficulty was to provide an army of 100,000 men with all necessaries at such a distance from Rome.² Sicily was quite drained and impoverished. Hiero of Syracuse, it is true, made every effort in his power, but his power soon reached its limit. Italy alone could supply what was necessary, but even Italy sorely felt the pressure of the war. The Punic fleet of Drepana commanded the sea, and the dreaded Numidian horsemen, the 'Cossacks of antiquity,' overran Sicily, levied heavy contributions from the friends of the Romans, and seized the provisions which were sent by land to the camp of Lilybæum.

The winter
blockade.

The winter had come, with its heavy rains, its storms, and all its usual discomforts. One of the two consuls, with two legions, returned home; the rest of the army remained in the fortified camp before Lilybæum. The Roman soldiers were not accustomed to pass the bad season of the year in tents, exposed to wet, cold, and all kinds of privations. They were in want of indispensable necessaries. The consuls had hoped to be able in the course of the summer to take Lilybæum by storm,³ and therefore the troops were probably not prepared for a winter campaign. Added to all this came hunger, the worst of all evils at this juncture, bearing in its train ravaging sickness. Ten thousand men succumbed to these sufferings,⁴ and the survivors were in such pitiable case that they were like a besieged garrison in the last stage of exhaustion.

¹ Thus is explained the fact that Polybius speaks twice of the construction of lines of circumvallation—i. 42, § 8, and i. 48, § 10.

² The siege of Sebastopol, 1854–55, affords a parallel case and an illustration.

³ Polybius, i. 41, § 4.

⁴ Diodorus, *loc. cit.* p. 86.

In Rome it was felt that the Roman fleet, which lay useless on the shore, must be once more equipped. The following year therefore (249) the consul P. Claudius Pulcher, the son of Appius Claudius the Blind, was sent to Sicily with a new consular army, and a division of 10,000 recruits as rowers, to fill up the gaps which fatigue, privations, and sickness had caused in the crews of the fleet. The object of this reinforcement could only be that of attacking the Carthaginian fleet under Adherbal in Drepana, for this fleet was the chief cause of all the misery which had befallen the besieging army. Claudius had without doubt received an express order to hazard a battle by sea. It was nothing but the ill-success of this undertaking that made him afterwards an object of the accusation and reproaches which all unsuccessful generals have to expect. He began by re-establishing strict discipline in the army, and thus he made many enemies. He then vainly sought once more to block up the entrance to the harbour of Lilybæum, and thus to cut off the supply of provisions to the town, which during the winter had been effected without any difficulty. His next step was to equip his fleet, mixing the new rowers with those still left of the old ones, and manning the ships with the picked men of the legion, especially volunteers, who expected certain victory and rich spoil; and, after holding a council of war, in which his scheme was approved, he sailed away from Lilybæum in the stillness of midnight, to surprise the Carthaginian fleet in the harbour of Drepana, which he reached the following morning. Keeping his ships on the right close to shore, he entered the harbour, which, on the south of a crescent-shaped peninsula, opens out towards the west in the form of a trumpet. Adherbal, though unprepared and surprised, formed his plans without delay, and his arrangements for the battle were made as soon as the ships of the enemy came in sight. His fleet was promptly manned and ready for the engagement; and while the Romans sailed slowly in at one side of the harbour, he left it on the other and stood out to sea. Claudius, to avoid

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PERIOD,
250-249
B.C.Defeat of
Claudius
Pulcher at
Drepana.

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IV.

being shut up in the harbour, gave the order to return. While the Roman ships were one after another obeying this order, they got entangled, broke their oars, hampered each other in their movements, and fell into helpless confusion. Adherbal seized the opportunity for making the attack. The Romans, close to the shore and in the greatest disorder and dismay, were unable to retreat, manœuvre, or assist each other. Almost without resistance they fell into the hands of the Carthaginians, or were wrecked in the shallows near the neighbouring coast. Only thirty ships out of two hundred and ten escaped. Ninety-three were taken with all their crews; the others were sunk or run ashore. Twenty thousand men,¹ the flower of the Roman army, were taken prisoners. Eight thousand were killed in battle, and many of those who saved themselves from the wrecks fell into the hands of the Carthaginians when they reached the land. It was a day of terror, such as Rome had not experienced since the Allia—the first great decisive defeat by sea during the whole war, disastrous by the multiplied miseries which it occasioned, but still more disastrous as causing the prolongation of the war for eight years more.²

Dictator-
ship of A.
Atilius
Calatinus.

The consul Claudius escaped, but an evil reception awaited him in Rome. It was not customary, it is true, for the Romans to nail their unsuccessful generals to the cross, as the Carthaginians often did; on the contrary, like Sulpicius after the Allia, and like Varro, at a later period, after Cannæ, they were treated mostly with

¹ Polybius (i. 51) does not state the total of the Roman fleet, but mentions only the number of the ships that escaped (30), and of those that were taken with their crews (93). This makes 123 in all. Orosius (iv. 10) gives in round numbers 120 ships as the strength of the Roman fleet, reckoning 90 as taken and 30 as saved. But Diodorus (xxiv. fr. 1) states the number of Roman vessels as 210, and Eutropius (ii. 26) even at 220. The latter writer agrees with Polybius and Orosius in giving 90 and 30 as the numbers of the captured and saved vessels respectively. The rest, he says, were sunk. According to his calculation they amounted to 100. It is strange that Polybius does not refer to these, and it is not likely that he includes them among the 93 vessels taken. He also omits all mention of the number of killed and of the prisoners taken, which we borrow from Orosius.

² Polybius, i. 49–51.

indulgence, and sometimes with honour. But Claudius belonged to a house which, although one of the most distinguished among the Roman nobility, had many enemies, and his pride could not stoop to humility and conciliation. With haughty mien and lofty bearing he returned to Rome; and when he was requested to nominate a dictator, as the necessities of the republic were urgent, he named, in utter contempt of the public feeling, his servant and client Glicia.¹ This was too much for the Roman senate. Glicia was compelled to lay down the dictatorship, and the senate, setting aside the old constitutional practice, and dispensing with the nomination by the consul, appointed A. Atilius Calatinus, who made Metellus, the hero of Panormus, his master of the horse. After the expiration of his year of office, Claudius was accused before the people on a capital charge, and only escaped condemnation by the timely outburst of a thunderstorm, which interrupted the proceedings.² It seems, however, that he was afterwards condemned to pay a fine.³ Henceforth he disappears from the page of history. It is uncertain whether he went into exile, or whether he soon died. At any rate he was not alive three years later, for it is reported that at that time, his sister, a Claudian as proud as himself, said once, when annoyed by a crowd in the street, she wished her brother were alive to lose another battle, that some of the useless people might be got rid of.⁴

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FOURTH
PERIOD,
250-249
B.C.

The hypocritical piety of a time in which the whole of religion was nothing but an empty form, attributed the defeat at Drepana to the godlessness of Claudius. On the morning of the battle, when he was informed that the sacred fowls would not eat, he ordered them, it is said, to be cast into the sea, that at least they might drink. It is a pity that anecdotes such as these are so related by

Alleged
profanity
of
Claudius.

¹ Livy, epit. 19; Suetonius, *Tib.* 2.

² Valerius Maximus, viii. 1, 4.

³ Polybius, i. 52, § 3.—Scholia Bobiensia ad Cicer. *De Natura Deorum*, ii. 3, 7.

⁴ Gellius, x. 6; Suetonius, *Tib.* 2.

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Cicero as to leave the impression that he himself recognised the wrath of the avenging gods in the fate of Claudius. Perhaps the story is not true, but like so many similar tales it was inspired by pious terror¹ after the day of the misfortune.² If it could, however, be proved to be true, it would show that the national faith had disappeared among the higher classes of the Roman people in the first Punic war. For a single individual would never venture on such ridicule of the popular superstitions if he were not sure of the approval of those on whose opinion he lays great weight. That the sacred fowls and the whole apparatus of auspices had not the smallest share in determining the result of the battle, the Romans knew, in the time of Claudius and of Cicero, as well as we do. The reason of the defeat lay in the superiority of the Carthaginian admiral and seamen, and the inexperience of the Roman consul and crews. The Roman nation ought to have accused itself for having placed such a man as Claudius at the head of the fleet, and for having manned the vessels with men who for the most part could work with the plough and the spade, but who knew nothing of handling an oar. The misfortune of Rome is attributable to the cumbersome Roman ships, and to the 10,000 newly levied rowers, who were sent by land to Rhegium, and from Messana to Lilybæum, and who probably knew nothing of the sea.³

Energy of
the Car-
thaginians.

The Carthaginians made the best use of their success. Immediately after their victory at Drepana, a division of their fleet sailed to Panormus, where Roman transport

¹ It was a consolation to feel, as Florus (ii. 2) says, 'that Claudius was overthrown, not by the enemy, but by the gods themselves, whose auspices he had despised.'

² The first who reports it is Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, ii. 3, 7.

³ This confirms our hypothesis that in the first Roman fleet the great majority of the crews consisted, not of landsmen, but of veteran seamen. These also manned the Roman fleet that was victorious at Ecnomus. The loss of these men in war and shipwrecks explains the failure of the second expedition in the African Syrtis, and the great disasters on the coast of Sicily and Italy (255 and 253 B.C.), whilst the assiduous practice of the rowers in 241 B.C. accounts for the victory at the Ægæan Islands.—Polybius, i. 59, § 12.

ships lay with provisions for the army before Lilybæum. These now fell into the hands of the Carthaginians, and served to supply the garrison of Lilybæum abundantly, while the Romans before the walls were in want of the merest necessities. The remainder of the Roman fleet was now attacked at Lilybæum. Many ships were burnt, others were drawn from the shore into the sea, and carried away; at the same time Himilco made a sally and attacked the Roman camp, but had to retreat without accomplishing his purpose.

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250-249
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The disaster of Drepana was soon after almost equalled by another calamity. Whilst the consul P. Claudius attacked the Carthaginian fleet with such bad success, his colleague L. Junius Pullus, having loaded eight hundred transports in Italy and in Sicily with provisions for the army, had sailed to Syracuse. With a fleet of a hundred and twenty ships of war, he wished to convoy this great number of vessels along the south coast of Sicily to Lilybæum. But the provisions had not yet all arrived in Syracuse when the necessities of the army compelled him to send off at least a part of the fleet under the protection of a proportionate number of war ships. These now sailed round the promontory of Pachynus (Cape Passaro), and had advanced as far as the neighbourhood of Ecnomus, where the Romans seven years before had gained their most brilliant naval victory over the Punians, when they suddenly found themselves face to face with a powerful hostile fleet consisting of a hundred and twenty ships. There was nothing left for them but to shelter their vessels as well as they could along the shore. But this could not be effected without much loss. Seventeen of their war ships were sunk, and thirteen were rendered useless; of their ships of burden, fifty went down. The others kept close to the shore, under the protection of the troops and of some catapults from the small neighbouring town of Phintias. After this partial success the Carthaginian admiral Carthalo waited for the arrival of the consul, hoping that he, with his ships of war, would accept battle. But when

Destruction of the
Roman
fleet and
transport
ships
under L.
Junius.

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Junius became aware of the state of things, he immediately turned back, to seek shelter in the harbour of Syracuse for himself and his great transport fleet. Himilco followed him and overtook him near Camarina. Just at this time signs were seen of a storm gathering from the south, which on this exposed coast involves the greatest danger. The Carthaginians, therefore, gave up the idea of attacking, and sailed in great haste in the direction of the promontory Pachynus, behind which they cast anchor in a place of safety. The Roman fleet, on the other hand, was overtaken by the storm, and suffered so terribly that of the transport ships not one was saved, and of the hundred and five war ships, only two. Many of the crew may have saved themselves by swimming to land, but the provisions were certainly all lost.¹

Seizure of
the temple
of the
Erycinian
Venus by
the consul
Junius.

The destruction of this fleet crowned the series of misfortunes which befell the Romans in the year 249 B.C., the most dismal time of the whole war. It seemed impossible to fight against such adverse fate, and voices were heard in the senate urging the termination of this ruinous war.² But pusillanimity in trouble had no place in the Roman character. A defeat only acted as a spur to new exertions and more determined perseverance. Immediately after the great losses at Drepana and Camarina, the consul Junius resumed the attack, as though he would not allow the Carthaginians time to be aware of having gained any advantage. A large portion of his crew had been saved. He was able therefore to bring reinforcements into

¹ The report of Diodorus (xxiv. fr. 1) is more full, and seems more accurate than that of Polybius (i. 52-54), who betrays the wish to attribute the losses of the Romans more to the action of the elements than to the courage of the Carthaginians. Moreover, Polybius is here guilty of an error, in calling the consul Junius the successor of Claudius, instead of his colleague, and therefore placing the destruction of the Roman fleet at Camarina in the year 248 instead of 249.

² Zonaras (viii. 15) reports that a senator who spoke in favour of peace was immediately killed in the senate-house. It is hardly necessary to say that this is an invention. Perhaps it came from a Carthaginian source, for no one acquainted with the dignity and sobriety of the Roman senate could have thought such an act possible.

the camp before Lilybæum, and he succeeded in establishing himself at the foot of Mount Eryx, not far from Drepana, which town he partially blockaded in the hope that he might thus prevent the Carthaginians sallying thence and overrunning the country. Hamilcar had destroyed the old town of Eryx some years before,¹ and had settled the inhabitants in Drepana. On the summit of the mountain, looking over a vast extent of sea, stood the temple of the Erycinian Venus, which, according to a Roman legend, was founded by Æneas, and was one of the richest and most celebrated of ancient temples. This was a strong position, easily defended; and, after the destruction of the town of Eryx by the Carthaginians, it had remained in their possession and was used as a watch tower. Junius, by a surprise, seized this temple, thus securing a point which, during the subsequent years of the war, was of great importance to the Romans.

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Another undertaking of Junius was less successful in its result. He endeavoured to establish himself on the coast between Drepana and Lilybæum on a promontory stretching out into the sea, called Ægithallus. Here he was surrounded by the Carthaginians in the night, and taken prisoner, with part of his troops.²

Capture of
Junius by
the Car-
thaginians.*Fifth Period, 248-241 B.C.*

HAMILCAR BARCAS. BATTLE AT THE ÆGATIAN ISLANDS.

PEACE.

From this time the character of the war changes. The great enterprises of the previous years were succeeded by hostilities on a small scale, which could not lead to a final decision. The Romans again gave up the naval war, and determined to confine themselves to the blockade of Lilybæum and Drepana. These were the only two places

Ravages of
the Car-
thaginian
fleet.¹ See above, p. 60.² Zonaras, viii. 15. If it be true, as Cicero reports (*De Divin.* ii. 33, 21), that Junius destroyed himself, this statement may still be reconciled with that of Zonaras.

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remaining in Sicily for them to conquer. If they could only succeed in blocking up the Carthaginians in these places, Sicily might be regarded as a Roman possession, and the object of the war would be attained. This blockade demanded, it is true, continued sacrifices and exertions. But during the whole of the war the Carthaginians had hardly made any attempt to issue from their strongholds and to overrun Sicily, as in former times. A comparatively small force, therefore, was sufficient to observe and to restrain them. The Carthaginian fleet, which had had undisputed rule of the sea, could not be warded off in the same way. It could not be confined and watched in one place.¹ The whole extent of the Italian and Sicilian coast was at all times exposed to its attacks. To meet these numerous attacks colonies of Roman citizens had been established in several sea towns. The number of these was now augmented by the colonies Alsium and Fregellæ—a sign that even the immediate neighbourhood of Rome was not safe from Carthaginian cruisers. The coast towns were, however, not entirely helpless, even without the assistance of Roman colonists. As the instance of the small town Phintias, on the south coast of Italy, shows,² they had catapults and ballistæ, which they used as strand batteries to keep off the enemy's ships. The larger, especially the Greek towns, were protected by walls, and the peasants in the open country found in them a temporary refuge, with their goods and chattels, until the enemy had retreated. In time the Romans, Greeks, and Etruscans also practised this kind of privateering, which, like the piracy of antiquity in general, and of the middle ages, occupied itself not so much with the taking of vessels on the high seas as with pillaging the coasts. War began now to be an occupation on the Roman side, which enriched a few citizens, whilst the community at large was impoverished. To what extent this privateering was gradually carried we learn

¹ Orosius, iv. 10.

² Here the Romans drew their ships on shore and defended them with artillery from Phintias. See above, p. 95.

from the story of an attack on the African town Hippo.¹ The Roman adventurers sailed into the harbour, plundered and destroyed a great part of the town, and escaped at last, though with some trouble, over the chain with which the Carthaginians had in the meantime attempted to close the harbour.

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III.

FIFTH
PERIOD,
248-241
B.C.

Two events belonging to the years 248 and 247 may enable us to form an idea of the situation of the Roman republic at this time. These are the renewal of the alliance with Hiero, and the exchange of Roman and Carthaginian prisoners. In the year 263, Rome had granted to Hiero only a truce and an alliance for fifteen years. During this long and trying period Hiero proved himself a faithful and indispensable ally. More than once circumstances had occurred in which, not merely enmity, but even neutrality on the part of Hiero would have been fatal to Rome. The Romans could not afford to dispense with such a friend. They therefore now renewed the alliance for an indefinite period, and Hiero was released from all compulsory service for the future.

Renewal of
the alli-
ance with
Hiero.

The second event, the exchange of the Roman and Carthaginian prisoners,² would not be surprising if it were not for the tradition that such a measure had been proposed by Carthage three years before (250 B.C.), and rejected by Rome on the advice of Regulus. Be this as it may, the exchange of prisoners in the year 247 cannot be denied, and it follows that the losses of the Romans, especially in the battle of Drepana, were sensibly felt. The consul Junius was probably among the prisoners now set free.³

Exchange
of
prisoners
with
Carthage.

In Sicily the war was now locally confined to the extreme west. The chief command over the Carthaginians was given in the year 247 to Hamilcar, surnamed Barcas, that is 'Lightning,' the great father of a still greater son—

Arrival of
Hamilcar
Barcas.

¹ Zonaras, viii. 16.

² Zonaras, viii. 16. Livy, epit. 19.

³ It looks very much like an empty boast, if the Roman historians reported that the number of the Carthaginian prisoners was much larger than that of the Romans. It seems unlikely that the Carthaginians ever ransomed their mercenaries. It was probably easier, cheaper, and safer to engage new ones.

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of Hannibal, who made this name above all others a terror to the Romans, and crowned it with glory for all time. Hamilcar, though still a young man, showed at once that he was possessed of more brilliant military talent than any officer whom Carthage had hitherto placed in command of her troops. He was not only a brave soldier but an accomplished politician.¹ With the small means which his exhausted country placed at his disposal, he was able so to carry on the war for six years longer than when at last the defeat of the Carthaginian fleet, occasioned by no fault of his, compelled Carthage to make peace, this peace was made on conditions which left Carthage an independent and powerful state.

His treatment of the Gallic mercenaries.

When Hamilcar arrived in Sicily, he found the Gallic mercenaries in a state of mutiny. The prayers, promises, and donatives by which three years before Himilco had purchased the fidelity of his mercenaries in Lilybæum, were more likely to encourage them in their insubordination than to keep them in strict discipline. Different and more efficient means were now applied to coerce them. The mutineers were punished without mercy. Some were sent to Carthage or exposed on desert islands, others thrown overboard, and the remainder surprised and massacred by night.

Operations of Hamilcar.

In a war carried on with such soldiers, even the best general had hardly any prospect of success against a national army like the Roman. So much the more brilliant appears the genius of the Carthaginian leader, who made his own personal influence among the troops supply the place of patriotic enthusiasm. He could not carry on the war on a grand scale. Neither the numbers nor the fidelity and skill of his troops were such that he could venture to attack the Roman armies, which from their fortified camps were threatening Lilybæum and Drepana. Compelled to conduct the war differently,

¹ Diodorus (xxiv. 1), following, probably, Philinus, applies to him the Homeric verse—

ἀμφοτέρων βασιλεύς τ' ἀγαθὸς κρατερὸς τ' αἰχμήτης.

he took possession of Mount Heirete (now Monte Pellegrino), near Panormus, whose precipitous sides made it a natural fortress, while on its level summit some ground was left for cultivation, and its nearness to the sea secured immediate communication with the fleet. While, therefore, the Romans lay before the two Carthaginian fortresses, Hamilcar threatened Panormus, now the most important possession of the Romans in the whole of Sicily; for not only had the reinforcements and supplies of their army to be forwarded from it, but it was the only place through which direct communication with Italy by sea was kept up. By the Carthaginian garrison at Heirete, not only was the importance of Panormus neutralised, but its safety was endangered, and Rome was compelled to keep a large garrison in it.

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For three years this state of things continued. From his impregnable rocky citadel, Hamilcar, as irresistible as the lightning whose name he bore, attacked the Romans whenever he chose, by sea or by land, in Italy or in Sicily. He laid waste the coasts of Bruttium and Lucania, and penetrated northwards as far as Cumæ. No part of Sicily was secure from his attacks. His adventurous raids extended as far as Mount Ætna. When he returned from such expeditions he made the Romans feel his presence. The task of describing the almost uninterrupted fighting between the Romans and the Carthaginians before Panormus seemed to Polybius almost as impossible as to follow every blow, every parry, and every turn of two pugilists.¹ The detail of such encounters escapes observation. It is only the bearing of the combatants in general and the result of which we become aware. Hamilcar, with his mercenaries, supported gloriously and successfully the unequal struggle with the Roman legions. The war thus waged by him was a prelude to the battles which his illustrious son was to fight on Italian soil. At length in the year 244 he left Heirete unconquered, and chose a new battle-field in a

Occupation of
Eryx by
Hamilcar.

¹ Polybius, i. 57, § 1.

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much more difficult situation on Mount Eryx, in the immediate neighbourhood of Drepana.¹ The reason for this change is not reported. Perhaps it may have been the precarious position of Drepana, which the Romans continued to besiege with increasing vigour. Close by Drepana, at the foot of the mountain, the Romans had an intrenched camp. On the summit they held the temple of Venus. Half way up the hill, on the slope towards Drepana, lay the ancient town of Eryx, demolished by the Carthaginians in the fifth year of the war,² but now partly restored and converted into a Roman fortification. This post Hamilcar surprised and stormed in a night attack, and then took up a strong position between the Romans at the foot and those at the top of the mountain. He kept open his communication both with the sea and with the garrison at Drepana, though on difficult roads. It is easy to conceive how dangerous such a position was in the midst of the enemy. Predatory excursions could hardly be undertaken from this point. Instead of gain and spoil the soldiers encountered dangers and privations; the fidelity of the mercenaries again wavered, and they were on the point of betraying their position and surrendering to the Romans, when the watchfulness of Hamilcar anticipated their intentions and compelled them to fly to the Roman camp to escape his revenge. The Romans did what they had never done before. They took these Gallic troops as mercenaries into their pay.³ We need no other evidence to prove the extremity to which Rome was now reduced.

Sufferings
of the
Roman
allies.

The war now really began to undermine the Roman state. It is impossible to ascertain the weight of the burdens which fell upon the allies. Of their contributions and their services, their contingents for the army and the fleet, the Roman historians purposely tell

¹ Polybius, i. 58, § 2.

² Diodorus, xxiii. fr. 9. See above, p. 60.

³ After the war they got rid of this band. They disarmed the men and sent them out of Italy.—Polybius, ii. 7, § 10.

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us nothing. But we know, without any such record, that they furnished at least one-half of the land army, and almost all the crews of the fleet. The thousands who perished in the battles at sea and in the wrecks were, for the most part, maritime allies (*socii navales*) who had been pressed into the Roman service. Nothing is more natural than that the extreme misery and horror of the hated and dreaded service should have excited them to resistance, which could only be quelled with great difficulty. What Italy suffered by the predatory incursions of the Carthaginians is beyond our calculation. But an idea of the losses which this war caused to Italy is given by the census of this time. While in the year 252 B.C. the number of Roman citizens was 297,797, it fell to 251,222 in the year 247 B.C., being reduced in five years by one-sixth.

The prosperity of the people suffered in proportion. The trade of Rome and of the maritime towns of Italy was annihilated. The union of so many formerly independent political communities into one large state, which, by putting down all internal wars seemed so likely to promote peaceful development and progress, involved them all in the long war with Carthage, and exposed them all alike to the same distress. One sign of this distress is the debasement of the coin. Before the war the old Roman As was stamped, or rather cast, full weight. But by degrees it sank down to one-half, one-third, a quarter, and in the end to one-sixth of the original weight, so that a coin of two ounces in weight was substituted, at least in name, for the original As of twelve ounces,¹ by which, of course, a proportionate reduction of

General
impover-
ishment of
the Roman
state.

¹ Asses of the full weight of twelve ounces have not been preserved. It is supposed that they were never struck of the full nominal value, to keep them from being melted down for other purposes, and to cover the cost of minting (Mommson, *Röm. Münzwesen*, p. 261). It seems, however, that a very slight reduction from the full weight would have answered these purposes. If, therefore, Asses of eleven and even of nine ounces are called heavy or full Asses, the term is applicable only from the contrast of the later Asses, which ranged between five and a half and two ounces. It would seem that, in reality,

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debts—in other words, a general bankruptcy—was caused. It was natural that in this gradually increasing poverty of the state, some individuals should become rich. War has always the effect of injuring general prosperity for the benefit of a few; just as diseases, which waste the body, often swell the growth of one particular part. In war, certain branches of industry and trade flourish. Adventurers, contractors, capitalists make their most successful speculations. In antiquity, the booty of war constituted a source of great profit for a few, particularly because the prisoners were made slaves. The armies, accordingly, were followed by a great number of traders who understood how to turn the ignorance and recklessness of the soldiers to their own advantage, in buying their spoils and purchasing slaves and articles of value at the auctions which were held from time to time. Another mode of acquiring wealth called forth by the war after the destruction of peaceful industry and trade was privateering, a speculation involving risks,¹ like the slave trade and the blockade-running of modern times. This kind of private enterprise had the further advantage of injuring the enemy, and formed a naval reserve, destined at no distant period to be of the most important service.

Tedious
prolonga-
tion of the
war.

The war in Sicily made no progress. The siege of Lilybæum, which had now continued for nine years, was carried on with considerably less energy since the failure of the first attack, and its object was plainly to keep the Carthaginians in the town. The lingering siege of Drepana was equally ineffectual. The sea was free, and the garrisons of both towns were thus furnished with all necessaries. It was not possible to dislodge Hamilcar from Mount Eryx. The Roman consuls, who during the last six years of the war had successively commanded in

even the older Asses of eleven or nine ounces were minted in consequence of an intentional reduction of the standard equivalent to a reduction of debts.

¹ Old Polyphemus says of pirates (Homer's *Odyssey*, ix. 255)—

ψυχὰς παρθέμενοι κακὸν ἀλλοδαποῖσι φέροντες.

Sicily, could boast of no success which might warrant them in claiming a triumph, in spite of the easy conditions on which this distinction might be obtained.

At length the Roman government determined to try the only means by which the war could be brought to an end, and once more to attack the Carthaginians by sea. The finances of the state were not in a condition to furnish means for building and equipping a new fleet. The Romans therefore followed the example of Athens, and called up the richest citizens, in the ratio of their property, either to supply ships or to unite with others in doing so. The Roman historians were pleased to extol this manner of raising a new fleet as a sign of devotion and patriotism. It was, however, in reality only a compulsory loan, which the state imposed upon those who had suffered least from the war, and had probably enjoyed great gains. The owners of privateers had the obligation and the means of supporting the state in the manner just described. A new fleet of two hundred ships was thus fitted out and sent to Sicily under the consul C. Lutatius Catulus in the year 242. The Carthaginians had not thought it necessary to maintain a fleet in the Sicilian waters since the defeat of the Roman navy in the year 249. Their ships were otherwise engaged in the very lucrative piratical war on the coasts of Italy and Sicily. Lutatius therefore found the harbour of Drepana unoccupied. He made some attacks on the town from the sea and the land side, but his chief energies were directed to the training and practising of his crews, thus avoiding the mistake by which the battle of Drepana was lost. He exercised his men during the whole of the summer, autumn, and winter in rowing, and took care that his pilots should be minutely acquainted with the nature of a coast singularly dangerous from its many shallows. Thus he anticipated with confidence a struggle which could no longer be delayed if Carthage did not wish to sacrifice her two fortresses on the coast.¹

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FIFTH
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Dispatch
of Caius
Lutatius
Catulus
with a
fleet to
Sicily.

¹ Polybius, i. 59. Zonaras, viii. 17.

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Defeat of
the Car-
thaginians
at the
Ægatian
Islands.

The die was cast in March the following year (241). A Carthaginian fleet, heavily laden with provisions for the troops in Sicily, appeared near the Ægatian Islands. The object of the commander was to land the provisions, to take Hamilcar, with a body of soldiers, on board, and then to give battle to the Romans. This object was frustrated by the promptness of Catulus, who, although wounded, took part in the battle after having handed over the command to the prætor Q. Valerius Falto. When the Carthaginians approached with full sail, favoured by a strong west wind, the Roman ships advanced, and compelled them to give battle. It was soon decided. A complete and brilliant victory crowned the last heroic exertions of the Romans. Fifty ships of the enemy were sunk, seventy were taken with their crews, amounting to 10,000 men; the rest, favoured by a sudden change of wind, escaped to Carthage.

Negotia-
tions for
peace.

The defeat of the Carthaginians was not so great as that of the Romans had been at Drepana. But Carthage was exhausted and discouraged. Perhaps she was alarmed by the premonitory signs of the terrible war with the mercenaries which soon after brought her to the very brink of ruin. Sicily had now been for several years as good as lost to the Carthaginians. The continuation of the war held out to them no prospect of winning back their former possessions in that island. Carthage therefore decided on proposing terms of peace, and she might entertain the hope that Rome would be not less ready to bring the war to a close. The negotiations were carried on by Hamilcar Barcas and the consul Lutatius as plenipotentiaries. At first the Romans insisted on dishonourable conditions. They demanded that the Carthaginians should lay down their arms, deliver up the deserters, and pass under the yoke. But Hamilcar indignantly refused these terms, and declared he would rather die in battle than deliver up to the enemy the arms with which he was intrusted for the defence of his country. Lutatius therefore waived this claim, the more readily as he wished to bring the negotiations speedily to an end, in order to secure for himself the credit

of having brought the long war to a close. The preliminaries of peace were thus settled. Carthage engaged to evacuate Sicily; not to make war upon Hiero of Syracuse; to give up all Roman prisoners without ransom, and to pay a sum of 2,200 talents in twenty years. On the whole the Roman senate and people approved of these terms. The formal conditions of the treaty involved the abandonment by Carthage of the smaller islands between Sicily and Italy (which was a matter of course), as well as the mutual obligation that each should refrain from attacking and injuring the allies of the other, or entering into an alliance with them; but the war indemnity imposed on Carthage was raised by 1,000 talents, to be paid at once.

Thus ended at length the war for the possession of Sicily, which had lasted uninterruptedly for three-and-twenty years,—the greatest struggle known to the generation then living. The most beautiful island of the Mediterranean, the possession of which had been contested for centuries by Greeks and Punians, was wrested from them both by a people who till quite lately had lain beyond the horizon of the civilised nations of the ancient world, which had exercised no influence on their political system and international dealings, and had never been even taken into account. Before the war with Pyrrhus, Rome was among the Mediterranean states of antiquity what Russia was in Europe before Peter the Great and the war with Charles XII. By her heroic and successful opposition to the interference of Pyrrhus in the affairs of Italy, Rome emerged from obscurity, and made herself known to the rulers of Egypt, Macedonia, and Syria as a power with which they might soon have to deal.

After the departure of Pyrrhus (273 B.C.) an Egyptian embassy was sent to Rome, to offer, in the name of King Ptolemy Philadelphus, a treaty of amity, which the Roman senate willingly accepted.¹ About the same time

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Position of
the Ro-
mans at
the close
of the war.

Embassies
to Rome
from
foreign
states.

¹ Zonaras, viii. 6: Καὶ Πτολεμαῖος δὲ ὁ Φιλάδελφος τὸν τε Πύρρον κακῶς ἀπηλλακόμενος καὶ τοὺς Ῥωμαίους ἀξιομαχόμενος δῶρά τε αὐτοῖς πέμψει καὶ

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messengers came to Rome from Apollonia, a flourishing Greek town on the Adriatic, perhaps for the same purpose. This was the time when the Greek world was opening to the Romans, when Greek art, language, and literature made their first entry into Italy—an event which sixteen centuries afterwards was to be followed by a second invasion of Greek learning. The Sicilian war was to a great extent a Greek war. For the first time all the western Greeks united in one great league against an ancient foe of the Hellenic name; and Rome, which was at the head of this league, appeared to the Greeks in the mother country, in Asia and Egypt, more and more as a new leading power whose friendship it was worth while to secure. No wonder that the history of this people began now to have the greatest possible interest for the Greeks, and that the first attempts of the Romans in writing history were made in the Greek language, and were intended for the Greek people.

Changes in
the mili-
tary insti-
tutions of
Rome.

While Rome, by the conquest of Sicily, gained, with regard to other powers, a position of importance and influence, it became unmistakeably clear for the first time that old institutions, suited for a town community and for the simplicity of ancient life, were insufficient for a more extended field of political and military operations. The Roman military system was organised for the defence of narrow boundaries, and not for aggressive warfare in distant parts. The universal duty of military service and the periodical formation of new armies, which was a consequence of it, had not appeared prejudicial in the wars with the Italian nations, who had the same institutions, and as long as the theatre of war was the immediate neighbourhood of Rome. When, however, it became no longer possible to dismiss every legion after the summer campaign, it was at once seen that a citizen army on the old plan had great military and economical disadvantages. The peasants, who were taken from their homesteads, grew

δημολογίαν ἐποίησαντο. Valerius Maximus, iv. 3, 10; Livy, epit. 14; Dion Cassius, fr. 121.

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impatient of prolonged service, or if they were ordered into distant countries like Africa.¹ It was necessary to steer a middle course, and to let at least one consular army return annually from Sicily to Rome.² Only two legions wintered regularly at the seat of war, to the great injury of military operations. Thus the time of service of the Roman soldiers was lengthened out to a year and a half. Even this for a continuance caused great difficulty. It was necessary to offer the soldiers some compensation for their long absence from home. This was effected in two ways, first by allowing them the spoils taken in war, and, secondly, by offering them a reward after the expiration of their time of service. The prospect of booty operated on them much as their pay influenced the mercenaries. It was a means for making the universal military service less onerous, for it could not fail to draw volunteers into the army.³ The granting of lands to veterans also served to render service in the legions less obnoxious. These military colonies, the traces of which are even now apparent,⁴ are not

¹ The same causes are in operation even now, and make it impossible in a country like England to introduce the conscription for military service. Englishmen will never submit to be forced into military service abroad, especially in the colonies. They acknowledge only the general obligation of defending their own country. For the same reason the French law of conscription admits of substitutes. Even in France, the sons of the first families would not go to serve on compulsion as common soldiers in Algiers or Cochin China. During the Crimean war, one-third of the men liable to be draughted paid for substitutes. In Germany, the universal obligation of serving in the army can be carried out only because Germany has no colonies and carries on no wars in distant parts. But even in Germany, the system, if tested by a long war, would probably break down; and it is modified to a considerable extent by the law which enables young men of higher education to go through their military duties in a single year instead of three.

² This appears to have been the rule, and it was applied even to the corps which was sent to Africa under Regulus.

³ This had always been the practice. But it depended on the decision of the general whether the booty was to be given to the troops or to be reserved for the exigencies of the state.

⁴ According to Pliny (*Hist. Nat.* vii. 45), L. Metellus, the victor of Panormus, was once a member of a commission of fifteen men for the division of land (*quindecimviri agris dandis*). We do not know when this commission was appointed; perhaps it was during the last years of the war. An extensive assignation of land to veteran soldiers took place after the end of the Hannibalian war.—Liv. *xxx.* 41, 49.

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tion of the
Roman
army.

therefore to be regarded as a symptom of the disorders of the state consequent upon the civil wars. They were a necessary result of the Roman military system;¹ and as long as there was unoccupied uncultivated land at the disposal of the state, such a measure, far from being hurtful, might even possess great advantages for the well-being of the state, as well as for the veterans.²

Considering the military training of the Roman soldiers, and the simplicity of the old tactics, the frequent change of the men in the legions was of less consequence than we might suppose, especially as the officers did not, as a matter of course, leave the service with the disbanded troops. When the rank and file were released from their military duty, the staff of the legion, it is true, did not remain; but it was in the nature of things that the centurions and military tribunes of a disbanded legion should be for the most part chosen again to form a new one. The military service is for the common soldiers only a temporary duty, but it constitutes a profession for the officers. The Roman centurion was the principal nerve of the legions, and for the most part repaired what the inexperience of the recruits and the want of skill in the commanders had spoilt. Regular promotion, according to merit, secured the continuance of the centurions in the army, and placed the most experienced of them at the head of the legion, as military tribunes. They were to the army what the paid clerks were to the civil magistrates—the embodiment of professional experience and the guardians of discipline.

Evil of
annually
elected
generals.

Such men were the more necessary as the Romans continued the practice of annually changing their commanders—

¹ In a similar manner, in Prussia, and other countries where the Prussian military system is adopted, the need is felt of providing civil employments for those soldiers who voluntarily serve in the army beyond the term fixed by law. These men form the staff of non-commissioned officers. They are eminently qualified for the lower grades of the civil service.

² After the Crimean war the attempt was made by the British government to establish the German Legion as colonists in South Africa. The failure of this attempt does not prove the system to be wrong.

in-chief. There was no greater obstacle to the military successes of the Romans than this system.¹ It suited only the old time when the dimensions of the state were small. In the annual campaigns against the Æquians and the Volscians, which often lasted only a few weeks, a commander needed no especial military education. But in the Samnite wars, a perceptible lack of experience, and more particularly of strategic skill, on the part of the consuls, delayed the victory for a long time. These defects were far more deeply felt in Sicily. Before a new commander had had time to become acquainted with the conditions of the task before him, even before he was on an intimate footing with his own troops, or knew what sort of enemy he had to oppose, the greatest part of his time of office had probably expired, and his successor might perhaps be on his way to relieve him. If, urged by a natural ambition, he sought to mark his consulship by some brilliant action, he was apt to plunge into desperate undertakings, and reaped disgrace and loss instead of the hoped-for victory. This was the inevitable result, even if the consuls elected were good generals and brave soldiers. But the issue of the elections was dependent on other conditions than the military qualities of the candidates, and the frequent election of incapable officers was the inevitable result. Only when there was an urgent cause, the people of necessity elected experienced generals. Under ordinary circumstances, the struggle of parties, or the influence of this or that family, decided the election of consuls. The power of the nobility was fully established in the first Punic war. We find the same families repeatedly in possession of the highest magistracies; and the fact that military ability was not always required of a candidate is proved above all by the election of P. Claudius Pulcher, who, like most of the Claudians, seems to have been a man unworthy of high command.

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¹ Zonaras, viii. 16: μέγιστον γὰρ οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι ἐσφάλλοντο, ὅτι κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν ἄλλους εἰθ' ἑτέρους ἄρχοντας ἐπεμπον, ἔρτι δὲ τὴν στρατηγίαν μαθηθάνοντας τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐπανον, ὥσπερ εἰς ἔσκησιν σφᾶς ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰς χρῆσιν αἰρούμενοι.

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The Roman navy.

If, in spite of these deficiencies, the result of the war was favourable to the Romans, it must be ascribed to their indomitable perseverance and the keen military instinct which enabled them always to accommodate themselves to new circumstances. Of this we have the clearest evidence in the quickness and facility with which they turned their attention to the naval war and to siege operations. The successes of the Romans at sea may, it is true, be attributed chiefly to the Greek shipbuilders, and to the Greek sailors and captains who served on their ships. The Greeks were also their instructors in the art of besieging towns with the newly invented machines, but the merit of having applied the new means with courage and skill belonged nevertheless to the Romans. The extravagant praise which has been lavished on them on account of their naval victories, it is scarcely necessary to repeat, they did not deserve; and it is a disgrace to them, heightened by the contrast of former times, that they never afterwards equipped fleets like those which fought at Mylæ and Ecnomus, and that, at a later period, when their power was supreme, they allowed the pirates to gain the upper hand, until the supplies of the capital were cut off, and the nobility were no longer safe in Campania, in their own country seats. This weakness, which became conspicuous at a later period, confirms our hypothesis of the prominent share which the Italian and Sicilian Greeks had in the first organisation of the Roman navy. It is at least a significant fact that the Hellenic nationality in Italy and Sicily declined with the decay of the maritime power of Rome.

Constitution of the Carthaginian armies.

The merits and defects of the Carthaginian manner of conducting the war were very different. The Carthaginians had standing armies, and they allowed their generals to keep the command as long as they possessed their confidence. In both these respects they were superior to the Romans. But the materials of their armies were not to be compared to those of their antagonists. Their soldiers were mercenaries, and mercenaries of the very worst kind;

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not native but foreign, a motley mixture of Greeks, Gauls, Libyans, Iberians, and other nations, of men without either enthusiasm or patriotism, urged only by a desire of high pay and booty. In the fickleness of these mercenaries, amongst whom the Gauls seem to have been the most numerous and the least to be trusted, lay the greatest weakness of the Carthaginian military system. The very best of their generals did not succeed in educating these foreign bands to be faithful and steady.¹ From the beginning of the war to its close, examples abound of insubordination, mutiny, and treachery on the part of the mercenaries; and of ingratitude, faithlessness, and the most reckless severity and cruelty on the part of the Carthaginians. If the mercenaries entered into negotiations with the enemy, betrayed the posts confided to them, delivered up or crucified their officers, the Carthaginian generals intentionally exposed them to be cut to pieces by the enemy, left them on desert islands to die of hunger, threw them overboard into the sea, or massacred them in cold blood. The relation of commander and soldier, which calls on both sides for the greatest devotion and fidelity, was with the Carthaginians the cause of continued conspiracy and internal war. The weapon which Carthage wielded in the war against Rome threatened either to break with every blow or to wound her own breast. We know probably only a small part of the disasters which befell Carthage, owing to the fickleness of her troops. How many undertakings failed, even in the design, owing to want of confidence in the mercenary troops, how many failed in the execution, we cannot pretend to ascertain. So much, however, is proved to our satisfaction, from isolated statements preserved to us, that the bad faith of the Carthaginian mercenaries was their chief weakness, and

¹ Not even Hamilcar Barcas did this, though he is especially extolled for his great influence over the minds of his soldiers, and is said to have succeeded in inspiring them with devotion to his own person, as a substitute for the patriotism which they lacked (Mommson, *Röm. Gesch.*, i. 537). The mercenaries under his command mutinied (Zonaras, viii. 16; Polybius, i. 77, § 5), and he did not possess their confidence (Polybius, i. 68, § 12).

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The Carthaginian
generals.

spoiled all that by their experience and their skill as veteran soldiers they might have accomplished.

We know little of the Carthaginian generals. But it is clear that on the whole they were superior to the Roman consuls. Among the latter, not one appears to be distinguished for military genius. They could lead their troops against the enemy and then fight bravely; but they could do nothing more. Metellus, who gained the great victory at Panormus, was perhaps the only exception; but even he owed his victory more to the faults of his opponent and his want of skill in managing the elephants than by the display of any military talent on his own part; and when he commanded the second time as consul, he accomplished nothing. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that Hannibal, the defender of Agrigentum, Himilco, who had the command for nine years in Lilybæum, Adherbal, the victor at Drepana, and Carthalo, who attacked the Roman fleet at Camarina and caused its destruction, and above all Hamilcar Barcas, were great generals, who understood not only the art of fighting, but also the conduct of a war, and by their personal superiority over their opponents outweighed the disadvantages involved in the quality of their troops. Among the Carthaginian generals some, of course, were incapable; as, for instance, those who lost the battles of Panormus and the Ægatian Islands. If the Carthaginians punished these men severely, we may perhaps be entitled to accuse them of harshness, but not of injustice; for we find that other unfortunate generals, Hannibal, for instance, after his defeat at Mylæ, retained the confidence of the Carthaginian government; and thus they punished, it would seem, not the misfortune of the generals, but some special fault or offence.

Carthaginian
inferiority
at sea.

The defeats of the Carthaginians at sea are most surprising. The Roman boarding-bridges cannot be regarded as the single, or even as the chief, cause of this. The only explanation which we can offer has been already given—that the Roman fleet was probably for the most part

built and manned by Greeks;¹ and even then it is still astonishing that the Carthaginians were only once decidedly victorious at sea in the course of the whole war. Nor can we understand why they did not fit out larger and more numerous fleets, to shut out the Romans from the sea altogether at the very beginning, as England did with regard to France in the revolutionary war. That they sent no second fleet after the defeat of Ecnomus to oppose the Romans, and to prevent their landing in Africa, and that after their last defeat they broke down all at once, must, from our imperfect acquaintance with the internal affairs of Carthage, remain incomprehensible. Perhaps the financial resources of this state were not so inexhaustible as we are accustomed to believe.

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The peace which handed over Sicily to the Romans affected the power of Carthage but little. Her possessions in Sicily had never been secure, and could scarcely have yielded a profit equal to the cost of their defence. The value of these possessions lay chiefly in the commerce with Sicily; and this commerce could be carried on with equal ease under Roman rule. Spain offered a rich and complete compensation for Sicily, and in Spain Carthage had a much fairer prospect of being able to found a lasting dominion, as there she had not to encounter the obstinate resistance of the Greeks, and as Spain was so distant from Italy that the Roman interests were not immediately concerned by what took place in that country.

Effect of
the peace
on the
power of
Carthage.

¹ In saying this we of course do not pretend to affirm that no Romans and other Italians were employed on board the fleet. On the contrary, we know not only that the *socii navales* were numerous, but that the naval service was utterly detested by the Italian allies, and drove them to mutiny and desertion in large numbers (Livy, xxiv. 23, 10). But as the Romans required thousands of sailors for their transports, it is probable that they first employed the untrained landsmen in this department of the service, and thus gradually trained them to be fit for manning war vessels. As for practising rowing on land, it may be as feasible as learning to swim without going into the water.

CHAPTER IV.

THE WAR OF THE MERCENARIES, 241-238 B.C.

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Revolt of
the Car-
thaginian
allies.

As sometimes the strongest men, when they have strained every nerve and have kept up bravely in fighting against some threatening danger, succumb suddenly at last when calm and quiet are re-established, and seem doomed to perish from some internal suffering, so Carthage at the end of the long war with Rome was threatened by a much more serious evil than that which she had just gone through. The bad humours in the body of the state, no longer absorbed by exertion and activity, attacked the inner parts, and threatened sudden death. A mutiny of the mercenaries of Carthage, in connection with a revolt of all the allies and subjects, followed close on the Sicilian war. For more than three years there raged a fearful strife, accompanied by horrors which show that man can sink lower than the beasts. The cause of this war was the great weakness of the Carthaginian state, which, as we have seen, consisted in the want of a uniform population animated by the same sentiments. The mixture of races, over which Carthage ruled, felt only the increased burdens of the war with Rome, and not the patriotic enthusiasm which lightens every sacrifice. A decisive victory on the side of Carthage might have inspired her subjects with the respect and fear which with them had to take the place of devoted attachment. But Carthage was conquered. She had, in the eyes of her subjects, lost the right to govern. It required but a slight cause to make the whole proud edifice of Carthaginian power totter to its foundation.

Cause of

This cause was the exhaustion of the Carthaginian

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mutiny.

finances. When the mercenaries returned from Sicily, and vainly looked for their overdue pay and the presents which had been promised to them, discontent and defiance arose among them, and they made higher and more extravagant demands when they saw that Carthage was not in a position to oppose them by force. It was now as difficult to pacify them as to bring them back to obedience. Open rebellion broke out, the mutineers and the allies¹ made common cause together, and in a short time all the towns of Libya were in revolt. Utica and Hippo Zaritas alone remained faithful. Tunes was in the hands of the mutineers, who were commanded by the Libyan Matho, by the Campanian Spendius, and by the Gaul Autaritus. The general Hanno, who as their favourite had been selected by the mercenaries as umpire to decide the quarrel, was taken prisoner and detained as hostage. Carthage was surrounded by her numerous enemies, and seemed hopelessly lost. But the spirit of the Carthaginian population now rose. An army was formed from the citizens and those mercenaries who had remained faithful, and Hamilcar Barcas took the command. The superiority of a true general over such chiefs as Matho and Spendius soon became apparent. The mutineers, although reinforced, according to report, by 70,000 Libyans and Numidians, were surprised and defeated again and again. Hamilcar tried clemency. He only demanded a promise from the prisoners not to make war upon Carthage, and then set them free. But the leaders of the mutineers, fearing a universal rebellion among their accomplices, decided on rendering peace with Carthage impossible by

¹ It is not at all likely that the towns subject to Carthage were in an enviable position. It was the general practice in antiquity, and even in modern times down to a recent period, for a governing country to treat dependencies and colonies as inferiors, and to aim chiefly at deriving from them the largest possible profit. If the Carthaginians, as is reported (Appian, v. 3), caused 3,000 of their subjects, who had joined Regulus, to be crucified, it seems natural that the Libyans should now make common cause with the mutinous soldiers. There seems to be, however, no sufficient ground for charging the Carthaginians with unusual and exceptional cruelty (Mommsen, *Röm. Gesch.*, i. 547).

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Suppression of the mutiny.

an act of barbarous treachery. They caused the imprisoned Hanno and seven hundred Carthaginians to die a cruel death, and even refused to give up the bodies for burial. The war had now assumed its real character,¹ and only the complete overthrow of the one or of the other party could put an end to it.

Carthage was indebted for its deliverance out of all this trouble to Hamilcar Barcas. Inspired by his personal qualities and the renown of his name, a Numidian chief called Naravas, with some thousands of horsemen, went over to his side. The enemy was beaten many times, thousands of prisoners were thrown under the elephants and trodden to death; and their leaders, Spendius and Autaritus, were nailed to the cross. Although the war was not uniformly successful; although Hippo, and even Utica, the oldest and most faithful ally of Carthage, revolted; although a fleet with provisions was destroyed by a storm, while on the way from the coast of the *Emporiæ* to Carthage; although, in consequence of a dispute between Hamilcar and Hanno the second in command, the enemies recovered themselves, and in a sally from Tunes defeated Hannibal, a lieutenant of Hamilcar, took him prisoner, and nailed him to the same cross on which Spendius had ended his life; yet the whole rebellion gradually collapsed, and after a reconciliation had taken place between Hamilcar and Hanno at the instance of the senate, Carthage soon gained the ascendancy, and stifled all further revolt in the blood of the mutineers. The Libyan towns submitted again, and Carthage was perhaps wise enough² not to punish the misguided masses for the crimes of the ring-leaders. Even Hippo and Utica, which had marked their revolt by the massacre of the Carthaginian garrison, seem to have received mild conditions. Carthage was once again ruler in Africa.

Conduct of

The conduct of the Romans in this war is one of the

¹ It became, in the terms of Polybius (i. 65, § 6), a πόλεμος ἄσπονδος.

² Polybius does not state how the revolted towns were treated.

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Romans.

greatest stains on their history. The conditions of peace which had terminated the Sicilian war had not been equal to their expectations. They had tried to get more out of the Carthaginians, but were obliged to content themselves with raising the contribution of war by 1,000 talents. There was now an opportunity of repairing their neglect, and Rome was not slow in making use of this opportunity. The Roman senate seems to have thought it unnecessary to interfere and to take part in the war of the mercenaries. It was enough to assist the rebels with the requisites of war. This was done by mercantile adventurers. Perhaps the Roman officials, even if they had wished it, would have found it difficult to prevent the sailing of ships which had provisions on board for the enemies of Carthage. But what view the senate took of such private speculations we shall soon see. A great number of blockade-runners¹ were captured by the Carthaginians. Rome had no plea or justification for interceding on behalf of these people. Nevertheless she did so, and there was nothing left for Carthage to do in her difficulty but to set the prisoners free. In acknowledgment of this the Roman senate gave up all the Carthaginian prisoners who were still in Italy,² and allowed its subjects in future to send the necessaries of war only to the Carthaginians, not to their enemies—a concession which one would suppose was a matter of course. It was expected that if Carthage had opposed the demands of Rome for the release of the blockade-breakers, the Romans would at once have declared war. Carthage yielded, and the Romans were thus debarred from following up their hostile policy; they were even obliged to permit their friend and ally King Hiero of Syracuse to come forward of his own accord to the assistance of the Carthaginians. This wise statesman³ saw plainly that the Carthaginians, after their expulsion from Sicily, were no longer his natural enemies—that they were on the contrary

¹ Polybius, i. 83, § 7, states that there were 500.² Polybius, i. 83, § 8.³ Polybius, i. 83, § 3: πάνυ φρονίμως καὶ νουνεχῶς λογιζόμενος.

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able to render him the most valuable services by keeping in check to some extent the excessive power of Rome. He therefore supported them with necessaries at a time when the mutineers blockaded Carthage by land and all supplies were cut off. Perhaps he also sent troops or allowed the Carthaginians to enlist mercenaries in his kingdom,¹ and his aid doubtless contributed materially to the final overthrow of the rebels.

Revolt of
the Car-
thaginian
mercen-
aries in
Sardinia.

But while the insurrection was still raging in Africa, the Carthaginian mercenaries in Sardinia had imitated the example of their comrades, had murdered their officers, and had taken possession of the island. Unable to keep their position among the natives, they sought aid from Rome. At first, as it is said, the Romans resisted this temptation; they disdained to unite themselves with the mutinous troops, and to make use of the momentary distress of Carthage for violating the conditions of peace which they had just sworn to observe. But when Carthage came out victorious from the doubtful struggle, the old jealousy of the Romans revived, and they decided to take the mutinous mercenaries of Sardinia under their protection. Roman politicians justified themselves probably with the sophistry that Sardinia no longer belonged to Carthage, since Carthaginian authority in the island had come to an end, and there was no longer a Carthaginian garrison in it. War therefore was not carried on against Carthage, when the island was taken, but against the Sardinian natives, who were now an independent nation. But Carthage protested against this view of the case, and made preparations for the reduction of the revolted island. The Romans now openly declared their intentions. They interpreted the Carthaginian armaments as a menace of

¹ This is probably the extent of the concession reported by Appian, v. 3: *καὶ ξενολογίαν ἐκ τῆς Ἰταλίας ἐς μόνον τόνδε τὸν πόλεμον ἐπέτρεψαν*.—Appian, viii. 5. No more than this is implied by Zonaras, viii. 17: *καὶ μισθοφόρους ἐκ τῆς οἰκείας συμμαχίδος αὐτοῖς ἐπαγαγέσθαι ἐπέτρεψαν*. The Romans could never have allowed any foreign power, least of all the Carthaginians, to raise troops in their own immediate dominions in Italy, and this was expressly stipulated in the treaty of peace.—Polybius, iii. 27, § 4; Appian, viii. 5.

war and complained of the interruption of Italian commerce by Carthaginian cruisers.

These complaints probably show that smuggling and the blockade-running of Italian traders had not been discontinued, in spite of the promise of Rome.¹ For Carthage there was left no choice, but either to engage in a war with Rome, or to agree to such conditions as Rome, in contempt of all justice and relying on her superior power, thought fit to propose. Carthage was too much exhausted to take the former alternative. She was obliged to purchase peace by resigning Sardinia, and by the payment of twelve hundred talents. Thus did the Romans of the old time show, as Sallust remarks in tones of praise, 'that they understood how to restrain their passions, and listened to the demands of right and justice; that especially in the Punic wars, in spite of the repeated treachery of the Carthaginians, they never allowed themselves to act in a similar way, and were alone guided in their actions by a sense of what was worthy of them.'²

The revolting treatment of her humbled rival was an evil seed destined to spring up soon in a luxuriant crop, and to bear as its fatal fruit the devastation of Italy in the Hannibalian war. The bitterness of soul with which the noble Hamilcar submitted indignantly to unjustifiable wrong explains the inextinguishable hatred of Rome which he cherished as long as he lived, and bequeathed as a sacred trust to his great son Hannibal.³ For the present

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Interference of the
Romans in
Sardinia.

Surrender
of Sardinia
to the
Romans.

¹ According to Appian (viii. 5), the Carthaginians took Roman merchant vessels and drowned the crews to escape detection. If there is any truth in this statement, the merchant vessels so treated must have carried supplies to the rebels or attempted to run the blockade. But in their present helpless condition, the Carthaginians, unless they were demented, could not have committed acts so foolish and so calculated to give the Romans provocation for war.

² Sallust, *Catil.*, 51. Very different is the opinion of Polybius (iii. 28), who says that for the proceedings of the Romans, οὔτε πρόφασιν οὔτ' αἰτίαν εὔροι τις ἂν εὐλογον· ἀλλ' ὁμολογουμένως τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἡναγκασμένους παρὰ πάντα τὰ δίκαια διὰ τὸν καιρὸν ἐκχωρῆσαι μὲν Σαρδόνος, ἐξενεγκεῖν δὲ τὸ προειρημένον πλῆθος τῶν χρημάτων.

³ Compare Polybius, iii. 9, § 6; and 10, §§ 4, 5.

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might triumphed over right. The island of Sardinia became a Roman province. But it was a long time before the wild inhabitants of the mountains were subdued and in some measure became accustomed to an orderly government. For many years Sardinia was the scene of the most savage wars¹ and the most terrible civil strife, in which the descendants of the Roman nobility obtained inglorious triumphs, and slaves for their ever-increasing estates. The neighbouring island of Corsica had never been permanently in the possession of the Carthaginians. The Romans now established themselves there, and united it to the province of Sardinia. But here, as in Sardinia, the natives withdrew into the impenetrable mountains of the interior, beyond the reach of Roman dominion, and resisted Roman customs and political order. The resources of the two islands remained undeveloped. It was only in the small coast towns and near the sea that the original barbarism gave way to civilisation and the dominion of Roman law. The interior remained barbarous; and among the many islands of the Mediterranean, Sardinia and Corsica alone, up to almost the present time, have never been the seats of political order and prosperity.

¹ Even bloodhounds were employed to hunt down the natives.—Zonaras, viii. 18.

CHAPTER V.

THE WAR WITH THE GAULS, 225-222 B.C.

THE twenty-four years of war with the great power of Carthage were followed by a six days' war with Falerii, if the collision between the colossal power of Rome and the puny town of Falerii can really be termed a war. How it happened that the Faliscans provoked the Romans, how they could venture to think of opposition, we cannot understand. The town, which, even at the time of Camillus, was constrained to submit to the superior strength of Rome, was without difficulty taken and destroyed. The Roman consuls were not ashamed to make this event the subject of a triumph, which is chronicled in the Roman Fasti by the side of the triumphs of Catulus and the Scipios.

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B.C.Destruction of
Falerii.

Putting aside this incident, the period between the first and the second Punic wars (from 241 till 218 B.C.) was occupied with wars of a more serious character—one in Italy with the Gauls, and two on the opposite side of the Adriatic with the Illyrians. In the order of time the first Illyrian war preceded the war with the Gauls; but for the sake of greater clearness we will follow in our narrative a geographical rather than a chronological order, and speak first of the war waged in Italy against the Gauls, and then of the two Illyrian wars conjointly.

Gallic and
Illyrian
wars.

After the defeat of the Senonian Gauls in the year 283 B.C., and after the establishment of the colony of Sena in their desolated territory, the Gallic races in Northern Italy remained quiet for forty-five years. This long pause, which was most advantageous to the Romans during the wars with Pyrrhus and the Carthaginians, may in part be

Causes for
the long
inaction of
the Gauls
in Italy.

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ascribed to the impression made among the Gauls by the defeat on the Vadimonian Lake and by the destruction of the Senonians.¹ It seems, however, that besides the exhaustion of the Gauls and their fear, another circumstance contributed to keep them thus long quiet; and this was probably the fact that during that long period they found occupation as mercenaries in the Carthaginian armies. The ending of the war in Sicily, while it stopped the employment of Gallic adventurers, was, therefore, a cause of renewed attacks on Italy. Rome accordingly could not fail soon to meet on another battle-field those Gallic warriors whom she had so long encountered in Sicily.

The position of the Gallic tribes.

The greater part of Italy, north of the chain of the Apennines, at that time justly called Cisalpine Gaul, had been for a course of years in the possession of several Gallic tribes. In the modern district of *Æmilia* were the Boians, the neighbours and allies of the conquered Senonians, and the smaller tribes of the *Lingonians* and *Anarians*; north of the *Po*, in the country about *Milan*, dwelt the great people of the *Insubrians*, while to the east of these on the *Mincio* and the *Adige* lay the *Cenomani*; but these tribes, little inclined, seemingly, to make common cause with their countrymen, remained neutral in all the hostilities against Rome. Besides these Gallic races, there were in the north of Italy two totally different nations: in the east and about the *Adriatic Sea*, the *Veneti*, while in the west, where the *Alps* and the *Apennines* join, the *Ligurians* were scattered about on both sides of the *Apennines* almost as far as the valley of the *Arno*, and towards the north in *Piedmont* along the upper course of the *Po* and its tributary streams.

Attack on the colony of *Ariminum*.

Four years before the outbreak of the war with Carthage (268 B.C.) the Romans founded the colony *Ariminum* (*Rimini*), on the *Adriatic Sea*, as the most northern bulwark of the Italy of that time. This town was exposed to the first attacks of the enemy whom it was intended

¹ Polybius, ii. 21, § 2.

to control. In the year 238 (in the third year, therefore, after the conclusion of peace with Carthage), a Gallic army, which we are told had been called by the chiefs of the Boians from Transalpine Gaul, encamped before Ariminum. However, before hostilities began, a dispute arose between the Boians and their troublesome and unwelcome guests, whose rapacity, it may be presumed, made but little distinction between friends and foes. The Boian chiefs were murdered by their own people, the strangers were attacked, conquered in open war, and compelled to return to their homes.

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Thus, for this time, the danger passed away.¹ Still, the attention of the Romans had been drawn to their north-east boundary, where new means of defence against their unruly neighbours seemed necessary. The colonists of Ariminum were clearly unable by themselves to resist the Gauls. Nothing was more suited to the needs of the case than an increase of the Roman population in those parts. This could easily be effected, and was desirable also on many other accounts. The whole country of the Senonians round about Ariminum, and south in Picenum, was depopulated and laid waste since the war of extirpation of 283, and was probably left for the use of the large Roman families only as pasture land. A better opportunity could not present itself for rewarding Roman veterans for their military service, for making impoverished peasants landowners of small estates, for peopling again a country which had become desolate, for bringing together on the endangered frontier a warlike and faithful population, and by the extension of the Latin race and the Latin tongue to Romanise the land conquered by force of arms. The only thing which was opposed to so wholesome a measure was the private interest of the Roman nobles who had taken possession of and used the land in

Proposed
extension
of the
colony.

¹ At least according to the report of Polybius, ii. 21. Other writers related serious battles with the Gauls and their allies the Ligurians (Zonaras, viii. 18; Orosius, iv. 12), in one of which 14,000 Gauls were killed and 2,000 taken by P. Valerius Falto, consul of the year 238, and brother of the prætor Q. Valerius Falto. See p. 106. Can this be an extract from the Valerian family chronicle?

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question as if it were their own. They had no legal right to the land. They were only possessors on sufferance until the state should think fit to make a different arrangement. They could lay no claim even to compensation if the land should be taken from them. But this fact only added virulence to the opposition with which the Roman nobility resisted any measure for dividing the state lands in the interests of the whole community rather than their own.

Agrarian
law of
Caius
Flaminius.

We have unfortunately only very imperfect accounts of the disputes which arose in Rome between the nobles and the popular party relating to the allotment of the land in Picenum. Even Polybius gives us no help here, and appears to have judged the measures from a narrow and aristocratic point of view. The champion of the popular party and of the public interest was the tribune C. Flaminius. In spite of all opposition on the part of the senate, he obtained the sanction of the people for his proposal (232 B.C.).¹ The nobility, blind and obstinate in their selfishness, carried their opposition to the utmost limits, and thus forced their opponents to take their stand on the formal constitutional law, to set aside the usual practice, and to cause the agrarian law to be passed by a vote of the assembly of tribes, without a previous resolution or the subsequent approbation of the senate. It was very much to be regretted that the co-operation of the senate was set aside, and that the popular leaders were enabled to become conscious of their power. But the senate could only attribute the loss of its influence to itself. It had taken up a position which it could not maintain, and hazarded the strength of its moral weight, which, till now, had been unimpaired; although, legally, since the Hortensian law in 287 B.C., a resolution of the tribes needed no confirmation from the senate. It is therefore not without a good reason that from the acceptance of the agrarian law of Flaminius by the

¹ Polybius, ii. 21. Cicero (*De Senect.* 4) differs from Polybius in placing the law four years later.

assembly of tribes against the opposition of the senate Polybius dates a change for the worse in the Roman constitution.¹

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If the nobles were not able to prevent the useful measure of Flaminius, they knew at least how to avenge themselves. The hatred of his enemies pursued him to his death on the bloody battle-field of Thrasymenus; nay, it even survived him, and endeavoured, by venomous and false representations in the Roman annals, to blacken the name of the popular leader.²

Conduct of
the patri-
cians to
Flaminius.

The agrarian law of Flaminius did not remain a dead letter, but was fully carried out. The country along the Adriatic Sea, through which formerly the barbarous Senonians had roamed, was filled with Roman settlers.³ This extreme outpost of Roman civilisation was connected with the centre of the empire by the Flaminian road (Via Flaminia), which crossed the Apennines in Umbria, and owed its name as well as its origin to the founder of the settlement in the land of the Senonians. It was the second great highway through Italy, connecting Rome with the eastern coast, its terminus being at Ariminum on the Adriatic, as that of the Appian way was Brundisium. These two roads opened the mountainous interior of the country to commerce, and united the seas on the east and on the west.

The great
road of
Flaminius.

Before these works could be completed, the neighbouring Gauls showed great uneasiness about the further advance of the Romans.⁴ The extension of civilisation is always an attack on surrounding barbarism; and as it was at that time in Italy, so is it now at the present day in North America. The Boians looked forward to the time when their country, like that of the Senonians, would be seized by Roman settlers; they saw that they were doomed to extermination, and they determined to

Move-
ments
among the
Gallic
tribes.

¹ Polybius, ii. 21.

² Polybius, ii. 81 ff.

³ Unfortunately we have received no information regarding the number of the settlers, and the extent of the portions of land allotted to them,

⁴ Polybius, ii. 21, §§ 8, 9.

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IV.Fears of
the Ro-
mans.

try and avert the threatened danger by an attack on Rome. They organised a military alliance of all the various Cisalpine Gallic tribes with the single exception of the Cenomanians, and they drew swarms of adventurers across the Alps by the prospect of rich spoils. The latter, called Gæsatiens, were not a peculiar Gallic tribe,¹ but volunteers from all parts of the country, such as for many years had been accustomed to enter into foreign, and mostly into the Carthaginian, service. They united together to form voluntary companies under separate leaders, a custom which prevailed for centuries among the Gauls and their neighbours the Germans.

The bringing together of these forces, with the manifest preparations for a war with Rome, roused again, not in Rome alone, but in the whole of Italy, that fear of the Gauls which had never quite disappeared since the battle on the Allia. The Romans had certainly overcome their rude enemies in many engagements, but not without having suffered many reverses on their own part. The brave Roman soldiers trembled at the thought of the Gauls, and shook with terror at the sight of the huge, half-naked, defiant forms. Their minds were alarmed by supernatural appearances of all kinds. A three-fold moon, or a sudden bright light in the midnight sky, flowing blood, and similar threatening signs were reported on all sides, and seemed to show that the gods were exasperated and must be solemnly appeased.² Superstition is always apt to do violence to human feelings; and although the Romans had long since given up ascribing to their deities a Satanic thirst for human blood,³ fear so troubled their thoughts that, to avert the impending evil, human beings were sacrificed on the public market in Rome.⁴ A male and a

¹ Plutarch, *Marcell.*, 3.

² Zonaras (viii. 20) and Plutarch (*Marcell.* 4) place these 'prodigia' in the year 223 B.C.

³ They were, according to Plutarch (*Marcell.*, 3), *πρῶτος διακέλμενοι πρὸς τὰ θεῶα*.

⁴ The Forum Boarium, Orosius, iv. 13. Plutarch, *Marcell.* 3.

female Gaul, and a male and a female Greek, were buried alive, in order that thus, without injury to the Roman people, a prophecy might be fulfilled which promised the possession of Roman soil to the Gauls and Greeks.¹

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At length, in the year 225, the storm burst. An army of Gauls, consisting of 50,000 foot, and 20,000 mounted on horses or war chariots, marched towards the south. The consul L. Æmilius Papus commanded a consular army of two legions and the proportionate number of allies—from 22,000 to 23,000 men in all—and was posted in Ariminum, from which side the attack was expected. A reserve corps of 50,000 Umbrians and Sabines, with 4,000 horse, was destined to protect Etruria under a prætor, and was probably stationed in the north-eastern part, somewhere in the neighbourhood of Arretium or Fæsulæ. The second consul, Atilius Regulus, was engaged in Sardinia in the interminable petty wars with the natives. On the intelligence of the advance of the Gauls, he was, it appears, immediately recalled; and the rapid and glorious issue of the campaign may principally be attributed to his timely appearance on the scene of action.

March of
the Gauls.

The Gauls deceived all the calculations of the Roman generals. They took neither the road through Picenum, nor the road through north-eastern Etruria by Fæsulæ, but, marching close to the western coast, had arrived already in the neighbourhood of Clusium, only three days' march from Rome, before the Romans really knew where they were. When the prætor followed them with the reserve corps, they turned suddenly round, enticed their enemy into an ambush, and completely defeated them.² Six

Retreat of
the Gauls
from
Clusium,
and battle
of Tela-
mon.

¹ Zonaras, viii. 19. According to Plutarch (*Marcell.* 3), this prophecy was contained in the Sibylline books. It is more probable that it was found in the 'libri fatales' of Etruscan origin. The Etruscans were from old the enemies of the Gauls and the Greeks. The genuine Sibylline books, which were Greek, would not have demanded the immolation of Greeks. But the confusion between the native or Etruscan prophecies and those of the so-called Sibylline books was general in Rome.—See vol. i. p. 80.

² This defeat must have taken place in the neighbourhood of Clusium. Polybius (ii. 26) does not name the place. He merely says that the Gauls marched from Clusium in the direction of Fæsulæ (ὡς ἐπὶ πόλιν Φαισούλαν),

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thousand men were cut down. The remainder took refuge in a strong position on a hill, where they were surrounded by the Gauls, and would have been compelled to surrender if the consul Æmilius had not, in the meantime, come to their assistance from Picenum. The Gauls, heavily laden with spoil, and encumbered by the task of watching thousands of prisoners, gave up the idea of a further advance towards Rome. They endeavoured also to avoid meeting with the consular army. Their object was, first, to place their spoils in safety, to collect new forces, and then to renew the profitable raid. They marched, therefore, northwards¹ along the coast on the same road by which they had come. The Roman army followed close upon their heels, but ventured on no serious attack. By a happy coincidence, the consul C. Atilius Regulus, who had brought back his legions from Sardinia, and had landed in Pisa,² marched southwards on the same road which the Gauls were following on their retreat northwards. Thus it happened that the enemies found themselves in the midst of the two Roman armies in the neighbourhood of Telamon. It was now no longer possible for them to evade a battle. They prepared to encounter both Roman armies at once. One front they

whereupon they were followed and overtaken by the Romans, who defeated them. As Fæsulæ lies in the neighbourhood of one of the well-known passes over the Apennines, the expression 'in the direction of Fæsulæ' is appropriate even if Fæsulæ was still a long way off. The Gauls broke up in the night and marched probably round the Roman army, which had followed them from north to south. Their cavalry did not start till the following morning, and was intended to draw the Romans after them. It is not at all probable that (as Rospatt surmises in *Feldzüge des Hannibal*, p. 115), Polybius confounded Fæsulæ with Clusium.

¹ But they did not follow the straight road. When they were met by the two Roman armies they were at Telamon, to the south-west of Clusium. How they got there we do not know. Perhaps they were driven back so far by the consul Atilius, whom they met on their northward march; perhaps they were induced by the prospect of more plunder to move in that direction.

² The consul's return from Sardinia was probably not fortuitous, but ordered by the senate. Moreover, the consul, in landing so far north as Pisa, may have intended to block up the neighbouring passes over the Apennines, and to act in co-operation with the other Roman armies, which he expected to find there.

directed northwards against the army of Regulus, the other southwards towards Æmilius. Thus they stood back to back, each flank covered by a barricade, the carriages, baggage, booty, and prisoners being separated from the combatants, and strongly guarded on a hill. In the front, which faced Æmilius, the place of honour was taken by the Transalpine Gæsatians, in comparison with whose ferocious bearing the appearance of the Gauls who were settled in Italy had a colouring of polish and civilisation. The Insubrians and Boians wore coats and trowsers. The Gæsatians, on the other hand, cast aside all dress as an encumbrance and fought naked, retaining only their ornaments. Heavy collars and bracelets made of twisted gold wire distinguished the most valiant warriors, who stood in the foremost ranks challenging their foes to the fight. They presented a strange sight to the Roman soldiers, and by their savage manners and gestures, by their insufficient arms for offence and defence, and by the richness of their ornaments, inspired awe, confidence, and cupidity at the same time. At the beginning of the battle the hosts of Gauls uttered a tremendous war cry, mingled with the sound of horns and trumpets. A momentous hour had arrived, which might well fill the breast of many a brave Roman with not unmanly anxiety. A victory for the enemy would renew terrors that followed the day of the Allia, a day which was registered in the Roman calendar as a never-to-be-forgotten day of mourning.

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The first encounter was between the horse. The consul Regulus led the Roman cavalry in person, but fell at the very onset, and his head was a fit trophy, though fortunately the only one, which the barbarians could boast of. Their horse drew back, and the fight between the infantry began. The superiority of Roman discipline and of Roman arms became immediately apparent. The shields of the Gauls were too small to protect them from the missiles with which the Romans assailed them from a safe distance. Their only weapon for attack was a sword,

Annihilation of the Gallic army.

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suitable for a blow but not for a stab, and of such bad steel that it bent at the first blow. Driven to despair they rushed madly against the Roman ranks, as if seeking a voluntary death, or cast themselves in wild flight on their hindmost ranks, thus throwing them into confusion. The legions now closed in on both sides, pressing the army of the Gauls nearer and nearer together, and then cut them down almost to the last man. Forty thousand were killed; ten thousand were taken prisoners; only the horsemen escaped. Of the two kings of the Gauls, Concolitanus fell alive into the hands of the conquerors; the other, Anerostus, fell by his own hand. The whole of the booty, the herds of cattle, the prisoners which the Gauls had dragged with them, all came into the possession of the victors, who, as far as it was possible, restored the booty to the plundered.¹

Devastation of the Boian territory by the consul Æmilius.

After this glorious victory Æmilius invaded the country of the Boians, and marched through it, plundering and laying it waste in all directions. Then he led his troops to Rome laden with rich booty, and ascended in a well-deserved triumph the Capitol, to offer due thanks to the gods for their deliverance of Rome. This triumphal procession was made memorable by the captured arms,² military ensigns, and golden chains of the Gauls, but above all by the line of captive chiefs who preceded the victor arrayed in complete armour. They had taken an oath not to lay down their arms till they had ascended the Capitol. This oath was now fulfilled amid the derisive shouts of the Roman people.³

¹ The description which Polybius (ii. 28-31) gives of this battle has quite the stamp of truth. Zonaras (viii. 30) relates that Regulus was not only killed, but also defeated before the chief battle was fought. This seems an error, arising from the preceding defeat of the Roman reserve army, which he confounded with that of Regulus.

² These arms were partly hung up in Roman temples, partly given to Hiero of Syracuse, as his share of the spoils. After the murder of Hieronymus, the grandson of Hiero, the people of Syracuse armed themselves with these Gallic weapons.—Livy, xxiv. 21. It is on this occasion that we hear incidentally of the part which Hiero had in repelling the Gallic invasion.

³ Zonaras, viii. 20.

The victory at Telamon was one of the most important which the Romans had thus far gained. It put an end to the fiercest of all the attacks of the Gauls,¹ and restored to the Roman soldiers that confidence in their own strength which they had almost lost when they faced these barbarous enemies. The ultimate results of this victory we can appreciate only when we bear in mind that but seven years later Hannibal with his Punic army stood in Cisalpine Gaul to organise the whole of the Gallic race for a war of extermination against Rome. With how much more brilliant success would this great general have borne down the Roman armies if the strength and courage of the Gauls had not first been broken! Apart from its influence on the progress of events, the battle of Telamon has for us an especial and peculiar interest, because we discern in the description of Polybius the impressions of an eye-witness and a combatant, who was no other than the venerable Fabius Pictor, the oldest Roman historian.² The entire Roman forces, both the consular armies and the reserve army, were engaged in the battle of Telamon. We may therefore safely conclude that Fabius, who served in this war, was present, and that the impression which the Gallic warriors made on the Romans was drawn in so graphic a manner because he himself received it on the spot.

After the victory at Telamon, the Romans resolved to

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Results of
the battle
of Tela-
mon.

¹ Polybius, ii. 31, § 7: ἡ μὲν οὖν βαρυτάτη τῶν Κελτῶν ἔφοδος οὕτως καὶ τούτῃ τῇ τρόπῃ διεφθάρη· πᾶσι μὲν Ἰταλιώταις, μάλιστα δὲ Ῥωμαίοις, μέγαν καὶ φοβερὸν ἐπικρεμάσασα κίνδυνον.

² That Polybius (ii. 28, § 11, and 29, § 2) had before him the report of a man who had really taken part in the battle, we see from the lively description of the engagement, but still more clearly from the words with which he refers to the personal impressions and opinions of an eye-witness. He says, 'When the combatants were near each other, it was a strange and wonderful sight for those who were present at the moment, and it remained in the imagination of those who heard the narrative afterwards.' He continues, 'Even now one may well doubt not less than the combatants did themselves whether the battle array of the Gauls was safe or unsafe for them.' This doubt of a combatant at the time can only have been expressed in the work of Fabius. We know thus much, that Fabius served in that war with the Gauls.

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tion of the
Insu-
brians.

prevent any further invasions of the Gauls by the conquest of the whole region of the Po valley. In the year immediately following the Boians were without any difficulty reduced to complete subjection. In the next year (223 B.C.) the consuls crossed the Po, and attacked the most powerful Cisalpine people, the Insubrians, in their own country. One of these two consuls was C. Flaminius, the recognised leader of the popular party, who as tribune had effected the allotment of the territory of Picenum to Roman settlers, and who was now raised to the consulship and intrusted with the conduct of the war, to the great vexation of the nobility. Although he was not wanting in courage and ability, it appears that he was greater as a statesman than as a general. His first military undertakings were failures. In crossing the Po he suffered a defeat, and when he had, either by an armistice or by the offer of peace, extricated himself from his difficulty, he was obliged to seek refuge in the country of the Cenomanians. But from this region he very soon advanced again to the attack. The Insubrians, seeing that peace and friendship with Rome were an impossibility, summoned together all the fighting men of their country, and marched towards the enemy with an army of 50,000 warriors. Acquainted as they were with the peculiarities of the country, they had a great advantage over the Romans, to whom Cisalpine Gaul at that time was as unknown as Germany was to the legions at the time of Tiberius. Flaminius soon found himself in a very critical position. In his Gallic allies he had no confidence, and he separated himself from them by breaking down the bridges across a river which flowed between his army and their auxiliary force. In front of this river, which in case of defeat shut off all hopes of retreat, he was compelled to accept a battle; but the bravery of the Roman soldiers made good the faults of the general. Obligated to conquer or to perish, they gained a signal victory, and with this victory the war was practically at an end. The obstinate Insubrians, it is true, still refused to submit to the

authority of Rome. They made one last effort, with the help of 30,000 mercenaries from Transalpine Gaul. But in the following year their capital, Mediolanum, was taken, and their subjection thus completed. Rome was now the mistress of the whole country from the Apennines to the Alps, and two new colonies, Placentia and Cremona, were destined permanently to secure the newly-conquered lands. The Cenomanians retained their nominal freedom and the friendship of the Roman people. The Veneti did the same. The Ligurians, with whom the Romans had since 238 almost year after year carried on petty warfare, remained, at least on their mountains, unconquered.¹ But whatever measure of independence these tribes might still retain, it was certain that they could not retain it long. The thinly peopled country, once subdued by the Roman sword, was in the act of being made the seat of order and civilisation by the Roman plough when the war with Hannibal suddenly broke out, and threw back for many years the development of Northern Italy.

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¹ Livy, *Epit.* 20; Eutropius, *iii.* 2; Zonaras, *viii.* 18, 19.

CHAPTER VI.

THE FIRST ILLYRIAN WAR, 229-228 B.C.

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Roman
colonies on
the
Adriatic.

AFTER the Roman dominion had penetrated as far as the Adriatic Sea, and was there fortified by the foundation of the colonies of Hatria, Castrum Novum, Firmum, Sena, and Ariminum, to which was added before the end of the Sicilian war (244 B.C.) the important town of Brundisium, Rome came for the first time into immediate contact with the countries and the peoples of the opposite coast. The war with Pyrrhus would no doubt have led to the immediate interference of the Romans in the politics of Greece, if Carthage had not for many years engrossed their attention. After the victorious conclusion of the war in Sicily, it was to be expected that Rome would seek to exercise in the East the influence which her recent accession of power had given her.

The
pirates of
Illyricum.

But the weight of her arm was to fall in the first instance, not on the Greeks proper, nor even on half Greeks like the Epirots of Pyrrhus, but on the Illyrian pirates, the primeval inhabitants of the mountainous coast lands on the Adriatic Sea, which seem destined by nature to be the seat of inextinguishable barbarism. The Illyrians of that time, like their present successors on the mountains of Dalmatia and Montenegro, were peculiarly fitted for a life of robbery. The much indented coast, with its numerous islands and headlands, surrounded by steep and wild mountains, was highly favourable for piratical enterprise. As long, however, as the Greek colonies in the Ionian Sea, especially Corcyra and Epidamnus, flourished, the Illyrian pirates had not ventured far out of their

retreats; at least they had not ventured into Greek waters in large numbers and with open violence. It was only when the Greek states had become so weakened by everlasting wars and revolutions as to be scarcely able to protect themselves, that the piracy of the Illyrians assumed larger proportions. They acted now like the Scandinavian sea-kings of the middle ages. With their small, quick-sailing Liburnian ships, they intercepted not only the merchant vessels which traded in those seas, but, sailing in fleets, sometimes of a hundred ships, along the coast of the Adriatic and Ionian Seas as far as Messenia in Peloponnesus, landed where they pleased, took possession of towns and villages, carried away spoils and prisoners, and before it was possible to bring any force against them they were on board again and gone. These piratical expeditions gradually assumed the character of regular wars. Thus a band of Illyrians attacked the flourishing Epirotic town Phœnice, which had a garrison of eight hundred Gallic mercenaries,¹ made common cause with the Gauls, sacked the town, fought a regular battle with the people of the country who rushed to the defence of their city, and at length returned unhurt to their own land with all the spoils. No wonder that Epirus and Acarnania found it advisable to come to an understanding with the Illyrians by which they secured for themselves the protection of the robber state. The Illyrians now extended their raids

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¹ Polybius (ii. 7) gives a detailed and interesting account of this band, from which we can form an opinion of the adventures and the character of the Gallic mercenaries of the time. They had been expelled from their own country on account of their treachery, and 3,000 of them had taken service under the Carthaginians in Sicily. Quarrelling with their employers about the amount of pay, they formed the plan of plundering the town of Agrigentum, of which they formed the garrison; but this plan was discovered and prevented. At a later period of the war they entered into a plot for delivering over the town of Eryx into the hands of the Romans (see above, p. 102); but they were foiled by the vigilance and vigour of Hamilcar Barcas. They then deserted in a body and took service under the Romans, who employed them till the end of the war. But the Romans would have nothing to do with them after the conclusion of peace. They were disarmed and sent out of Italy. Thereupon they crossed over to Epirus, and continued their lawless practices in that country.

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to other parts. The towns and islands of those parts—Issa, Pharos, Apollonia, and Epidamnus—were in constant terror. Epidamnus was treacherously attacked by a number of men who had asked permission to fetch drinking water for their ships, and when they were hospitably admitted drew forth hidden knives, and cutting down the guards, took possession of the gate till the remainder of the band came from the ships and pressed into the town. The inhabitants succeeded only with the greatest difficulty in overcoming the robbers, and in driving them back to their ships.¹ The Corcyræans were less fortunate. The Illyrians, in league with the Acarnanians, fought a regular battle with them and their countrymen the Achæans, and compelled them to give over the island to them. Coreyra seemed destined to be thrown like a ball from the hand of one conqueror to that of another. The Illyrians gave over the government to a Greek from the island of Pharos, called Demetrius, who, judging by the little we know of him, appears to have been a reckless and unprincipled adventurer. By such successful undertakings the robber state of the Illyrians gradually became a considerable power. Their king felt himself to be a potentate not unlike the successors of Alexander the Great; and indeed he seemed fully entitled to consider himself the equal of Pyrrhus or the king of Macedonia, who was obliged to ask his assistance against the Achæans.²

Roman
embassy to
Illyricum.

The commerce of the Italian towns had long suffered under the scourge of the Illyrian pirates. At length the Roman senate sent two brothers, Caius and Lucius Coruncanius, to Scodra (Scutari), the seat of the Illyrian kings, complaining of their doings and asking for redress. At that time a queen called Teuta was governing in the place of her young son Pinnes. She promised that she, as queen of the Illyrians, would avoid all hostility against Rome in political matters, but she declared at the same time that she was not in a position to oppose the private undertakings

¹ Polybius, ii. 9.

² Polybius, ii. 2.

of her subjects. According to Illyrian law she said that every man was free to carry on war with another on his own account. Upon this the younger Coruncanius answered that it was customary among the Romans for the state to punish the transgressions of individuals. They would take good care to make the Illyrians also observe this custom. The queen made no answer to this ill-timed reply, but on the return of the brothers she caused them to be waylaid, and the younger one was killed.

War was now unavoidable. In the year 229 a fleet of two hundred ships sailed across the Adriatic Sea under the command of the consul Cn. Fulvius Centumalus, while a land army of 20,000 men and 2,000 horse marched to take ship at Brundisium under the second consul, L. Postumius Albinus. It was high time that a strong arm should interfere. The recently completed conquest of Corcyra had made the Illyrians so confident and daring that they contemplated nothing less than the reduction of all the independent Greek states of that neighbourhood. They besieged at the same time Epidamnus and Issa, and threatened Apollonia. But one summer campaign sufficed to put an end to their encroachments. When the Roman fleet appeared before Corcyra, the shrewd Demetrius saw at once with what sort of people he had to deal. To sacrifice himself in a hopeless contest for the Queen Teuta was not to his mind. He delivered the island over to the consul Fulvius, and offered his services in the prosecution of the war against the Illyrians. The fleet now sailed northwards under his guidance. Epidamnus and Issa were delivered without difficulty. The legions had in the meantime crossed from Italy. The strongholds and hiding-places of the Illyrians fell one after another into the power of the Romans. Now and then there was a serious struggle, but on the whole the Roman arms were irresistible. The Atintanians and Parthinians, two nations subjected by the Illyrians, joined the Romans. The Queen Teuta took refuge in the citadel of Rhizon, where for the time she was safe.

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229-228
B.C.

Successful
Roman
campaigns
in
Illyricum.

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In the autumn Fulvius was able to return with the greater part of the army and the fleet. His colleague Postumius remained in Illyria with forty ships and a few troops, formed an army out of the native people, and thus kept the Illyrians in check during the winter. In the following spring (228 B.C.) the Illyrian queen gave up further resistance and accepted the conditions of peace which Rome prescribed. All the conquests of the Illyrians were restored, and the nations which had been subjected again became independent. The Illyrians pledged themselves to sail no armed vessels further south than Lissus (Alessio), and even to pay a yearly tribute. After the enemy had been thoroughly humbled, the relations of the east coast of the Adriatic Sea were regulated according to the interests of Rome. Demetrius of Pharos, who had shown himself a valuable ally, received, under Roman supremacy, one part of Illyria and the guardianship of the youthful king Pinnes. The Greek towns retained their independence. All the peoples and towns which were freed from the Illyrians entered into an alliance with Rome, which, after the Roman custom, was a sort of mild subjection. It was announced to the Greeks in Hellas proper that the Romans had crossed the sea to release them from their foes.¹ There was unbounded joy at the receipt of this news. The Athenians determined to make the Romans honorary citizens and to admit them to the mysteries of Eleusis.² The Corinthians invited them to take part in the Isthmian games. Perhaps the just gratitude felt by the degenerate successors of the conquerors of Salamis stifled their feelings of shame, and caused them to forget the difference between the former times, when the Greeks defied the whole power of the Persian empire, and the present, when they suffered foreign barbarians to protect them from despicable robber hordes.

¹ Polybius, ii. 12.² Zonaras, viii. 19.

CHAPTER VII.

THE SECOND ILLYRIAN WAR, 219 B.C.

SHORTLY after the settlement of affairs in Illyria, the war with the Gauls broke out in Italy, which occupied Rome for a few years. The restless Demetrius of Pharos thought this a favourable time to free himself from a troublesome subjection to Rome. He was already before this time in close friendship with Antigonus, king of Macedonia, who was the first of all the Greek princes to find the neighbourhood of Rome an inconvenience, and to feel the duty of resisting Roman encroachments on the Greek continent. Relying on this connexion, and hoping that Rome would soon be engaged in a new war with Carthage, he began to attack the Roman allies, and to treat the conditions of peace of 228 generally with contempt. He sailed with fifty ships so far even as the Ægean Sea, plundering and laying waste the islands. Rome could not tolerate these acts, if she cared to retain the gratitude or respect of the Greeks. Nor was it the dignity of Rome alone, but her interests also, which demanded the prompt chastisement of Demetrius. A new war with Carthage had by this time become inevitable. If, before its outbreak, the quarrel with Illyria was not settled, the east coast of Italy would be threatened, not merely by Demetrius, but also by his friend and ally, the king of Macedonia, whose interest peremptorily demanded a union with Hannibal and a common war with Rome.

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219 B.C.

Alliance of
Demetrius
of Pharos
with Anti-
gonus,
king of
Mace-
donia.

Under these circumstances the Romans hastened to settle the Illyrian difficulty as speedily as possible, that

Capture of
Pharos by

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IV.Æmilius
Paullus.Position of
Rome after
the Gallic
and
Illyrian
wars.

they might the sooner oppose Hannibal in Spain. In the spring of the year 219 B.C. they sent the consul L. Æmilius Paullus to Illyria. He discharged his duty with ability and success, took in a short time the fortress of Dimalon, which had been considered impregnable, and by combining stratagem and bravery made himself master of the town and island of Pharos. Demetrius, flying to the king of Macedonia, sought to prevail on him to declare war against Rome, and fell some years later in an attack on the fortress of Ithome, in Peloponnesus.

Thus the danger of a greater war in the East was happily averted. The town of Pharos was destroyed, that it might no longer serve as a refuge for pirates. The former state of things was restored, and Rome, now free from all care, could, after the conclusion of the wars with Gaul and Illyria, look forward with confidence to the struggle which Hannibal for some years past had prepared, and which was now on the point of breaking out.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE SECOND PUNIC OR HANNIBALIAN WAR, 218-201 B.C.

First Period, from the beginning of the war to the battle of Cannæ, 218-216 B.C.

THE treaty of peace which had put an end to the first Punic war in 241 B.C. was the inevitable result of the exhaustion of both the belligerent nations. It was satisfactory to neither. After the immense efforts and sacrifices which Rome had made in the twenty-three years of war, she found that the evacuation by the Carthaginians of a few fortresses in Sicily, and the payment of a sum of money, was a result not in accordance with the high hopes which seemed justified after the landing of Regulus in Africa, and after his first brilliant and unexpected victories. Yet the senate and the Roman people were not able to alter the terms of peace materially. By refusing to ratify the negotiations of the generals they succeeded in extorting from the Carthaginians a few thousand talents more, but nothing else. A further demand might have roused the spirit of the Carthaginians and have continued the war to an indefinite period. Accordingly, Rome contented herself with what she could get, and what was after all a great gain. When the war of the mercenaries broke out in Africa, she availed herself of the distress of Carthage to extort the cession of Sardinia, and an additional payment of 1,200 talents.

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PERIOD,
218-216
B.C.Results of
the first
Punic war.

The disastrous termination of the Sicilian war could not fail to produce a great effect on the internal affairs of the Carthaginian republic. Unfortunately we have but a very imperfect knowledge of the public institutions of Carthage.

Effects of
the war on
the inter-
nal consti-
tution of
Carthage.

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and we can only guess what must have taken place on the occasion in question. But thus much seems certain, that the war with Rome, and still more the mutiny of the mercenaries, shook the power of the aristocracy.¹ A war is, under all circumstances, a severe test for the constitution of a state. Whatever is unsound in the administration and government comes to light, and an unsuccessful war is frequently the cause of reforms, provided a people has still vital energy enough left to discover and to apply the remedies which it needs.² This was the case in Carthage. In the war with the mercenaries, when the state could only be saved by the arms of its own citizens, when the people of Carthage were obliged to fight their own battles, they were justified in claiming for themselves a greater share in the government. A democratic movement took place, at the head of which we find Hamilcar Barcas, the most eminent statesman and soldier that Carthage possessed at that time. It is perfectly clear, even from the scanty reports preserved in the extant writers, that at the end of the Sicilian war Hamilcar found himself in opposition to the party which was then in possession of the government. He ceased to be commander-in-chief. In the perils of the war with the mercenaries, he again entered the service of the state. It was he to whom Carthage owed her deliverance from a ruin that seemed inevitable. His triumph in the field gave him the ascendancy over the aristocratic party and its leader, Hanno, surnamed the Great. It appears that from this time forward Hamilcar practically directed the government of Carthage, somewhat in the way in which Pericles had

¹ Polybius, vi. 51. The policy of the house of Barcas is called a δημοκρατία and a ἐταρεία τῶν πονηροτάτων ἀνθρώπων. (Appian, vi. 5; Diodorus, xxv. p. 96, Tauchnitz.) Such a misrepresentation is not surprising; it is similar to the account of the revolution in Volsinii (see vol. i. p. 479), which exhibits the spite and mendacity of aristocratic historians.

² It will not be necessary to give many instances. The regeneration of Prussia after the disastrous war with Napoleon in 1806; the abolition of slavery in Russia after the Crimean war; the establishment of parliamentary government in Austria after Sadowa, are among the most striking illustrations of the historical law referred to in the text.

governed Athens, without interfering materially with the forms of the republican constitution. His accession to power was not unlike a change of ministry in a modern state. The party which had governed the state before, now formed the Opposition; as a matter of course, it became the party of peace when Hamilcar and his sons looked upon the renewal of the war with Rome as an inevitable necessity, and as the only chance for the preservation of liberty and independence. It is a proof no less of the high political qualities of the Carthaginians than of the magnanimity of Barcas and his house, that, under such circumstances, Carthage preserved her republican liberties, and was not overwhelmed by a military despotism.

The mutiny of the mercenaries was scarcely suppressed, and the revolted African subjects brought back to obedience, when Hamilcar directed his attention to a country where he could hope to find compensation for the loss of Sicily and Sardinia. This country was Spain, to which, from the remotest antiquity, Phœnician traders and settlers had been attracted, but which had hitherto not been conquered by the Carthaginian arms, or made subject, to any considerable extent, to Carthaginian authority.

The island town of Gades, situated beyond the pillars of Hercules in the outer sea, was older perhaps than Carthage herself. Its national sanctuary of the Phœnician Melkarth (Hercules) vied in importance and dignity with the temples of the mother country. The fertile plain of Andalusia, the old land of Tartessus, was celebrated for its wealth, and enriched at an early period the merchants of Tyre and Sidon. The abundance of precious metals in Spain attracted the skilful Phœnician miners, who knew how to work the mines with profit. No doubt Spain had been for ages of the greatest importance for the trade of Carthage; but as long as her possessions in Sicily and Sardinia absorbed her attention and her energies, it seems that Spain was not so much the object of the public as of the private enterprise of the

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Policy of
Hamilcar
Barcas.

Phœnician
settle-
ments in
Spain.

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Rapid
growth of
Carthagi-
nian power
in Spain.

Carthaginian citizens, and that conquests in that country were not contemplated.

This was changed now after the war with Rome. Carthage began to extend her power and dominion in Spain, as England did in India after the loss of the American plantations. With an astounding rapidity she spread her possessions from a few isolated places on the coast over the southern half of the peninsula, and she appeared destined to establish the ascendancy of the Semitic race, and of Semitic culture, in a country where, nearly a thousand years later, the Arabs, a kindred Semitic people, succeeded in gaining a footing, and in reaching a high degree of civilisation. At the time of the Carthaginian conquest it seemed that Spain was about to be for ever separated politically from Europe, and to be united with North Africa, with which it has much in common through its geographical situation and its climate. Yet, owing to the events which we are now about to relate, the Punic conquest of Spain was of short duration, and left no traces behind except a few geographical names, like Cadiz and Carthagera; but the Moorish dominion, which lasted for more than seven hundred years, has left a stamp on the Spanish people which can even now be recognised, and not least in the religious fanaticism of which it was the principal cause.

Attitude
of the
Roman
state.

For nine years Hamilcar worked with great success for the realisation of his plan, and a considerable portion of Spain was already subjected to the dominion of Carthage when he lost his life in battle. His son-in-law, Hasdrubal, raised to the command of the army by the voice of the soldiers and by the approval of the people of Carthage,¹

¹ We do not know in what manner the preliminary election of the general by the votes of the army was conducted. It could not have been an illegal usurpation of authority by the soldiers, nor a violation of discipline. Perhaps the committee of Carthaginian senators, which, as we know, accompanied the army, selected the most popular and able officer, conferred on him the preliminary command, and reported to Carthage, to obtain the consent of the home authorities. Some such arrangement must have been necessary, unless a general was named from the first as second in command, and as successor in case of the death of the commander-in-chief. At any rate, it is not likely

proved himself a worthy successor of Hamilcar, though he extended and secured the dominion of Carthage less by force of arms than by persuasion and peaceful negotiations with the native races. He founded New Carthage (Carthagera), which he destined to be the capital of the new empire, as it was more favourably situated than Gades, and well suited to be a depot of arms and munitions of war for military undertakings in the central and eastern parts of Spain. The power and the influence of Carthage extended more and more northwards, and excited at last the attention and jealousy of Rome, which had for a time been apparently indifferent to the proceedings of the Carthaginians in the Pyrenæan peninsula. Hasdrubal was obliged to declare that Carthage would not extend her conquests beyond the river Ebro. At the same time the Romans entered into friendly relations with several Spanish tribes, and concluded a formal alliance with the important town of Saguntum,¹ which, though situated a good way to the south of the Ebro, was intended to oppose, under Roman protection, a barrier to the further progress of the Carthaginians.

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B.C.

This was the state of affairs in Spain when in 221 B.C. Hasdrubal was cut off prematurely by the hand of an assassin. The universal voice of the Spanish army appointed as his successor Hannibal, the eldest son of Hamilcar Barcas, then only twenty-eight years old.

Death of
Hasdrubal.

The Carthaginian people confirmed this choice, and by doing so placed their fate in the hands of an untried

Hannibal,
son of
Hamilcar
Barcas.

that the foreign mercenaries had any influence in the election. If the Carthaginian citizens serving in the army expressed their wishes as to the choice of a successor, and even if they possessed a formal right of election, it would have been a proceeding differing not very widely from the election of a Roman consul by the *comitia centuriata*, and it could be justified more easily than civil legislation by an army in the field, such as is reported of Rome (Livy, vii. 16). That the Carthaginians intentionally left to their armies a voice in the election of generals is clear from a proceeding in the war with the mercenaries, when the army is allowed to decide whether Hamilcar or Hanno is to command it.—See Polybius, i. 82.

¹ The site of Saguntum, on the coast north of Valencia, is now known as Murviedro, or the Old Walls.

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young man, of whom they might hope, but could not know, that he had the spirit of his father. But of one thing the Carthaginians might well be assured, that the son had inherited his father's glowing hatred of Rome, and that with his ardent spirit he held as his sacred duty the task of avenging past wrongs, and of establishing the security and power of his native country on the ruins of the rival city. There can be no doubt that the people of Carthage shared the sentiments of Hamilcar's family—that the loss of Sicily and Sardinia, whilst prompting feelings of revenge, convinced them that a lasting peace with Rome was impossible. They saw that even the twenty-four years of war in Sicily had not sufficed to fight out their quarrel, and that, sooner or later, the contest must be renewed. Every danger in which Carthage might possibly be involved, every war with foreign enemies, and every civil disturbance, might, to the faithless and ungenerous enemy, offer an opportunity for coming forward with new demands, and for extorting humiliating concessions. If this was the conviction of the Carthaginian people (and we have no reason to doubt it), they could not make a happier choice than in appointing Hannibal to the command in Spain. Never has a nation found a more fit and worthy representative. Never has the national will and spirit been embodied so completely and so nobly in one person, as in Hannibal was embodied the spirit and the will of Carthage. Even the low passion of hate seemed ennobled in a man who, in a lifelong, almost superhuman struggle with an overwhelming force, was animated and fired by it to persevere in a hopeless cause. No Roman ever gathered up and concentrated in himself so fully the great qualities of his nation as Hannibal did those of Carthage. We should only insult him if we were to compare him with Scipio, or any other of his contemporaries.¹ Rome has produced but one man who can compare with Hannibal. And this Hannibal, so great and powerful, so nearly fatal to the greatness and the very existence of

¹ See Arnold, *History of Rome*, iii. 64.

Rome, is, though a stranger, the first person we meet with in the history of Rome who inspires us with the feeling of personal interest, and with whose doings and sufferings we can sympathise. Before Hannibal appears on the historic stage, the shadowy figures of the Valerii, the Claudii, the Fabii, and hosts of other much-bepraised Roman heroes of the good old time, leave us cold and indifferent. They have too little reality and too little individuality about them. They are eclipsed by the foreigner Pyrrhus. But the adventures of Pyrrhus belong only in part to the history of Rome. Hannibal's whole life, on the contrary, was absorbed by his contest with the Roman people. He knew no other aim and aspiration than to lay Rome in the dust. Hence even the ancients have justly called the war, of which he was the life and soul,¹ the 'Hannibalian war,' and almost reluctantly have extolled his name, and inscribed it in imperishable letters on the tablets of history.

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A more dangerous antagonist than Hannibal the Romans never encountered. A high-minded people, able to appreciate true greatness, would, at least after his fall, have been generous or just to such an enemy, and, by acknowledging his greatness, would have honoured itself. The Romans acted otherwise. Bitterly as they hated, reviled, and persecuted Carthage, the most deadly poison of their hatred they poured upon Hannibal; they did not hesitate to blacken his memory by the most revolting accusations, and they went so far as to hold him alone personally responsible for the calamities which the long war brought over Italy. This feeling of hostility to Hannibal suggested or confirmed the account which Fabius Pictor, the oldest Roman historian, gave of the origin of the war.² Hannibal, it was said, began the war on his own responsibility, without the consent, nay, even against the wish of the govern-

Hatred of
the Ro-
mans for
Hannibal.

¹ Polybius, ix. 22: τῶν ἐκατέρους, Ῥωμαίοις φημι καὶ Καρχηδονίοις, προσπιπτόντων καὶ συμβαινόντων εἰς ἓν ἀνὴρ αἷτιος καὶ μία ψυχὴ, λέγω δὲ τὴν Ἀννίβου.

² Polybius, iii. 8.

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ment of Carthage.¹ He began it for merely selfish purposes, to put an end to impeachments which his political opponents were at that time bringing forward against the friends of his father and his brother-in-law.² The war was therefore not a war of the Carthaginian people with Rome, but a war of Hannibal and his party, undertaken in the interest of this party and of the family of Hamilcar Barcas. Even the expedition to Spain had, according to this view, been undertaken by Hamilcar, without the approbation and authority of the government, for the purpose of avoiding and baffling the impending inquiry into his conduct in Sicily.³ Hasdrubal showed the same contempt of the constituted authorities. He founded for himself an empire in Spain, independent of Carthage, and he entertained the design of overthrowing the republic, and of making himself king.⁴ The government was not strong enough to curb and control the men of the house of Barcas. It was dragged into the war with Rome against its will, and in spite of its conviction that the war would be pernicious to the state; but, though unable to prevent the war, the government of Carthage punished Hannibal by refusing or stinting the supplies or reinforcements which he wanted to carry his Italian campaign to a victorious end.

Real
position of

Polybius⁵ has, in a few words, exposed the utter absurdity

¹ This is perhaps the echo of the excuses by which, after the disastrous termination of the war, the Carthaginians endeavoured to cast the blame on Hannibal. Livy (xxx. 22) puts the following words into the mouth of the Carthaginian ambassadors: 'Eum *iniussu Senatus* non Alpes modo sed Iberum quoque transgressum, nec Romanis solum, sed ante etiam Saguntinis *privato consilio* bellum intulisse.' (Conf. *ibid.* s. 16, c. 42.) Yet this speech itself is perhaps based upon the erroneous supposition of Hannibal's guilt, and is not a true report of the words used by the Carthaginian ambassadors. For we shall see that, when peace was concluded, Hannibal was still at the head of affairs in Carthage, and he would hardly have tolerated such arguments as those reported by Livy. Napoleon I., after his fall, was in a similar manner made responsible for the wars in which he had involved France; but with more justice, for he was an absolute sovereign, and his will was law in France. Carthage was a republic, and no individual could force the majority of the senate and the people to adopt a policy which they condemned.

² Appian, vi. 9, vii. 3.

³ Appian, vii. 2.

⁴ Polybius, iii. 8, § 2.

⁵ Polybius, iii. 8.

of a view like this. 'If,' he says, 'Hannibal had been a mutinous general, and determined, for his own personal interests, to involve his country in a war which the government was anxious to avoid, how did it happen that the latter did not seize the opportunity of getting rid of such a dangerous citizen, when, after the fall of Saguntum, the Romans demanded that he should be given up to them? But the Carthaginian senate, far from sacrificing or even disowning him, approved his actions as with one voice, accepted and returned with enthusiasm the Roman declaration of war, and carried on this war for seventeen years, until the state was exhausted and compelled to sue for peace.'¹

When, after the war with the mercenaries, Carthage was enfeebled and crippled, and Rome, in utter defiance of

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Hannibal
as a Car-
thaginian
general.

¹ It is a matter of some surprise that, after such a confutation, Mommsen, in his *History of Rome* (vol. i. chap. iv.), should return to the false representation of Fabius Pictor. He dwells with a censorial pleasure on the alleged hostility between the house of Hamilcar Barcas and the Carthaginian government. He speaks of a predilection ('Hinneigung') of the Carthaginian oligarchy (*i.e.* Hannibal's political opponents) for Rome, of an 'understanding between them and the Romans which bordered upon treason,' of a 'pro-Roman government' in Carthage. When Hannibal succeeded to the command of the army, 'the peace party was in power at Carthage,' and 'they had no intention to allow the young man to indulge in freaks of youthful patriotism at the public cost;' but Hannibal paid no attention to their wishes or commands; 'he reported that he was obliged to punish Saguntum for some act of hostility to Carthaginian subjects, and, without waiting for an answer, began the siege, *i.e.* the war with Rome. The Carthaginian senate were more afraid of their own army and the populace than of Rome, or they saw that it was too late to undo what had been done, or else they lacked energy for decisive action and resolved at last to resolve upon nothing, and, without waging the war, to suffer it to be waged.' This view is sufficiently condemned by its intrinsic improbability, and has therefore been rejected in antiquity by Polybius (iii. 8; iii. 13, §§ 1, 2), and in modern times by Heeren (*Ideen*, ii. 1, 8), Vincke (*Der zweite punische Krieg*, 1841, pp. 142-170), and C. Peter (*Studien zur röm. Gesch.* pp. 19-27). It assumes a political situation in Carthage such as can only be brought about by a total wreck of order, by anarchy and confusion. It describes the government as venal, timid, listless, without decision, trembling before its own army, split into factions, opposed to the noblest patriots, partial to the enemies of the country, drifting hopelessly into a tremendous war, which it condemned and vainly tried to avoid. How such a government was able to carry on the war for seventeen years, and almost to overthrow the most warlike and powerful state of the ancient world, is a miracle which defies our understanding, and which can be believed only by a blind unreasoning faith.

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justice, had availed herself of the distress of her old rival to deprive her of Sardinia, then it was that Hamilcar Barca devoted himself and his house to the service of the avenging goddess, and planned the war with Rome.¹ He left his native town to lay in Spain the foundation of a new colonial empire of Carthage, and when he was offering up sacrifice at the altar of the tutelary god of the Carthaginian people and was praying for his divine protection, he bade his son Hannibal, then a boy of nine years, lay his hands on the altar and swear that he would always be the enemy of Rome. He took him to Spain; he brought him up in his camp, to prepare him for the task for which he had destined him, and he sacrificed his life to save that of his son.² For eight years Hannibal served under his brother-in-law Hasdrubal. His military bearing made him the idol of the army. Then, in the full vigour of life, and still in all the freshness of youth, he was summoned, by the confidence of his comrades, and by the unanimous voice of the Carthaginian people,³ to take the command of the army and to carry out the policy of his father.

Resources
of
Carthage.

Twenty years had elapsed since the peace of 241 B.C. With wonderful energy and success Carthage had recovered from her misfortunes. The government was no longer in the hands of the oligarchy; the popular party was at the head of affairs, and was led by the men of the house of Barca. An extensive territory had been conquered in Spain. The Iberian tribes, subjected by force of arms or conciliated by peaceful negotiations and readily submitting to Carthaginian authority, furnished for the army an abundant supply of volunteers or compulsory recruits⁴ in place of the inconstant Gallic mercenaries, of whom the Carthaginian army was mainly composed in the first war. The Libyan subjects were reduced to obedience, and furnished excellent foot soldiers. The Numidians, more closely united with Carthage than ever before, by the military genius and the policy of Hamilcar and Hasdrubal, sup-

¹ Polybius, iii. 10, §§ 3 and 4; iii. 13, § 1.

² Diodorus, xxv. fr. 2.

³ Polybius, iii. 13, § 4.

⁴ Livy, xxi. 11, 21.

plied a light cavalry that could not be matched by the Romans. The finances had to some extent recovered, in spite of the heavy contributions of war exacted by Rome, amounting to 4,400 talents.¹ The time was come when Carthage might hope to renew the contest with a fair hope of final victory. The Romans, like the Carthaginians, looked upon the peace of 241 B.C. as only an armistice, but they very much underrated the strength of their conquered rival. They regarded Carthage as so thoroughly broken and exhausted that they might at pleasure resume the war at any time most convenient for them. They were prepared to do so after the termination of the war with the mercenaries; but the readiness with which Carthage in that time of depression submitted to the humiliating conditions imposed as the price of peace averted an open rupture, while the resignation of the Carthaginians being interpreted as an unmistakeable sign of weakness strengthened the conviction that for the future also Carthage would be unable to offer a long or determined resistance. The Romans had, probably, but an imperfect knowledge of the great advance which the Carthaginian power had made by its conquests in Spain, still less were they informed of the invigoration of the political system of Carthage by the triumph of the democracy and the ascendancy of the family of Barcas. Rome was therefore in no hurry to follow up the policy struck out in the first Punic war. She was the more inclined to delay as this war had dealt severe blows to Italy, and had caused losses which time had not yet repaired. Moreover, the acquisition of Sardinia was followed by almost uninterrupted hostilities with the stubborn inhabitants of that island, and by similar petty wars in Corsica and Liguria—wars which, though unimportant in themselves, were yet sufficient to withdraw the attention of the Romans from other quarters. The Illyrian war (229 B.C.) was a far more serious affair,

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B.C.Policy of
the
Romans in
delaying
the
renewal of
the war.¹ Upwards of 1,100,000*l*.

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especially as it engaged the whole Roman fleet. But it was more especially the long threatened war with the Gauls (225 B.C.) which procured for Carthage a temporary respite and a continuance of the peace with Rome. This war lasted for four years. It came to an end just before the death of Hasdrubal, and even then it was ended only in appearance. The resistance of the Gauls in the valley of the Po was broken in 221 B.C., and the Romans set about securing the possession of the land by establishing the two colonies of Placentia and Cremona on the Po. Now, at last, the time seemed to have arrived when Rome could devote herself to the settlement of her old dispute with her rival for supremacy in the western Mediterranean.

Alliance
of Sagun-
tum with
Rome.

During the last few years the attention of the Romans had been drawn to the progress of the Carthaginians in Spain. Spanish tribes and towns which dreaded annexation to the Carthaginian province applied for assistance to Rome. The result of this application was the treaty by which Hasdrubal had pledged himself to confine his conquests within the Ebro. Another result was the alliance between Rome and Saguntum. According to the conditions of the peace of 241 B.C. the allies of either of the two contracting states were not to be molested by the other. It is true that Saguntum¹ was not the ally of Rome at the time when that peace was concluded. But, nevertheless, it was evident that Rome could not be debarred from concluding new alliances, and it appeared a matter of course that she must and would afford her protection no less to her new allies than to the old. If the Carthaginians questioned or disregarded this claim of Rome, the peace was broken, and no appeal was left but to arms. No doubt could exist on this subject either at Rome or at Carthage.

Prepara-
tions of
Hannibal.

Immediately upon his appointment to the command of the army, Hannibal was anxious to begin the war with Rome, and the time would have been extremely favourable, as in the year 221 B.C. Rome was still sufficiently occupied with the Gauls. But he was obliged to make ample pre-

¹ See p. 147.

parations before undertaking so serious an enterprise, and moreover the Carthaginian possessions in Spain had to be enlarged and secured, so as to serve as a proper basis for his operations. He also wished, no doubt, to feel and try the extent of his power over the army and of his authority at home; to familiarize himself with the troops who were destined to carry out his bold conceptions—to seat himself firmly in the saddle and to try the mettle of his steed. He therefore devoted the years 221 and 220 to the task of subduing some tribes south of the Ebro, training his army, inspiring his men with confidence in his command, enriching them with booty and thus heightening their zeal, and finally of providing for the security of Spain and Africa during his absence.

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All these preparations were made by the beginning of the year 219 B.C. The first object of his attack was Saguntum, the rich, powerful, and well-fortified town to the south of the Ebro, which had lately sought and obtained the Roman alliance. The Saguntines boasted of Greek origin, and called themselves descendants of colonists from the island of Zakynthos—an assertion for which, in all probability, they had no authority beyond the similarity of the two names. They appear to have been genuine Iberians, like the other nations in Spain, and to have had no more affinity with the Greeks than could be claimed by the Romans. At that time, when the Romans acted as protectors and liberators of the Greeks in the Adriatic and Ionian Seas, and when they began to pride themselves on their assumed descent from Homeric heroes, the Grecian name was a welcome pretext and a means for obtaining political advantages. But even without this pretext the alliance of Saguntum was of sufficient importance to Rome. It was admirably situated and adapted for a base of operations against the Carthaginian possessions in Spain, and could answer the purpose which Messina had served in Sicily. At any rate it might be made a barrier against the further advance of the Carthaginians, and with this view it had been received into Roman protection while Hasdrubal commanded in Spain.

Importance of
Saguntum.

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embassy
to
Hannibal.

The Roman senate felt convinced that a warning would at once be followed by an abandonment of the Carthaginian designs on Saguntum, which of late had become more manifest, and of which the Saguntines had repeatedly informed the senate.¹ It accordingly dispatched an embassy to Hannibal (in 219 B.C.) to point out the consequences if he persisted in hostilities against the friends and clients of the Roman people. But Hannibal made no secret of his intentions. He told the ambassadors that the alliance between Saguntum and Rome was no reason why he should not treat the former as an independent state; that he had as much right as the Romans to interfere in the internal affairs of Saguntum, and in case of necessity to defend that town from the usurped protectorate of Rome.² A similar answer was given to the ambassadors by the senate of Carthage, whither they had proceeded from Hannibal's camp.³

Siege of
Saguntum
by
Hannibal.

The Romans knew now that they had no longer to deal with the peace-loving, yielding Hasdrubal, nor with a broken-spirited people who recoiled with terror from even the threat of war. Now was the time, if they meant seriously to stand up for their new allies, to send forth with a fleet and an army to Spain, and this was demanded by their own interest as well as by that of the Saguntines. But they did not stir during the whole of this year, and left the despairing Saguntines to their fate. Hannibal, at no loss for a pretext to declare war against Saguntum, laid regular siege to the town in the spring of the year

¹ Polybius, iii. 15, § 1. Livy, xxi. 6.

² Polybius, iii. 14, 15. The Romans had put an end to a civil war in Saguntum, and had killed the leaders of the party opposed to them. There can be no doubt that this party was a Carthaginian party. The situation in Saguntum was therefore similar to that which had existed in Messana at the commencement of the first Punic war, when a Roman and a Carthaginian party divided the town. Perhaps Hannibal hoped by means of his adherents to get possession of Saguntum, without employing force. If he had been successful in this, he might have begun his campaign a whole year earlier, whilst the Romans were still occupied in Illyria, and whilst the situation in the north of Italy was far more favourable for Carthage than afterwards.

³ Livy, xxi. 11. Polybius, iii. 15, § 12.

219 B.C. But the Saguntines resisted with the obstinacy and determination which have at all times characterised Spanish towns. For eight months all the efforts of the besiegers were in vain. Hannibal's military genius was of little avail in the slow operations of a regular siege, where success depends not so much on rapid resolutions and bold combinations as on stubborn perseverance in a methodical plan. The eight months of tedious, harassing, and bloody fighting for the possession of Saguntum were calculated to disgust Hannibal with all siege operations, and we find that during all his campaigns in Italy he undertook them unwillingly, and persevered only in one with any degree of firmness. It is probable that the hope of Roman succour braced the courage of the Saguntines and protracted their defence. But as this hope in the end proved vain, the resistance of the brave defenders of the doomed town was borne down. Saguntum was taken by storm, and suffered the fate of the conquered. The surviving inhabitants were distributed as slaves among the soldiers of the victorious army, the articles of value were sent to Carthage, the ready money was applied to the preparations for the impending campaign.¹

Now that the war had in fact begun, the Romans sent another embassy to Carthage, as if they still thought it possible to preserve peace. But their demands were such that they might safely have dispatched an army at the same time, for they could not expect that the Carthaginians would listen to them. The Roman ambassadors required that Hannibal and the committee of senators which accompanied the army should be given up to them as a sign that the Carthaginian commonwealth had taken no part in, and did not approve of, the violence done to the allies of Rome. But the authorities at Carthage were far from ignominiously sacrificing their general, and submitting themselves to Roman mercy and generosity. They endeavoured to show that the attack on Saguntum did not involve a rupture of the peace with Rome, because, when

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Second
embassy
of the
Romans to
the Car-
thaginians.

¹ Polybius, iii. 17, § 10. Livy, xxi. 15.

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that peace was concluded by Hamilcar and Catulus in 241 B.C., Saguntum was not yet numbered among the allies of Rome, and could not therefore be included among those whom Carthage had undertaken to leave unmolested. The Roman ambassadors declined to discuss the question of right or wrong, and insisted on the simple acceptance of their demands. At last, after a long altercation, the chief of the embassy, Quintus Fabius Maximus, gathering up the folds of his toga, exclaimed: 'Here I carry peace and war; say, ye men of Carthage, which you choose.' 'We accept whatever you give us,' was the answer. 'Then we give you war,' replied Fabius, spreading out his toga; and without another word he left the senate-house, amid the boisterous exclamations of the assembly that they welcomed war, and would wage it with the spirit which animated them in accepting it.¹

Character
of the
second
Punic war.

Thus the war was resolved upon and declared on both sides—a war which stands forth in the annals of the ancient world without a parallel. It was not a war about a disputed boundary, about the possession of a province, or some partial advantage; it was a struggle for existence,² for supremacy or destruction. It was to decide whether the Greco-Roman civilisation of the West or the Semitic civilisation of the East was to be established in Europe, and to determine its history for all future time. The war was one of those in which Asia struggled with Europe, like the war of the Greeks and Persians, the conquests of Alexander the Great, the wars of the Arabs, the Huns, and the Tartars. Whatever may be our admiration of Hannibal, and our sympathy with heroic and yet defeated Carthage, we shall nevertheless be obliged to acknowledge that the victory of Rome—the issue of this trial by battle—was the most essential condition for the healthy development of the human race.

¹ Polybius, iii. 20, 33. Livy, xxi. 18.

² Polybius, ii. 14: 'Ἀννίβας ἐπεβάλετο καταλβεῖν τὴν Ῥωμαίων δυναστείαν, κ.τ.λ. Appian (vi. 4) erroneously calls the second Punic war a war for the possession of Spain. See Vincke, *Der zweite punische Krieg*, pp. 16, 124.

Since the first war with Carthage, the strength of Rome had materially increased. At the time when the war broke out in Sicily, ten years had scarcely passed since the completion of the conquest of Italy. In Samnium, Lucania, and Apulia the generation still lived which had measured its strength with Rome in the long struggle for supremacy and independence. The memory of all the sufferings during the war, the humiliation of defeat, the old animosity and hatred were yet alive in their hearts. Now, however, after the lapse of sixty years, a new generation had grown up in Italy, which was a living part of the body of the Roman people, and had given up all idea of carrying on a separate existence. In a hundred battles the conquered nations of Italy had fought and bled by the side of the Romans. An Italo-Roman national feeling had grown up in the wars in which Romans and Italians had confronted Libyans, Gauls, and Illyrians. Where could the peoples of Italy find the enjoyments, hopes, and blessings of national life, except in their union with Rome?

In an economical point of view, the supremacy of Rome was, for the Italians, a compensation for the loss of their independence. It had put a stop to an intolerable evil—the endless disputes and wars, which appear to be inseparable from small communities of imperfect civilisation. The calamities of a great war, like that in Sicily between Rome and Carthage, strike the imagination by the great battles, the sacrifices, and losses on a large scale which characterise them; but the everlasting paltry feuds of neighbours, accompanied by pillage, burning, devastation, and murder in every direction, cause a much larger amount of human suffering, especially where, as in Italy at that time, every man is a warrior, every stranger an enemy, every enemy a robber, and all look upon war as a source of profit. This deplorable state of things had ceased in Italy after the supremacy of Rome was established. Henceforth, it was alone the Roman people that waged war, and the theatre of war had mostly been beyond the confines of Italy.

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an Italo-
Roman
nation.Gain to
the
conquered
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When the nations of Italy had furnished their contingents and contributed their share to the expenses of the war, they could till their fields in peace, without fearing that a hostile band would suddenly break in upon them, set fire to the standing corn, cut down the fruit trees, drive away the cattle, and carry off their wives and children into slavery. Only the districts near the coast had been alarmed by the Carthaginians during the first war; but the interior regions had been quite exempt from hostile attacks; and, even on the coast, the numerous Roman colonies had offered protection from the worst evils of war.

Burdens
of the
Roman
allies.

The public burthens which the allies of Rome had to bear were moderate. They paid no direct taxes. The military service was no hardship for a warlike population, especially as there was always a chance of gaining booty. The Greek cities were principally charged with furnishing ships. The other allies sent contingents to the Roman army, which, in the aggregate, seldom amounted to a greater number of men than were furnished by Rome itself. In the field these troops were victualled by the Roman state, and were therefore no source of expense to the allies. If we bear in mind that the different Italian communities enjoyed, for the most part, perfect freedom and self-government in the management of their own affairs, and that everywhere the leading men found their authority increased by their intimate connexion with the Roman nobility, we can easily understand that, in the beginning of the Hannibalian war, the whole of Italy was firmly united, and formed a striking contrast to the Carthaginian state with its discontented subjects and inconstant allies.

Population
of Italy.

Of the state of the population of Italy in the period before the second Punic war, we are tolerably well informed. Polybius relates¹ that at the time when the Gauls threatened to invade Etruria (in 225 B.C.) a general

¹ Polybius, ii. 24.

census was taken of the military forces of which Rome might dispose in case of war, and that the number of men capable of bearing arms amounted to 770,000. If this statement is, on the whole, to be trusted, not only for the accuracy of the information originally obtained by the officers employed in the census, but for the faithful preservation of the official numbers by the historians,¹ we can infer from it that at the time in question, *i.e.* shortly before the appearance of Hannibal in Italy, the population of the peninsula was nearly as great as it is at the present day, and that it amounted to about 9,000,000 in those parts which then were included in the name of Italy, *i.e.* the peninsula south of Liguria and Transalpine Gaul, and exclusive of the islands.²

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The Carthaginian statesmen had a just appreciation of the dangers involved in a war with Rome. The Roman armies were composed of citizens accustomed to the use of arms, and of faithful allies equally warlike and equally brave. Forces like these they could not match, either in quantity or quality. The citizens of Carthage were neither so numerous as those of Rome, nor available for service beyond Africa. The subjects and allies were not very trustworthy. The Libyans and Numidians had only just been reduced again to submission, after a sanguinary war; the Spaniards were hardly broken to the yoke, and served rather the generals than the commonwealth of Carthage. The ancient undoubted superiority of the Carthaginian navy was gone. Rome was now mistress of the western Mediterranean, as well by her fleets as through the possession of all the harbours in Italy, Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica,

Naval
power of
the
Romans
and Car-
thaginians.

¹ A few variations occur, indeed, but they are not material. Eutropius (iii. 5), on the authority of Fabius Pictor, gives 800,000 as the right number; Pliny (*Hist. Nat.* iii. 24) gives 780,000. Livy's statement (epit. 20), giving the number as 300,000, must arise from an error in transcribing the text.

² The population, in 1865, of the former kingdom of Naples, of the States then belonging to the Church, the Marches, Umbria, and Tuscany, was 10,694,252 (according to Kolb's *Statistik*). Compare Zumpt, *Ueber den Stand der Bevölkerung im Alterthum* (*Abhandlungen der Berliner Akademie*, 1812, p. 19), and the Appendix at the end of the present volume.

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and even on the coast of Illyria. In the basin of the Tyrrhenian Sea, in the Adriatic and Ionian Seas, maritime operations on a large scale were very hazardous for Carthage, as nowhere was a single port open to them. They could interrupt the Roman communications, capture transports and trading vessels, harass and alarm the coasts of Italy; but this kind of piratical warfare could not lead to great results. In her finances Carthage was no longer what she had been. Her resources had been drained in the long wars in Sicily and Africa, and the war indemnities exacted by Rome were felt even by the wealthy state of the Punic merchants to be a heavy burden. The new conquests in Spain, it is true, had brought some relief. But the loss of Sicily and the hostility of Rome had, to a great extent, paralysed trade. Even before the end of the Sicilian war, it is clear that the financial resources of Carthage had begun to fail. The equipment of the fleet, which was routed at the Ægæan Islands, had absorbed all the means left at the disposal of the state. When this great and supreme effort had failed, peace had become absolutely necessary. The war with the mercenaries was provoked by the unseasonable but necessary illiberality with which the claims of the soldiers for overdue pay and promised compensations were met. If Spain had not yielded a rich return beyond paying for the military enterprises of Hamilcar and Hasdrubal, it would have been hard for Carthage to recover strength for a new contest. As it was, her financial weakness must have been the principal cause of the slowness and inefficiency which she displayed in sending reinforcements to Hannibal.

Alliance
of the Car-
thaginians
with the
Gauls.

Thus, with her own strength alone, Carthage could scarcely hope to meet her hated and dreaded antagonist on equal terms. It was necessary to secure allies, and the events of the last few years seemed in the highest degree favourable for organising in different quarters a combined action against Rome. Above all Hannibal reckoned upon the co-operation of the Gauls in the north of Italy. In spite of their defeats in Etruria and on the

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Po, they were far from being broken, dispirited, or reconciled. On the contrary, the attempt of the Romans to establish colonies in their country provoked their renewed hostility. If these Gauls, with their rude undisciplined, ill-armed hordes alone, were able to jeopardize the Roman supremacy and to shake the foundations of the Roman empire, what might not Hannibal expect to accomplish with their aid, if he regulated their impetuous bravery, and ranged them among his highly disciplined Libyan and Spanish soldiers? The Gauls had not yet ceased to be the terror of southern Europe. Even as mercenaries they excelled in many military qualities. Fighting in their own cause, defending their own homes, they might, in a good military school, become invincible.

These hopes hastened the resolution of Carthage to renew the war, and determined the plan of the campaign. The land of the Gauls in the north of Italy was to be the basis of Hannibal's operations, and the Gaulish warriors were to fight under his standards. The spoliation and plunder of Italy was to pay for the expenses of the war. It was this consideration which determined Hannibal to march across the Pyrenees and the Alps into the country of the Insubrians and Boians, on the Po, where he was expected with impatience. He had for some time past been in negotiation with these peoples. They had supplied him with information regarding the Alpine passes, and had promised guides; and he reckoned on their strenuous assistance when he undertook that enterprise which filled the whole world with astonishment and admiration.

The Gauls were not the only allies that Hannibal hoped to find in Italy. He knew that a hostile army was sure to be welcomed in Africa by the discontented subjects of Carthage. At the time of Agathokles, during the invasion of Regulus, and during the mutiny of the mercenaries, the Libyans and Numidians—nay, on one occasion, even the kindred citizens of Utica—had made common cause with the enemies of Carthage. Hannibal hoped in like manner to gain the adhesion of the Marsians, the Samnites,

Expected
revolt of
the Italian
allies.

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Campanians, Lucanians, and Bruttians, perhaps even of the Latins, if he should be able, by brilliant victories, to banish their fear of the power and vengeance of Rome. He did not know how firmly these peoples were united with Rome, and perhaps he forgot that his alliance with the Gauls, the common enemies of all Italy, was calculated to make his friendship suspected.

Attitude of
the Macedonian
government.

Not in Italy alone, but also beyond the confines of Italy, the Carthaginians hoped to find allies for an attack upon Rome. Antigonus, the king of Macedonia, watched with uneasiness the aggressive policy of the Romans, and their interference in the affairs of the Greek states. A Roman party in these states could not but be hostile to Macedonia. It was natural, therefore, that he should be ready to oppose the Romans. He had already instigated Demetrius of Pharos to the war with Rome, and after his expulsion from Illyria he had received him at his court, and refused to surrender him to the Romans. Messengers went backwards and forwards between Macedonia and Carthage, and Hannibal was justified in hoping that the first great victory would secure his active co-operation in a war with Rome.

Provisions
of Hannibal for
the defence
of Spain
and Africa.

These plans, negotiations, and preparations occupied Hannibal during the period from the winter of 219 to 218 B.C. He had, moreover, to provide for the military defence of Spain and Africa during his absence. He sent a body of 15,000 Spaniards to Carthage, and an equal force of Libyans from Africa to Spain, making the troops serve at the same time as hostages to guarantee the fidelity of their countrymen. On the approach of winter he had allowed his Spanish troops to go home on furlough, feeling sure that they would be the more ready to join him again for the following campaign in spring. The plunder of Saguntum had stimulated their eagerness to serve under the Carthaginian general, and they were ready to try again the fortune of war under such a victorious and liberal leader.

When in the spring¹ of 218 B.C., Hannibal had again collected his army and made all the necessary preparations, he set out on his march from New Carthage, rather later, it may be supposed, than he had originally intended—in the beginning of summer.² His force consisted of ninety thousand foot, twelve thousand horse, and thirty-seven elephants.³ Until he reached the Ebro, his road passed through the territory of tribes that had already submitted to Carthage. But the land between the Ebro and the Pyrenees was inhabited by independent and hostile peoples, who resisted the advance of the Carthaginian army. Hannibal, who had no time to lose, sacrificed a considerable portion of his army for the purpose of quickly forcing his way through this country, and he succeeded in his plan, at the cost of losing twenty thousand men. Having reached the Pyrenees, he left his brother Hasdrubal and ten thousand men to defend the newly conquered territory. An equal number of Spanish soldiers he dismissed to their homes, finding that they were reluctant to accompany him, and preferring to take with him a smaller army of chosen and devoted warriors than a large discontented host. Thus his forces were reduced to fifty thousand foot and nine thousand horse with the elephants, when he crossed the Pyrenees by some pass near the Mediterranean, apparently without encountering any serious difficulty. The Gaulish tribes living between the Pyrenees and the Rhone did not oppose the march. It was only when Hannibal arrived at the Rhone that he encountered any resistance. The Gauls in that part of the country had assembled a force on the left, or eastern, bank of the river, and endeavoured to prevent the passage. Hannibal was obliged to halt a few days before he could cross. He sent a detachment under Hanno higher up the river to an undefended place, where they crossed without difficulty on rapidly constructed rafts; meanwhile he collected all the vessels that could be procured, caused

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PERIOD,
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B.C.March of
Hannibal
from New
Carthage,
218 B.C.¹ Polybius, iii. 34, § 6.² Polybius, v. 1. § 3: ἀρχομένης τῆς θερείας.³ Polybius, iii. 35.

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Landing of
a Roman
army at
Massilia.

trees to be felled and hollowed out for canoes, and when, on the third day, the fire signals of Hanno announced that he had arrived in the rear of the Gauls, he forced the passage. The Gauls, attacked in front and rear, made no long resistance. On the fifth day after his arrival on the Rhone, Hannibal had gained the left bank, and caused the elephants and heavy baggage to be ferried over on rafts.

The passage of the Rhone was not yet quite accomplished when intelligence arrived which showed that the utmost dispatch was necessary, unless the whole plan for the ensuing campaign was to be upset at the very beginning. A Roman army had landed at Massilia, and was now only four days' march from the mouths of the Rhone. A collision with the Romans in Gaul, even if it had led to the most brilliant victory, would have detained Hannibal so long that the passage of the Alps would have been impossible before the winter had set in. It was already the beginning of October, and in a short time the mountains would be impassable; and if the Alps were not crossed before the winter, the Romans would probably block up the passes, and Africa, instead of Italy, would become the theatre of war.

Inade-
quate
prepara-
tions of
the
Romans.

The Roman embassy which had demanded satisfaction in Carthage for the attack on Saguntum, and had formally declared war, had not been dispatched from Rome, as might have been expected, immediately after the fall of Saguntum in the course of the year 219, but in the following spring. The same slowness which the Romans had exhibited in their diplomatic action they showed in the actual preparations for war. They had evidently no conception of Hannibal's plan for the ensuing campaign, nor of the rapidity with which his ardent spirit worked. The Romans flattered themselves with the idea that they would be able to choose their own time to begin hostilities, and to select the theatre of war. They waited quietly for the return of the ambassadors from Spain, whither they had proceeded from Carthage, for the purpose of making themselves acquainted with the state of affairs and of

encouraging the friends of Rome to persevere in their fidelity. Then the two customary consular armies were levied in the usual manner; the one destined, under the command of Tiberius Sempronius Longus, to be sent to Sicily, and from thence to cross over into Africa to attack the Carthaginians in their own country; the other, under Publius Cornelius Scipio, to act against Hannibal in Spain. The Romans hoped to carry on the war with four legions, little thinking that twenty would not suffice.

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B.C.

Meanwhile they were busily engaged in completing the conquest of Northern Italy.¹ Two new strongholds, the colonies of Placentia and Cremona, had been established there for the purpose of keeping the country in subjection. Each of them had received a garrison of six thousand colonists. Three commissioners, among them the consular Lutatius, who had gained the decisive victory at the Ægatian Islands (in 241 B.C.), were engaged in assigning the land to the colonists, and in making the necessary arrangements for the administration of the new communities, when they were suddenly surprised, in the spring of 218 B.C., by a new rising of the Boians.² These people, who saw their land distributed to Roman colonists, felt in the highest degree alarmed and exasperated, and could not restrain their impatience nor wait for the arrival of Hannibal. They fell upon the colonists in different parts of the country, forced them to take refuge in the fortified town of Mutina,³ and laid siege to the town. Under the pretext of wishing to negotiate, they succeeded in inducing the three commissioners to come out of the town for a conference, seized them treacherously, and held them as a security for the safety of the hostages which they had been obliged to give to the Romans on the conclusion of peace.

Rising of
the Boian
Gauls.

Upon the news of these events, the prætor Lucius

Additional
Roman
levies.

¹ We prefer calling Gallia Cisalpina by the name used in the text, though, properly speaking, it was not yet included in the term Italy.

² Polybius. iii. 40.

³ Polybius (iii. 40, § 8) calls Mutina a Roman colony. This is a mistake, for it was not till 183 B.C. that Mutina was made a colony in due form.

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Manlius, who commanded a legion at Ariminum, marched in all haste towards Mutina; but he was surprised in the midst of the dense forests which, at that time, covered those plains,¹ was repulsed with great loss, and blockaded in a village called Tanetum, on the Po, where he threw up earthworks for his defence. Thus the whole of Northern Italy was again in a state of insurrection. The Romans had not succeeded in extinguishing the fire in their own house before the enemy attacked it from without. The danger within was even more alarming than the foreign war, which might possibly be delayed. It was therefore resolved at Rome to send the two recently levied legions, which Scipio was to have led into Spain, immediately to the Po, and to raise, in their place, two new legions for the service in Spain against Hannibal.² This measure tended, of course, to delay the departure of Scipio considerably, and it enabled Hannibal to gain a start, and to carry out his original plan of avoiding a collision with the Romans until he should have reached Italy.

Voyage
and march
of Scipio.

When at length, probably late in the summer of 218 B.C.,³

¹ Livy, xxi. 25: 'Silvæ tunc circa viam erant, plerisque incultis.'

² Polybius, iii. 40, § 14. According to Livy (xxi. 26), only one of the two legions of Scipio, with 5,000 allies, was sent to reinforce the prætor C. Manlius in Cisalpine Gaul.

³ Polybius (iii. 41, § 2) says: οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ τῶν Ῥωμαίων, ἐτοιμασάμενοι τὰ πρὸς τὰς ἰδίαις ἐπιβολάς, ἐξέπλεον ὑπὸ τὴν ὥραν ἐπὶ τὰς προκειμένας πράξεις. This statement, vague as it is with regard to time, cannot be intended to mean that both consuls left Rome precisely at the same time. Nothing prevented the departure of Sempronius for Sicily as soon as his two legions were formed. But Scipio, whose legions were dispatched to the Po, was obliged to wait until new legions were raised, a process that could hardly take less than one or two months. It is not likely that during all this time Sempronius remained idle at Rome, merely for the purpose of starting simultaneously with his colleague in the opposite direction. His task was quite different from that of Scipio, and quite independent of it. He intended to cross from Sicily into Africa, and made extensive operations to carry out this enterprise in the course of the year 218 B.C. (Polybius, *ibid.* § 3). The expression of Polybius, ὑπὸ τὴν ὥραν, is therefore no sufficient evidence to show that Scipio, as Mommsen says (*Rom. Hist.* i. 585), started early enough from Rome to reach Massilia by the end of June. If, as appears from a comparison of dates, Scipio arrived at the Rhone about the middle of September, he must have left Rome in August; Sempronius had left in the beginning of summer for Sicily. The expression ὑπὸ τὴν ὥραν may therefore be vaguely applied to both events.

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Scipio's legions were formed, he embarked and sailed along the coast of Etruria and Liguria to the mouths of the Rhone, on his way to Spain. But on reaching Massilia he was surprised by the news that Hannibal, whom he expected to encounter in Spain, had crossed the Ebro and the Pyrenees, and was on his march towards the Rhone. This was the first intimation which the Romans had of Hannibal's plan. But even yet Scipio was in doubt. If Hannibal intended to attack Italy from the north, the coast road to Genoa, and through the country of the Ligurians, was the nearest. Scipio knew not for certain that Hannibal intended to cross the Alps, nor which pass he would choose. To make sure about this he sent a squadron of horse along the left bank of the Rhone to look out for Hannibal. If he had arrived in Gaul only a few days earlier, so as to be able to dispute the passage of the Rhone, he might have baffled Hannibal's plan. As it was, his horsemen soon met a party of Numidian cavalry coming down the river to reconnoitre. A skirmish took place, and the Romans, on their return, boasted that they had had the better against superior numbers. The news they brought sufficed to show that Scipio had come too late, and that Hannibal had already gained the left bank of the river. Nevertheless, Scipio marched northwards with his whole force, hoping perhaps that Hannibal would turn southwards to meet him. But when he had reached the spot where Hannibal had crossed the Rhone, and heard that the Carthaginian army had marched towards the interior of Gaul, he saw that it was useless to advance further, and was no longer doubtful about the plan of his opponent to penetrate across the Alps into Northern Italy.¹ He therefore returned forthwith to Massilia, ordered his brother Cneius to continue with the legions the voyage to Spain, and returned himself with a small detachment to

¹ Polybius. iii. 19. § 1: ἐξενίσθη μὲν ὡς ἐνδέχεται μάλιστα, πεπεισμένος ὑδέποτ' ἂν αὐτοὺς ταλμῆσαι τῇδε ποιήσασθαι τὴν εἰς Ἱταλίαν πορείαν . . . ἑωρῶν δὲ τετολμηκότας, αὖθις ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς ἠπείγετο κ.τ.λ. Compare Polybius, ii. 61, § 5.

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Boldness
and wis-
dom of
Hannibal's
plan.

Genoa, whence he hastened to the Po to take the command of the troops assembled there, and to attack Hannibal immediately after his descent from the mountains.

Nothing proves more the boldness and grandeur of Hannibal's enterprise than the fact that the Romans did not suspect it until he had all but reached the foot of the Alps. In spite of the repeated warnings and the varied information which they had received from their friends in Spain, from the Massaliots and the neighbouring Gauls, it had never occurred to them that Hannibal might possibly venture upon such a plan. It was, indeed, well known to them that the Alps were not absolutely impassable. The numerous swarms of Gauls that had invaded Italy had found their way across the mountains. But the Gauls dwelt on both sides of the Alps; they were at home among the precipitous rocks and the snow mountains; and if irregular troops, unencumbered with heavy baggage, might find their way through these wild regions, it by no means followed that an army of Spaniards, Libyans, Numidian horse, and even elephants would attempt to scale those mountain walls, where they would have to encounter the terrors of nature and of hostile tribes at the same time. When Hannibal, nevertheless, undertook the enterprise, and carried it to a successful end, the impression he produced was deep and lasting, and the exploit was looked upon as hardly short of miraculous. Historians delighted in painting and exaggerating the obstacles with which Hannibal had to contend, the savage character of the mountaineers no less than the terrors of nature. Polybius¹ censures these descriptions, which, as he remarks, tend to represent Hannibal, not as a wise and cautious general, but as a reckless adventurer. Before carrying out his plan, says Polybius, he made careful inquiries respecting the nature of the country through which he had to march, the sentiments of the inhabitants, and the length and condition of the road

¹ Polybius, iii. 47.

His conviction that the enterprise would be difficult and dangerous, but not impossible, was justified by the event. But it seems certain that if Hannibal, as no doubt he expected, had been able to commence his march a month earlier, his loss in crossing the Alps would have been considerably less.

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As soon as Hannibal had the whole of his army, inclusive of the elephants and the baggage, on the left bank of the Rhone, he marched northwards, and reached in four days the confluence of the Rhone and the Isere.¹ The country lying between these two rivers was called the 'Island,' and was inhabited by the Allobrogi, one of the largest and bravest Gallic tribes.² On his arrival Hannibal found the natives engaged in a dispute between two brothers for the chieftainship. He favoured the claims of the elder brother, and by his interference quickly settled the dispute, gaining thereby the friendship and support of the new chief. His army was amply supplied with food, shoes, warm clothing, and new arms, and was accompanied by the friendly tribe until it reached the foot of the Alps.

Hannibal
and the
Allobro-
gians.

It is, even to the present day, an unsolved question by which road Hannibal marched to and across the Alps, although Polybius describes it at full length, and was well qualified to do so, having, only fifty years after Hannibal, travelled over the same ground, with a view of

Passage of
the Alps.

¹ It appears from this that Hannibal must have crossed the Rhone about half way between the sea and the Isere. But it has not been possible to identify the exact spot. It appears that the most likely place is the neighbourhood of Roquemaure.—See *Quarterly Review*, vol. cxxiii. p. 198.

² It is perhaps doubtful if in Hannibal's time the Allobroges dwelt in the more level part of the country between the Rhone and Isere, to the west of the higher mountains. Polybius does not mention the name of the inhabitants of the 'Island;' but he opposes them to the Allobroges who molested Hannibal's march as soon as he reached the Alps. We might nevertheless assume that the lowlanders belonged to the same race as the Allobroges of the mountains, and that the latter formed independent communities. But the narrative of Polybius (especially iii. 49, § 13) tallies far better with the assumption that Hannibal's friends in the western part of the 'Island' were not Allobroges.

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giving a description of it in his great historical work.¹ But the descriptions which the ancient writers give of localities are, for the most part, exceedingly defective and obscure. Even from Cæsar's own narrative we cannot make out with certainty where he crossed the Rhine and the Thames, and where he landed on the coast of Britain. The imperfect geographical knowledge possessed by the ancients, their erroneous notions of the form and extent of countries, of the direction of rivers and mountain-ranges with regard to the four cardinal points,² in some measure account for these inaccuracies. Not being accustomed, from their youth upwards, to have accurate maps before their eyes, they grew up with indistinct conceptions, and were almost accustomed to a loose and incorrect mode of expression when speaking of such matters.³ But it seems that, apart from this imperfect knowledge of geography, they lacked the keen observation of nature which distinguishes the moderns. As they seem all but insensible to the beauties of landscapes, they were careless in the examination and study of nature; and their descriptions of scenery are seldom such that we can draw an accurate map or picture after them, or identify the localities at the present time. Moreover, the permanent features of landscapes—the mountains, rivers, glens,

¹ According to Appian (vii. 4), the pass by which Hannibal crossed was afterwards called the Pass of Hannibal (καὶ καλεῖται διόδος Ἀννίβου). If this statement is true, the designation must have been invented at a very late period, and was based on mere conjectures. Neither Polybius nor even Livy knew anything of it. In Livy's time the question was already controversial, and he would no doubt have referred to the designation as an argument, if he had known it.

² Thus (iii. 47, § 2) Polybius fancies the source of the Rhone to be due north of the Adriatic, and its course from east to west. Livy's account of Hannibal's marches in Italy is frequently confused and at variance with geographical facts (Livy, xxii. 3). Appian (vi. 6) makes the Ebro flow into the Atlantic, and places Saguntum between the Ebro and the Pyrenees.

³ What can be more vague than such expressions as *δυσχωρία* and *εὐκαιροί τόποι*, which Polybius uses (iii. 50, § 3). Again, when he describes a locality as situated *μεταξὺ τοῦ Πάδου καὶ τοῦ Τρεβία ποταμοῦ*, he leaves it undecided whether it is on the right or the left bank of the Trebia, and thus he has given rise to the controversy about the situation of the battle-field in question. See below, p. 189, note 2.

lakes, and plains—had seldom names universally known and generally current,¹ as is the case at present; nor were there accurate measurements of distances, heights of mountains, the width of passes, and the like. Where, in addition to these defects, there were even wanting human habitations, towns or villages with well-known and recognisable names, it became impossible to describe a route like that of Hannibal across the Alps with an accuracy that excludes all doubts.

Thus it has happened that every Alpine pass, from that of Mont Genevre to the Simplon, has in turn been declared to have been the one by which Hannibal crossed into Italy.² Nobody can settle this question satisfactorily who has not travelled over every pass himself. We must leave this investigation to an Alpine traveller with sufficient leisure and enthusiasm, and meanwhile confine ourselves, under the guidance of Polybius, the oldest and most trustworthy witness, to find a road which has possibility and probability in its favour, though, perhaps, absolute certainty is unattainable.

The distances given by Polybius leave, in reality, only a doubt whether Hannibal crossed by the Little St. Bernard or by the Mont Cenis.³ It is becoming now more and

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cal con-
troversies.

March to
the Little
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nard.

¹ Polybius, iii. 36. § 2: 'ῤητέον δ' οὐκ αὐτὰς τὰς ὀνομασίας τῶν τόπων καὶ ποταμῶν καὶ πόλεων ὕπερ ἔτι ποιῶσι τῶν συγγραφέων ὑπολαμβάνοντες ἐν παντὶ πρὸς γνώσιν καὶ σαφένειαν αὐτοτελὲς εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ μέρος. Οἶμαι δ' ἐπὶ μὲν γνωριζομένων τόπων οὐ μικρά, μεγάλα δὲ πέφυκε πρὸς ἀνάμνησιν ἢ τῶν ὀνομάτων παράθεσις· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀγνωσμένων εἰς τέλος ὁμοίαν ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν ἢ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐξήγησις ταῖς ἀδιανοήτοις καὶ κρουσματικαῖς λέξεσιν.

² Even Livy (xxi. 38) notices the contradictory opinions and doubts of the historians, and expresses his astonishment at them, as, in his opinion, the question should be decided by the testimony of L. Cincius Alimentus, who professed to have heard from Hannibal himself that, on descending from the Alps, he came into the country of the Taurini—a statement in which all historians agreed. But, in spite of Livy's confidence, Polybius makes a different statement. Moreover, the authority of Cincius is very questionable, as, in giving the strength of Hannibal's army with which he crossed the Alps, he includes the Gauls and Ligurians that joined him near the river Po.

³ Hence the route by the Great St. Bernard and that by the Simplon are altogether out of the question. The Great St. Bernard, it seems, would never have been thought of if the Alps in that neighbourhood had not been called the Pennine range. This name was supposed to be derived from the Pœni or Carthaginians. By a similar etymological ingenuity, the Graian Alps were said to be the locality where the Greek (Graius) Hercules crossed.

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more the universal opinion that Hannibal made use of the former of these two routes. This was the usual road by which the Gallic tribes in the valley of the Po communicated with their countrymen in Transalpine Gaul. By this pass alone they could obtain auxiliaries, as they often did from beyond the Alps; for the territory of the Salassians, their friends and allies, extended to the foot of this pass on the Italian side, whilst the Mont Cenis pass led into the country of their enemies, the Ligurian tribe of the Taurini.¹ The guides whom the Insubrians had sent to Hannibal, and who had promised to conduct him by a safe road, could not possibly advise him to take the road of Mont Cenis. It seems therefore highly probable that Hannibal marched over the pass of the Little St. Bernard. But now another difficulty arises, viz., that of determining by which road he reached this pass from the 'Island' of the Allobrogians. The shortest and easiest way seems to be that along the river Isere, which leads almost to the foot of the pass. But the distances given by Polybius are at variance with this route;² and, moreover, when he says that Hannibal marched 'along *the* river,' he can only have meant the Rhone,³ and not the Isere. It seems therefore the most probable view, that Hannibal followed the course of the Rhone, avoiding, however, the sharp

¹ Polybius, iii. 44, § 7.

² Polybius, iii. 51, § 1. The 800 stadia to the ascent of the Alps, it appears, must be computed from the point where, after a four days' march along the Rhone (iii. 49, § 5), Hannibal reached the 'Island;' and this agrees with the statement (iii. 39, § 9) which makes the distance between the place of crossing the Rhone to the ascent of the Alps to be 1,400 stadia. If Hannibal had marched along the Isere, the 800 stadia would have taken him considerably beyond Grenoble; and yet this is the only place where he could find the *δυσχωρία* mentioned by Polybius as favouring the attacks of the mountaineers.

³ This expression *παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν* must, however, not be taken literally, as the Rhone makes a sharp angle at Lyons, which Hannibal no doubt cut off; but it is, on the whole, not inappropriate—at least, not more so than the comparison of the 'Island' with a triangle similar to the Egyptian Delta. If Polybius had only taken the trouble to designate the spot where Hannibal left the valley of the Rhone, almost all doubts would have been removed. But he says not a word about it. Compare above, p. 172, note 3.

bendings, until he reached the spot where the mountains of Savoy (the Mont du Chat) approach the river—that he crossed this chain of mountains, and marched past the present town of Chambéry in a southern direction until he reached the Isere again at Montmelian, and followed its course to the foot of the Little St. Bernard.¹

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For ten days the army marched over level ground without encountering any difficulty. The Allobrogian chiefs, who, as it seems, were not averse to plunder, dreaded the cavalry of Hannibal and his Gaulish escort. But when the latter had returned home, and Hannibal entered the defiles of the mountains, he found the road blocked up by the mountaineers in a place where force could avail nothing.² He was informed by his guides that the enemy were accustomed to keep the heights guarded only by day, and to retire in the night to their neighbouring town. He therefore caused his light-armed troops to occupy the pass in the night. The attacks of the barbarians, who returned on the following day and harassed the slowly advancing long line of march, were repulsed without much difficulty. Yet Hannibal lost a number of beasts of burden and a good deal of his baggage, the latter being no doubt the principal object of the barbarians. Fortunately many of the animals and some prisoners were recovered in the town which lay near the pass, and which contained also provisions for a few days.³

Hostility
of the
moun-
taineers.

¹ This view is supported by Cramer and Wickham (*Dissertation on the Passage of Hannibal over the Alps*, 1820), and lately again confirmed by W. J. Law (*Quarterly Review*, vol. cxxiii. art. 8). The only doubt suggested by this theory is the crossing by Hannibal of the Mont du Chat near Chevelu. On this road Hannibal would have passed by the Lake of Bourget. Is it likely that Polybius would not have mentioned this lake? This difficulty would be removed if we might suppose that Hannibal reached the mountains and the first *δυσχωραίαι* at the town of Les Échelles. But I am not aware whether in that locality there is a road practicable for horses and elephants.

² This locality was, according to Cramer and Wickham, in the Chevelu Pass over the Mont du Chat.

³ Polybius does not mention its name; and, if he had been able or willing to do so, it would have been to his readers one of the *ἀδιανόητοι καὶ κρουσμάτι-καὶ λέξεις* (iii. 36. § 3), i.e. gibberish; they would not have been any the wiser. If Hannibal's march went over the Mont du Chat, the town was the

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Treachery
of the
Gauls.

Having given his troops one day of rest, Hannibal continued his march. On the fourth day the natives met him with branches of trees in their hands as a sign of friendliness, and requested him to march through their land without doing them any injury. They brought cattle, and offered hostages as proofs of their sincerity. Hannibal suspected that all these signs of devotion were insincere, and intended to lull him into security. Therefore, though he accepted their offers, he provided against treachery, sent his baggage and cavalry in advance, and covered the march with his infantry. Thus the cumbersome portion of the army passed through the most difficult places, and was in tolerable security, when, on the third day, the faithless barbarians rushed to the attack, rolled and threw stones from both sides of the narrow pass, and killed a great number of men and animals. Hannibal was compelled to spend a night away from his baggage and cavalry.¹ But this was the last time that the mountaineers seriously attempted to obstruct his march. From this time forward they ventured only on isolated acts of plunder, and soon after Hannibal reached the summit of the pass, on the ninth day after he had commenced the ascent.

Descent of
the Alps.

It was now nearly the end of October, and the ground was already covered with fresh fallen snow.² No wonder that the men born under the burning sun of Africa, or in the genial climate of Spain, felt their hearts sink within them in those chill and dreary regions, when they measured the hardships that still awaited them with those which they had endured.³ Hannibal endeavoured to raise

present Bourget; if it went by Les Échelles, it was Chambéry; whereas, if Hannibal followed all along the Isère, it was Cularo, afterwards called Gratianopolis, now Grenoble.

¹ Polybius, iii. 53, § 5: *περὶ τι λευκόπετρον ὄχυρόν*. Whether this was a *white rock*, the Roche Blanche, which is at the foot of the pass over the Little St. Bernard, or whether it is simply an ordinary bare rock, I dare not decide.

² Polybius, iii. 54, § 1.

³ Polybius, *loc. cit.*: *τὰ πλῆθη δυσθύμως διακείμενα καὶ διὰ τὴν προγεγεννημένην ταλαιπωρίαν καὶ διὰ τὴν ἔτι προσδοκωμένην*.

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their courage by directing their eyes towards Italy, which lay expanded at their feet like a promised land, the goal of their hopes and the reward of their perseverance. Then, after a rest of two days, the downward march began. This was no further molested by any hostile attack; but the obstacles which nature presented were greater. The snow covered dangerous places, and, breaking under the feet of the men, hurled many into precipices. One portion of the road had been made impassable, and was partly broken away, by avalanches. In the attempt to pass by a side-way over a glacier,¹ the tramp of the army soon reduced the recent snow to a slush, and on the ice which was under the snow the men slipped, whilst the horses broke through with their hoofs and remained fixed in it. Hannibal was obliged to halt, and to repair the broken part of the road.² The whole army was set to work, and thus one day sufficed to restore the road sufficiently for horses and beasts of burden to pass. But three more days passed before the Numidians succeeded in making the road broad and firm enough for the elephants. When at length this last obstacle was overcome, the army passed from the region of snow into the lower and gentler slopes, and in three more days it encamped at the foot of the Alps.

Thus, at length, Hannibal accomplished his task, but at a cost which made it doubtful whether it would not have been wiser never to have undertaken it. Of the 59,000 chosen warriors who had marched from Spain, not less than 33,000 had been carried off by disease, fatigue, or the sword of the enemy. Only 12,000 Libyan and 8,000

Condition
of Han-
nibal's
army.

¹ What Polybius describes (iii. 55) appears to have been nothing but a glacier. Whether a glacier exists, or formerly existed, in the vicinity of the pass, and in what locality, is a question to be decided by members of an Alpine Club.

² On this occasion the rocks, according to Livy (xxi. 37), were softened by fire and vinegar. What are we to think of such a story, which looks almost like a joke? The effect of vinegar on heated rocks may be tried by experiment; but even if it should turn out to be what Livy says, how are we to imagine Hannibal in possession of such a quantity of vinegar? Nor can it have been easy to obtain trunks of trees (*arboribus circa immanibus deiectis detruncatisque*) in the region of snow and ice.

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Spanish foot and 6,000 horsemen had reached the spot where the real struggle was not to end, but to begin. And these men were in a condition that might have inspired even enemies with pity. Countless sufferings, miseries, wounds, hunger, cold, disease had deprived them almost of the appearance of human beings, and had brutalised them in body and mind.¹ With our admiration of Hannibal's genius mingles an involuntary astonishment that he thought the object which he had gained worthy of such a price, and that, in spite of his losses, he was able to justify the wisdom of his determination by the most brilliant success. It is not easy to banish the suspicion that Hannibal anticipated less difficulty in the passage of the Alps than he encountered. Though the attacks of the mountaineers were probably not so serious as they are represented, yet they added materially to the losses of the army.² No doubt Hannibal was justified in expecting that these tribes would receive him as the friend and ally of their countrymen on the Po, and we may suppose that they had formally promised to assist instead of obstructing the passage. We are at a loss to account for their hostility. Perhaps their only object was plunder. The obstructions thus caused were the more serious as Hannibal was too late in the season for crossing the mountains easily. But it is impossible to determine the cause of this delay—whether Hannibal's departure from New Carthage was postponed unduly; whether the campaign between the Ebro and the Pyrenees, or the passage of these mountains, or the march through Gaul, or the crossing of the Rhone and the transactions with the Allobrogians detained him longer than he had calculated; or whether, in spite of all his inquiries, he had no correct knowledge of the distances and the difficulties of the road. But there can be no doubt that the cold, added to the fatigue of

¹ Polybius, iii. 60, § 6: Οἱ γε μὴν σωθέντες καὶ ταῖς ἐπιφανείαις καὶ τῇ λοιπῇ διαθέσει διὰ τὴν συνέχειαν τῶν προειρημένων πόνων οἷον ἀποτεθριωμένοι πάντες ᾔσαν.

² Polybius, iii. 60, §§ 3, 4.

mountain-climbing among ice and snow, was more pernicious to his men than anything else. A march of fifteen days under the weight of arms and baggage, over the highest and steepest mountains of Europe, and on such roads as the tramp of men and animals alone, without any engineering skill, had made, and fifteen nights' bivouac where even in October piercing cold winds sweep down from the snow-fields and glaciers, were alone sufficient to destroy an army. What must have been the fate of those who fell down from exhaustion, or were left behind wounded or diseased? Nothing is said in this narrative (and very rarely at any other time in the accounts of ancient warfare) of the sick and wounded. No doubt every serious wound or illness caused death, especially on a march where even vigorous men experience difficulty in keeping pace with their comrades. Recent events have shown that the care of the sick and wounded in war is a very late and a very imperfect product of civilisation and philanthropy.

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The army required a few days to recover from their fatigue before Hannibal could venture to begin the campaign, at a season when, under ordinary circumstances, the time for winter-quarters had arrived. He then turned against the Taurinians, a Ligurian tribe which was hostile to the Insubrians, and had rejected his proffered alliance. In three days their chief town was taken, their fighting men cut down,¹ and it was made evident to all their neighbours that they had only to choose between destruction and the Carthaginian alliance. In consequence of this, all the tribes in the upper valley of the Po, Ligurians as well as Gauls, joined Hannibal. The tribes living further eastward still hesitated, from fear of the Roman armies that occupied their country.² Hannibal, in order to enable them to join him, found it necessary to march

Hannibal
and the
Tauri-
nians.

¹ According to Appian, viii. 5 : τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους ἔσφαξεν ἐς κατάπληξιν τῆς ἄλλης Κελτικῆς.

² Polybius, iii. 60, § 12 : τινὲς δὲ καὶ συστρατεύειν ἠναγκάζοντο τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις.

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Alleged
device of
Hannibal
for the en-
courage-
ment of his
soldiers.

immediately against the Romans, and to force them to accept a battle.

We may presume that it was hardly necessary for Hannibal to urge his soldiers to bravery. Their conduct up to this time was a sufficient guarantee for the future. Nevertheless, as we are told,¹ Hannibal placed before their eyes a spectacle to show that death has no terrors for a man if death or victory is the only chance of deliverance from unendurable evils. Before the assembled army he asked his Gallic prisoners if they were prepared to fight with one another unto the death, provided that liberty and splendid arms were the reward of victory. When with one voice they all professed themselves ready to stake life for freedom, Hannibal selected by lot several pairs of combatants. These fought, fell or conquered like heroes, and were envied by those of their companions who had not been fortunate enough to be selected. Thus wretched barbarian captives showed what can be expected of soldiers fighting for the highest prize, and Hannibal's men were not disposed to yield to them in military spirit.

March and
defeat of
Scipio.

It would almost appear that the issue of the first Punic war had produced among the Romans a feeling of superiority over the Carthaginians. They had no conception of the change that had taken place in the Carthaginian army, and that, instead of Gallic mercenaries, Libyan and Spanish subjects and allies formed now the principal strength of their old enemies. Of course they were still more ignorant of the military genius of Hannibal. They were consequently full of courage and confident of victory; and Scipio, as he had ventured in Gaul to advance against Hannibal with an inferior force, did not hesitate now to do the same. From Placentia he marched westward along the left bank of the Po, crossed the Ticinus, and found himself suddenly face to face with a considerable corps of cavalry, which Hannibal, advancing on the same bank down the river, had sent before the main body of his army

¹ Polybius, iii. 62. Dion Cassius, fr. 57, 4. Livy, xxi. 42.

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to reconnoitre. Thus the first encounter on Italian soil took place between the Po and the Ticinus. It did not assume the dimensions of a battle. No Roman infantry, except the light-armed troops, were engaged; but the conflict was severe, and terminated, after a spirited resistance, in a decided repulse of the Romans. Scipio himself set his men the example of bravery. Fighting in the foremost ranks, he was wounded, and owed his life to the heroism of his son, then a youth of seventeen years, but destined to become the conqueror of Hannibal, and to terminate the terrible war so inauspiciously opened at the Ticinus.¹ After this check, Scipio could not think of venturing on a regular battle. The level country round about was too favourable for the superior cavalry of the Carthaginians. He made therefore a hasty and even precipitate retreat, sacrificing a detachment of 600 men, who covered the bridge over the Po until it was destroyed by the retreating army, and, less fortunate than Horatius Cocles in the good old time, were all made prisoners of war.

In order to cross the Po, Hannibal was obliged to ascend its bank for some distance, until he found a place where the elephants and the cavalry could swim the stream, and where it was easy to construct a bridge for the infantry. Then he advanced towards Placentia, near which city the consul Scipio had constructed a fortified camp. He crossed, as it appears, the small river Trebia, which, running down from the Apennines in a northerly direction, joins the Po not far to the west of Placentia. Thus the two armies again confronted one another, and Hannibal was anxious to bring on a decisive engagement, whilst Scipio, moderating his ardour after his recent ill success, and moreover compelled to inactivity by his wound, kept within his lines. It was most fortunate for the Romans that they had completed the fortification of Placentia and Cremona. Without these two strongholds

Passage of
the Trebia.

¹ Polybius, x. 3. Livy, xxi. 46. According to the account of Cælius, preserved by Livy (*loc. cit.*), Scipio's life was saved by a Ligurian slave.

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they would, after Hannibal's appearance, have been unable to keep their footing in the valley of the Po, and the Gauls would have been throughout the war much less hampered in their offensive operations as Hannibal's allies, if the Roman garrisons in those two fortresses had not kept them in constant alarm for the safety of their own country.

Attitude of
the Gallic
tribes.

As yet the Gauls had not unanimously declared themselves for Hannibal. Most of them were ready to abandon the cause of Rome, others wavered in their fidelity, a few remained steadfast and sent auxiliaries. But Scipio could not rely on these men. In one night more than 2,000 of them mutinied in the Roman camp, overpowered the sentinels at the gates, and rushed out to join Hannibal. They were received kindly, praised for their conduct, and dismissed to their homes with great promises if they would persuade their countrymen to revolt from Rome. Hannibal was now in hopes that all the Gallic tribes would join his standard, and he eagerly wished for an opportunity to deal the Roman army a decisive blow, which might inspire the Gauls with confidence in his strength.

Move-
ment of
the Roman
army to the
left bank of
the Trebia.

Scipio, on his side, sought to avoid a conflict. As he did not feel safe enough on the level ground, in the immediate vicinity of Placentia, he broke up his camp in the night, and, using the utmost silence, marched higher up the Trebia, in order to gain a more favourable locality for a camp on the hills which form the last spurs of the Apennines running northward towards the Po. As Hannibal's army was not far off, this movement was no doubt hazardous, especially as Scipio's march went past the hostile camp. In spite of the care employed to avoid noise, the movement of the Romans was perceived. Hannibal's horsemen were immediately at their heels, and had they not been delayed by the plunder of the Roman camp, it would have been difficult for Scipio to reach, without great loss, the left, or western, bank of the Trebia, and there to fortify a new camp. As it was, he succeeded in gaining a strong

position, where he was in perfect safety, and was able to await the arrival of his colleague Sempronius, who, with his army, was on his way from Sicily.

As we have seen above, Sempronius had, in the early part of the summer, sailed with two legions to Sicily. In that province he had made preparations for a landing in Africa, but had been detained by the energy with which the Carthaginians had begun hostilities in that quarter. Even before his arrival, a Carthaginian squadron of twenty vessels of war had appeared in the Sicilian waters. Three of them had been driven by a storm into the Straits of Messina, and had been captured by the Syracusan fleet with which the old king Hiero was in readiness to join the Roman consul. From the prisoners, Hiero ascertained that a Carthaginian fleet was on its way to surprise Lilybæum and to promote a rising of the Roman subjects in Sicily, many of whom regretted the change of masters, and would fain have returned to their old allegiance. This important news was at once communicated to the prætor, M. Æmilius, who at that time commanded in Sicily; the garrison of Lilybæum was warned, and the Roman fleet kept in readiness, while all round the coast a strict look-out was kept for the Carthaginians, and messengers were dispatched into the several towns to enjoin vigilance. Accordingly, when the Punic fleet, consisting of thirty-five sail, approached Lilybæum, it found the Roman garrison ready to receive it. There was no chance of taking the town by surprise. The Carthaginians resolved, therefore, to offer battle to the Roman fleet, and drew up at the entrance of the port. The number of the Roman ships is not given. Livy¹ only mentions the circumstance that they were manned with better and more numerous troops than those of the Carthaginians. The latter, therefore, tried to avoid being boarded, and relied on their skill in using the beaks (*rostra*) for disabling and sinking the hostile vessels. But they succeeded only in a single instance, whereas

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nius in
Sicily.

¹ Livy, xxi. 49.

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the Romans boarded several of their vessels, and captured them, with their crews, amounting to 1,700 men. The rest of the Carthaginian ships escaped. Again it was shown that the sea, their own peculiar element, had become unfavourable to the Carthaginians; whilst, on the other hand, the genius of Hannibal had the effect of reversing the relative strength and confidence of the two nations in their land forces, and of causing the superiority of the Roman legions over the Carthaginian mercenaries to be forgotten.

Zeal of
King
Hiero.

Meanwhile, Tiberius Sempronius had arrived in Sicily with his fleet of one hundred and sixty sail and two legions, and had been received by King Hiero with the respect due to the representative of the majesty of Rome. Hiero placed his fleet at the disposal of the consul, offered him his homage and his vows for the triumph of the Roman people, and promised to show himself in his old age as faithful and persevering in the service of the Roman people as he had been in the former war, when he was in the vigour of manhood. He promised to provide the Roman legions and crews, at his own expense, with clothing and provisions, and then reported on the condition of the island and the plans of the Carthaginians. The two fleets sailed in company to Lilybæum. They found there that the design of the Carthaginians on Lilybæum had failed, and that the town was safe. Hiero therefore returned with his fleet to Syracuse; Sempronius sailed to Malta, which the Carthaginian commander Hamilcar, the son of Gisgo, surrendered with the garrison of 2,000 men. These prisoners, as well as the men captured in the engagement off Lilybæum, were sold as slaves, with the exception of three noble Carthaginians. Sempronius then sailed in search of the hostile fleet, which, meanwhile, committed depredations in the Italian waters, and which he thought to find among the Liparian Islands. He was mistaken, and on his return to Sicily received information that it was ravaging the coast of Italy near Vibo. But his further action in the south was stopped by the

news, which arrived soon after, of Hannibal's march across the Alps.¹ He prepared immediately to join his colleague Scipio in Cisalpine Gaul. Placing twenty-five ships under the command of his legate Sextus Pomponius for the protection of the Italian coast, and reinforcing the squadron of the prætor M. Æmilius to fifty sail, he sent the remainder of his fleet with his troops to Ariminum in the Adriatic. Having regulated affairs in Sicily, he followed the main body with ten ships. The rest of his army which could not be taken on board the fleet he ordered to proceed to Ariminum by land, leaving every soldier free to find his way as best he could, and only binding them by oath to appear at Ariminum on the appointed day.²

From Ariminum Sempronius marched to the Trebia, where he effected his junction with Scipio, apparently without difficulty.³ The Roman army now amounted to

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Junction of
Sempronius
with
Scipio.

¹ Probably this news and the order of the senate to leave Sicily were dispatched from Rome as soon as Scipio had reported his encounter with the Carthaginian cavalry near Massilia. When Scipio resolved to send his own legions to Spain, it was natural that he should wish to have in their place the Sicilian legions of Sempronius for joint operations against Hannibal on the Po. If the news reached Sicily about the beginning of November, Sempronius had just time to be in Ariminum about the middle of December.

² Polybius (iii. 61) and Livy (xxi. 51) give contradictory statements concerning the mode of transporting the army from Sicily to Cisalpine Gaul. The former relates that the soldiers proceeded all the way by land; the latter speaks only of their conveyance on board the fleet. Both writers are most positive and distinct in their statements, so that they must have spoken on authority, and cannot be supposed to have indulged in unfounded conjectures. The authority of Polybius is very high; yet he is not free from errors and omissions. He touches but slightly on the events in Sicily in the year 218. We owe our knowledge of them to Livy, who must have followed a well-informed witness. His statement is borne out by the reflection that we cannot understand why Sempronius should not have made use of the ships, nearly one hundred in number (Livy, xxi. 17)—which he did not leave in Sicily—for the purpose of conveying his troops without fatigue to Ariminum. Perhaps his ships did not suffice to carry all the men, and a portion of them were obliged to march on foot through the whole length of Italy, as we have assumed in the text.

³ It is strange that he accomplished this without any opposition on the part of Hannibal. The road from Ariminum to the Trebia traverses an uninterrupted plain, and must, in the vicinity of Placentia, have approached very near the Carthaginian camp. This circumstance has given rise to the conjecture, that Hannibal's camp was on the western side of the Trebia, and

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more than 40,000 men,¹ and was consequently more numerous than that of the invaders. But the position of Hannibal was now very much improved. By the treason of a Latin officer from Brundisium, he had gained possession of the fortified place of Clastidium (now called Casteggio, near Montebello), where the Romans had collected their supplies. Thus he had now abundance of provisions, whilst the Roman army, swelled by the arrival of Sempronius to double its original number, felt, no doubt, most keenly the loss of the supplies which had been destined for its use. Under these circumstances, Sempronius naturally wished to bring on a battle. He had not come all the way from Sicily to shut himself up in a fortified camp on the Trebia, and to look on quietly, whilst tribe after tribe in Cisalpine Gaul joined Hannibal, and swelled the hostile army. He might well ask for what purpose two consular armies were sent out against the enemy, except to attack and defeat him.² He had been successful in his own province of Sicily, and had been crossed and thwarted in a direct attack on Carthage by the order of the senate, which recalled him and transferred him to the north of Italy. If he should be so fortunate as to destroy Hannibal's army, he would have the glory of having quickly brought the war to a triumphant conclusion. Nor would he share this glory with anybody, as, while his colleague Scipio was disabled by his wound,

consequently that of Scipio on the eastern, contrary to the statement of Polybius (see below, p. 189, note 2). But the difficulty is not removed by this unjustified assumption. The Trebia offered no obstacle to the hostile cavalry. Even when it was swollen high by sudden rain in the night before the battle, which took place soon after, the Roman infantry were able to wade through it. Supposing, therefore, that Hannibal had been stationed on the left bank of that river, he would yet have been able, even there, to obtain information of the march of Sempronius, and to advance to meet him before his junction with Scipio. Our sources give no explanation of the unmolested junction of the two Roman armies. Perhaps we may venture on the supposition that it was effected whilst Hannibal was engaged with the capture of Clastidium, several miles westward of the Trebia.

¹ Polybius, iii. 72, § 11. According to Livy (xxi. 55), 18,000 Romans, 20,000 allies, 4,000 horse, and, besides, Cenomanian auxiliaries.

² Compare Livy, xxi. 52 init.

he had the undivided command of the two consular armies. Polybius, refusing to regard the resolution of Sempronius as the result of rational calculation, or of the necessity of his position, charges him with recklessness and vanity,¹ contrasting with his conduct the prudent caution of Scipio, who is said to have dissuaded him from risking a battle. We can hardly decide whether Polybius is right or wrong. It is possible that Sempronius, just like Scipio at first, had no just estimation of the enemy with whom he had to deal, and that, thinking victory certain, he was over anxious to secure the glory for himself. At the same time it is tolerably evident that Polybius, in his partiality to Scipio, endeavours as much as possible to throw upon the shoulders of Sempronius the blame of the defeat on the Trebia. He was the friend of the Cornelian house, and could not but imbibe in the family circle of the Scipios all the views most in accordance with the reputation of that family, views which he has done his best to propagate and to back by his authority.

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The two hostile armies were encamped at a short distance from one another; the Carthaginians nearer to Placentia, on the right, or eastern, bank of the Trebia, the Romans higher up the river, on the left bank. A cavalry engagement took place, and, terminating apparently to the advantage of the Romans, had increased the confidence of Sempronius. This Hannibal had expected. He knew that the Romans would not defer the decision much longer,² chose his battle-field with the unerring eye of a consummate general, and made all the necessary preparations for the impending struggle.

Prepara-
tions for
the battle
of the
Trebia.

Not far from the Roman camp, but on the opposite side of the Trebia, was a dried-up watercourse with high banks overgrown with bushes, high enough to hide infantry and even cavalry. Here Hannibal ordered his spirited young brother Mago³ to proceed before daybreak with one

Tactics of
Hannibal.

¹ Polybius, iii. 70, § 7: ὑπὸ τῆς φιλοδοξίας ἐλαυνόμενος καὶ καταπιστεύων τοῖς πράγμασι παραλόγως ἔσπευδε κρίναι δι' αὐτοῦ τὰ ὕλα κ.τ.λ.

² Polybius, iii. 70, § 13.

³ Polybius, iii. 71, § 6: ὄντα νέον μὲν δρμῆς δὲ πλήρη καὶ παιδομαθῇ περὶ τὰ πολεμικά.

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thousand chosen horsemen and as many foot soldiers, and to lie in ambush until the signal should be given. Then he sent the Numidian cavalry across the river right against the Roman camp to draw them out to battle. What he had expected took place. As soon as the Romans, early in the morning, caught sight of the Numidians, Sempronius, without even giving his men time to strengthen themselves by the usual morning meal, ordered the whole of his cavalry, four thousand strong, to advance against them, and the foot to follow. The Numidians retired back across the river, closely pursued by the Roman cavalry and infantry. The day was raw, damp, and cold. It was towards mid-winter, and sleet and snow filled the air. In the previous night a copious rain had fallen in the mountains, and the river Trebia had risen so high that the soldiers in fording it stood breast high in the icy water. Stiff with cold and faint with hunger they arrived on the right bank, and immediately found themselves in front of Hannibal's army, which was drawn up in a long line of battle, the infantry, 20,000 strong, in the centre, 10,000 horsemen and the elephants on the wings. Hannibal had taken care that his men should have a good night's rest, and be prepared for the work of the day by an ample breakfast.

Defeat of
the
Romans.

The battle had hardly begun when the Romans lost every chance of victory. The superior Carthaginian cavalry drove in the Roman cavalry on both wings, and, in combination with the elephants, attacked the legions on the flanks whilst Hannibal's Libyan, Spanish, and Gaulish infantry engaged them in front. Nevertheless, the Romans kept their ground for a while with the utmost courage, until Mago, with his two thousand men, broke forth from the ambush and seized them in rear. Terror and disorder now spread among them. Only ten thousand men in the centre of the Roman line kept their ranks unbroken, and, cutting their way through the Gauls opposed to them, made good their retreat to Placentia; the

remainder of the Roman infantry, in helpless confusion, tried to regain their camp on the western side of the Trebia. But before they could cross the river the greater portion were cut down by the numerous cavalry of the Carthaginians, or perished under the feet of the elephants. Many found their death in the river, which with its swollen and icy flood cut off their retreat. Some reached the camp; others, especially the horse which had been chased off the field on both flanks, joined the corps of ten thousand which alone effected an orderly retreat to Placentia. The pursuit lasted until showers of rain mixed with snow compelled the conquerors to seek the shelter of their tents. The weather was so bitterly cold and tempestuous that Hannibal's army suffered severely, and almost all¹ the elephants perished.²

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The tempest continued to rage all night. Under its cover Scipio succeeded in crossing the river Trebia with the remnants of the defeated army, and in reaching Placentia unmolested by the victorious but exhausted Carthaginians.³ In this town and in Cremona, under the

Retreat of
Scipio to
Placentia.

¹ According to Polybius (iii. 74, § 11), only one elephant survived; according to Livy (xxi. 58), Hannibal had, at a subsequent period, more than seven left.

² It is strange that doubts could arise whether the battle was fought on the right or on the left bank of the Trebia. The narrative of Polybius points distinctly to the right bank, and that of Livy is quite unintelligible under any other supposition. (Compare especially Polybius, iii. 66, § 9; iii. 67, § 9; iii. 68, § 5; Livy, xxi. 65). Mommsen (*Röm. Gesch.* i. 599; English translation, ii. 117) maintains that the battle took place on the left bank of the Trebia, but his arguments are untenable, as shown by Peter (*Studien zur röm. Gesch.* p. 35 ff.). The possibility of a doubt is a proof of our remark above (p. 172), that the ancient writers are deficient in accuracy in their geographical and topographical descriptions. If modern writers (like Rospatt, *Feldzüge des Hannibal*, p. 14) simply reject the statement of Polybius, because in their opinion it is inconsistent with strategical laws, they are guilty of an unjustifiable disregard of authority. We fully agree with a remark of Arnold (*Hist. of Rome*, iii. p. 96): 'It is not explained by any existing writer how Sempronius was able to effect his junction with his colleague without any opposition from Hannibal.' This is the reason for the assumption that Scipio's camp must have been on the right bank of the Trebia (see above, p. 185, note 3). 'But so much in war depends upon trifling accidents, that it is vain to guess where we are without information.'

³ This circumstance is mentioned by Livy (xxi. 56), and is in itself sufficient to show that the Roman camp was not on the right side of the Trebia, on which Placentia lay, but on the left.

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shelter of the recently constructed fortifications, the shattered remains of the four legions passed the rest of the winter in safety. The supplies from the surrounding country were cut off, as the Gauls had by this time risen in mass against Rome, and as Hannibal's cavalry ranged freely all over the vast plain about the Po. But the navigation of this river, it seems, was still open. The fishing boats of the natives could not stop the armed vessels of the Romans, and thus the Roman colonists and soldiers received the necessary supplies, and were enabled to hold their ground at this most critical period.

Success
and
ability of
Hannibal.

The great battle of the Trebia was the concluding and crowning operation of Hannibal's campaign, the reward for the innumerable labours and dangers which he and his brave army had encountered. The march from New Carthage to Placentia across the Ebro, the Pyrenees, the Rhone, the Alps, and the Po, in great part through hostile nations, and on wretched roads, with an army composed of different races, and inspired by no feeling of patriotic devotion, is not matched by any military exploit in ancient or in modern history. But that which raises it above the sphere of mere adventurous daring, and qualifies it as an achievement worthy of a great general, is the splendid victory with which it closed.

Effects of
Hannibal's
victory.

This victory produced the most important results. Even the immediate and direct gain was great. The two consular armies were shattered. The number of the slain and the prisoners is not stated, but we can hardly suppose it to have been less than half of the whole army engaged. Still greater was the moral effect. From this time forward the name of Hannibal was terrible to the Roman soldier, just as the name of the Gauls had been of old. And these two most terrible enemies of Rome were now united, flushed with victory and ready to turn their arms against the devoted city. The dreadful calamity which came upon the republic after the black day of the Allia might now not only be repeated but surpassed. At that time the Capitol at least had broken the onset of the barbarians,

and had saved the Roman nation from extinction. But what chance was there now of resisting the man who, with but small support from the Gallic tribes, had destroyed a superior Roman army, and was now leading all the hereditary enemies of the Roman name against the city? To face such dangers, without despairing, the Romans required all the iron firmness of their character, which never was more formidable than when veritable terrors appeared on all sides.¹

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Such firmness was the more necessary as Hannibal, at this early period of the war, showed that it was his intention to undermine the Roman state within, whilst he was attacking it from without. After his victory on the Trebia, he divided his prisoners into two classes. Those who were Roman citizens he kept in rigorous captivity. The Roman allies he dismissed without ransom, and assured them that he had come into Italy in order to deliver them from the Roman yoke. If they wished to recover their independence, their lost lands and towns, they should join him, and with united strength attack the common enemy of them all.²

Hannibal's
treatment
of his
prisoners.

In spite of the advanced season, and the severity of the winter, Hannibal showed a restless activity. He was busied in organising the alliance of the Gaulish tribes against Rome. The Boians brought him, as a pledge of their fidelity, the three Roman commissioners³ whom they had captured. He was joined also by the Ligurians, who had year after year been hunted and harassed by the Romans like wild beasts, and who brought as hostages some noble Romans whom they had captured in their country.⁴ Still the Romans held several fortified places on the Po. One of these, called Victumviæ, was stormed

Winter
operations
of Han-
nibal.

¹ Polybius, iii. 75, § 8: τότε γὰρ φοβεράτατοι Ῥωμαῖοι καὶ κοινῇ καὶ κατ' ἑαυτοὺς ἀποθανόντες ἐκ τῆς φοβῆς ἀληθινός.

² Polybius, iii. 77. The testimony of Polybius suffices to prove that the statement of Zonaras (viii. 24), that Hannibal caused the Roman prisoners to be put to death, is a falsification of history due to the national hatred of Roman patriots.

³ See above, p. 167.

⁴ Livy, xxi. 59.

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by Hannibal, and the defenders were treated with all the severity of the laws of war; ¹ the attempt to take another fort by surprise failed. The two principal places, Placentia and Cremona, could not be taken without a formal siege; for besides the remains of the beaten army, each of them had a garrison of six thousand colonists, *i.e.* veteran soldiers. For such an attempt Hannibal had neither time nor means. He was hastening to carry the war into Southern Italy. The Gauls began to feel the pressure of the numbers which they had now to support, and they were burning with impatience for the plunder of Italy. The fundamental feature of their character was inconstancy.² They had no idea of fidelity and perseverance. It was nothing but their own advantage that united them with Hannibal. Their attachment could easily be changed into hostility. Hannibal's own life might be exposed to danger if the treacherous disposition of these barbarians were stimulated by a prize offered for his head. His brother-in-law, Hasdrubal, had fallen a victim to assassination. Alexander of Epirus had been killed by a faithless Lucanian ally.³ It was not impossible that a similar fate awaited Hannibal. If we can trust the report of Polybius, such apprehensions induced Hannibal to avail himself of a 'Punic deceit,'⁴ by assuming different disguises and wearing false hair, so that his own friends could not recognise him. Yet we can hardly think such a device worthy of Hannibal, nor does it seem probable that a general who was worshipped by his soldiers should have been compelled to hide himself under a disguise in the midst of his army, in order to protect his life from the dagger of an assassin. We should be rather inclined to think that Hannibal acted as his own spy, to sound the disposition of his new allies.

Unsuccessful attempt

In his impatience to leave Cisalpine Gaul, Hannibal made an attempt to cross the Apennines before the end

¹ Livy, xxi. 57.

² ἀθεσία.—Polybius, iii. 78, § 2.

³ See vol. i. p. 380.

⁴ Polybius, iii. 78, § 1: 'Ἐχρήσατο δὲ τινὶ καὶ Φοινικικῷ στρατηγήματι.

of winter.¹ But he was foiled in this undertaking. The army was overtaken in the mountains by so terrific a hurricane that it was unable to proceed. Men and horses² perished from the cold, and Hannibal was compelled to return to his winter-quarters near Placentia.

Simultaneously with the stirring events which accompanied Hannibal's march, Spain also had been the theatre of serious conflicts. Publius Scipio, as we have seen, had sent from Massilia his brother Cneius with two legions to Spain, whilst he himself had hastened to the Po. In spite of its great distance, Spain was still Hannibal's only base of operations; and, by its natural wealth and its warlike population, it was a chief source of strength for Carthage. The Romans therefore could not leave Spain in the undisturbed possession of their enemies, though they were attacked in Italy itself. Moreover, their own interest as well as their honour bound them to send assistance to those Spanish tribes, between the Ebro and the Pyrenees, who had espoused their cause in the great struggle between the two rival republics. Hannibal had overthrown them when he passed through their country on his march to Italy, but he had not had time to reduce them to perfect submission and peaceful obedience. It was still possible to gain their alliance for Rome. The dispatch of the two legions to Spain was, therefore, perfectly justified; and the senate showed its approval of it by continuing the war in Spain at all costs throughout the greatest distress caused by Hannibal's victories in Italy. Spain was for Rome what Cisalpine Gaul was for Hannibal. Both countries had been recently and imperfectly conquered, and were full of unwilling subjects, easily roused to rebellion. As the overthrow of Roman dominion in the north of Italy opened a way for an attack on the vital parts of her empire, so the conquest of Spain promised to facilitate

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of Han-
nibal to
cross the
Apennines.

Operations
in Spain.

¹ Livy, xxi. 58; 'Ad prima ac dubia signa veris profectus ex hibernis in Etruriam ducit.' Polybius passes this over entirely.

² It was on this occasion that, according to Livy (*loc. cit.*), Hannibal lost seven of the elephants which were left after the battle of the Trebia.

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Defeat of
Hanno by
Scipio.

Alarm in
the city of
Rome on
the tidings
of Han-
nibal's
victory at
the Trebia.

a transfer of the war into Africa, where alone it could be brought to a victorious conclusion.

Of the events in Spain during the year 218 B.C. we have not much to report. Cneius Scipio succeeded, by persuasion or force, in gaining for the Roman alliance most of the tribes between the Pyrenees and the Ebro; he defeated Hanno, whom Hannibal had intrusted with ten thousand men for the defence of that country, and he took up his winter-quarters in Tarraco.

The first news which reached Rome of the battle of the Trebia was contained in an official report of the consul Sempronius, which bears a striking resemblance to other official reports of very recent times. It stated, for the information of the senate and the Roman people, that a battle had taken place, and that Sempronius would have been victorious if he had not been prevented by inclement weather.¹ But soon there came reports which were not official, and stated the naked truth. The alarm in Rome was so much the greater, and it rose to positive apprehension for the safety of the town.² Since the great disaster in the Caudine passes, more than a century before this time, no similar calamity had befallen the united legions of both consuls; and on that memorable occasion the army had been saved from destruction by the short-sighted confidence which the Samnite general had placed in the faith and honour of the Roman people. It was only the battle of the Allia which could compare in disastrous results with the recent overthrow, for on that fatal day the army which was destined to cover Rome had been completely routed and dispersed; and the memory of the terrors of that evil time was now recalled the more readily as the dreaded Gauls marched in Hannibal's army upon the city which they had once already burned and sacked. To the terror of the foreign enemy were added apprehensions from internal discord. After a long peace the struggle between the two opposite parties had, a few years before, broken

¹ Polybius, iii. 75, § 1: ὅτι μάχης γενομένης τὴν νίκην αὐτῶν ὁ χειμὼν ἀφείλετο.

² Livy, xxi. 57.

out again. The comitia of centuries had in 241 B.C. been remodelled on democratic principles. Whilst the nobility was degenerating more and more into a narrow oligarchy, a popular party had been formed, bent on invigorating and renewing the middle class, and on checking the accumulation of wealth in a few hands. The chief of this party was Caius Flaminius. He had in his tribuneship encountered the violent opposition of the senate in passing a law for the division of public land in Picenum amongst Roman citizens; ¹ he had connected that country with Rome by the Flaminian road, a work by which, like Appius Claudius with his road and aqueduct, he had given employment to a great number of the poorer citizens, and had gained a considerable following. The construction of a new race-course in Rome, the Circus Flaminius, was another measure designed to conciliate the favour of the people. At the same time these considerable public works are an evidence of a stricter and growing control over the public revenue, for the money which they required could not be derived from any private or extraordinary source.² By such attention to the finances of the state, Flaminius necessarily incurred the hostility of the rich and influential men of the nobility, who were in the habit of deriving profit from renting public domains, saltworks, mines, and the like, and from farming the customs. These men, from the nature of their occupation, considered it their privilege to rob the public. It had become quite customary for the nobility to violate the Licinian law, to occupy more land and to keep more cattle on the common pasture than the law allowed. Occasionally honest and fearless tribunes or ædiles ventured to put down this abuse by prosecuting and fining the offenders; but no radical cure was effected, nor was it easy to effect one. Since the passing of the Licinian laws (in 366 B.C.) Rome had conquered Italy, Sicily, and

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B.C.¹ See above, p. 126.² Plutarch (*Quest. Roman.* 66) conjectures that perhaps Flaminius gave land to the state, from the produce of which the expense was defrayed. This is impossible. Perhaps Plutarch had read something of the revenues of public land being devoted to the object in question.

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Sardinia, and had confiscated conquered lands on a large scale. How was it possible to coerce the rapacity of the great and powerful families by enforcing a law which was passed when Rome was not even mistress of the whole of Latium? The great increase in the number of slaves, which was one of the results of the wars in Southern Italy, Sicily, Corsica, Liguria, and Illyria, made it possible to farm large estates, and to keep numerous flocks and herds on the extensive public pastures. The increase of capital which flowed to Rome from the conquered districts enriched the noble families, which monopolised the government. When the first province was acquired beyond the confines of Italy, the besetting sin of the Roman aristocracy, their ungovernable rapacity, coupled with cruelty and violence, shot up like a flame which has reached a store of new, rich fuel. The great danger that threatened the Roman commonwealth became more than ever evident. The lingering fever became more violent and malignant, and it was high time for a vigorous hand to interfere and to stop, if possible, the progress of the disorder. Flaminus, it appears, was the man for it; but unfortunately he was almost isolated among the Roman aristocracy. His own father, it is said, pulled him down from the public platform, when he was speaking to the people to recommend his agrarian law; and when the tribune C. Claudius, who was probably a plebeian client of the great Claudian family, proposed a law to prevent senators and the sons of senators from engaging in foreign trade and from possessing any vessels beyond a certain moderate size,¹ Flaminus was the only man in the senate who spoke in favour of the proposal. He was therefore opposed by the whole of that powerful party which monopolised the government for their own benefit. But he had the people on his side; and as at that time the Assembly of the Tribes was independent and competent to legislate for the whole republic, he was in a position to carry his reforms by the votes of the people,

¹ Livy, xxi. 63: 'Ne quis senator, cuive senator pater fuisset maritimam navem quæ plus quam trecentarum amphorarum esset, haberet.'

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B.C.Opposition
to Flami-
nius.

and in direct opposition to the senate. Had he lived longer, it is possible that the economical condition of the Roman people would not have become so utterly wretched and hopeless as the Gracchi found it a hundred years later.

Flaminius had been raised to the consulship as early as 223 B.C.—a time when the war with the Insubrians was raging with all its force. He had no great military abilities; but as a general he was probably not inferior to the average of Roman consuls. It was therefore, in all probability, not from any apprehension of his incapacity, nor from superstition caused by threatening phenomena, but from political animosity, that the senate sent a message to recall him to Rome, pretending that his election was vitiated by some defect in the auspices, and calling upon him to resign his office.¹ Flaminius had got into difficulties, but he was just on the point of inflicting a severe blow on the enemy,² when the sealed letter of the senate was delivered to him. Guessing the contents, he left it unopened until he had gained the victory. Then he answered that, as the gods themselves had clearly fought for him, they had sufficiently ratified his election; and, thus setting the authority of the senate at defiance, he continued the war. On his return to Rome the people voted him a triumph, in spite of the opposition of the senate, and when Flaminius had celebrated this triumph he laid down his office. In one of the succeeding years he was made master of the horse by the dictator Minucius, but was obliged to resign this command because at his nomination a mouse had been heard to squeak.³ The nobility, as it appears, carried on against him a sort of holy war. They marshalled heavenly signs and auspices on their side; but these weapons were evidently becoming antiquated, for they produced very little effect, as was shown in the sequel.

¹ Zonaras, viii. 20: διὰ τε γοῶν τὰ τέρατα ταῦτα καὶ ὅτι τινὲς παρὰ νόμῳ ἐλεγον τοῖς ὑπάρχουσιν αἰρεθῆναι, μετέπεμψαν αὐτοῦς. Polybius does not mention this undignified manœuvre of the nobility. Being an enlightened man, he was probably ashamed to report such a thing of his friends. He also passes over the miracles that happened in 217. See below, p. 205.

² See above, p. 134.

³ Plutarch, *Marcell.* 3.

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Efforts to
prevent the
re-election
of Flami-
nius.

When, after the defeat on the Trebia, the consular elections for the ensuing year were at hand, and the confidence of the people seemed to be turning in favour of the popular leader Flaminus, as the first Roman that had signally beaten the Gauls in their own country beyond the Po, the oligarchical party worked hard to prevent his election. Universal fear had seized the minds of men, and made them see in every direction images of terror, and miraculous phenomena of evil foreboding. Livy¹ has preserved an interesting list of these 'prodigies,' which illustrates the peculiar mode of superstition dominant at that time among the vulgar:—In the vegetable market a child of six months called out 'Triumph;' in the cattle market a bull ran up into the third story of a house, and leaped into the street; fiery ships were seen in the sky; the Temple of Hope was struck by lightning; in Lanuvium the holy spear moved of its own accord; a raven flew into the temple of Juno, and perched on the pillow of the goddess; near Amiternum there were seen, in many places, human forms in white robes; in Picenum it rained stones; in Cære the prophetic tablets² shrank; in Gaul a wolf snatched the sword of a sentinel from its sheath.

To propitiate the anger of the gods, manifested by these numerous signs, the whole people were for several days engaged in sacrifices, purifications, and prayers. Dedicatory offerings of gold and bronze were placed in the temples; lecisternia, or public feastings of the gods,³ were ordered, and solemn vows were made on the part of the Roman people.

Flaminus
elected
consul.

If the priests intended, in the interest of the nobility, to keep the people by religious terrors from electing Flaminus,⁴ who, as a notorious free-thinker, scoffed at the national superstition, their pains were lost, for

¹ Livy, xxi. 62.

² Livy, *loc. cit.*: 'Cære sortes extenuatas.' These 'sortes' were tablets or staves of wood or other materials, with prophetic signs, letters, or words engraved on them. Compare Cicero, *De Divinatione*, ii. 41, 85; Livy, xxii. 1.

³ See vol. i. p. 386.

⁴ That such was indeed their intention is evident from the comparison of their former measures in the year 223 B.C. Compare especially Zonaras, viii. 20.

Flaminius was elected to the consulship in spite of all opposition. It was customary that the newly-elected consul, on the day of entering on his office, should dress himself in his house in his official robe (the *prætecta* or purple-bordered toga), ascend the Capitol in solemn procession, perform a sacrifice, convene a meeting of the senate, in which the time was fixed for the Latin festival (*feriæ Latinæ*) on the Alban Mount by the temple of Jupiter Latiaris, and that he should not start for his province before the termination of this festival, which at the period of the Hannibalian war lasted several days.¹ In order to avoid the chicanery of his opponents, who might have retained him in the city or compelled him to resign, under some futile pretext of a bad omen² or of an irregularity in the ceremonies, Flaminius disregarded the usual formalities, and left Rome abruptly, in order to enter on his office in his camp at Ariminum. The senate, greatly exasperated, resolved to recall him, and sent an

¹ See Becker, *Handbuch der röm. Alterthümer*, ii. 122; iv. 440.

² Livy, xxi. 63: 'Flaminius ratus auspiciis ementiendis, Latinarumque feriarum mora, et consularibus aliis impedimentis retenturos se in urbe, simulato itinere privatus clam in provinciam abiit.' Livy (xxii. 1) gives a formidable list of these 'prodigia,' which were evidently intended to keep Flaminius from taking the field:—'In Sicily the spears of soldiers were seen to be on fire; in Sardinia the staff which a Roman knight carried burnt away in his hand whilst he was on his round to inspect the sentinels on the wall of a town; frequent fires lighted up the sea-coast; from two shields blood exuded; several soldiers were struck by lightning; the orb of the sun appeared to grow smaller; in Præneste fiery stones fell from the sky; at Arpi shields were seen in the sky, and the sun appeared to be fighting with the moon; at Capena two moons were seen by day; at Cære the water of a stream was mixed with blood, and spots of blood even appeared on the water that flowed from the fountain of Hercules; at Antium bloody ears fell into the baskets of reapers: at Falerii the heavens seemed to be rent asunder, and from the gap a bright light shone forth; the prophetic tablets shrank, and one of them fell on the ground, containing the words: "Mavors shakes his spear;" sweat appeared on the statue of Mars in the Appian road, and on those of the sacred wolves; at Capua the heavens seemed to be on fire, as also the moon, which set amidst a shower of rain; goats were born covered with wool; a hen was changed into a cock, and a cock into a hen.' The list of expiatory rites and sacrifices is equally interesting. In it are comprised the dedication to Jupiter of a golden thunderbolt fifty pounds in weight, several other offerings, lectisternia, and a public feast (*convivium publicum*).

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embassy to insist on his immediate return. Flaminius paid no attention to the order of the senate, which he knew to be of no legal force, and assumed the command of the army at Ariminum without the observance of the usual religious formalities. But signs of warning occurred even now. At the sacrifice a calf, already struck, but not killed by the axe, escaped from the hands of the attendant, sprinkled many persons with its blood, and disturbed the solemn proceedings by the terror which such an evident sign of the divine displeasure produced. The great calamity that was to befall Italy was hastened by the wickedness of men like Flaminius, who disregarded the warnings of the gods.

Marches of
the two
consuls.

The internal disputes did not prevent the Romans from making their preparations for the ensuing campaign with circumspection and care.¹ The military strength of Italy was sufficient, not only once more to encounter the principal enemy with perfect confidence, but amply to provide for the safety of the distant parts of the Roman dominion. Troops were sent to Sicily, Sardinia, Tarentum, and other places. Sixty quinqueremes were added to the fleet. The faithful Hiero of Syracuse, as indefatigable in the service of Rome as ever, sent 500 Cretans and 1,000 light-armed infantry.² Four new legions were raised, and magazines of provisions were established in the north of Etruria and in Ariminum, by one of which two routes the advance of the Carthaginians was expected. In the latter place the remnants of the army beaten at the Trebia were collected,³ and hence Flaminius led his men by cross and by-roads over the Apennines into northern Etruria,⁴ to

¹ Polybius, iii. 75.

² The Cretans were probably archers; they were as much in repute for their skill in the use of the bow as the Balearians for their expertness in using the sling. The Romans used neither of these weapons.

³ Probably, as Mommsen suggests, conveyed by water from Placentia and Cremona.

⁴ Livy, xxi. 62: 'Per tramites Apennini.' Probably the cavalry of these four legions remained at Ariminum; for, in the first place, the mountain roads would be very difficult to pass with cavalry; secondly, the cavalry was of more importance in the plain near Ariminum than in the hilly country of Etruria;

join them to the two new legions which had been directed there straight from Rome.¹

The second consul, Cn. Servilius, proceeded to Ariminum with the two other newly-levied legions.² His army

thirdly, the army of Servilius at Ariminum must have been unusually strong in cavalry, as a detachment of 4,000 horse could be dispatched to intercept Hannibal (see p. 204).

¹ Thus the divergent statements of Polybius (iii. 77) and Livy (xxi. 62) can be made to agree.

² Polybius is not sufficiently explicit in his statements concerning the armaments and the strength of the military force in 217 B.C. It seems almost that he purposely avoids expressing himself clearly. He says (iii. 75) that the Romans sent two armies (*στρατόπεδα*) to Sardinia and Sicily, garrisons to Tarentum and other places, that they fitted out sixty *penteres*, and that the consuls raised new armies (*στρατιάς*). It is especially important to understand the latter expression, *συνήγον τοὺς συμμάχους καὶ κατέγραφον τὰ παρ' αὐτοῖς στρατόπεδα*. Mommsen, as it seems, infers that the consuls did not raise any new legions, but only completed those that had been defeated on the Trebia. This cannot be right. The words of Polybius do not admit such an interpretation. Moreover, it does not agree with the statements of the strength of the army of Flaminius in the battle on Lake Thrasymenus, nor with a report of Appian (vii. 8). In the battle on the Thrasymene the Romans lost, according to Polybius, 30,000 men, *i.e.*, their whole army, the strength of which Appian also gives at 30,000 men. This was in round numbers the two new legions (20,000 men), and 10,000 men more, *i.e.* the remnants of the legions from Transalpine Gaul. Accordingly, of the 42,000 men who fought at the Trebia, only 10,000 men were disposable for the campaign of 217 B.C., a result which is in perfect accordance with all that we know of the disastrous battle on the Trebia. The statement of Appian (vii. 8) is to this effect, that in 217 B.C. the Romans had on foot thirteen legions. This number cannot be made up, if we suppose that the consuls of 217 had not formed four new legions, but simply replenished the legions of the preceding year. On the other hand, the number of thirteen legions agrees with the assumption that in 217 B.C. four new legions were raised. There were in Spain two legions, in Sicily and Sardinia one each, in Tarentum and the rest of Italy one, on the one hand the remnants of four legions, and, lastly, four new ones. Apart from the objections which these positive statements cause against Mommsen's unsupported assumption, the course of events seems to show that the Romans did not confine themselves to supplementing the remnants of the defeated legions, but thus expose themselves to the risk of another defeat by Hannibal's victorious army, which was now considerably swelled by Gauls. This view is hardly borne out by the expressions of Polybius (iii. 75, § 4), *διὸ καὶ παραδόξου ἀνέντος αὐτοῖς τοῦ πράγματος περὶ τὰς λοιπὰς παρασκευὰς διαφερόντως ἐγίνοντο*: 7: *πάντα δὲ καὶ πανταχόθεν ἐνεργῶς ἡτοίμαζον*. Polybius is silent on the circumstance related by Livy, that Flaminius entered on his office at Ariminum. Following his narrative alone, we might fancy that Flaminius had proceeded from Rome straight to Arretium in Etruria. This silence is perhaps intentional. Polybius, as a free-thinker, was disgusted with the use which the Roman aristocracy made of the popular superstition, but instead of reproving

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consisted, according to Appian, of 40,000 men in all. If this statement is to be trusted, Servilius must have had, besides the two new legions and the usual number of allies, a body of 20,000 auxiliaries, who were perhaps Cenomanians. The cavalry of his army was very strong if, as Polybius reports,¹ Servilius dispatched 4,000 of them into Etruria as soon as he was informed of Hannibal's march in that direction.

Miscalculation of the Romans.

The situation was, upon the whole, identical with that of 225 B.C., eight years before, when the Romans expected that the Gauls would advance either by the eastern road through Picenum, or on the western side of the Apennines from the Upper Arno. They had then divided their armies between Ariminum and Arretium, in order to cover both roads to Rome. But as they were then deceived by the Gauls, who crossed the Apennines, not near the Upper Arno, but far westward near the sea-coast, and suddenly appeared in Etruria without having encountered any opposition, so they were now a second time surprised by Hannibal.

March of the Carthaginians.

On the first appearance of spring the Carthaginian army broke up from the plain of the Po. It had been considerably strengthened by Gauls. Crossing the Apennines, probably by the pass which is now called that of Pontremoli and leads from Parma to Lucca,² Hannibal had reached the Arno, while Servilius was still expecting him at Ariminum. The march to Fæsulæ, through the low ground along the Arno, was beset with great difficulties. The country was flooded by the spring rains and the melting of the snow on the mountains, and had in several places assumed the aspect of vast lakes. Men and beasts sank deep into the soft ground ; many of the horses

his friends, he remained silent. But this silence cannot invalidate the positive testimony of Livy.

¹ Polybius, iii. 86.

² The locality where Hannibal crossed the Apennines cannot be fixed with more certainty than his passage over the Alps, as Polybius mentions no names and does not describe the country accurately. Nissen (*Rhein. Museum*, xxii. 574) is in favour of the road from Modena or Bologna to Pistoja, and thinks the inundated country was the valley of the Ombrone between Pistoja and Fiesole.

lost their hoofs and perished. A portion of the army was obliged to wade through the water for three days, and to pass the nights without being able to find dry spots on which they might rest or sleep, except the bodies of fallen animals, and heaps of the abandoned baggage. The damp and variable weather, together with excessive fatigue, and especially the want of sleep, caused sickness and terrible havoc among the troops. Hannibal himself lost one of his eyes by inflammation. The Gauls suffered most. They formed the centre in the line of march, and if Hannibal had not taken the precaution of causing the cavalry, under his brave brother Mago, to close the rear, they would have deserted in crowds, for they were near home, and, as Gauls, they had no perseverance to bear up against continued hardships.

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Having reached the Upper Arno, Hannibal allowed his army to repose. Then he marched southwards, passing by the camp of Flaminius near Arretium, in the direction of Cortona. To attack the fortified camp of the consul would have been hopeless. Even at the Trebia Hannibal had left the defeated and wounded Scipio and his discouraged army unmolested in his camp, and had preferred to engage two united consular armies in the field rather than attack one within its intrenchments. It was therefore natural that he should now try to provoke Flaminius to leave his camp and fight a battle.¹ If he marched further south towards Rome, it was impossible for Flaminius to remain stationary at Arretium. Between Hannibal and Rome there was now no Roman army. Who would take the responsibility of letting the enemy march unopposed upon Rome? Whether Hannibal would attack the city, and whether an attack would succeed, nobody could tell. At any rate the apprehensions in Rome were great. It was the duty of the two consuls to beat the enemy in the field.²

Move-
ments of
Hannibal
towards
Rome.

¹ According to Polybius (iii. 82), Flaminius was aggravated and offended because Hannibal marched past him as from contempt. This is surely a misrepresentation, like many others, intended to cast a blemish on the character of Flaminius, and it owes its origin probably to his political opponents.

² The same view is expressed by Nissen (*Rheinisches Museum*, xxii. 565).

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ments of
Flaminius.

On no account could they think of remaining in the north of Italy whilst the capital was threatened.¹

Flaminius accordingly broke up from Arretium and followed Hannibal closely. It is not at all probable that he had any idea of offering or accepting battle before his colleague, whom he had now every reason to expect in Etruria, should arrive from Ariminum. Perhaps he contemplated a repetition of the campaign in the late Gallic war, which eight years before had led to such brilliant results.² At that time a Gallic army, followed by the army of one Roman consul, suddenly encountered the other consul in front, and was cut to pieces by a combined attack of the two colleagues. Now, if Servilius marched rapidly by the Flaminian road from Umbria, and succeeded in placing himself between Hannibal and Rome, the two consuls could, as on the previous occasion, fall upon the enemy from two sides. It appears that Servilius acted upon such a plan as this. He dispatched a body of 4,000 horse, under C. Centenius, in advance, and followed with the infantry on the Flaminian road.³ It was therefore the duty of Flaminius to keep as close as possible to the Carthaginians, in order to be near enough, on the expected approach of the second Roman army, for a combined action. He was strong enough for this, for he had more than 30,000 men. This force sufficed to hamper the movements of the invaders, and even to protect the country to some extent from devastation. In a few hours Roman soldiers could make a fortified camp, in which they would be safe from a surprise, and even from an attack in due form. For this reason a Roman general could venture close to an enemy, without exposing himself to any extraordinary risks.⁴ The plan of Flaminius cannot therefore

¹ Thus the Roman legions followed Pyrrhus when he marched upon Rome. See vol. i. p. 523.

² See above, p. 129.

³ These marched on the Flaminian road (see Nissen, *Rhein. Museum*, xx. 228), and had probably left it at Mevania to turn to the right towards Perugia, when the battle on the Lake Trasymenus forced them to return. On this retreat they were overtaken and defeated by Maharbal. See below, p. 210.

⁴ This was usual in the strategical operations of the Romans. A well-

be called rash. But he had in his calculation overlooked one item, or rated it at too low a figure. The enemy he had to deal with was not a horde of barbarian Gauls, but a disciplined army of veteran soldiers, led by Hannibal.

The unfortunate are seldom treated with justice by their friends, never by their enemies. Flaminius was the recognised leader of the popular party, and the history of Rome was written by the adherents and clients of the nobility. Thus Flaminius has experienced, even at the hands of Polybius, an ungenerous, nay, unjust, treatment. But, in truth, if he committed faults in his command, if he allowed himself to be outwitted and surprised in an ambush by a superior antagonist, he is not more guilty than many other Roman consuls before and after him, whose faults were forgiven because they belonged to the ruling party. And yet few of these have an equal claim to consideration and forgiveness with Flaminius, who atoned for his fault with his life.¹ Nevertheless, party hatred survived him, and delighted in making him responsible for the whole misfortune which the genius of Hannibal inflicted on his ill-fated army.

Polybius disdains repeating the silly charge brought against Flaminius, that he rushed into misfortune through his contempt of the gods. Livy, however, is more punctilious in preserving traits which are characteristic of Roman manners and sentiment. He relates, therefore, that, on starting from Arretium, he was thrown from his horse, but disregarded not only this warning of the gods,

known illustration is the campaign of Fabius Maximus in the following year. Compare Livy, xxii. 12: 'Fabius per loca alta agmen ducebat modico ab hoste intervallo, ut neque omitteret eum, neque congregaretur.'

¹ Arnold (*History of Rome*, iii. 110) says most justly and eloquently: 'Flaminius died bravely, sword in hand, having committed no greater military error than many an impetuous soldier whose death in his country's cause has been felt to throw a veil over his rashness, and whose memory is pitied and honoured. The party feelings which have so coloured the language of the ancient writers respecting him need not be shared by a modern historian. Flaminius was indeed an unequal antagonist to Hannibal; but, in his previous life, as consul and as censor, he had served his country well; and if the defile of Thrasymenus witnessed his rashness, it also contains his honourable grave.'

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Reasons
for the
censures
passed
upon Fla-
minius.

Charges
brought
against
Flaminius.

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but another also which still more plainly bade him stay. An ensign-bearer being unable with all his strength to pull the ensign out of the ground, Flaminius ordered it to be dug out.¹ On the other hand, Polybius² prefers a graver charge against the unfortunate general. He says that he was urged by political considerations—by the fear of losing the popular favour; that he wished to appropriate to himself the glory of defeating Hannibal without sharing it with his colleague; that he was puffed up with vanity, and considered himself a great general; and that for these reasons he was anxious to hurry on an engagement with Hannibal, and rushed heedlessly into danger. We hold these charges to be unjust, and to be refuted by the events themselves.³ If Flaminius had been foolishly eager to bring on an engagement, he would surely not have waited till Hannibal had advanced as far as Arretium, still less would he have allowed him to pass by his camp. He would have gone to meet him, and he would have been able to attack the Punic army before it had recovered from the fatigues and hardships of a long march across the Apennines and through the lands inundated by the Arno. He would, then, if he had been victorious, have prevented the devastation of northern Etruria, and have secured for himself the glory which he is said to have so much coveted. Instead of doing this, he remained quietly in his camp; and the fatal battle on the Thrasymene was not offered by him, but accepted, because he had no chance of avoiding it. It is no less an invention of his political enemies that, as Polybius says, Hannibal built his plan on his knowledge of the inconsiderate ardour, audacity, and vainglorious folly of Flaminius. His faults were too much the general faults of most Roman consuls to make it necessary for Hannibal to devise peculiar stratagems against this particular leader.

¹ Livy, xxii. 3.² Polybius, iii. 81.³ The statement of Polybius (iii. 82, § 8), that the number of soldiers in the army of Flaminius was less than that of the unarmed crowd attracted by the hope of booty, is a self-evident and unpardonable exaggeration.

When, on his march, Hannibal had passed Cortona, and reached the Lake Thrasymenus (Lago di Perugia), he resolved to halt and to wait for the Romans, who were closely following him; and then, having chosen his ground, he made his dispositions for the coming struggle. On the northern side of the lake, where it is skirted by the road from Cortona to Perugia, a steep range of hills approaches near to the water's edge, so that the road (from Borghetto to Magione) passes through a defile, formed by the lake on the right and the mountains on the left. In one spot only (near the modern village of Tuoro) the hills recede to some distance, and leave a small expanse of level ground, bordered on the south by the lake, and everywhere else by steep heights. On these heights Hannibal drew up his army. With the best portion of his infantry, the Libyans and Spaniards, he occupied a hill jutting out into the middle of the plain. On his left or eastern side he placed the slingers and other light troops; on his right he drew up the Gauls, and beyond them his cavalry, on the gentler slopes as far as the point where the defile begins and where he expected the advance of the Romans. Probably the ground near the lake was marshy, and consequently the road wound along the foot of the hills, where they receded from the water.¹

Late in the evening of the day on which these arrangements were made (it was still April), Flaminius arrived in the neighbourhood, and encamped for the night not far from the lake. Early the next morning he continued his march, anxious to keep close up to the enemy, and not suspecting that the lion whose track he was following was crouching close by and was prepared to leap upon him with

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Disposi-
tion of
Hannibal's
forces.

The battle
of the
Thrasymene lake.

¹ This is the description of the battle-field given by Nissen (*Rhein. Museum*, xxiii. 580 ff.). But it is evident that Polybius (iii. 83) imagined it to be different. He seems to have thought that the road on which Flaminius was attacked ran right through, and not past, the valley, the two sides of which Hannibal had lined with his troops. But, as the road from Cortona to Perugia passes through no such valley near the lake (see Arnold, *Hist. of Rome*, iii. 106), we have no alternative but to adapt to the locality, as well as we can, the description of the battle given by Polybius.

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a sudden bound. A thick mist had risen from the lake and covered the road and the foot of the hills, while their summits were shining in the morning sun. Nothing betrayed the presence of the enemy. With the feeling of perfect security, in regular marching order, laden with their baggage, the soldiers entered the fatal ground, and the long line of the army wound along slowly between the lake and the hills. The head of the column had already passed the small plain on their left, and was marching along that part of the road where the mountains came close to the water's edge. The rear-guard had just entered the defile, when suddenly the stillness of the morning was broken by the wild cry of battle, and the Romans, as if they were attacked by invisible enemies, were struck down without being able to ward off or return a blow. Before they could throw down their cumbersome baggage and seize their arms, the enemy was among them. They rushed in masses from all the hills at the same time. There was no time to form into order of battle. Every one had to rely on the strength of his own arm and strike for life as well as he could. In vain Flaminius tried to rally and form his men. They rushed in all directions upon the enemy or upon each other, wild with dismay and despair. It was no battle, but a butchery. The office of the general could no longer be to lead his men, and to superintend and control the fight, but to set the example of individual courage, and to discharge the duty of the meanest soldier. This duty Flaminius performed, and he fell in the midst of the brave men whom he had led to their death. The Romans were slain by thousands, showing in death that unwavering spirit which so often led them to victory. A few, pushed into the lake, tried to save their lives by swimming, but the weight of their armour pressed them down. Others waded into the water as far as they could, but were mercilessly cut down by the hostile cavalry, or died by their own hands. Only a body of 6,000 men, which had formed the head of the line of march, cut their way through the Carthaginians and reached the top of the hills,

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from which, after the mist was dispersed, they beheld the terrible carnage below, and saw at the same time that they were unable to assist their perishing comrades. They therefore moved forward, and took up a position in a neighbouring village. But they were soon overtaken by Hannibal's indefatigable cavalry, under the command of Maharbal, and were compelled to lay down their arms and surrender.

In three short hours the work of destruction was finished. Fifteen thousand Romans covered the bloody field. The prisoners were equally numerous. It appears, from the account of Polybius, that none escaped.¹ The Roman army was not only defeated but annihilated. The loss of the Carthaginians, on the other hand, was small. Fifteen hundred men, for the most part Gauls, had fallen. Hannibal honoured thirty of the more distinguished of them by a solemn funeral. He searched also for the body of the unfortunate Flaminius, to give him a burial worthy of his rank. But among the heaps of the slain, the Roman consul, stripped, no doubt, and despoiled of his insignia, could not be identified. A hostile fate, which exposed him to the reviling tongue of his political opponents and blackened his memory, deprived him also of the respect which a generous enemy was ready to bestow. The prisoners were treated by Hannibal as on the previous occasion. Those of them who were Romans were kept in chains. The Roman allies obtained their freedom without

¹ In Livy's account we can perceive the intention to make the Roman loss appear smaller than it was, and to exaggerate that of the Carthaginians, although he protests against such an intention, and, in truth, does not on this occasion indulge to an undue extent in that national sin of the Roman historians (Livy, xxii. 7). He admits that 15,000 Romans fell in the battle, and that 6,000 were taken by Maharbal after the battle was over; but he says nothing of any prisoners made in the battle, which is an evident, if not an intentional, omission. According to Polybius, the number of prisoners amounted altogether to 15,000. He says nothing of fugitives. But Livy states that 10,000 Romans escaped, which, if true, would go far to modify the character of the calamity. Livy, moreover, states the number of slain in the Carthaginian army at 2,500 (1,000 more than Polybius), and he adds, evidently, for the purpose of soothing the soreness of Roman patriotism, that many died afterwards of their wounds.

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Dismay in
the city of
Rome on
the tidings
of the
battle.

ransom, and were assured that Hannibal waged war only with Rome, and had come to free them from the Roman yoke.

The news of the terrible slaughter at Lake Thrasymentus reached Rome in the course of the following day.¹ This time no attempt was made to hide or to colour the truth. Already fugitives had hastened to Rome, and reported what they had seen or what they apprehended. The Forum was thronged with an anxious crowd that pressed round the senate-house, impatient to know what had happened. When at length, towards evening, the prætor Marcus Pomponius ascended the public platform, and announced, with a loud voice, 'We are beaten in a great battle, our army is destroyed, and Flaminius, the consul, is slain,' the people gave themselves up to their grief without reserve, and the scene was more affecting than even the carnage of the battle.² The senate alone preserved its dignity, and calmly consulted on the measures necessary for the safety of the town.

Defeat of
Centenius.

Three days later fresh tidings of evil arrived. The 4,000 horse under the proprætor Centenius, whom the consul Servilius had dispatched from Ariminum to retard the advance of Hannibal until he could follow with the bulk of his troops, had fallen in with the victorious army, and were either cut to pieces or captured by Maharbal's cavalry and light troops.³ By this reverse the army of the second

¹ This may be inferred from Livy, xxii. 6, 7.

² Polybius, iii. 85, § 8.

³ The spot where this happened is not mentioned by Polybius (iii. 86). Zonaras names Spoletium, and Livy (xxii. 8) agrees with him in so far as he refers it to Umbria. Appian (vii. 9) says the engagement took place near a lake called Pleistina, which is otherwise quite unknown. Appian's account, however, is very incorrect and confused. He makes the force of Centenius to be 8,000 strong, and says he was sent from Rome. Nissen (*Rhein. Museum*, xx. 224) thinks that the Lake Pleistina, like several other lakes that existed formerly in Central Italy, is now dried up, and that its bed is to be recognised in the valley of Pistia, between Colfiorito, Serravalle, and Dignano, on the road from Foligno to Camerino. This view is very plausible. It would prove, moreover, that Servilius, with the second consular army, to which the 4,000 horse belonged, was marching southwards, on the Via Flaminia, evidently with the intention of placing himself between Hannibal and Rome, or of joining the army of

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consul, being deprived of its cavalry, was disabled, and could no longer offer any resistance to Hannibal's advance. The Punic horsemen now ranged without control through southern Etruria, and showed themselves actually at Narnia, scarcely two days' march from Rome.¹

The most serious apprehensions for the safety of the city appeared not unfounded. Between Hannibal and Rome there now intervened no army in the field. One army was destroyed and the other was far away in Umbria, crippled and unable to oppose the enemy. The boldest resolutions could be expected of a general like Hannibal. Nothing seemed to be able to stop or retard the progress of the man who passed through Italy like a devastating element, crushing all resistance and setting all obstacles at nought. Nevertheless the men of Rome did not despair. The senate remained united for several days in a permanent consultation from morning until evening, and, by its gravity and firmness, gradually inspired the terrified people with some degree of confidence and hope. Measures were taken immediately for the defence of the city. The bridges over the Tiber and other rivers were destroyed,² stones and projectiles accumulated, and the walls put in a state of defence. The arms which were hung up in the temples as trophies of war were taken down and distributed to old soldiers.³ Above all things, a new head was given to the state. The times were remembered when men like Cincinnatus and Camillus, invested with unlimited authority, had saved the republic from imminent danger. The ancient office of the dictatorship had almost fallen into oblivion. The living generation of younger men knew of it only from the tales of their fathers. Thirty-two years had passed since, in the darkest period of the first Punic war, after the great defeat at Drepana, a dictator had been chosen. Now, in the

his colleague. This plan must, of course, have been concerted between the two consuls as soon as Hannibal had appeared in Etruria, and in it lies a further justification of Flaminius.

¹ Zonaras, viii. 25.² Livy, xxii. 8. Zonaras, viii. 25.³ Appian, vii. 11.

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overwhelming violence of the tempest, this often tested sheet anchor was tried again. But it was not possible to appoint a dictator according to the forms and rules of the old law. A consul ought to nominate the dictator; but Flaminius was dead, and between Servilius and Rome stood the hostile army. A mode of appointing a dictator was therefore adopted which had never been resorted to before, and was never applied again. A pro-dictator and a master of the horse¹ were elected by popular suffrage. The man selected was Q. Fabius Maximus, who had served the state honourably in many public functions, and who belonged to a noble and at the same time moderate patrician house, which from the earliest ages of the republic, and especially in the Samnite wars, had proved its warlike abilities. Q. Fabius was not a bold, enterprising general, but a man of firmness and intrepidity; and it was precisely such a man that Rome required at a time when adversity was threatening on all sides.

Prodic-
tatorship
of Q.
Fabius
Maximus.

The first task of the dictator was to restore the shaken faith in the national gods. There was no hope of salvation from the present calamity, unless the gods were duly propitiated. It was clear that, not the sword of the enemy, but the contempt of the gods, which Flaminius had been guilty of, was the cause of the great reverses. Now the impious scoffers had been put to shame, and the forfeited favour of the outraged deity could only be regained by penitence and submission to the sacred rites of the national religion. The Sibylline books were consulted. On their advice the dictator vowed a temple to the Erycinian Venus, and the prætor T. Otacilius promised a temple to the goddess Reason (Mens). For the celebration of the public games the sum of thirty-three thousand three hundred and thirty-three and one-third pounds of copper was voted;² white oxen were slaughtered as an atoning

¹ Polybius, iii. 87. Livy, xxii. 8. According to Plutarch (*Fab. Max.* 4), it was Fabius himself that nominated the *magister equitum*. There can be no doubt that the statement of Polybius and Livy is correct.

² Surely a most remarkable number, and one showing the sacredness of the number *three* among the Romans. It reminds us of the oldest political

sacrifice, and the whole population, men, women, and children, put up their prayers and offerings to the gods. For three continuous days the six principal pairs of deities were publicly exhibited on couches and feasted.¹ A solemn vow was made by the community, if the Roman commonwealth of the Quirites should remain unimpaired for five years, to sacrifice to Jupiter all the young of swine, sheep, goats, and cattle that should be born in this year.² It was not necessary to devote also the children of men; they fell in full hecatombs as victims to the god of war on the field of battle.

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Having scrupulously fulfilled the duties to the gods, Fabius addressed himself to military measures. The first task was to fill up the gap which the fatal battle of Lake Thrasymenus had made in the armed force. Two³ new legions were raised. The consul Servilius was ordered to come to Rome with his two legions. He met the dictator at Oriculum on the Tiber, not far from Narnia.⁴ Here the Roman soldiers who had never been commanded by a dictator saw for the first time that his power in the state was supreme. When the consul was drawing near the dictator, the latter commanded him to dismiss his lictors, and to appear alone before his superior, who was preceded by twenty-four lictors.

Military
measures
of Fabius.

Meanwhile more evil news had arrived. A fleet of

Greatness
of the
emergency.

institutions of Rome, in which the number *three* and its multiples frequently occur—the three tribes, the thirty curies, the three hundred knights, and the original legion of three thousand men; the three hundred senators, three hundred colonists, and, in religion, the Capitoline trinity of Jupiter, Venus, and Minerva.

¹ Livy, xxii. 10: 'Sex pulvinaria in conspectu fuerunt; Iovi ac Iunoni unum, alterum Neptuno ac Minervæ, tertium Marti et Veneri, quartum Apollini ac Dianæ, quintum Vulcano ac Vestæ, sextum Mercurio et Cereri.'

² Livy, xxii. 9, 10. Polybius passes over the detail of all the superstitious rites, which he detests, and says only (iii. 88, § 7), *Φάβιος . . . θύσας τοῖς θεοῖς . . . ἐξώρμησε*.

³ Livy, xxii. 11. According to Polybius (iii. 88, § 7), four legions. Livy's statement is more precise and credible, especially as it is confirmed xxii. 27.

⁴ This statement of Livy (xxii. 11) appears to be trustworthy, and is preferable to that of Polybius (iii. 88, § 8), according to which Fabius and Servilius effected their junction in northern Apulia.

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transports, destined for the legions in Spain, had been surprised and taken by the Carthaginians near Cosa on the coast of Etruria. Upon this news Servilius was sent to Ostia, to arm and equip the Roman ships in that port. Out of the lower class of people he enrolled seamen for the fleet and a body of soldiers to serve as a garrison for the city. Already the pressure of war was felt, and was producing alarming symptoms. In spite of the apparently inexhaustible population of Italy, in spite of the vast superiority of Rome over Carthage in men trained to war—the point in which the preponderance of Rome chiefly lay—the Romans were obliged, in the second year of the war, to take soldiers from a class of citizens which in the good old time was looked upon as unworthy of the honourable service of war. From among the freedmen, the descendants of manumitted slaves, those were enrolled who were fathers of families, and seemed to have given pledges to the state for their fidelity in its service. The time was not yet come, but it was approaching, when the proud city would be compelled to arm the hands of slaves in her defence.

Plans of
Hannibal.

The apprehension that Hannibal, after his victory over Flaminius, would march straight upon Rome, proved unfounded. Hannibal knew perfectly well that, with his reduced army, his few remaining Spanish and African veterans, and with the unsteady Gauls, he could not lay siege to such a town as Rome. His plan had been from the very beginning to induce the Roman allies to revolt, and in union with them to strike at the head of his foe. He calculated above all on the Sabellian nations in the heart of Italy. They had offered the longest and stoutest resistance to the Roman supremacy. If he succeeded in gaining their co-operation, his great plan was realised, Carthage was avenged, and Rome annihilated or permanently weakened. Hannibal therefore did not remain long in Etruria, which was entirely in his power, and where he would have found ample resources and booty for his army. It seems that he did not expect much help from the Etruscans, who were too fond of peace and quiet, and looked

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upon his allies, the Gauls, their old national enemies and despoilers, with unmitigated distrust. After an unsuccessful attempt to surprise Spoletium, he marched westwards, through Umbria and Picenum, to the coast of the Adriatic. These rich and well-cultivated districts now felt the scourge of war. The Roman settlers, who, since the agrarian law of Flaminius, were very numerous in Picenum, suffered most. No doubt Hannibal followed the same rule which since his first victory he had observed with regard to the Roman citizens and Roman allies that fell into his hands. The former he had treated, if not cruelly, yet with harshness and severity, by keeping them as prisoners and loading them with chains. The latter he had endeavoured to gain over by his generosity, and had dismissed them without ransom. There is something, therefore, perplexing in the statement of Polybius,¹ that Hannibal now put to death all the men capable of bearing arms that fell into his hands. We have no hesitation in declaring this to be a pure fiction or a gross exaggeration. By such an act of cruelty, Hannibal, even if he had been capable of it, would have interfered with the success of his own plan. But we can hardly hold him capable of causing the murder of inoffensive people, when the utmost severity he showed to soldiers taken in battle was imprisonment. The Roman reports were therefore either inspired by national hatred, or caused by isolated acts of barbarity, such as occur even in the best disciplined armies, not with the sanction, but against the explicit order of the commander-in-chief.

Yet, though in all probability the lives of the people of Picenum were spared, their property was forfeited to the wants and the rapacity of the invading host. Hannibal's

The Car-
thaginians
in Pice-
num.

¹ The language of Polybius (iii. 86, § 11) is not quite precise. Having said that Hannibal killed *πολὸν πλῆθος ἀνθρώπων* on his march, he adds, *παράγγελμά τι δεδομένον ἦν, φονεύειν τοὺς ὑποπίπτοντας τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἡλικίαις*. Whether this order was executed, and whether those that were actually killed were killed in compliance with it, or for other reasons, he does not say, but he leaves us to infer it. It is to be remarked, however, that Livy, who seldom omits an opportunity for stigmatising what he calls Hannibal's 'inhumana crudelitas,' is silent on this alleged act of barbarity, which he might have brought in with effect (xxii. 9).

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soldiers had not yet recovered from the hardships of the preceding winter and spring, and from their wounds received in battle. A malignant skin disease was spread among them.¹ The horses were overworked and in wretched condition. Now, in the beautiful mild spring weather, Hannibal gave his army time to repose and to recover. The country on the Adriatic produced wine, oil, corn, fruit in abundance. There was more than could be consumed or carried away.² Now, at length, the army was in the possession and enjoyment of the rich land which on the snow-covered heights of the Alps had been promised to them as the reward for their fidelity, courage, and endurance.

Adoption
of the
Roman
arms.

But the time had not yet arrived for mere enjoyment and repose, as if the hardships of war were all over. Hannibal made use of the short interval of rest, the fruit of his victory, to arm a portion of his army in the Roman style. The quantities of arms taken in battle sufficed to equip the African infantry with the short swords and the large shields of the Roman legionary soldiers. We cannot imagine a more striking proof of the superiority of the Roman equipment, and consequently of the instinctive aptitude of the Roman people for war, than the fact that the greatest general of antiquity, in the heart of the hostile country, exchanged the accustomed native armament of his soldiers for that of the Romans.

Exultation
at Car-
thage.

A march of ten days had brought Hannibal from the lake Thrasymentus across the Apennines to the shore of the Adriatic. Having reached the sea coast, he renewed the communication with Carthage which had long been interrupted, and sent home the first direct and official report of his victorious career. Of course the Carthaginians were not ignorant of his proceedings. The sudden withdrawal of the Roman legions, which had been sent to Sicily for an expedition into Africa, was in itself a sufficient

¹ Polybius (iii. 87, § 2) calls it *λεμόψωρος*.

² Polybius (iii. 88, § 1) tells us that Hannibal's soldiers had washed their horses with old wine.

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intimation that the Romans were attacked in Italy. Carthaginian cruisers hovered about the Italian coasts. At Cosa, on the coast of Etruria, a fleet of Roman transports had been taken. The state of affairs in Italy was therefore, on the whole, perfectly well known in Carthage. Nevertheless, the first direct message from Hannibal, and the authentic narrative of his immense success, produced raptures of joy and enthusiasm, which showed that Hannibal was supported by the consentient voice of his countrymen. The Carthaginians resolved to continue with all their strength the war in Italy and Spain, and to reinforce in every possible manner, not only Hannibal, but his brother Hasdrubal in Spain.¹

The fidelity
of the
Roman
allies.

Having completely restored and re-organised his army, Hannibal left the sea-board, and marched again into the midland parts of Italy, where the genuine Italians lived, who vied with the Romans and Latins for the prize of courage. He passed through the country of the Marsians, Marrucinians, and Pelignians into the northern part of Apulia, called Daunia.² Everywhere he offered his friendship and alliance for a war with Rome, but everywhere he met with refusals. Not a single town opened her gates to him. All were as yet unshaken in their fidelity to Rome. No doubt this fidelity was due in part to the character of the Roman government, which was not unjust or oppressive, and allowed to the subjects a full measure of self-govern-

¹ Polybius, iii. 87, § 5: 'Εφ' οἷς ἀκούσαντες μεγαλείως ἐχάρησαν οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι καὶ πολλὴν ἐποίουντο σπουδὴν καὶ πρόνοιαν ὑπὲρ τοῦ κατὰ πάντα τρόπου ἐπικουρεῖν καὶ τοῖς ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ καὶ τοῖς ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ πράγμασι. Compared with this evidence of Polybius, we cannot attribute the slightest weight to the statements of Appian (vii. 16) and Zonaras (viii. 26), who say that, upon Hannibal's report of his victories, the Carthaginians laughed at his demanding reinforcements and assistance, saying that, if he were victorious, he ought to be able to send money home, and not to ask for aid. Such silly language refutes itself. The wonder is that any man pretending to the name of an historian could attribute it to the government of a state like Carthage.

² This is the line of march given by Livy (xii. 9). Polybius (iii. 88, 3) does not take Hannibal so far away from the coast, but straight from Picenum, through the country of the Marrucinians and Frentanians, into Daunia. Perhaps the main body of the army marched on the more direct road, and the more inland districts were only visited by detached flying corps.

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ment;¹ and partly it was produced by fear of the revenge which Rome would take if in the end she proved victorious. But it is apparent that another motive operated at the same time. A feeling of Italian nationality had grown up. The Italians had been bound together with the Romans by the fear which they both entertained of the Gauls, the worst enemies of their fertile country. As the numerous tribes of Greeks learnt to feel and act as one nation in their common war with the Persians, thus the Italians first became conscious of being a kindred race in consequence of the repeated invasions of the Gauls, and they learnt to look for safety in a close union under the leadership of Rome. These Gauls, the hereditary enemies of all Italy, were now the most numerous combatants in Hannibal's army. It was chiefly their co-operation that made the present war so terrible, and threatened universal devastation, ruin, and extermination. These feelings of the Italians were the disturbing force which crossed Hannibal's expectations. Nevertheless, he did not yet despair of the ultimate success of his plan. Perhaps his sword could yet break the charm which bound up the Italians with Rome. If they were acted upon mainly by fear, he had only to show that he was more to be feared than the Romans, and that they risked more in remaining faithful to their masters than in joining the invader.

Roman
firmness.

The fidelity of the allies was justified by the firmness which the Romans displayed. Stunned for a moment by the terrible blow of the late battle, the senate had speedily recovered its composure, its confidence, and its genuine Roman determination. There were no thoughts of yielding, of compromise, or peace; but the spirit of unwavering resistance animated the senate and every individual Roman. Not a single soldier was withdrawn from Spain, Sardinia, or Sicily. The spirit with which Rome was determined to carry on the war was most clearly expressed in the order issued to the different

¹ How the country flourished is seen from Polybius, iii. 90, § 7.

Italian districts threatened by the Punic army. It enjoined the people to take refuge in the nearest fortresses, to set fire to the farm-houses and villages, to lay waste their fields, and to drive away the cattle.¹ Italy was to become a desert, rather than support the foreign invaders.

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It was in truth not advisable for a Roman army now to venture on an encounter in the open field with the irresistible conqueror. The losses of the Trebia and the Thrasymenus could indeed be quickly replaced by new levies, and Fabius ordered four new legions to be raised. But the impression produced by the repeated defeats could not be so easily effaced. The self-confidence of the Roman soldiers was gone. Before they again crossed swords with the dreaded enemy, they had to learn to look him in the face. Among the new levies there was, no doubt, a proportion of old soldiers who had served in former campaigns, but the majority were young recruits; for the large levies, recently made, could not have been effected unless the younger men had been enlisted in considerable numbers. The most difficult task, however, must have been that of replacing the centurions and higher officers who had fallen in battle; and the want of a sufficient number of experienced officers must have made the newly-raised legions still more unfit to encounter Hannibal's formidable veterans.

Roman
levies.

These circumstances necessarily imposed on Fabius the utmost caution, even though he had not been by nature inclined to it. Before he could venture on a battle, he was obliged to accustom his army to war, and to revive the courage and self-confidence which generally characterised the Roman soldier. He did this skilfully and persistently, and thus he rendered the most essential service that any general could at that time render to the state. He marched (probably with four legions²) through Samnium into northern Apulia, and encamped in the neighbourhood of Hannibal near Æcæ. In vain the latter

Tactics of
Fabius in
Apulia.

¹ Livy, xxii. 11.

² Compare above, p. 213, note 3.

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tried to draw him out of his camp, and to force on an engagement. Neither the haughty challenges of the Punians, nor the sight of the devastations which they committed round about, nor the impatience of Marcus Minucius, his master of the horse, could induce the wary old Fabius to change his cautious strategy. At length, Hannibal marched past him into the mountains of Samnium, and thus forced him to follow. But Fabius followed more cautiously than Flaminius. He was naturally the 'cunctator,' and moreover he had before his eyes the disaster that had befallen Flaminius. Hannibal had no chance of coming upon him unawares. He passed through the country of the Hirpinians and Caudinians without impediment or resistance. For the third time in this one year he crossed the Apennines, and suddenly appeared in the Campanian plain. It was to be made clear to all the Italians that the Punians were masters of Italy, and that no Roman ventured to oppose them.

Events in
Campania.

The plain of Campania was the garden of Italy. Its fertility is proved by the many flourishing towns which, in a wide circle, surrounded Capua, the largest and richest of them all. Hannibal had already found partisans in Capua, and he was in hopes that this city, which of old was a rival of Rome, would join his cause. Among the captives whom he had discharged after the battle on the Thrasymene, there were three Capuan knights. These had promised their services, and it was no doubt in order to support and back their plans by the presence of his army that he appeared now before the town. But the fruit was not yet ripe. Capua remained faithful to Rome. Hannibal, therefore, did not remain longer in Campania than was sufficient to plunder and lay waste the fertile Falerian plain north of the Volturnus. The dictator Fabius had followed in the track of the enemy across the Apennines, and was encamped on the summit of the mountain ridge of Massicus, which, from Casilinum, the modern Capua, on the Volturnus, extends in a north-westerly direction as far as the sea, and borders the

Falernian plain on the north. From this high and safe position, the Romans could see how the villages of the plain were consumed by the flames, and how the cultivated fields were changed into wastes. But nothing could induce Fabius to leave the heights and to offer battle in the plain. Under these circumstances it appeared that chance was offering him an opportunity of dealing the enemy a decisive blow.

Hannibal had never had the intention of wintering in Campania before a strong and large town was in his possession. He set himself therefore in motion to march back into Apulia, with immense spoils and with long trains of captured cattle. It seemed feasible to intercept an army thus encumbered somewhere in the mountainous region which lay between the plains of Campania and Apulia—a region with which the Romans had become thoroughly familiar in the Samnite wars, and which was inhabited by faithful allies. The attempt was actually made. In a spot where the pass over the mountains was contracted on one side by the river Volturnus, and on the other by steep declivities, a detachment of 4,000 Romans was posted to block up the road, whilst Fabius, with the rest of his army, had taken a strong position on the crest of a hill not far off. But it was not so easy to catch Hannibal in a trap, nor was the slow and pedantic Fabius the man to do it. No doubt Hannibal, if he had found it necessary or desirable, might have turned back and taken another road;¹ but he preferred marching straight on. In order to clear the pass in front of him, he caused, in the night, a number of oxen, with bundles of lighted wood fastened to their horns, to be driven against the crest of the range of hills. The 4,000 men in the pass, deceived by this sight, and thinking that the Carthaginian army intended to cross the hills in that direction, left their post in the defile and

¹ Zonaras (viii. 26) and Appian (vii. 14) relate that Hannibal put to death 5,000 prisoners of war, to rid himself of this encumbrance. As neither Polybius nor Livy confirms this startling statement, we are justified in setting it aside as false.

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Romans
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hastened to the spot on the heights which they believed to be threatened. But they encountered here only a few light-armed troops, whilst the bulk of the Punic army, with all their plunder, marched unmolested through the pass, which had been left without defence. During the disorder and the tumult of the night, Fabius had not ventured out of his camp; and when day broke, he could just see his soldiers being driven from the heights with great loss, and the hostile army winding through the defile and beyond his reach.¹

Again Hannibal marched through Samnium and crossed the Apennines for the fourth time in the same year (217 B.C.), to take up his winter-quarters in the sunny plain of Apulia. He occupied the town of Geronium between the rivers Tifernus and Frento, and established his magazines in it. For his army he constructed a fortified camp outside the town. Two-thirds of his troops he dispatched in every direction to collect supplies, while with the remaining third he kept Fabius in check, who had again followed him, without however venturing so near as to risk a battle. But during a temporary absence of the dictator, who had been obliged to go to Rome for the performance of some religious ceremonies, Minucius, the master of the horse, being left in command of the Roman forces, made an attempt to check the predatory excursions of the Cartha-

¹ The locality of this celebrated stratagem of Hannibal cannot be ascertained with accuracy from the reports either of Polybius (iii. 92) or of Livy (xxii. 16), who differ considerably from one another. We may here remark again, what we have observed several times, that the ancient authors are most defective in their descriptions of places. Near Casilinum, where, according to Livy, Hannibal found himself almost surrounded ('inclusus inde videri Hannibal via ad Casilinum obsessa'), the mountains and the river form nothing like a defile. Polybius mentions a range of hills called Eribanus, but we are unable to identify it. On the whole, it is utterly impossible for us to ascertain accurately the movements of Hannibal from Apulia to Campania and back again, owing partly to the obscurity or the contradictions of the several historians, partly to our ignorance of the ancient geography of Italy. Livy (xxii. 13) relates that Hannibal intended to march from Apulia to Casinum in Latium, but, by a mistake of his guides, was taken to Casilinum. This story is no doubt without the least foundation. It looks like a camp anecdote, and is in every respect improbable.

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ginians, and, as he boasted in a report to the senate, he actually succeeded in gaining some advantages. Upon this news becoming known to the people, a storm of indignation broke loose against Fabius. Had Rome fallen so low, the people asked, that they must give up Italy as a helpless prey to the haughty invader, that they must suffer him to march unopposed wherever he listed through the length and breadth of the peninsula, and to pillage and waste it with his African, Spanish, and Gaulish hordes? Surely it was not the duty of a Roman army to follow the enemy, to keep cautiously in a safe camp, and quietly to look on whilst the whole country was being devastated. How could it be expected that the allies would remain faithful in their allegiance if they were left exposed to all the horrors of war? Were not the Roman soldiers men of the same race that had repeatedly struck down the Gauls, and in a war of twenty years had wrested Sicily from these Carthaginians? But there was no doubt of the warlike spirit of the soldiers; the general only lacked resolution and courage. Minucius had just shown that Hannibal was not unconquerable, and if only the brave master of the horse had freedom of action, perhaps the disastrous war might now be ended with one blow.¹

Such views found favour in Rome, especially with the multitude, which felt most keenly the pressure of war, and was already impatient for peace. In the assembly of the tribes, accordingly, the foolish proposal was made to equalise Minucius and Fabius in the command of the army; that is to say, to destroy that unity of direction and authority which gave its chief value to the dictatorship in comparison with the divided command of the consuls. In the old time, when the office of the dictator was better understood as an embodiment of the majesty and authority of the whole state, it would have been impossible thus to curtail the dictatorial power. Now, however, the terrible disasters of the war had produced the effect which may be observed in the case of sick persons who have tried several remedies

The
military
power
shared
equally
between
the dic-
tator and
the master
of the
horse.

¹ Livy, xxii. 25.

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in vain, and are almost given up for lost. The usual and regular treatment is abandoned, and the chance remedy of some impudent quack is adopted in sheer despair. The Roman people, generally so sober, composed, and self-collected, so conservative and so full of confidence in their ancient institutions, suddenly became reckless innovators and undid their own work.

Defeat of
Minucius.

On his return into Apulia, Fabius made an arrangement with Minucius to the effect that the legions should be divided between them, and that each should act independently of the other. Fabius continued in his old practice, and, fortunately for Rome, kept near Minucius. The latter was burning with impatience to show what he could do now that he was no longer hampered by the old pedant's timidity. Hannibal was delighted at the prospect of a battle which he had been anxious to bring about with the whole Roman army, and which was now offered by one-half of it. He again chose the battle-field with his accustomed skill, and concealed a body of 5,000 men in ambush. The battle was quickly decided, and would have ended in a rout of the Romans as complete as that of the Trebia, if Fabius had not come up just in time to cover the retreat of his rival.¹ Minucius felt so shamed and humbled that he laid down his independent command, and voluntarily resumed his position as master of the horse under the dictator, until, after the expiration of the six months of extraordinary command, both abdicated and handed over the legions to the consul of the year, Cn. Servilius, and his colleague, M. Attilius Regulus, who had in the meantime been elected in the place of Flaminius. The situation of affairs in Apulia remained unaltered. Hannibal, in his camp before Geronium, awaited the winter with well-filled magazines. The Romans contented themselves with watching his movements, and both parties made their preparations for the campaign of the ensuing year (216 B.C.).

Effects of
the policy
of Fabius.

The skill, caution, and firmness of Fabius had given Rome time to recover from the stunning blow of the

¹ Livy, xxii. 28.

battle on the Thrasymenus, and to regain self-possession and confidence. Much was profited by the mere fact that the war came to a sort of standstill; and the reputation which the 'cunctator' Fabius acquired, even among his contemporaries, of having saved Rome from ruin¹ is not quite undeserved, though it is clear that his mode of warfare was imperatively commanded by the circumstances in which he found himself. After the annihilation of the army of Flaminius, Rome was not in a position to meet the conqueror again in the field, even if all the troops had been recalled from Spain, Sicily, and Sardinia. It was necessary to create a new army, to accustom it to war, and to inspire it with courage. Only two new legions were raised. These, added to the two legions of Servilius, formed an army which in numbers may have equalled that of Hannibal, but could not be compared with it in experience, self-reliance, and general efficiency. It would have been madness, with such an army as this, to risk a battle, only a few months after the terrible disaster which had befallen Flaminius. If, nevertheless, the Roman people began to grow impatient and to clamour for a battle and a victory, we must remember they were no wiser than the populace generally is, and that they were already suffering grievously from the calamities and burdens of war.

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But the Roman senate was far indeed from losing its firmness and its wonted spirit of haughty defiance. Indeed, the greatest danger that could threaten the safety of the

Spirit
of the
Roman
senate.

¹ The verse of Ennius (Cicero, *Offic.* i. 24) is well known: 'Unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem.' It was probably in this year of his prodictatorship that the senate voted him a crown of grass (*corona graminea*), the highest military distinction which was awarded to a general who had saved a besieged town. Gellius says (*N. A.* v. 6): 'Hanc coronam gramineam senatus populusque Romanus Q. Fabio Maximo dedit bello Penorum secundo quod urbem Romanam obsidione hostium liberasset.' According to Pliny (*Hist. Nat.* xxii. 5), the grass crown was decreed 'Hannibale ex Italia pulso.' But this seems hardly possible, if it be true, as Plutarch relates (*Fab. Max.* 27), that Fabius fell sick and died *περὶ ὃν χρόνον Ἀννίβας ἀπῆρεν ἐξ Ἰταλίας*. Livy also gives the year (203) of Hannibal's departure from Italy as that of the death of Fabius.

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commonwealth had not yet shown itself. The Roman allies and subjects as yet exhibited no symptom of rebellion, and as long as these remained faithful, the victories of Hannibal produced only military advantages which might at any time be counterbalanced by the fortune of war. It was therefore of the first importance to keep alive among the allies the old faith in the power of Rome, and not to yield one inch of that proud position which accepted faith and obedience as a natural duty, and not as a benefit. In this spirit the senate met an offer of some Greek cities,¹ which sent golden vessels from their temples to Rome as a voluntary contribution towards the expenses of the war. The senate accepted the smallest of the presents, in order to honour the intention of the allies, and returned the remainder with thanks and with the assurance that the Roman commonwealth did not require any aid. The aged King Hiero of Syracuse, zealous as ever in his political attachment to Rome, sent a golden image of the Goddess of Victory, 300,000 bushels (*modii*) of wheat, 200,000 of barley, and 1,000 archers and slingers. This gift was not refused. The golden Victory was placed for a good omen in the temple of the Capitoline Jupiter. The supplies of grain and the auxiliary troops were accepted as a tribute due to the protecting state.² In the course of the year ambassadors were sent to the king of Macedonia, to demand the surrender of Demetrius of Pharos, who had taken refuge with him. The king of the Illyrians was reminded to pay the tribute due to Rome, and the Ligurians were warned to abstain from hostilities against the Roman republic. At the same time the maritime war and the war in Spain were carried on with vigour. In the latter country the campaign of 217 B.C. had been opened successfully. Cn. Scipio sailed from Tarraco southwards with a fleet of thirty-five vessels, in which number there were a few fast-sailing galleys of

Operations
of Cn.
Scipio
in Spain.

¹ Of Neapolis and Pæstum (Livy, xxii. 32, 36).

² Livy, xxii. 37. Valerius Maximus, iv. 8, ext. 1. Zonaras, viii. 26.

Massilia,¹ and defeated at the mouth of the Ebro a superior Carthaginian fleet of forty ships of war, causing them a loss of twenty-five ships.² After this, when a Carthaginian fleet of seventy sail cruised off Pisa, in the expectation of falling in with Hannibal,³ one hundred and twenty Roman ships were sent from Ostia against them under the command of the consul Servilius. But the Roman consul, not being able to find the Carthaginian fleet in the Tyrrhenian Sea, sailed to Lilybæum, and thence to the coast of Africa. In the smaller Syrtis he landed on the island of Meninx, which he plundered, and from the island of Cercina he exacted a contribution of war amounting to 10,000 silver talents. He even ventured to land on the coast of Africa, but was repulsed with great loss.⁴ Having, on his return voyage, taken possession of the small island of Cossyra, he landed at Lilybæum, and proceeded by the land route through Sicily and southern Italy to Rome, in order, after the expiration of the dictatorship of Fabius, to assume the command of the army in Apulia with his colleague Atilius Regulus.

Meanwhile Publius Scipio, the consul of the year 218, had been sent to Spain with a reinforcement of thirty vessels and 8,000 men.⁵ The senate considered the war in Spain to be so important that, even after the annihilation of the Flaminian army, when Hannibal seemed to be threatening Rome and was laying waste central Italy without opposition, this considerable force was withdrawn from the protection of Italy and sent to that distant country. The Romans thought that Hannibal would be isolated and powerless in Italy, if they could but prevent reinforcements being sent to him from Spain. The two

Dispatch
of rein-
forcements
for Spain.

¹ The co-operation of Greek vessels is mentioned so rarely that it might almost appear as an exception. But we refer to vol. i. pp. 275, 276, note 1.

² Polybius, iii. 95 ff. Livy, xxii. 19 ff.

³ It was probably this fleet that captured the Roman transports destined for Spain. See above, p. 213.

⁴ Livy, xxii. 31.

⁵ Livy, xxii. 22. Polybius does not mention the 8,000 men, and gives the number of ships as twenty.

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brothers Scipio, carried on the war in that country not less by the arts of persuasion than by the force of arms. They endeavoured to gain the friendship of the numerous independent tribes, and they skilfully availed themselves of the discontent which the recently imposed dominion of Carthage had called forth. Nor did they disdain to make use of treason. It is related that a Spanish chief, called Abelux, in order to gain the favour of the Romans, delivered into their hands a number of Spanish hostages, which were then detained by the Carthaginians in Saguntum. These hostages the Scipios sent back to their friends, and thus gained for themselves the reputation of generosity without any cost or sacrifice. Their military enterprises were confined to a few expeditions into the country south of the Ebro, which, however, did not result in any serious collision with the Carthaginians.

Civil dis-
sensations
at Rome.

If ever there was a time when unity was necessary among the citizens of Rome, to avert the threatened downfall of the republic, it was in the first few years of the Hannibalian war. Even the unconditional abandonment of party spirit and the most hearty and devoted patriotism seemed hardly able to save the commonwealth. Nevertheless it was precisely at this time that dissension showed itself again, and that civil discord threatened to break out. Flaminius had been raised to the consulship chiefly as leader of the democratic party. If he had been able to defeat Hannibal, the popular cause would at the same time have triumphed over the privileged class. But the liberal politician happened to be an unsuccessful general. Through his defeat and death the nobility gained the upper hand, and Fabius was chosen to restore its full supremacy and prestige. This called forth in Rome a violent opposition. His apparent timidity, his slowness and indifference to the sufferings of the ravaged country, supplied his opponents with grounds for laying to the charge of the nobility the intentional prolongation of the war, and enabled them at last to limit his dictatorial power by the decree which raised Minucius to an inde-

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pendent command. This last imprudent measure had been carried chiefly through the influence of C. Terentius Varro, a man who, in spite of his low birth, had been raised successively to several of the high offices of the republic, from the quæstorship upwards, and was now actually a candidate for the consulship.¹ He evidently enjoyed the full confidence of the people, and he was consequently elected for the year 216, in spite of the opposition of the nobility, whilst of three patrician candidates none obtained a sufficient number of votes. Thus Varro, being alone elected, held the comitia for the election of a colleague, and used his influence in favour of Lucius Æmilius Paullus, a man of well-known military capacity. Paullus had, three years before, commanded in Illyria,² and had in a very short time brought that war to a successful issue; he had afterwards been suspected of dishonesty in the division of the spoil, but had escaped condemnation, and now enjoyed the confidence of the nobility in fuller measure, as, in opposition to the plebeian Varro, he represented the principles of the old families. The annalists have accordingly shown him especial favour, and have done their best to throw the blame for the great misfortune that was about to befall Rome on the shoulders of his colleague Varro, the butcher's son.³

It had become evident that Hannibal could not be conquered by a Roman army of equal strength. Four legions opposed to him could do no more than watch and

Enrolment
of a new
Roman
army.

¹ He was quæstor, plebeian and curule ædile, and prætor. Whether he ever was tribune of the people is doubtful.

² A law had been passed in 342 B.C., forbidding the re-election of a person to the same magistracy within ten years (Livy, vii. 42, x. 13; see vol. i. p. 345); but in times of danger this law was set aside, and a law moved by the consul Cn. Servilius had suspended it for the period of the Hannibalian war. See Livy, xxvii. 6: 'Cn. Servilio consule, ex auctoritate patrum ad plebem latum plebemque scripsisse, ut quoad bellum in Italia esset, ex iis qui consules fuissent, quos et quotiens vellet reficiendi consules populo ius esset.'

³ It is not at all probable that, as Mommsen says (*Röm. Gesch.* i. 610; English translation, ii. 128), 'Varro was recommended by nothing but his low birth and his coarse impudence.' Compare the just remarks of Arnold, *Hist. of Rome*, iii. 129; Dion Cassius, fr. 49; Livy, xxiii. 25, 32; xxiv. 10, 11, 41; xxv. 3, 6; xxvii. 24, 35; xxx. 26; xxxi. 11, 49.

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embarrass his movements, and limit his freedom of foraging and of plundering the country, even though they might, under favourable circumstances, venture to attack detached portions of the enemy. This had been the practice of Fabius; it had answered its purpose for the time, but it was not calculated to bring the war to an end, and, by exposing the Italians for an indefinite period to the calamities of war, it tried their fidelity too long. The Romans now resolved to end this state of things before it was too late, and before either the allies should revolt or reinforcements reach Hannibal from Africa or Spain. The senate resolved to add four new legions to those of the preceding year, and to raise the strength of each legion from 4,200 foot and 200 horse to 5,000 foot and 300 horse. Thus the army opposed to Hannibal numbered, with the allies, not less than 80,000 foot and 6,000 horse. It was a force larger than any that Rome had ever sent against an enemy. On the Trebia and the Thrasymenus the Roman armies had reached only half that strength, and in the earlier wars a single consular army of two legions had generally been sufficient. But now the object was to crush Hannibal by an overwhelming force, and the new consuls received positive orders from the senate to offer a battle.¹

Question
of supplies.

This was, indeed, not only advisable but absolutely necessary. An army of nearly 90,000 men could only with the greatest difficulty be fed in a country which, almost for a whole year, had been made to support both the Roman and the Carthaginian armies, and which was no doubt thoroughly exhausted. Moreover, Hannibal had, before the arrival of the new consuls, left his position near Geronium, and had seized the citadel of Cannæ, not far from the sea, on the south of the river Aufidus, where the Romans had established a magazine for the supply of their army.² The eight legions were therefore

¹ Polybius, iii. 107, § 7; 108, § 2.

² Polybius, iii. 107, § 2. The annalists, who approved of the alleged plan of Æmilius Paullus to avoid a battle, gave an entirely different colouring to

obliged to retire to another part of the country, or to risk a battle.

According to the account of the Roman annalists, which Polybius adopted,¹ the two consuls could not agree on the plan of battle to be adopted. Varro, carried away, it was said, with blind self-confidence,² hurried on a decision, as soon as the hostile armies were in front of each other, whilst the more cautious Æmilius, following in the footsteps of Fabius, urged that they should avoid a battle in the plains of Apulia, where Hannibal's superior cavalry had free scope to act. But the successfulness of a skirmish among the outposts had the effect, perhaps intended by Hannibal,³ of raising the courage of the Romans and inducing them to move forward. They now established their camp on the right bank of the Aufidus, not far from the camp of Hannibal.

The two consuls had the chief command of the army in turn on alternate days. This arrangement, which seemed purposely devised to exclude uniformity and systematic order from the strategic movements, may have been good enough in a war with barbarians; but in a contest with Hannibal it went far towards neutralising all the advantages which the innate courage of the Romans and their great superiority in numbers gave them. It is no doubt an exaggeration that Varro alone was responsible for the

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of the
Roman
army.

Defects
of Roman
military
usage.

these events, which altogether perverted the truth. According to them, the Romans had abundance of provisions, whilst Hannibal was short of them. Livy (xxii. 43) goes so far as to say that great discontent prevailed in Hannibal's army, and a disposition to mutiny and treason, and that Hannibal, in despair, had formed the plan of returning with the cavalry to Gaul. It was the intention of the writers who reported these idle tales to condemn the strategy of Varro, and to make him answerable for the great disaster.

¹ Polybius, iii. 116.

² Mommsen (*Röm. Gesch.* i. 611; English translation, ii. 129) improves upon the vituperative tone of the Roman annalists: 'It was necessary,' he says, 'to allow the hero of the pavement to have his way.'

³ Livy, xxii. 41: 'Hannibal id damnum haud ægerrime pati; quin potius credere velut inescatam temeritatem ferocioris consulis ac novorum maxime militum esse.' Zonaras, ix. 1: 'Ἀντίβας ἐκὼν ὑπεχώρησεν, ὅπως δεδιέναι νομισθεὶς ἐπισπάσαιτο μᾶλλον αὐτοὺς εἰς παράταξιν.'

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advancing movement of the Roman army into the immediate proximity of the enemy, and for the necessity of accepting the battle which was the inevitable result. It appears, on the contrary, that both Paullus and Varro, in conformity with the orders of the senate and by the force of circumstances, made no attempt to avoid a battle; but if the views of the two consuls did not agree in every respect, if one of them hurried on the decision whilst the other preferred to wait for ever so short a time, it is possible that one of them could compel his colleague to accept the very conditions of battle which he had from the first disapproved.

Movements of
the consul
Æmilius.

The two armies were now so near each other that a battle was inevitable; and this was clear to Æmilius Paullus himself. On the day, therefore, on which he had the supreme command he divided the legions, and passed with about one-third of his forces from the camp which was on the right bank of the Aufidus, to the left bank, where, a short distance lower down and nearer to the enemy, he erected a second and smaller camp.¹ This

¹ Polybius, iii. 110, § 8. Unfortunately the expressions of Polybius are again vague (see above, p. 172), and leave it doubtful on which side of the river the larger and smaller camps were respectively placed. He says: *Εἰς δὲ τὴν ἐπαύριον ὁ Λεύκιος οὔτε μάχεσθαι κρίνων, οὔτε μὴν ἀπάγειν ἀσφαλῶς τὴν στρατιὰν ἔτι δυνάμενος τοῖς μὲν δυσὶ μέρεσι κατεστρατοπέδευσε παρὰ τὸν Αὔφιδον ποταμόν . . . τῷ δὲ τρίτῳ πέραν, ὑπὸ τῆς διαβάσεως πρὸς τὰς ἀνατολάς, ἐβάλετο χάρακα, τῆς μὲν ἰδίας παρεμβολῆς περὶ δέκα σταδίου ἀποσχών, τῆς δὲ τῶν ὑπεναντίων μικρῷ πλείον.* Further on he says of Hannibal (ch. 111, § 11): *ποιούμενος τὸν χάρακα παρὰ τὴν αὐτὴν πλευρὰν τοῦ ποταμοῦ τῇ μείζονι στρατοπεδεῖα τῶν ὑπεναντίων.* It looks almost as if Polybius had intentionally avoided the decisive words *right* and *left*. His words leave the position of the two camps, and consequently the locality of the battle, quite undetermined. We must therefore try to fix it from other data. As we see from Livy (xxii. 43), Hannibal was encamped near Cannæ, *i.e.* on the right bank of the Aufidus. Nothing is said of his moving to the other side of the river, until he crossed on the day of battle (Livy, xxii. 46; Polybius, iii. 113, § 6). This alone proves conclusively that the field of battle was on the left bank. Moreover Polybius states that the Romans had their right wing on the river, and the Carthaginians the left. If, with this position, the two armies had been drawn up on the right bank, it would follow that the Romans had actually marched past the Carthaginian army and were now standing between it and the sea. Nothing is reported of such an extraordinary and dangerous manœuvre. Nevertheless Arnold (*Hist. of Rome*, iii. p. 135)

movement towards the Carthaginian army was evidently a challenge, and shows very clearly with what degree of security and self-confidence the Roman armies could manœuvre in the immediate neighbourhood of the enemy.¹ Hannibal was highly delighted at the resolution of the Romans. A whole year had passed since the battle on the lake Thrasymenus, a year in which all his attempts to bring on a battle had been vain. Now, at length, his wish was gratified, and, confident of success, he looked forward to the great passage of arms which was to arbitrate between his own country and her deadly foe.

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In Rome the collision between the two armies was looked for day after day, and the town was in the most anxious suspense. After the repeated disasters of the last two years, the confident expectation of victory was gone. Like a desperate gambler, Rome had now doubled her stake; and if fortune went against her once more, it seemed that all must be irrecoverably lost. At such times man feels keenly his dependence on higher powers. The Romans especially were liable to convulsions of superstitious fear; they were, as Polybius says, 'powerful in prayers; when great dangers threatened, they implored gods and men for help, and thought no practices unbecoming or unworthy of them that are usual under such circumstances.'² Accordingly the population was feverish with religious excitement; the temples were crowded, the

State of
feeling in
Rome.

assumes it as certain, as he is obliged to do, because he places the battle on the right bank. Now there appears to be no inducement for the selection of this bank as the field of battle beyond the statement of Polybius and Livy that the Roman army, leaning with their right wing on the river, had their faces turned to the south. But, though the general course of the Aufidus is from S.W. to N.E., there is near Cannæ a decided bend in the river to the S. or S.E., so that, even on the left bank of the river, the Romans could front towards the south, and yet rest on the river with their right wing.

¹ Compare above, p. 204.

² Polybius, iii. 112, § 9: *δεινοὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς περιστάσεσι Ῥωμαῖοι καὶ θεοὺς ἐξιλάσκεσθαι καὶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ μηδὲν ἀπρεπὲς μηδ' ἀγεννὲς ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις καιροῖς ἡγεῖσθαι τῶν περὶ ταῦτα συντελουμένων.* Virgil (*Æn.* iii. 260) makes Æneas say of his companions:

'Cecidere animi nec iam amplius armis
Sed votis precibusque iubent exposcere pacem.'

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IV.The battle-
field of
Cannæ.

gods besieged with prayers and sacrifices; warnings and prophecies of old seers were in everybody's mouth, and every house and every heart was divided between hope and fear.¹

The Aufidus (now called Ofanto) is the most considerable of the numerous coast-rivers which flow eastward from the Apennines into the Adriatic Sea; but its broad bed is filled only in winter and spring. It was now the early part of summer, about the middle of June; and the river was so narrow and shallow that it could be crossed everywhere without any serious difficulty. In the neighbourhood of the smaller Roman camp the Aufidus made a sudden sharp bend towards the south or south-east, and after a short distance turned again to the north-east, which is the general direction of its course. Here, on the left or northern bank, was the battle-field selected by Varro. In the larger camp on the right bank of the river, and a little way higher up, he left only a garrison of 10,000 men, with orders to attack, during the battle, the Carthaginian camp, which was on the same side of the river, and thus to divide the attention and the forces of the enemy. With the remainder of his infantry and 6,000 horse he crossed the Aufidus, and drew up his army in the usual manner, having the legions in the middle and the cavalry on the wings, with his front looking southward and the river on his right. As the infantry consisted of eight legions, the front ought to have had twice the length of two usual consular armies. But instead of doubling the breadth of front Varro doubled the depth, probably for the purpose of using the new levies, not for the attack, but for increasing the pressure of the attacking column. Thus it happened that, in spite of the great numerical superiority of the Romans, they did not present a broader front than the Carthaginians. On the right flank of the infantry, leaning on the river, stood the Roman horse, which contained the sons of the noblest

¹ Compare Livy, xxii. 36, 57.

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families, and formed the flower of the army. The much more numerous cavalry of the allies was stationed on the left wing. Before the front there were, as usual, the light troops, which always began the engagement, and retired through the intervals of the heavy infantry behind the line after they had discharged their weapons. The Roman cavalry on the right was commanded by Paullus, and the cavalry of the allies on the left wing by Varro, while Cn. Servilius, the consul of the preceding year, and Minucius, the master of the horse under Fabius, led the legions in the centre.

As soon as Hannibal saw that the Romans offered battle, he also led his troops, 40,000 foot and 10,000 horse, across the river, which he had now in his rear. In taking this position he risked no more than his situation at the time warranted, for he knew that a defeat would, under any circumstances, end in the total destruction of his army. He drew up his infantry opposite the Roman legions; but, instead of forming them in a straight line, he advanced the Spaniards and Gauls in a semicircle in the centre, placing the Africans on their right and left, but at some distance behind them. On his left wing, by the bank of the Aufidus, and opposed to the Roman cavalry, were the heavy Spanish and Gaulish horse, under Hasdrubal; on the right, under Hanno, the light Numidians.¹ Hannibal, with his brave brother Mago, took his position in the centre of his infantry, to be able to survey and to guide the battle in every direction. His African infantry was armed in the Roman fashion with the spoils of his previous victories; the Spaniards wore white linen coats with red borders, and carried short straight swords, fit for cut and thrust; the Gauls, naked down to the waist, brandished their long sabres, suitable only for cutting. The aspect of these huge barbarians, who had after the recent battles regained the prestige of bravery and invincibility, could not fail to make a deep impression upon the Roman soldiers, and to

Disposition of the
Cartha-
ginian
army.

¹ Polybius, iii. 114, § 7. Appian, vii. 20. According to Livy (xxii. 46), Maharbal commanded the Numidians.

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IV.Defeat of
the Roman
cavalry.

fill them with anxiety and misgivings for the result of the impending conflict.

The sun had been two hours risen when the battle began. When the light skirmishers had been scattered, the heavy horsemen of the Carthaginians dashed, in close ranks and with an irresistible shock, upon the Roman cavalry. For one moment these stood their ground, man against man, and horse against horse, as if they were welded into one compact mass. Then this mass began to waver and to be broken up. The Gauls and Spaniards forced their way among the disorganised squadrons of their antagonists, and cut them down almost to a man. Pushing forward, they soon found themselves in the rear of the Roman infantry, and fell upon the allied cavalry on the left wing of the Romans, which was at the same time attacked in front by the Numidians. Their appearance in this quarter soon decided the contest here; the allied horsemen were driven off the field. Hasdrubal intrusted their pursuit to the Numidians, and fell with all his forces upon the rear of the Roman infantry, where the young inexperienced troops were placed, of whom many had never yet met an enemy in the field.

Destruction of the
Roman
infantry.

Meanwhile the Roman infantry had driven in the Spaniards and Gauls who formed the advanced centre of the Carthaginian line. Pressing against them from the right and the left, the Romans contracted their front more and more, and advanced like a wedge against the retiring centre of the Carthaginian army. When they were on the point of breaking through it, the African infantry on the right and left fell upon the Roman flanks. At the same time the heavy Spanish and Gaulish cavalry broke upon them from behind, and the retiring hostile infantry in front returned to the charge. Thus the huge unwieldy masses of the Roman infantry were crowded upon one another in helpless confusion and surrounded on all sides. Whilst the outer ranks were falling fast, thousands stood idle in the centre, pressed close against each other, unable

to strike a blow, penned in like sheep, and doomed to wait patiently until it should be their turn to be slaughtered. Never before had Mars, the god of battle, gorged himself so greedily with the blood of his children. It seems beyond comprehension that in a close combat, man to man, the conquerors could strike down with cold steel more than their own number. The physical exertion alone must have been almost superhuman. The carnage lasted nearly the whole day. Two hours before the sun went down, the Roman army was annihilated, and more than one-half of it lay dead on the field of battle. The consul Æmilius Paullus had been wounded at the very beginning of the conflict, when his horsemen were routed by the Carthaginian horse. Then he had endeavoured, in spite of his wound, to rally the infantry and to lead them to the charge; but he could not keep his seat in the saddle, and fell, unknown, in the general slaughter. The same fate overtook the proconsul Cn. Servilius, the late master of the horse Minucius, two quæstors, twenty-one military tribunes, and not less than eighty senators—an almost incredible number, which shows that the Roman senate consisted not only of talking but also of fighting men, and was well qualified to be the head of a warlike people. The consul Terentius Varro, who had commanded the cavalry of the allies on the left wing, escaped with about seventy horsemen to Venusia.

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It was not Hannibal's custom to leave his work half-done. Immediately after the battle he took the larger Roman camp. The attack which its garrison of 10,000 men had made on the Carthaginian camp during the battle had failed; and the Romans, driven back behind their ramparts, and despairing of being able to resist the victorious army, were compelled to surrender. The same fate befell the garrison and the fugitives who had sought shelter in the smaller camp. Nevertheless, the number of prisoners was very small in comparison with that of the slain; it amounted to about 10,000 men. In Canusium,

Capture of
the Roman
camps.

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IV.

Venusia, and other neighbouring towns, about 3,000 fugitives were rallied. Many more were dispersed in all directions. This unparalleled victory, which surpassed his boldest expectations, had cost Hannibal not quite 6,000 men, and among them only two hundred of the brave horsemen to whom it was principally due.¹

Effects of
the battle
of Cannæ.

Great as was the material loss of the Romans in this most disastrous battle, it was less serious than the effect produced by it upon the *morale* of the Roman people. Throughout the whole course of the war they never quite recovered from the shock which their courage and self-confidence had sustained. From this time forward Hannibal was invested in their eyes with supernatural powers. They could no longer venture to face² him like a common mortal enemy of flesh and blood. Their knees trembled at the very mention of his name, and the bravest man felt unnerved at the thought of his presence. This dread stood Hannibal in the place of a whole army, and did battle for him when the war had carried off his African and Spanish veterans, and when Italian recruits made up the bulk of his forces. How stupified and bewildered the Romans felt by the stunning blow at Cannæ may be seen from one striking

¹ There are, as may be expected, considerable variations among our informants as to the losses of the two armies in the battle. According to Polybius (iii. 117), 72,000 Romans were killed, 20,000 taken, and no more than 4,000 escaped. Livy (xxii. 49) makes the loss of the Romans to consist of 45,000 infantry and 2,700 cavalry killed, 3,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry taken in the battle, 2,000 men taken in Cannæ, and 16,400 in the two camps; the total loss, therefore, 48,200 killed and 22,900 prisoners, or 71,100 men. According to him (xxii. 52, 54), about 14,000 escaped. This agrees with the statement (xxii. 36) that the strength of the army was 87,200, for this leaves only 2,100 men as 'missing.' The statement of Livy has the appearance of greater accuracy, and agrees better than that of Polybius, at least as far as the fugitives are concerned, with what we are told in the course of the war of the 'legiones Cannenses,' which, as a punishment for their behaviour at Cannæ, were condemned to serve in Sicily without pay to the end of the war. The statements of the loss of the Carthaginians vary only between 6,000 and 8,000.

² The Greeks called this with an expressive term *ἀντοφθαλμείν*. Still stronger is the Shakesperian term 'outstare.' See *Merchant of Venice*, ii. 1: 'I would outstare the sternest eyes that look.'

instance.¹ Several Roman knights, young men of the first families, had so completely lost all hope of saving their country from utter ruin, that in their despair they conceived the wild plan of escaping to the sea-coast, and seeking shelter in some foreign country. From this dishonourable plan they were diverted only by the energetic intervention of the youthful P. Cornelius Scipio, who, forcing his way among them, is said to have drawn his sword, and threatened to run through any one that refused to take an oath never to abandon his country.

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The patriotic annalists did all that they could to assign as the cause of the Roman defeat the perfidious cunning of the Punians. This intention becomes especially evident in Appian's description of the battle, and in his concluding remarks.² It was related³ that Hannibal placed a body of men in an ambush, and that during the battle these men attacked the Romans in the rear; moreover, that five hundred Numidians⁴ or Celtiberians⁵ approached the Roman lines under the pretext of desertion, and being received without suspicion, and left unguarded in the heat of the battle, attacked the Romans and threw them into confusion. Nature itself was made to favour the Carthaginians and to help them to gain the victory, like the cold weather on the Trebia and the mist at the lake Thrasymenus. A violent south wind carried clouds of dust into the faces of the Romans, without in the least incommoding the Carthaginians, whose front looked northward.⁶ According to Zonaras,⁷ Hannibal had actually calculated upon this friendly wind, and to increase its efficacy he had on the previous day caused the land which lay to the south of the battle-field to be ploughed up. In

Causes
assigned
by popular
writers for
the Roman
defeat.¹ Livy, xxii. 53.² Appian, vii. 26.³ Zonaras, ix. i. Polybius knows nothing of this.⁴ Livy, xxii. 48.⁵ Appian, vii. 20.⁶ Plutarch, *Fab.* 16. It appears that Ennius, in his epic poem, had dwelt upon this circumstance, as may be gathered from the fragment (viii. 9, edit. Vahlen). 'Iamque fere pulvis ad cœlum vasta videtur.'⁷ Zonaras, ix. 1.

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such silly stories some writers sought consolation for their wounded feelings; but on the whole it must be confessed that the Roman people, though writhing and suffering under the blows of Hannibal, and deeply wounded in their national pride, admitted their defeat frankly, and instead of falsifying it, or obliterating it from their memory, were spurred on by it to new courage and to a perseverance which could not fail to lead in the end to victory.

The
Roman
allies.

The overthrow at Cannæ was so complete that every other nation but the Romans would at once have given up the idea of further resistance.¹ It seemed that the pride of Rome must now at last be humbled, and that she was as helplessly at the mercy of the invader as after the fatal battle on the Allia. What chance was there now of resisting this foe, whose victories became only the more crushing as the ranks of the legions became more dense? Since he had appeared on the south side of the Alps, no Roman had been able to resist him, and every successive blow which he had dealt had been harder. It seemed impossible that Italy could any longer bear within her own limits such an enemy as the Punic army. If Rome was unable to protect her allies, they had no alternative but to perish or to join the foreign invader.

Disposition
of
Hannibal
towards
the
Romans.

This was from the beginning Hannibal's calculation; and now it appeared that his boldest hopes were about to be realised, and that the moment of revenge for the wrongs of Carthage was approaching. Nevertheless this truly great man was not swayed by the feeling that he might now indulge in the pleasure of retaliation. More than this pleasure he valued the safety and the welfare of his country, and he was ready to sacrifice his personal feelings to higher considerations. In spite of his victories, he had learnt to appreciate the superior strength of Rome; and instead of still further trying the fortune of war, he resolved now, in the full career of victory, to seize the first oppor-

¹ Livy (xxii. 51) does not exaggerate in saying: 'Nulla profecto alia gens tanta mole cladis non obruta esset.'

tunity for concluding peace. His envoy, Carthalo, who went to Rome to negotiate about the ransom of the Roman prisoners, was commissioned by him to show his readiness for entertaining any proposals of peace which the Romans might be willing to make. But Hannibal did not know the spirit of the Roman people, if he thought that it was broken now; and he, like Pyrrhus, was to discover that he had undertaken to fight with the Hydra.

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The feverish excitement which prevailed in Rome during the time of the expected conflict did not last very long. Messengers of evil ride fast. Though no official report was sent¹ by the surviving consul, the news of the defeat reached Rome, nobody knew how, and the first rumour went even beyond the extent of the actual calamity. It was said that the whole army was annihilated, and both consuls dead. On this dreadful day Rome was saved only by the circumstance that the whole breadth of Italy lay between it and the conqueror. If, as in the first Gallic war, the battle had been fought within sight of the Capitol, nothing could have saved the town from a second destruction, and Hannibal would not have been bought off, like Brennus, with a thousand pounds of gold.

Danger
of the
Roman
city.

The Roman people gave themselves up to despair. They thought the last hour of the republic was come, and many who had lost their nearest friends or relatives in the slaughter of battle may have been almost indifferent as to any further calamities which might be in store for them. The city was almost in a state of actual anarchy. The consuls, and most of the other magistrates, were absent or dead. A small remnant only of the senate was left in Rome. In one battle eighty senators had shed their blood, and many, no doubt, were absent with the armies in Gaul, Spain, Sicily, or elsewhere on public service. In this urgency the senators who happened to be on the spot took the reins of government into their hands, and strove by their calm and dignified firmness to counteract the effects of the general consternation.

Pre-
cautions of
the senate.

¹ Dion Cassius, fr. 49. Livy, xxii. 54-56.

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Q. Fabius Maximus was the soul of their deliberations. On his proposition the measures were determined upon which the urgency of the danger required. Guards were placed at the gates to prevent a general rush from the city; for it seemed that, as after the rout of the Allia, 174 years before, the terrified citizens thought of seeking shelter elsewhere, and were giving up Rome for lost. Horsemen were dispatched on the Appian and Latin roads to gather whatever tidings they could from messengers or fugitives. All men who could give information were brought before the authorities. Strict orders were given to prevent vague alarm, and the women who filled the streets with their lamentations were made to retire into the interior of the houses. All assemblies and gatherings of the people were broken up, and silence restored in the city. At length a messenger arrived with a letter from Varro, which revealed the extent of the calamity. Though it confirmed, on the whole, the evil tidings which had anticipated it, yet it contained some consolation. One consul at least, and a portion of the army, had escaped; and (what was the most welcome news for the present) Hannibal was not on his march to Rome, but still far away in Apulia, busy with his captives and his booty.

Military
measures
for carry-
ing on the
war.

Thus at least a respite was gained. The old courage returned by degrees. The time for mourning the dead was limited to thirty days. Measures were taken for raising a new force. A fleet was lying ready at Ostia, to sail under the command of M. Claudius Marcellus to Sicily, whence disquieting news had arrived that the Carthaginians had attacked the Syracusan territory and were threatening Lilybæum.¹ Under the present circumstances the anxiety for the safety of Sicily had to give place to the care for the defence of the capital. A body of 1,500 troops was transferred from the fleet at Ostia to garrison Rome, and a whole legion² from the same naval force was ordered

¹ Livy, xxii. 56.

² We meet here (Livy, xxii. 57) with a novelty, a 'legio classica,' called the 'third, which was no doubt intended to serve on the fleet in naval

to march through Campania to Apulia for the purpose of collecting the scattered remains of the defeated army. With this legion Marcellus proceeded to Canusium, only three miles from the fatal field of Cannæ, and, relieving Varro from the command in Apulia, requested him to return to Rome. The Roman historians relate, with national pride, that all civil discord was at once buried in the present danger of the commonwealth, that the senators went out to meet the defeated consul, and expressed their thanks to him for not despairing of the republic. Such sentiments were honourable and worthy of the best days of Rome; but if it were true that Varro had caused the disaster of Cannæ by his folly and incapacity—if indeed he had forced on the battle against the instructions of the senate and the advice of his colleague—in that case the acknowledgment of his merits, and the generous and conciliatory spirit exhibited by the senate, would have been a virtue all the more questionable inasmuch as it could not fail to have the effect of re-instating Varro in the confidence of the people and of again intrusting him with high office. But we have already been constrained to doubt the report of Varro's incapacity,¹ and the conduct of the senate after the battle of Cannæ justifies this doubt. In the course of the war Varro rendered his country many important services, and he was always esteemed a good soldier.² On the present occasion it is reported³ that the dictatorship was offered to him, but that he refused it because he considered his defeat at Cannæ as a bad omen. Having nominated M. Junius Pera dictator, he returned at once to the theatre of war, leaving to the dictator the management of the government, the levying of new troops, and the duty of presiding over the election of the consuls for the ensuing year.

expeditions, such as those of Sempronius in the first year of the war. (See above, pp. 167, 183 ff.; cf. Livy, xxiv. 11, § 3: 'Legionem Valerio ad classem relinqui'). In the beginning of the year, two legions had been raised from the population of the town of Rome alone, as we are informed by Livy (xxiii. 14). How these two legions were employed we do not know. Perhaps the third 'legio classica' was one of them.

¹ See above, pp. 229, 231.

² See above, p. 229, note 3.

³ Valerius Maximus, iii. 4, 4; iv. 5, 2. Frontinus, iv. 5, 6.

Second Period of the Hannibalian War.

FROM THE BATTLE OF CANNÆ TO THE REVOLUTION IN
SYRACUSE, 216—215 B.C.

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Position of
Hannibal
in Italy.

Unvarying success had accompanied Hannibal from the first moment of his setting foot in Italy, and had risen higher and higher until it culminated in the crowning victory at Cannæ. From this time the vigour of Hannibal's attack relaxes; its force seems spent. The war continues, but it is changed in character; it is spread over a greater space; its unity and dramatic interest are gone. For Hannibal those difficulties begin which are inseparable from a campaign in a foreign country at a great distance from the native resources. His subsequent career in Italy is not marked by triumphs on the colossal scale of the victories at the Trebia, the Thrasymenus, and Cannæ. He remains indeed the terror of the Romans, and scatters or crushes on every occasion the legions that venture to oppose him in the field, but, in spite of the insurrection of many of the Roman allies and of the undaunted spirit of the Carthaginian government, it becomes now more and more apparent that the resources of Rome are superior to those of her enemies. Gradually she rises from her fall. Slowly she recovers strength and confidence. Yielding on no point, she keeps up vigorously the defensive against Hannibal, whilst she passes to the offensive in the other theatres of war, in Spain, Sicily, and finally in Africa; and, having thoroughly reduced and weakened the strength of her adversary, she deals a last and decisive blow against Hannibal himself.

The
histories of
Polybius.

Unfortunately we lose after the battle of Cannæ the most valuable witness, on whom we have chiefly relied for the earlier events of the war. Of the great historical work of Polybius only the first five books are preserved entire, while of the remaining thirty-five we have only

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detached fragments, valuable indeed, but calculated more to make us feel the greatness of the loss than to satisfy our curiosity. Polybius has almost the authority of a contemporary writer, though the Hannibalian war was ended when he was still a child. He wrote when the memory of these events was fresh, and information could easily be obtained—when exaggerations and lies, such as are found in later writers, had not yet ventured into publicity or found credence. He was conscientious in sifting evidence, in consulting documents, and visiting the scenes of the events which he narrates. As a Greek writing on Roman affairs, he was free from that national vanity which in Roman annalists is often very offensive. Though he admires Rome and Roman institutions, he brings to bear upon his judgment the enlightenment of a man trained in all the knowledge of Greece, and of a statesman and a soldier experienced in the management of public affairs. He is indeed not free from errors and faults. His intimate friendship with some of the houses of the Roman nobility biassed his judgment in favour of the aristocratic government, and his connexion with Scipio Æmilianus made him, willingly or unconsciously, the panegyrist of the members of that family. He is guilty of occasional oversights, omissions, or errors, some of which we have noticed; but, taking him for all in all, he is one of our truest guides in the history of the ancient world, and we cannot sufficiently regret the loss of the greater part of his work. Fortunately the third decade of Livy, which gives a connected account of the Hannibalian war, is preserved, and we find in the fragments of Dion Cassius, Diodorus, and Appian, and in the abridgment of Zonaras, as well as in some other later extracts, occasional opportunities for completing our knowledge. But it cannot be denied that, with some exceptions, the history of the war flags after the battle of Cannæ. The figure of Hannibal, the most interesting of all the actors in that great drama, retires more into the background. We know for certain that he was as great in the years of comparative, or apparent, inactivity as in the time which

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ended with the triumph at Cannæ; but we cannot follow him into the recesses of southern Italy, nor watch his ceaseless labours in organising the means and laying the plans for carrying on the war in Italy, Sicily, Spain, Greece, Gaul, and in all the seas. We know that he was ever at work, ready at all times to pounce upon any Roman army that ventured too near him, terrible as ever to his enemies, full of resources, unyielding in the face of multiplied difficulties, and unconquered in battle, until the command of his country summoned him from Italy to Africa. But of the details of these exploits we have a very inadequate knowledge, partly because no history of the war written on the Carthaginian side has been preserved,¹ and partly because the full narrative of Polybius is lost.

Religious
ceremonies
at Rome.

The disaster of Cannæ, it appears, had long been foretold, but the warnings of the friendly deity had been cast to the winds. More than that, the Roman people had been guilty of a great offence. The altar of Vesta had been desecrated. Two of her virgins had broken the vow of chastity. It is true they had grievously atoned for their sin: one had died a voluntary death, the other had suffered the severe punishment which the sacred law imposed. She was entombed in her grave alive, and left there to perish; the wretch who had seduced her was scourged to death in the public market by the chief pontiff.² But the conscience of the people was not at ease. A complete purification and an act of atonement seemed required to relieve the feeling of guilt and to regain the favour of the outraged deity. Accordingly an embassy was sent to Greece to consult the oracle of Apollo at Delphi. The chief of this embassy was Fabius Pictor, the first writer who composed a continuous history of Rome from the foundation of the city to his own time. But even before the reply of the Greek god could be received, something

¹ Sosilos' work, τὰ περὶ Ἀννίβαν, is lost. Comp. Polybius, iii. 20.

² Livy xxii. 57: 'L. Cantilius, scriba pontificis, qui cum Floronia stuprum fecerat, a pontifice maximo eo usque virgis in comitio cæsus erat, ut inter verbera expiraret.'

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had to be done to calm the apprehensions of the public, and to set at rest their religious terrors. The Romans had national prophecies, preserved like the Sibylline books, with which they were often confounded.¹ These books of fate were now consulted, and they revealed the pleasure of a barbarous deity, which again claimed, as during the last Gallic war nine years before, to be appeased by human sacrifices. A Greek man and a Greek woman, a Gaul and a Gaulish woman were again buried alive. By such cruel practices the leading men at Rome showed that they were not prevented by the influence of Greek civilisation and enlightenment from working on the abject superstition of the multitude, and from adding to their material strength and patriotic devotion by religious fanaticism.

Drain of
the war on
the popu-
lation
of Italy.

The superiority of Rome over Carthage lay chiefly in the vast military population of Italy, which in one way or another was subject to the republic and available for the purposes of war. At the time of the last enumeration, which took place in 225 B.C. on the occasion of the threatened Gaulish attack, the number of men capable of bearing arms is said to have amounted to nearly 800,000, and in all probability that statement fell short of the actual number.² Here was a source of power that seemed inexhaustible. Nevertheless the war had hardly lasted two years before a difficulty was felt to fill up the gaps which bloody battles had made in the Roman ranks. Since the engagement on the Ticinus the Romans must have lost in Italy alone 120,000 men, actually slain or taken prisoners, without reckoning those who succumbed to disease and the fatigues and privations of the prolonged campaigns. This loss was felt most severely by the Roman citizens; for these were kept by Hannibal in captivity whilst the prisoners of the allies were discharged. Whether the latter were enrolled again, we

¹ The Sibylline books were of Greek origin, but similar in character to the native 'libri fatales,' on which they were, in a manner, engrafted, and with which they formed one body of prophetic writings, in the keeping of the decemviri (afterwards quindecimviri) sacris faciundis. See vol. i. p. 80.

² See the Appendix on the population of Italy, at the end of this volume.

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are not informed. At any rate a corresponding number of men was spared for the necessary domestic labour, for agriculture and the various trades; and consequently the allies who remained faithful to Rome could more easily replace the dead, although they also had already reached that point of exhaustion where war begins to undermine, not only the public welfare, but society itself in the first conditions of its existence. Men capable of bearing arms are, in other words, men capable of working; and it is upon work that civil society and every political community is finally based. If, therefore, only one-tenth of the labour strength of Italy was consumed in two years, and if another tenth was needed for carrying on the war, we may form an idea of the fearful disorganisation which was rapidly spreading over Italy, of the check to every sort of productive industry at a time when the state, deprived of so many of its most valuable citizens, was obliged to raise its demands in proportion, and to exact more and more sacrifices from the survivors. The prevalence of slavery alone explains how it was possible to take away every fifth man from peaceful occupations and employ him in military service. The institution of slavery, though incompatible by its very nature with the moral or even the material progress of man, and though always a social and political evil of the worst kind, has at certain times been of great temporary advantage; for, by relieving the free citizens to a great extent from the labour necessary for existence, it has set them free to devote themselves either to intellectual pursuits, to the cultivation of science and of art, or to war. We have no direct testimony of the extent to which slave-labour was employed in Italy at the time of the second Punic war; but we have certain indications to show that, if not everywhere in Italy, at least among the Romans, and in all the larger towns, the number of slaves was very considerable.¹

¹ The noble Romans were, even in the field, accompanied by slaves, who served as grooms, or carriers of baggage (calones).—Livy, xxii. 58. Paullus Diaconus, s. v. calones, p. 62. Servius ad Virg. *Æn.* vi. 1.

These remarks are suggested by the statements of the measures which the dictator M. Junius took after the battle of Cannæ for the defence of the country. In order to raise four new legions and one thousand horse, he was compelled to enrol young men who had only just entered on the military age; nay, he went even further, and took, probably as volunteers, boys below the age of seventeen who had not yet exchanged their purple-bordered toga (the toga prætexta) the sign of childhood, for the white toga of manhood (the toga virilis). Thus the legions were completed.¹ For the present Rome had reached the end of her resources. But the man-devouring war claimed more victims, and the pride of the Romans stooped to the arming of slaves.² Eight thousand of the most vigorous slaves, who professed their readiness to serve, were selected. They were bought by the state from their owners, were armed and formed into a separate body destined to serve by the side of the legions of Roman citizens and allies. As a reward for brave conduct in the field, they received the promise of freedom.³ With these slaves, six thousand criminals and debtors were set free, and enrolled for military service.⁴

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B.C.New levies
of the
dictator
M. Junius
Pera.

The full significance of this measure can be appreciated only if we bear in mind how the Roman government treated those unhappy citizens whom the fortune of war had delivered into captivity. In the first Punic war it had been the practice of the belligerents to exchange or ransom the prisoners. It seemed a matter of course that the same practice should be observed now, provided that

Refusal of
the
Romans to
ransom the
prisoners
taken at
Cannæ.¹ Livy, xxii. 57.² Livy, xxii. 57: 'Et aliam formam novi delectus inopia liberorum capitum ac necessitas dedit.'³ Livy, xxiv. 14. According to Appian, vii. 27, the slaves were set free at once.⁴ Livy, xxiii. 14: 'Ad ultimum prope desperatæ rei publicæ auxilium, cum honesta utilibus cedunt, descendit.' This mentioning of prisoners for debt is strange, as, according to Livy (viii. 28), imprisonment for debt was abolished. Probably this abolition referred only to Roman citizens; and the debtors referred to by Livy as liberated from prison and enrolled were perhaps Italian allies.

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Hannibal was ready to waive the strict right of war which gave him permission to employ the prisoners or to sell them as slaves. From his point of view the last was evidently the most profitable, for it was his object to weaken Rome as much as possible, and Rome possessed nothing more precious than her citizens. But, as we have already noticed, he was led by higher considerations and by a wise policy to seek a favourable peace with a nation which, even after Cannæ, he despaired of crushing.¹ He selected, therefore, from among the prisoners ten of the foremost men, and sent them to Rome, accompanied by an officer named Carthalo, with instructions not only to treat with the senate for the ransom of the prisoners, but to open at the same time negotiations for peace. But in Rome the genuine Roman spirit of stubborn defiance had so completely displaced the former fears that no man thought of even mentioning the possibility of peace; and Hannibal's messenger was warned not to approach the city. Thereupon the question was discussed in the senate, whether the prisoners of war should be ransomed. The mere possibility of treating this as an open question causes astonishment. The men whose liberty and lives were at the mercy of Hannibal were not purchased mercenaries nor strangers. They were the sons and brothers of those who had sent them forth to battle; they had obeyed the call of their country and of their duty, they had staked their lives in the field, had fought valiantly, and were guilty of no crime except this, that with arms in their hands they had allowed themselves to be overpowered by the enemy, as Roman soldiers had often done before. But in this war Rome wanted men who rated their lives as nothing, and were determined rather to die than to flee or surrender. In order to impress this necessity upon all Roman soldiers, the unfortunate prisoners of Cannæ were sacrificed. The senate refused to ransom them, and aban-

¹ Compare Hannibal's speech to the prisoners (Livy, xxii. 58): '*Romanos satis miti sermone alloquitur; non internecivum sibi esse cum Romanis bellum; de dignitate atque imperio certare,*' &c.

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doned them to the mercy of the conqueror.¹ At the very time when Rome armed slaves in her defence, she handed over thousands of freeborn citizens to be sold in the slave-markets of Utica and Carthage, and to be kept to field labour under the burning sun of Africa. We may admire the grandeur of the Roman spirit, and from some points of view it is worthy of admiration; but we are bound to express our horror and detestation of the idol of national greatness to which the Romans sacrificed their own children in cold blood.

As if they could excuse or palliate the inhuman severity of the Roman senate by painting in a still more odious light the character of the Punic general, some among the Roman annalists related that Hannibal, from spite, vexation, and inveterate hatred of the Roman people, now began to vent his rage on his unfortunate prisoners, and to torment them with the most exquisite cruelty. Many of them, they said, he killed, and from the heaped up

Roman
slanders
against
Hannibal.

¹ Polybius (vi. 58) and Livy (xxii. 58) give an interesting account of the sending of the ten deputies of the prisoners to Rome. According to them they had sworn to return to Hannibal if the negotiations failed; but one of their number, after leaving the camp, returned immediately, under the pretext of having forgotten something, thinking thus to comply with his promise, and he remained in Rome when the other nine returned into captivity, after the refusal of the senate to ransom the prisoners. But the Romans would not allow this subterfuge, and sent him back to Hannibal in chains. There was, however, another version of this story, which can be traced (see Cicero, *De Offic.* iii. 32, § 115) to C. Acilius, one of the oldest Roman annalists, a contemporary of the elder Cato. According to this version, all the ten deputies played the trick imputed in the first version to one only, and, what is of more importance, all of them remained at Rome after the breaking off of the negotiations, in consequence of a decree of the senate which sanctioned this perfidious sophistry. They were, indeed, afterwards degraded by the censors, and lived covered with infamy, so that some of them destroyed themselves, and others retired altogether from public life, but they were not compelled to return into captivity, as they had sworn to do. It can hardly be doubted that, of the two versions, this is the one more entitled to credence; for we cannot see how it would ever have obtained circulation if it had not been founded on truth, whereas the other version seems invented from patriotic motives. Livy gives some details which corroborate it: he mentions the names of three messengers dispatched by Hannibal on account of the delay caused by the conduct of the first ten. He also assumes its truth in a later account (xxiv. 18). So does Valerius Maximus (ii. 9, 8), whilst the story of Gellius (*N. A.* vii. 18) is an attempt to combine both versions.

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corpses he made dams for crossing rivers; some, who broke down under the weight of the baggage which they had to carry on the marches, he caused to be maimed by having their tendons cut; the noblest of them he compelled to fight with one another like gladiators, for the amusement of his soldiers, selecting, with genuine Punic inhumanity, the nearest relations—fathers, sons, and brothers—to shed each other's blood.¹ But, as Diodorus relates, neither blows, nor goads, nor fire could compel the noble Romans to violate the laws of nature, and impiously to imbrue their hands with the blood of those who were nearest and dearest to them. According to Pliny,² the only survivor in these horrid combats was made to fight with an elephant, and when he had killed the brute, he received indeed his freedom, which was the price that Hannibal had promised for his victory, but shortly after he had left the Carthaginian camp, he was overtaken by Numidian horsemen and cut down. If such detestable cruelties were really within the range of possibility, we should have to accuse, not only those who inflicted them, but those also who, by refusing to ransom the prisoners, exposed them to such a fate. But the silence of Polybius,³ and still more the silence of Livy, who would have found in the sufferings of the Roman prisoners a most welcome opportunity for rhetorical declamations on Punic barbarity, are sufficient to prove that the alleged acts of cruelty are altogether without foundation, and that they were invented for the purpose of representing Hannibal in an odious light, and of raising the character of the Romans at the expense of that of the Carthaginians.⁴

¹ Appian, vii. 38; viii. 63. Diodorus, excerpt. *De Virtut.* 568, p. 101, Tauchnitz. Zonaras, ix. 2. Valerius Maximus, ix. 2, ext. 2: 'Hannibal cuius maiore ex parte virtus sævitia constabat in flumine Vergello corporibus Romanis ponte facto exercitum traduxit. Idem captivos nostros oneribus et itinere fessos infima pedum parte succisa relinquebat. Quos vero in castra perduxerat, paria fere fratrum et propinquorum iungens ferro decernere cogebat.'

² Pliny, *Hist. Nat.* viii. 7.

³ Polybius had twice occasion to speak of the alleged cruelties of Hannibal: vi. 58 and ix. 24.

⁴ This contrast of the εὐσέβεια of the Romans, with the ἀμάρτης of the Car-

When, on the evening of the bloody day of Cannæ, Hannibal rode over the battle-field, he is reported by Appian to have burst into tears, and to have exclaimed, like Pyrrhus, that he did not hope for another victory like this. It is possible that credulous Romans may have found in this childish story some consolation for the soreness of their national feelings. But an impartial observer cannot but feel convinced that Hannibal's heart must have swelled with pride and hope when he surveyed the whole extent of his unparalleled victory, and that he considered it cheaply purchased by the loss of only 6,000 of his brave warriors. But he did not allow himself to be carried away by the natural enthusiasm which caused the impetuous Maharbal, the commander of his light Numidian cavalry, to urge an immediate advance upon Rome, and so to put an end to the war in one run. 'If,' said Maharbal, 'you will let me lead the horse forthwith, and follow quickly, you shall dine on the Capitol in five days.' We may be sure that Hannibal, without waiting for Maharbal's advice, had maturely considered the question whether the hostile capital, the final goal of his expedition, were within his reach at this moment. He decided that it was not, and we can scarcely presume to accuse the first general of antiquity of an error of judgment, and to maintain that he missed the favourable moment for crowning all his preceding victories. All thaginians is especially insisted upon by Diodorus (*loc. cit.*). It was even reported that Hannibal had trained his soldiers to feed on human flesh. Polybius (ix. 24) explains how this idle story arose. One of Hannibal's subordinate generals, called Hannibal Monomachos, is said to have advised his chief to accustom the soldiers to human flesh, so that they might, in case of necessity, have this food to fall back upon, when all other supplies failed. But Hannibal, it is said, rejected the odious idea. Upon such evidence as this Hannibal was accused of cruelty! Arnold (*Hist. of Rome*, iii. 154), though he says in a note that 'the remarks of Polybius should make us slow to believe stories of Hannibal's cruelties, which so soon became a theme for the invention of poets and rhetoricians,' nevertheless repeats in his text the charges brought against him. He says, 'When Hannibal found that his officer had not been allowed to enter the city, and that the Romans had refused to ransom their prisoners, his disappointment betrayed him into acts of the most inhuman cruelty.' If Arnold's note was an afterthought, it is a pity that he left his text unaltered.

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battle of
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Reasons
for Hanni-
bal's hesi-
tation to
march
upon
Rome.

that we can do is to endeavour to discover the motives which may have kept him from an immediate advance upon Rome.

After the battle of Cannæ, Hannibal's army numbered still about 44,000 men. It was surely possible with such a force as this to penetrate straight through the mountains of Samnium, and through Campania into Latium, without encountering any formidable resistance. But this march could not be accomplished in less than ten or eleven days, even if the army were not delayed by any obstacles, and marched ever so fast. The interval of time which must thus elapse between the arrival of news from the battle-field and the approach of the hostile army, would enable the Romans to make preparations for defence, and excluded, accordingly, the possibility of a surprise. Rome was not an open city, but strongly fortified by its situation and by art. Every Roman citizen up to the age of sixty was able to defend the walls, and thus, even if no reserve was at hand (which Hannibal could not take for granted), Rome was not helplessly at the mercy of an advancing army.

Policy of
Hannibal.

Failing to take Rome by a surprise, Hannibal would have been compelled to besiege it in form. This was an undertaking for which his strength was insufficient. His army was not even numerous enough to blockade the city and to cut off supplies and reinforcements from without. What could, therefore, be the result of a mere demonstration against Rome, even if it was practicable and involved no risk?¹ It was of far greater importance to gather the certain fruits of victory—to obtain, by the conquest of some fortified towns, a new basis of operations in the south of Italy, such as he had not had since his advance from Cisalpine Gaul. Now, at last, the moment had come when Hannibal might expect to be joined by

¹ Vincke (*Der zweite punische Krieg*, p. 351) considers the omission of a march upon Rome an unpardonable error. He thinks that Hannibal ought to have marched so rapidly as to precede the news of the Roman defeat at Cannæ; and insists that, even if the enterprise had failed, it would not have entailed dangers or losses.

the Roman allies. The battle of Cannæ had shaken their confidence in the power of Rome to protect them if faithful, or to punish their revolt; and thus were severed the strongest bonds which had hitherto secured their obedience. If Hannibal now succeeded in gaining them over to his side, his deep-laid plan would be brilliantly realised, and Rome would be more completely and securely overpowered than if he had stormed the Capitol.

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Keeping this end steadily in view, Hannibal again acted precisely as he had done after his previous victories. He set the captured allies of the Romans free without ransom, and dismissed them to their respective homes, with the assurance that he had come to Italy to wage war, not with them, but with the Romans, the common enemies of Carthage and Italy. He promised them, if they would join him, his assistance for the recovery of their independence and their lost possessions, threatening them at the same time with severe punishment if they should still continue to show themselves hostile.

Overtures
of Hanni-
bal to the
Roman
allies.

It causes just astonishment, and it is a convincing proof of the political wisdom and the fitness of the Roman people to rule the world, that even now the great majority of their Italian subjects remained faithful in their allegiance. Not only the citizens of the thirty-five tribes, of whom many had received the Roman franchise not as a boon, but as a punishment—not only all the colonies, Roman as well as Latin—but also the whole of Etruria, Umbria, Picenum, the genuine Sabellian races of the Sabines, Marsians, Pelignians, Vestinians, Frentanians, and Marrucinians, the Pentrian Samnites, and the Campanians, as well as all the Greek cities,¹ remained faithful to Rome. Only in Apulia, in southern Samnium, where the Caudinians and Hirpinians lived, in Lucania and Bruttium, and especially in the city of Capua, more or less readiness was shown to revolt from Rome; but even in those places, where the greatest hostility against Rome

Fidelity of
the allies
to Rome.

¹ The latter, no doubt, partly out of fear of the Bruttians.—Livy. xxiv. 1.

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prevailed, there was not a trace of attachment to Carthage, and everywhere there was found a zealous Roman party which opposed the Carthaginian alliance. This was, as we have hinted above, partly the consequence of the national antipathy of Italians and Punians, between natives and foreigners; partly it was the alliance of Hannibal with the Gauls, which made the Italians averse to join the invader; partly that dread of Roman revenge, of which, even after Cannæ, they could not rid themselves. But it was mainly the political unity under the supremacy of Rome, which, in spite of isolated defections, bound the various races of Italy into indissoluble union, and in the end prevailed even over the genius of Hannibal.

Revolts in
Bruttium
and
Campania.

When the Apulian towns of Arpi,¹ Salapia,² and Herdonea,³ and the insignificant and all but unknown Uzentum in the extreme south of Calabria, had embraced the Carthaginian cause, Hannibal marched along the Aufidus into Samnium, where the town of Compsa opened her gates to him. A portion of his army he sent under Hanno to Lucania for the purpose of organising a general insurrection among the restless population of that district; another portion, under the command of his brother Mago, he dispatched to Bruttium with the same commission,⁴ whilst he himself marched with the bulk of his army into Campania. The Lucanians⁵ and Bruttians were ready to rise against Rome. Doubtless they chafed impatiently under a government which obliged them to keep the peace; they regretted their former licence of ravaging and plundering the land of their Greek neighbours, and they hoped, with Hannibal's sanction, to be able to resume

¹ Polybius, iii. 118, § 2.

² Livy, xxiv. 47. Appian, vii. 45.

³ Livy, xxvii. 1. Both Polybius and Livy are inaccurate in their statements which refer to the revolt of the allies. They omit to mention at the proper place the defection of some, as of Salapia and Herdonea, referring but casually to it on some other occasion; and again they enumerate others as having joined Hannibal after the battle of Cannæ, who remained in their allegiance for some time longer, as, for instance, Tarentum.

⁴ Livy, xxiii. 11.

⁵ But with some exceptions. See Livy, xxiv. 20; xxv. 16.

on a large scale those practices of brigandage to which they had been so long addicted.¹ Only two insignificant towns, Consentia and Petelia, remained faithful to Rome, and were taken by force, after an obstinate resistance.

From a port on the Bruttian coast Mago now sailed to Carthage, and conveyed to the government Hannibal's report of his last and most glorious victory, as also his views and wishes with regard to the manner of conducting the war for the future. After the battle of Cannæ the character of the war in Italy was changed. Up to that time the Romans had defended themselves so vigorously that they might almost be said to have acted on the offensive. They had striven to beat Hannibal in the field, opposing to him first an equal, then a double force. They resolved now to confine themselves entirely to the defensive, and indeed from this time to the end of the war they never ventured on a decisive battle with Hannibal. The Carthaginians had military possession of a large portion of southern Italy. Hannibal had no difficulty in maintaining this possession, and needed for this purpose no great reinforcements from home, especially since he reckoned on the services of the Italians. But he was not able to aim a decisive blow at Rome. To do this he needed assistance on a large scale—nothing less, in fact, than another Carthaginian army, which, considering the naval superiority of the Romans, could reach Italy only by land. A considerable portion of this army moreover must necessarily consist of Spaniards, for Africa alone could not supply sufficient materials. Spain, therefore, was, under present circumstances, of the greatest importance to Carthage. In that country Hasdrubal, the brother of Hannibal, carried on the war against the two Scipios. If in the year 216 he could beat the Romans, penetrate over the Pyrenees and the Rhone, and then in the following spring cross the Alps, the two brothers could march upon Rome from north and south, and end the war by the conquest of the capital.

To carry out this plan, which Mago as Hannibal's con- Resolution.

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Change
in the
character
of the war.

¹ Livy, xxiv. 2.

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of the Carthaginians to reinforce Hannibal.

fidential envoy laid before the Carthaginian government, it was resolved to send 4,000 Numidian horse and forty elephants to Italy, and to raise in Spain 20,000 foot and 4,000 horse. We hear much¹ of the opposition which these measures encountered in the Carthaginian senate. Hanno, the leader of the party hostile to the house of Barcas, it is said, resisted Hannibal's propositions and the prosecution of the war. But as the Barcide party had an overwhelming majority, the opposition was powerless and unable to thwart Hannibal's plans. We can therefore easily believe that the Carthaginian senate voted all but unanimously the supplies of men and materials of war which Hannibal required.

The war in Spain.

As matters stood now, everything depended on the issue of the war in Spain. While the rapid course of events in Italy was followed by a comparative rest, while the war was there resolving itself into a number of smaller conflicts, and turned chiefly on the taking and maintaining of fortified places, the Romans succeeded in dealing a decisive blow in Spain, which delayed the Carthaginian plan of reinforcing Hannibal from that quarter to a time when the Romans had completely recovered from the effects of their first three defeats on the Trebia, the Thrasymenus, and the Aufidus.

Further revolts among the Roman allies.

But this event, which was in reality the turning-point in the career of Carthaginian triumphs, did not take place till later in the course of the year 216 B.C. Meanwhile the prospects of Rome in Italy had become still more clouded. The battle of Cannæ began to produce its effects. One after another of the allies in southern Italy joined the enemy, and Rome in her trouble and distress was obliged to leave to their fate those who, remaining faithful, only asked for protection and help to enable them to hold their ground.

Condition of Capua.

The richest and most powerful city in Italy next to Rome was Capua. She was able to send into the field 30,000 foot and an excellent cavalry of 4,000 men, unsur-

¹ Livy, xxiii. 13.

passed by any Italian state. No city not included in the Roman tribes appeared so intimately connected with Rome as Capua. The Romans and the Capuans had become one people more completely than the Romans and the Latins. The Capuan knights possessed the full Roman franchise, and the rest of the people of Capua enjoyed the civil rights of Romans exclusive only of the political rights. The Capuans fought in the Roman legions side by side with the inhabitants of the thirty-five tribes. A great number of Romans had settled in Capua, and the prominent families of this town were connected by marriage with the highest nobility of Rome. These Capuan nobles had a double motive for remaining faithful to Rome. Through the decision of the Roman senate they had in the great Latin war (338 B.C.¹) obtained political power in Capua and the enjoyment of an annual revenue which the people of Capua were made to pay to them. A Roman prefect resided in Capua to decide civil disputes in which Roman citizens were concerned; but in every other respect the Capuans were free from interference with their local self-government. They had their own senate and their national chief magistrate, called Meddix. Under the dominion of Rome the town had probably lost little of her former importance and prosperity, and she was considered now, as she had been a century before, a worthy rival of Rome.

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But it was precisely this greatness and prosperity which fostered in the people of Capua the feeling of jealousy and impatience of Roman superiority. A position which smaller towns might accept without feeling humbled could not fail to offend the pride of a people which looked upon itself as not inferior even to the people of Rome. The plebeians of Capua, in other words the vast majority of the population, had been grievously wronged and exasperated by the measure of the Roman senate which had deprived Capua of her domain or public land, and had in consequence imposed a tax for the support of the Capuan nobility. The

Disposition
of the
plebeians
of Capua
towards
Hannibal.¹ See vol. i. p. 373.

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natural opposition between the two classes of citizens, which we find in every Italian community, had through this measure been embittered by a peculiar feeling of injustice on the popular side, and by the slavish attachment of the nobles to their foreign friends and supporters. It was not Hannibal's appearance in Italy that first produced this division in Capua. But the discontent which had been growing for years, had hitherto been kept down by the irresistible power of Rome. Now, as it seemed, the hour of deliverance was at hand. Soon after the battle of the lake Thrasymenus in the preceding year, when Hannibal for the first time appeared in Campania, he had tried to detach Capua from the Roman alliance. Some Capuan prisoners of war whom he had set free, had promised to bring about an insurrection in their native city; but the plan had failed.¹ Another decisive victory over the Romans was wanted to inspire the national and popular party in Capua with sufficient courage for so bold a step as the throwing off of their allegiance. Such a victory had been gained at Cannæ; and the revolution in Capua was one of its first and most valuable fruits.²

Revolt of
Capua,
Atella,
and
Calatia.

The Capuan nobility was neither strong enough to suppress the popular movement in favour of Hannibal, nor honest and firm enough to retire from the government and to leave the town after the Carthaginian party had gained the ascendancy. Only a few men remained faithful to Rome, foremost among whom was Decius Magius. The majority of the senate of Capua allowed themselves to be intimidated by Pacuvius Calavius,³ one of their number, and hoped by joining the Carthaginians to save their prerogatives and their position. Soon after the battle of Cannæ they despatched an embassy to Hannibal and concluded a treaty of friendship and alliance with Carthage, which guaranteed their entire independence, and especially an immunity from the obligation of military service and other burthens.⁴ As the prize of their joint victory over

¹ See above, p. 220.

² Livy, xxiii. 2-10. Zonaras, ix. 2.

³ Livy, xxiii. 2.

⁴ Livy, xxiii. 7: 'Legati ad Hannibalem venerunt pacemque cum eo con-

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Rome they hoped that the dominion over Italy would fall to their share. In order to cut off every chance of a reconciliation with Rome, and to convince their new ally of their unconditional attachment, the Capuan populace seized the Roman citizens who happened to be residing among them, shut them up in one of the public baths, and killed them with hot vapour. Three hundred Roman prisoners were delivered into the keeping of the Capuans by Hannibal as a security for the safety of an equal number of Capuan horsemen who were serving with the Roman army in Sicily. The example of Capua was followed voluntarily or on compulsion by Atella and Calatia, two neighbouring Italian cities. All the other numerous towns of Campania, especially the Greek community of Neapolis and the old city of Cumæ (once, like Neapolis, a Greek settlement, but now entirely Italian), remained faithful to Rome. This was due to the influence of the nobility, while the popular party evinced everywhere a strong desire to join the Carthaginian cause.

Among the great events which convulsed Italy at this time our attention is arrested by the fate of a comparatively humble individual, because it permits us to catch a glimpse of the civil struggles and vicissitudes which the great war called forth in every Italian city, and because it throws an interesting and a favourable light on the character of Hannibal.¹ Decius Magius was the leader of the minority in the Capuan senate, which, remaining faithful to Rome, rejected all the offers of Hannibal, and even after the occupation of their town by a Punic garrison entertained the hope of recalling their countrymen to their allegiance, of overpowering and murdering the foreign troops, and restoring Capua to the Romans. He made no secret of his sentiments and his plans. When Hannibal sent for him into his camp, he refused to go, because, as a free citizen of

The
resistance
of Decius
Magius to
Hannibal.

dicionibus his fecerunt, ne quis imperator magistratusve Pœnorum ius ullum in civem Campanum haberet, neve civis Campanus invitus militaret munusve faceret; ut sunt leges, sui magistratus Capuæ essent.

¹ Livy, xxiii. 8-10.

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Capua, he was not bound to obey the behests of a stranger. Hannibal might have employed force; but his object was to gain over as a friend, not to punish, so influential a man as Decius. When he made his public entry into Capua, the whole population poured out to meet him, eager to see face to face the man who had taken the Roman yoke from their shoulders. But Decius Magius kept aloof from the gaping crowd. He walked up and down on the market-place with his son and a few clients as if he had no concern in the general excitement. On the following day, when he was brought before Hannibal, he exhibited the same spirit of defiance, and tried even to rouse the people against the invaders. What would have been the fate of such a man, if he had thus defied a Roman general? Hannibal was satisfied with removing him from the place where his presence was likely to cause difficulties. He ordered him to be sent to Carthage to be kept there as a prisoner of war. But Decius Magius was spared the humiliation of living at the mercy of his hated enemies. The ship that was to take him to Carthage was driven by adverse winds to Cyrene. Hence he was brought to Egypt; and King Ptolemy Philopator, who was on friendly terms with Rome, allowed him to return to Italy. But where was he to go? His native town was in the hands of a hostile faction and of the national enemies, while Rome was carrying on a war of extermination against her. He remained an exile in a foreign land, and thus was spared the misery of witnessing the barbarous punishment which a few years later the ruthless hand of Rome inflicted on Capua. No man would have been more justified in deprecating this punishment, and more likely to mitigate it, if Roman justice could ever be tempered with mercy, than the man who had dared in the cause of Rome to defy the victorious Hannibal.¹

Story of
Pacuvius
Calavius.

The two hostile parties which opposed each other in the Campanian towns had caused even members of the same families to be divided against each other.² Pacuvius Cala-

¹ Livy, xxiii. 10.

² Livy, xxiii. 8.

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vius, the chief instigator of the revolt of Capua, had married a daughter of a noble Roman, Appius Claudius, and his son was a zealous adherent of the Roman cause. The father tried in vain to convince the youth that the star of Rome had set, and that his native town of Capua could regain her ancient position and splendour only by a league with Carthage. Not even the countenance and the kind words of Hannibal himself, who at the father's request pardoned the errors of the son, could conciliate the sturdy young man. Invited with his father to dine in company with Hannibal, he remained sullen through the merriment of the banquet, and refused even to pledge Hannibal in a cup of wine, under the pretext of not feeling well. Towards evening, when Pacuvius left the dining room for a time, his son followed him, and drawing him aside into a garden at the back of the house, declared his intention of presently killing Hannibal and thus obtaining for his countrymen pardon for their great offence. In the utmost dismay, Pacuvius besought his son to give up this heinous scheme, and vowed to shield with his own body the man to whom he had sworn to be faithful, who had intrusted himself to the hospitality of Capua, and whose guests they were at this moment. In the struggle of conflicting duties filial piety prevailed. The youth cast away the dagger with which he had armed himself, and returned to the banquet to avert suspicion.

In Nola as in Capua the people were divided between a Roman and a Carthaginian party.¹ The plebs was in favour of joining Hannibal, and it was with difficulty that the nobles delayed the decision, and thus gained time to inform the prætor Marcellus, who was then stationed at Casilinum, of the danger of a revolt. Marcellus immediately hastened to Nola, occupied the town with a strong garrison, and repulsed the Carthaginians, who, counting on the friendly disposition of the people of Nola, had come to take possession of the town. This lucky hit of

Occupation
of Nola by
the prætor
Marcellus.¹ Livy, xxiii. 14.

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Marcellus was magnified by the Roman annalists into a complete victory over Hannibal. Livy¹ found in some of the writers whom he consulted the statement that 2,800 Carthaginians were slain; but he is sensible and honest enough to suspect that this is a great exaggeration. The extent of the success of Marcellus was no doubt this, that Hannibal's attempt to occupy Nola with the assistance of the Carthaginian party failed; and considering the importance of the place, this was indeed a great point gained. But it was an empty boast if Roman writers asserted in consequence that Marcellus had taught the Romans to conquer Hannibal.² Livy hits the truth by saying that not to be conquered by Hannibal was more difficult at that time than it was afterwards to conquer him. It was the merit of Marcellus that he saved Nola from being taken. This was effected not only by anticipating the arrival of the Carthaginians, and by securing the town with a garrison, but by severely punishing the leaders of the popular party in Nola, who were guilty or suspected of an understanding with Hannibal. When seventy of them had been put to death, the fidelity of Nola seemed sufficiently secured.³

Occupation
of Nuceria
and
Acerræ by
Hannibal.

The pretended victory of Marcellus at Nola appears the more doubtful as Hannibal about the same time was able to take in the immediate neighbourhood the towns of Nuceria and Acerræ,⁴ and made several attempts to gain

¹ Livy, xxiii. 16.

² Compare Cicero, *Brut.* iii. 12: 'Post Cannensem illam calamitatem primum Marcelli ad Nolam prælio populus se Romanus erexit.' Valerius Maximus, i. 6, 9.

³ Livy, xxiii. 17.

⁴ On this occasion the stories of Hannibal's treachery and cruelty are repeated. According to Zonaras (ix. 2: compare Dion Cassius, ff. 50, 54; Appian, viii. 63), Hannibal caused the senators of Nuceria to be killed; and though he promised the other inhabitants to let them leave the town in safety, he caused them to be cut down on the road by his horsemen. This story is indirectly contradicted by Livy (xxiii. 15), who relates that the people of Nuceria rejected the offer of Hannibal, who wished them to take service with him, and took refuge all over Campania, but especially in Nola and Neapolis; that thirty senators of Nuceria, on being refused admittance into Capua, went to Cumæ. Livy either could not have found anything of the

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possession of Neapolis. Neapolis would have been a most valuable acquisition, as a secure landing-place and a station for the Carthaginian fleet. But the Neapolitans were on their guard. All attempts to take the town by surprise failed, and Hannibal had not the means of laying siege to it in a regular manner. His attempts to take Cumæ were equally futile, and even the petty town of Casilinum, in the immediate vicinity of Capua, on the river Volturnus, offered a stout resistance. But Casilinum was too important on account of its position to be left in the hands of the Romans. Hannibal therefore resolved to lay regular siege to it.

The siege of Casilinum claims our special attention, as it shows the spirit and the quality of the troops of whom the Romans disposed in their struggle with Carthage. When the Roman legions in the spring of the year 216 B.C. assembled in Apulia, the allied town of Præneste was somewhat in arrear in preparing its contingent. This contingent, consisting of five hundred and seventy men, was therefore still on its march, and had just reached Campania, when the news of the disaster of Cannæ arrived. Instead of marching further south, the troops took up their position in the little town of Casilinum, and were there joined by some Latins and Romans, as well as by a cohort of four hundred and sixty men from the Etruscan town of Perugia, which, like the Prænestine cohort, had been delayed in taking the field. Shortly after this Capua revolted, and everywhere in Campania the popular party showed a disposition to follow the example of Capua. To prevent the people of Casilinum from betraying their Roman garrison to the Carthaginians, the soldiers anticipated treason by a treacherous and barbarous act. They fell upon the inhabitants, put to death all that were suspected,¹ destroyed

Siege of
Casilinum.

alleged atrocities of Hannibal in the annals he consulted, or he discredited the statements. Mommsen (*Rom. Hist.* i. p. 623; Eng. translation, ii. 142) accepts them as true.

¹ From Livy xxiii. 17 it would appear that all the inhabitants were killed, but this is contradicted by Livy himself in another place (xxiii. 19). This heinous act of the Roman garrison closely resembles the doings of the garrison

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that portion of the town which lay on the left bank of the river, and put the other half in a state of defence. The Carthaginians summoned the town in vain, and then tried to take it by storm; but several assaults were repulsed by the garrison with the greatest courage, and with perfect success. Hannibal with his victorious army was unable to take by force this insignificant place, with its garrison of scarcely one thousand men—so utterly was he destitute of the means and apparatus necessary for a regular siege; and perhaps he shrunk from sacrificing his valuable troops in this kind of warfare. Yet he did not give up Casilinum. He kept up a blockade, and in the course of the winter hunger soon began its ravages among the defenders. A Roman force under Gracchus, the master of the horse of the dictator Junius Pera, was stationed at a short distance, but made no attempt to throw supplies into the town, or to raise the siege. Gradually all the horrors of a protracted siege broke out in the town; the leather of the shields was cooked for food, mice and roots were devoured, many of the garrison threw themselves from the walls or exposed themselves to the missiles of the enemies to end the pangs of hunger by a voluntary death. The Roman troops under Gracchus tried in vain to relieve the distress of the besieged by floating down the river during the night casks partly filled with grain. The Carthaginians soon discovered the trick, and fished the casks out of the river before they reached the town. When all hope of relief was thus gone, and half of the defenders of Casilinum had perished by hunger, the heroic Prænestines and Perusians at last consented to surrender the town on condition of being allowed to ransom themselves for a stipulated sum.¹

of Enna in Sicily, and those of the Campanian legion in Rhegium.—See vol. i. p. 518.

¹ Again some annalists accused Hannibal of an act of cruel perfidy. They said (Livy, xxiii. 19) that horsemen were sent after the men and killed them. Livy had no difficulty in rejecting this impudent lie, which is exposed by the subsequent narrative of the honours publicly awarded to the Prænestine soldiers after their return. He says: '*Donec omne aurum persolutum est, in vinculis habiti; tum remissi summa cum fide.*'

They were justly proud of their performance. Marcus Anicius, the commander of the Prænestine cohort, who, as Livy remarks, had formerly been a public clerk, caused a statue of himself to be erected on the market-place of Præneste, with an inscription to commemorate the defence of Casilinum. The Roman senate granted the survivors double pay and exemption from military service for five years. It is added that the Roman franchise was also offered to them, but declined. Probably the men of Perusia were honoured like the Prænestines, but we have no information on the subject.

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The obstinate defence of Casilinum is instructive, as showing the spirit by which the allies of Rome were animated. If after the battle of Cannæ the citizens of two towns which did not even possess the Roman franchise fought for Rome with such firmness and heroism, the republic could look with perfect composure and confidence upon all the vicissitudes of the war; nor could Hannibal with a handful of foreign mercenaries have much hope of subduing a country defended by several hundred thousand men as brave and obstinate as the garrison of Casilinum.

Prospects
of the war.

The blockade of Casilinum had lasted the whole winter, and the surrender of the town did not take place before the following spring. Meanwhile Hannibal had sent a portion of his army¹ to take up their winter-quarters in Capua. The results of the battle of Cannæ were in truth considerable, but we can hardly think that they answered his expectations. The acquisition of Capua was the only advantage worth mentioning; and the value of this acquisition was considerably reduced by the continued resistance which he had to encounter in all the other important towns of Campania, especially in those on the sea coast. Thus Capua was in constant danger, and instead of vigorously supporting the movements of Hannibal it compelled him to take measures for its protection. It could not be left without a Carthaginian garrison, for the

Hannibal's
Italian
allies.

¹ Two detachments of his army were in Lucania and Bruttium; a third was blockading Casilinum.

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Roman party in the town would, as the example of Nola showed, have seized the first opportunity for betraying it into the hands of the Romans. The conditions on which Capua had joined the Carthaginian alliance, viz. exemption from military service and war taxes, show clearly that Hannibal could not dispose freely of the resources of his Italian allies. He could rely only on their voluntary aid; and it was his policy to show that their alliance with Carthage was more profitable for them than their subjection to Rome. It was evident, therefore, that he could not raise a very considerable army in Italy; and that if he could have found the men, he would have had the greatest difficulty in providing for their food and pay, and for the materials of war.

Defeat of
Hasdrubal
at Ibera
in Spain.

Still, whatever difficulties Hannibal might encounter by continuing the war in Italy, he might, after the stupendous success that had hitherto accompanied him, expect to overcome, provided he obtained from home the reinforcements on which he had all along calculated. His first expectations were directed to Spain. In this country the Romans had with a just appreciation of its importance made great efforts during the first two years of the war to occupy the land between the Ebro and the Pyrenees, and they had thus blocked up the nearest road by which a Punic army could march from Spain to Italy. The two Scipios had even advanced beyond the Ebro to attack the Carthaginian dominions in the southern part of the peninsula, and, following the example of Hannibal in Italy, they had adopted the policy of endeavouring to gain over to their side the subjects and allies of Carthage. In the third year of the war Hasdrubal had to turn his arms against the Tartessii,¹ a powerful tribe in the valley

¹ There is some doubt whether the revolted tribe was that of the Tartessii or the Carpesii. (See Drakenborch's note to Livy, xxiii. 26.) Our ignorance of the ancient geography of Spain, and still more the ignorance of it which the ancient historians betray, and which makes their narratives so vague, is the chief cause of the obscurity in which the events in Spain are hidden, and has given ample scope to the inventions and exaggerations with which the narrative of the war in Spain is disfigured.

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of the Bætis, which had revolted, and was reduced only after an obstinate resistance. Then, after he had received reinforcements for the defence of the Carthaginian possessions in Spain, he advanced towards the Ebro to carry out the plan which was so essential for Hannibal's success in Italy. In the neighbourhood of this river, near the town of Ibera,¹ the two Scipios awaited his arrival. A great battle was fought; the Carthaginians were completely beaten; their army was partly destroyed, partly dispersed. This great victory of the Romans ranks in importance with that on the Metaurus and that of Zama. It foiled the plan of the Carthaginians of sending a second army into Italy from Spain,² and left Hannibal without the necessary reinforcements at a time when he was in the full career of victory, and seemed to need only the co-operation of another army to compel Rome to yield and to sue for peace. The Romans now had leisure to recover from their great material and moral overthrow, and after surviving such a crisis as this they became invincible.

While the Roman arms in Spain not only opposed a barrier to the advance of the Carthaginians, but laid the foundation for a permanent acquisition of new territory, the two provinces of Sicily and Sardinia, lately wrested from Carthage, showed alarming symptoms of dissatisfaction. The dominion of Rome in these two islands had not been felt to be a blessing. Under its weight the government of Carthage was looked upon by a considerable portion of the natives as a period of lost happiness, the evils of the present being naturally felt more keenly than those of the past. The battle of Cannæ produced its effect even in these distant parts of the Roman empire, and revived the hopes of those who still felt attachment to their former rulers, or thought to avail themselves of their aid to cast off their present bondage. Carthaginian fleets

State of
Corsica,
Sardinia,
and Sicily.

¹ This town of Ibera, which Livy (xxiii. 28) calls '*urbem opulentissimam ea tempestate regionis eius*,' is never mentioned again by any other writer, and its locality is entirely unknown to us.

² Livy, xxiii. 29: '*Ea pugna Hasdrubali non modo in Italiam traducendi exercitus sed ne manendi quidem satis tuto in Hispania spem reliquerat.*'

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cruised off the coasts of Sicily and kept the island in a continued state of excitement. The Roman officers who commanded in Sicily sent home reports calculated to cause disquiet and alarm. The proprætor T. Otalicius complained that his troops were left without sufficient supplies and pay. From Sardinia the proprætor A. Cornelius Mammula sent equally urgent demands.¹ The home government had no resources at its disposal, and the senate replied by bidding the two proprætors do the best they could for their fleets and troops. In Sardinia consequently the Roman commander raised a forced loan—a measure ill calculated to improve the loyalty of the subjects.² In Sicily it was again the faithful Hiero who volunteered his aid, and this was the last time that he exerted himself in the cause of his allies. Although his own kingdom of Syracuse was at this very time exposed to the devastations of the Carthaginian fleet, he nevertheless provided the Roman troops in Sicily with pay and provisions for six months. The old man would have been happy if before his death he could have seen the war ended, or at least warded off from the coasts of Sicily. He foresaw the danger to which its continuance exposed his country and his house, and he conjured the Romans to attack the Carthaginians in Africa as soon as possible. But the year after the battle of Cannæ was not the time for such an enterprise, and before it came to be carried out a great calamity had overwhelmed Sicily, had overthrown the dynasty and exterminated the whole family of Hiero, and had reduced Syracuse to a state of desolation from which it never rose again.

¹ Livy, xxiii. 21.

² Livy says (xxiii. 21): 'Cornelio in Sardinia civitates sociæ benigne contulerunt.' This expression is apt to mislead. What the effect of the measure of Cornelius was, we learn from Livy, xxiii. 32, where the people of Sardinia are spoken of as complaining that they had had to submit to harsh and extortionate demands, and that they were oppressed by being made to pay heavy contributions and to furnish supplies. The loans of the Sardinians appear from this to have been not unlike those which English kings used to raise in the city of London, and which were euphemistically called 'benevolences.'

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Although since the battle of the Trebia the seat of war had been shifted from Cisalpine Gaul to central and southern Italy, and although Rome itself was now more directly exposed to the victorious arms of Hannibal, yet the Romans had neither given up Cremona and Placentia, their fortresses on the Po, nor relaxed their efforts for continuing the war with the Gauls in their own country. They hoped thereby to draw off the Gallic auxiliaries from Hannibal's army,¹ and moreover to prevent any Punic army which might succeed in crossing the Pyrenees and Alps from advancing further into Italy. For this reason in the spring of 216 two legions and a strong contingent of auxiliaries, amounting altogether to 25,000 men, were sent northward, under the command of the prætor L. Postumius Albinus, at the time when Terentius Varro and Æmilius Paullus set out on their ill-fated expedition to Apulia. The disaster of Cannæ naturally rendered the task of Postumius very difficult by increasing the courage of the tribes hostile to Rome, and by damping that of their friends. Nevertheless the prætor kept his ground in the country about the Po during the whole of the year 216, and so far gained the confidence of his fellow-citizens that he was elected for the consulship of the ensuing year. But before he could enter on his new office he was overtaken by an overwhelming catastrophe,² second only to the great disaster of Cannæ. He fell into an ambush, and was cut to pieces with his whole army. It is related³ that the Gauls cut off his head, set the skull in gold, and used it on solemn occasions as a goblet, according to a barbarous custom which continued long among the later Gauls and Germans.

Defeat of
Postumius
Albinus in
Cisalpine
Gaul.

Rome was in a state of frantic excitement. The worst calamities of the disastrous year that had just passed away seemed about to be repeated at the very time when the

Further
revolts of
Roman
allies in
Bruttium.¹ Polybius, iii. 106, § 6.² This was early in the year 215 B.C., more than seven months after the battle of Cannæ. Polybius (iii. 118, § 6) is careless in stating that it happened 'a few days after.'³ Livy, xxiii. 24. Zonaras, ix. 3.

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brave garrison of Casilinum had been forced to capitulate, and when by this conquest Hannibal had opened for himself the road to Latium. A short time before the faithful towns of Petelia and Consentia in Bruttium had been taken by storm. The others were in the greatest danger of suffering the same fate. Locri soon after joined the Carthaginians under favourable conditions :¹ and thus a maritime town of great importance was gained by the enemy. In Croton the nobility tried in vain to keep the town for the Romans, and to shut out the Bruttian allies of Hannibal. The people admitted them within the walls, and the aristocratic party had no choice but to yield to the storm and to purchase for themselves permission to leave the town by giving up possession of the citadel.² Thus the whole of Bruttium was lost to the Romans, with the single exception of Rhegium. The legions were stationed in Campania, and did not venture beyond their fortified camps. Everywhere the sky was overhung with black clouds. In Spain alone the victory of the Scipios at Ibera opened a brighter prospect. By it the danger of another invasion of Italy by Hannibal's brother was for the present averted. Had the battle near the Ebro ended like the battles hitherto fought on Italian soil, it would seem that even the hearts of the bravest Romans must have despaired of the republic.

Sojourn of
Hannibal
in Capua.

Hannibal passed the winter of 216–215 B.C. in Capua. These winter-quarters became among the Roman writers a favourite topic of declamation. Capua, they said, became Hannibal's Cannæ.³ In the luxurious life of this opulent city, to which Hannibal's victorious soldiers gave themselves up for the first time after long hardships and privations, their military qualities perished, and from this time victory deserted their standards. This statement, if not altogether false, is at any rate a vast exaggeration.

¹ The date of the loss of Locri and Croton cannot be ascertained with perfect accuracy. Livy reports it twice: xxiii. 30, and xxiv. 1.

² Livy, xxiv. 2, 3.

³ Florus, ii. 6: 'Capuam Hannibali Cannas fuisse.' Livy, xxiii. 18. Valerius Maximus, ix. 1, ext. 1.

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As we have seen, only a portion of Hannibal's army passed the winter in Capua, whilst the rest was in Bruttium, Lucania, and before Casilinum. But apart from this, it is manifest that the people of Capua could not at that time have been sunk in luxury and sensual pleasures. If their wealth had been little affected by the calamities of the war, surely the necessity of feeding some thousand soldiers would soon have sobered them down and taught them the need of economy. Hannibal knew how to husband his resources, and he would not have allowed his men to drain his most valuable allies. We can scarcely suppose that voluntary extravagance and excessive hospitality marked the conduct of a people which had, at the very outset, stipulated for immunity from contributions. Lastly, it is not true that the Punic army had in Capua the first opportunity of recovering from the hardships of the war, and of enjoying ease and comfort. The soldiers had had pleasant quarters in Apulia after the battle on the lake Thrasymenus,¹ and had already passed one winter comfortably. But whatever may have been the pleasures and indulgences of Hannibal's troops in Capua, their military qualities cannot have suffered by them, as the subsequent history of the war sufficiently demonstrates.

That Hannibal's offensive tactics were relaxed after the battle of Cannæ is particularly evident from the events of 215 B.C. The year passed without any serious encounters between the two belligerents. The Romans had resolved to avoid a battle, and applied their whole strength to prevent the spread of revolt among their allies, and to punish or re-conquer the towns that had revolted. The war was confined almost entirely to Campania. In this country Hannibal did not succeed, after the surrender of Casilinum, in making any further conquests. An attempt to surprise Cumæ failed, and on this occasion the Capuans suffered a serious reverse.² Neapolis remained steadfast

Operations
in Cam-
pania,
215 B.C.

¹ See above, p. 216.

² Livy's account (xxiii. 35), divested of the specific colouring which a patriotic Roman would naturally give it, comes to this, that the Roman consul,

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and faithful to Rome; Nola was guarded by a Roman garrison, and the Roman partisans among the citizens; and a renewed attempt of Hannibal to take this town is said to have been thwarted, like the first attack, the year before, by a sally of the Romans under Marcellus, and to have resulted in a defeat of the Carthaginian army.¹ On the other hand the Romans took several towns in Campania² and Samnium,³ punished their revolted subjects with merciless severity, and so devastated the country of the Hirpinians and Caudinians that they piteously implored the help of Hannibal. But Hannibal had not sufficient forces to protect the Italians who had joined his cause and who now felt the fatal consequences of their step. Hanno, one of Hannibal's subordinate officers, being beaten at Grumentum in Lucania by Tiberius Sempronius Longus, an officer of the prætor M. Valerius Lævinus, who commanded in Apulia, was obliged to retreat into Bruttium. A reinforcement of 12,000 foot, 1,500 horse, 20 elephants, and 1,000 talents of silver, which Mago

Sempronius Gracchus, in conjunction with the people of Cumæ, laid a trap for the Capuans. The various towns of Campania, it appears, celebrated a common festival at Hamæ (as the Latins celebrated theirs on the Mons Albanus). During one of these festivals, the Roman consul Sempronius Gracchus and the Cumanians surprised and killed the unarmed and unresisting Capuans. They afterwards justified this act of treachery by saying that the Capuans had intended to surprise them, and were caught in their own snare. But, as Arnold remarks (*Hist. of Rome*, iii. 184), this could only be a suspicion, whilst the overt act of violence was their own.

¹ According to all appearance, this alleged victory is but another version of that of the preceding year. In all essential parts the same circumstances are related, only on a larger scale. Instead of 2,800 Carthaginians, 5,000 are slain in the second fight, together with four elephants. Plutarch (*Marcell.* 11) relates only one victory of Marcellus; but we cannot appeal to his authority, as his account seems to be the result of a confusion. Livy relates (xxiv. 17) actually a third victory of Marcellus over Hannibal at Nola, in which 2,000 Carthaginians are killed. It is precisely the same story over again. The plebeians at Nola send for Hannibal, the nobility for Marcellus; the march of Marcellus is identical with that related xxiii. 17. The panegyrists of the house of Marcellus, it seems, had great faith in the credulity of the public; nor did they see any improbability in a story which makes the people of Nola call in the aid of Hannibal a second time, shortly after a first attempt had been punished by the execution of seventy of the conspirators.

² Compulteria, Trebula, and Saticula.—Livy, xxiii. 39.

³ Livy, xxiii. 37.

was to have brought to his brother in Italy, had been directed to Spain after the victory of the Scipios at Ibera; and Hannibal had accordingly, in the year 215 B.C., not only calculated in vain on being joined by his brother Hasdrubal and the Spanish army, but he was also deprived of the reinforcements which ought to have been sent to him straight from Africa. As at the same time the revolt of the Roman allies did not spread further, and as the Romans gradually recovered from the effects of the defeat at Cannæ, the fact that Hannibal was not able to accomplish much is easily explained.

As in Italy, so in the other theatres of war, the Carthaginian arms were not very successful during this year, 215 B.C. In Spain, the victory of the Scipios at Ibera was followed by a decided preponderance of Roman influence. The native tribes became more and more disinclined to submit to Carthaginian dominion, thinking that the Romans would help them to regain their independence. It seems that the battle of Ibera was lost chiefly by the defection of the Spanish troops. Hasdrubal had thereupon tried to reduce some of the revolted tribes, but was prevented by the Scipios, and driven back with great loss. According to the reports which the Scipios sent home, they had gained victories which almost counterbalanced the disaster of Cannæ. With only 16,000 men they had totally routed at Illiturgi a Carthaginian army of 60,000 men, had killed more of the enemy than they themselves numbered combatants, had taken 3,000 prisoners, nearly 1,000 horses, and seven elephants, had captured fifty-nine standards, and stormed three hostile camps. Soon after, when the Carthaginians were besieging Intibili, they were again defeated and suffered almost as heavily.¹ Most of the Spanish tribes now joined Rome.

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Defeat of
the Car-
thaginians
at Illiturgi
and
Intibili
in Spain,
215 B.C.

¹ Livy, xxiii. 49. It is a great pity that we have no more detailed report of these two splendid victories than the dry narrative which Livy gives in half a chapter. But the meagreness of the report might be excused if its truth were beyond suspicion. We shall find in the sequel that all the statements that have reference to the affairs of Spain, and especially to the exploits of the Scipios in that country, are tainted with laudatory exaggeration on an

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the
Romans in
Sardinia.

These victories threw into the shade all the military events which took place in Italy this year.

Equal success attended the Roman arms in Sardinia. In the preceding year the proprætor Aulus Cornelius Mammula had been left in that island without supplies for his troops, and had exacted the necessary sums and contributions by a species of forced loans from the natives.¹ The discontent engendered by this measure, in connexion with the news of the battle of Cannæ, had the effect of inflaming the national spirit of the Sardinians, who, from the time of their subjection to Rome, had hardly allowed a year to pass without an attempt to shake off the galling yoke. The Carthaginians had contributed to fan this flame,² and now dispatched a force to Sardinia to support the insurgents. Unfortunately the fleet which had the troops on board was overtaken by a storm and compelled to take refuge in the Balearic Islands, where the ships had to be laid up for repair.³ Meanwhile, the son of the Sardinian chief Hampsicoras, impatient of delay, had attacked the Romans in the absence of his father, and had been defeated with great loss. When the Carthaginians appeared in the island, the force of the insurrection was already spent. The prætor Titus Manlius Torquatus had arrived from Rome with a new legion, which raised the Roman army in the island to 22,000 foot and 1,200 horse. He defeated the united forces of the Carthaginians and revolted Sardinians in a decisive battle, whereupon Hampsicoras put an end to his life, and the insurrection in the island was eventually suppressed.

Alliance of

While thus the sky was clearing in the west, a new

unusually large scale. Arnold (*History of Rome*, iii. 260) says: 'The Roman annalists, whom Livy has copied here, seem to have outdone their usual exaggerations in describing the exploits of the two Scipios, and what amount of truth may be concealed beneath this mass of fiction we are wholly unable to discover.'

¹ See above, p. 270.

² Livy, xxiii. 41: 'Hanno, auctor rebellionis Sardis, bellique eius haud dubie concitor.'

³ Livy, xxiii. 34.

storm seemed to be gathering in the east. Since the Romans had obtained a footing in Illyria, they had ceased to be uninterested spectators of the disputes which agitated the eastern peninsula,¹ and they had assumed the character of patrons of Greek liberty and independence. By this policy, and by their conquests in Illyria, they had become the natural opponents of Macedonia, whose kings had steadily aimed at the sovereignty over the whole of Greece. The jealousy between Macedonia and Rome favoured the ambitious plans of Demetrius of Pharos, the Illyrian adventurer whom the Romans had at first favoured and then expelled, 219 B.C.² Demetrius took refuge at the court of King Philip of Macedonia, and did all in his power to urge him to a war with Rome. Hannibal also had hoped for the co-operation of the Macedonian king. But the so-called Social War which Philip and the Achaian league carried on since 220 B.C. against the piratical Ætolians occupied him so much that he had no leisure for another enterprise. Then the news reached him of the invasion of Italy by Hannibal. The gigantic struggle between the two most powerful nations of their time attracted specially the attention of the Greeks. In the year 217 B.C. Philip was in the Peloponnesus. It happened to be the time of the Nemean games, with which, as with the other great festivals of the Greek nation, not even war was allowed to interfere. The king, surrounded by his courtiers and favourites, was looking on at the games, when a messenger arrived straight from Macedonia and brought the first news of Hannibal's great victory at the lake Thrasymenus. Demetrius of Pharos, the king's confidential friend, was by his side. Philip immediately imparted the news to him and asked his advice. Demetrius eagerly seized the opportunity to urge the king to a war with Rome, in which he hoped to regain his lost possessions

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Philip of
Macedonia
with Han-
nibal.

¹ This was the real beginning of that revolution which Polybius (v. 105) places in the year 217 B.C., and traces to the peace of Naupactos. See p. 278, note 1.

² See above, p. 138 ff.

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in Illyria. At his suggestion Philip resolved to end the war in Greece as soon as possible, and to prepare for a war with Rome. He hastened to conclude peace at Naupactos¹ with the Ætolians, and forthwith began hostilities by land and sea against the allies and dependents of Rome in Illyria. But he displayed neither promptness, energy, nor courage. He took a few insignificant places from the Illyrian prince Skerdilaidas, an ally of the Romans; but when he had reached the Ionian Sea with his fleet of one hundred small undecked galleys of Illyrian construction (*lembi*), in the hope of being able to take Apollonia by surprise, he was so frightened by a false report of the approach of a Roman fleet, that he made a precipitate and ignominious retreat. Perhaps he was already disheartened, and beginning to repent the step which he had taken, when in 216 B.C. the news of the battle of Cannæ and of the revolt of Capua and other Roman allies inspired him with new hope, and induced him to conclude with Hannibal a formal alliance, by which he promised his active co-operation in the war in Italy, on condition that Hannibal, after the overthrow of the Roman power, should assist him to establish the Macedonian supremacy in the eastern peninsula and islands.² Thus the calculations and expectations with which Hannibal had begun the war seemed on the point of being realised, and the fruits of his great victories to be gradually maturing.

Mistaken
policy of
Philip.

The Romans had watched the movements of Philip with increasing anxiety. As long as he was implicated in the Greek Social War, he was unable to do any mischief. But when he brought this war to a hasty conclusion to have his hands free against Illyria and Rome, the senate made an attempt to frighten him by demanding the extradition of Demetrius of Pharos.³ When Philip refused

¹ Polybius (v. 105) dates from this peace the complication of the politics of the eastern and western states of the Mediterranean, which had formerly been independent of each other, but were henceforward determined by Rome. *Τὰς μὲν οὖν Ἑλληνικὰς καὶ τὰς Ἰταλικὰς, ἔτι δὲ τὰς Λιβυκὰς πράξεις οὗτος ὁ καιρὸς καὶ τοῦτο τὸ διαβούλιον συνέπλεξε πρῶτον, κ.τ.λ.*

² Polybius, vii. 9. Livy, xxiii. 33. Zonaras, ix. 4. ³ See above, p. 226.

this demand and followed up his refusal by an attack upon Illyricum, Rome was *de facto* at war with Macedonia; but the condition of the republic was such that the senate was compelled to ignore the hostility of the Macedonian king as long as he made no direct attack upon Italy. But when, in the year 215 B.C., an embassy which Philip had sent to Hannibal fell into their hands, they learnt with terror that, in addition to the war which they had to carry on in Italy, Spain, and Sardinia, they would have to undertake another in the east of the Adriatic. They did not, however, shrink from the new danger, and, in fact, they had no choice. They strengthened their fleet at Tarentum and the army which the prætor M. Valerius Lævinus commanded in Apulia, and made all the necessary preparations for anticipating an attack of Philip in Italy by an invasion of his own dominions.¹ But it seems that Philip never earnestly contemplated the idea of carrying the war into Italy. He was bent only on profiting by the embarrassment of the Romans to pursue his plans of aggrandisement in Greece. It was, therefore, easy for the Romans to keep him occupied at home by promising their support to all who were threatened by Philip's ambitious projects; and the military resources of Macedonia, which, if they had been employed in Italy in conjunction with and under the direction of Hannibal, might have turned the scale against Rome, were wasted in Greece in a succession of unprofitable petty encounters.

¹ On this occasion they sent to Valerius a sum of money, which was originally destined to repay Hiero of Syracuse for his loan of the preceding year. At the same time Hiero again supplied 200,000 modii of wheat (Livy, xxiii. 38). This proves sufficiently that Hiero did not die before 215 B.C., as has been supposed.—See Mommsen, *Röm. Gesch.* i. 615; English translation, ii. 133.

Third Period of the Hannibalian War.

THE WAR IN SICILY, 215-212 B.C.

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Death of
Hiero,
king of
Syracuse.

Sicily, the principal theatre of the first war between Rome and Carthage, had hitherto been almost exempt from the ravages of the second. While Italy, Spain, and Sardinia were visited and suffering by it, Sicily had only been threatened now and then by the Carthaginian fleets, but had never been seriously attacked. But now, in the fourth year of the war, an event took place destined to bring over the island all the worst calamities of an internecine struggle, and to give the final blow to the declining prosperity of the Greek cities. In the year 215 B.C. King Hiero of Syracuse died, at the advanced age of more than ninety years, and after a prosperous reign of fifty-four. He was among the last of that class of men produced by the Greek world with wonderful exuberance, who were called 'tyrants' in more ancient times, and who afterwards, when that name lost its original and inoffensive signification, preferred to call themselves 'kings.' The best, and also the worst, of these rulers had sprung up in Syracuse, a city which had tried in rapid succession all forms of government, and had never long been able to abide by any. Syracuse had seen the arbitrary, but in their way honourable, tyrants Gelon and the elder Hiero; then the blood-stained first Dionysius, and his son, the consummate ideal of a man of terror; afterwards Agathokles, great and brave as a soldier, but detestable as a man; and, lastly, the wise and moderate Hiero II., under whose mild sceptre she once more revived, after a period of anarchy and depression, and enjoyed a long peace, security, and well-being in the midst of the most devastating wars. Polybius¹ bestows on Hiero full and well-deserved praise,

¹ Polybius, vii. 8.

and his honourable testimony deserves to be recorded. 'Hiero,' he says, 'obtained the government of Syracuse by his own personal merit; fortune had given him neither wealth, nor glory, nor anything else. And what is of all things the most wonderful, he made himself the king of Syracuse without killing, driving into exile, or harming a single citizen, and he exercised his power in the same manner in which he had acquired it. For fifty-four years he preserved peace in his native city, and the government for himself, without danger of conspiracy, escaping that jealousy which generally fastens itself on greatness. Often he proposed to lay down his power, but was prevented by the universal wish of his fellow-citizens. He became the benefactor of the Greeks, and strove to win their approval. Thus he gained great glory for himself, and won from all people great good-will for the men of Syracuse. Though he lived surrounded by magnificence and luxury, he reached the great age of more than ninety years, retaining possession of all his senses with unimpaired health of body, which seems to me to be a most convincing proof of a rational life.'

Such a ruler was the best constitution for Syracuse, where republican freedom never failed to produce civil war, anarchy, and all imaginable horrors. Hiero renewed the laws which, about a century and a half before his time, had been enacted in Syracuse by Diokles, and, what was of far more importance, he took care that they should be enforced. He seems to have bestowed his especial care on the improvement of agriculture, industrial pursuits, and commerce, and on healing the wounds which the long wars had inflicted on his country. Thus it is explained how he was always able to supply money, corn, and other necessities of war when his allies needed his aid. But he was at the same time a patron of art, and animated by the desire of gaining the approbation of the whole Hellenic race—a desire which had been strong in his predecessors Gelon and Hiero, and even in the blood-stained tyrant Dionysius. He embellished the city of

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Character
of Hiero's
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Syracuse with splendid and useful buildings, contested in the great national games of the Greeks the prizes which were the highest peaceful honours that a Greek could aspire to; he erected statues at Olympia,¹ and patronised poets like Theokritos, and practical philosophers like Archimedes. Of his Greek national spirit, and at the same time of his humane sentiments and of his wealth, he gave a striking proof when, in 227 B.C., the city of Rhodes was visited by a terrible earthquake, which destroyed the walls, dockyards, a great part of the town, and also the far-famed colossus. It was not the universal custom in antiquity, as it is at present in the civilised world, to relieve extraordinary calamities like this by charitable contributions from all parts. But Hiero's proper feelings supplied the force of custom. He readily and liberally succoured the distressed Rhodians, giving them more than one hundred talents of silver and fifty catapults, and exempting their ships from tolls and dues in the port of Syracuse. For this liberality, which was entirely his own doing, he gracefully and modestly disclaimed any personal merit, by putting up in Rhodes a group of statues representing the city of Syracuse in the act of crowning her sister city.²

Relations
of Hiero
with Rome
and Car-
thage.

How Hiero assisted Rome with never-failing zeal and loyalty we have noticed on several occasions. It was by this steadfast and honest policy that he succeeded in keeping unscathed the independence of Syracuse during the contest of his two powerful neighbours. When peace was concluded after the first Punic war, this independence was formally recognised, and Hiero had now good reason to persevere in his attachment to Rome, which had proved her superiority over Carthage, and was now mistress of the greater part of Sicily, exercising that influence over him which a patron has over his client. Nevertheless he did not hesitate to render, in the Mercenary War, that essential service to Carthage which seemed to him called for.

¹ Pausanias, vi. 15, 3.

² Polybius, v. 88.

He wished to preserve a balance of power, and the Romans had no just cause or pretext to interfere with him, though, from their ungenerous policy with regard to Carthage at this time, they must have been annoyed at any support being given to their rivals. In the year 237 B.C. Hiero paid a visit to Rome, was present at the public games, and distributed 200,000 modii of corn among the people. Perhaps the journey was not undertaken merely for pleasure. It was not customary at that time for princes to travel for their amusement. Hiero went to Rome soon after the disgraceful stroke of policy by which the Romans had acquired possession of Sardinia; ¹ and it is not at all unlikely that, even at that early period, four years after the termination of the first Punic war, a desire was manifested in Rome to annex the Syracusan dominions to the Roman province of Sicily, and thus to prevent the possibility of Carthage finding in some future war friends or allies in Syracuse. If, indeed, such dangers were then threatening his independence, Hiero succeeded in removing them, and, by renewed proofs of sincere attachment, was able to maintain himself in the favour of his too powerful friends. The Gallic war (225 B.C.) gave him again an opportunity for it; ² and soon after the breaking out of the second Punic war, he showed his unaltered zeal and attachment by sending auxiliaries and supplies, in 217 and 216 B.C.³ It seemed that, of all parts of the Roman dominions, Sicily was most exposed to the attacks of the Carthaginians, and the most serious danger arose from the existence of a strong Carthaginian party within the island. Sicily had been so long under Carthaginian dominion or influence that here, as well as in Sardinia, such a party could not fail to exist. It was of course made up chiefly of the large number of men who had suffered by the change of masters, and were hoping for better things from a return of the Carthaginians. The whole of Sicily, as the succeeding events prove, was in a

¹ See above, p. 120. ² See above, p. 132, n. 2. ³ See above, pp. 200, 226.

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state of fermentation, and it required but a slight impulse to rouse a great part of the population to take up arms against Rome. This impulse was given in 215 B.C. by the death of Hiero, which produced an effect so much the more fatal as his son Gelon, who seems to have shared his sentiments and policy, had died shortly before him, leaving only a son, called Hieronymus, a boy of fifteen years.¹

Effects of
Roman
supremacy
in Sicily.

Of the condition of Sicily since its acquisition ² by Rome in 241 B.C., we can form only an imperfect notion. We may suppose that, upon the whole, the material prosperity of the island was gradually increasing, after the ending of the destructive internal wars; but we should not wonder if the compulsory peace which the different communities of Sicily were now enjoying had been felt by many to be a mark of their subjection. The towns which during the war with Carthage had joined the Roman side—such as Segesta, Panormus, Centuripa, Alæsa, Halicyæ—occupied a privileged position and were free from all taxes and services. The Mamertines of Messina were regarded as allies of Rome, and supplied their contingent of ships like the Greek towns in Italy. All the other towns were tributary, and paid the tenth part of the produce of their land. This liability implied no oppression, for most of the Sicilians had in former times paid the same tax to the Carthaginians, or to the government of Syracuse. But the Romans placed on the free intercourse between the different communities restrictions which must have been felt as highly injurious and annoying. No Sicilian was allowed to acquire landed property beyond the limits of his native community, and the right of intermarriage and

¹ According to Livy (xxiii. 30), the disposition of Gelon was hostile to Rome, and his sudden death caused the suspicion that Hiero was the cause of it. But this statement is refuted by Polybius, from whose accounts (v. 88, vii. 8, § 9) it appears that Gelon, down to the very last years of his father's life, was associated with him in the government, and conformed in all respects to his father's wishes.

² It is of course understood that we speak only of the Roman portion of Sicily, *i.e.* of Sicily apart from the kingdom of Syracuse.

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inheritance was probably confined within the same narrow bounds, Roman citizens and the people of the few favoured towns being alone exempt from this restriction. Thus every town in Sicily was, to a great extent, isolated, and the limited competition placed the privileged few at a great advantage both in the acquisition of land and in every kind of trade and commerce. Under such circumstances the freedom from military service was probably not felt to be a great boon, especially as at that time the prospect of booty and military pay was no doubt attractive to many of the impoverished population. Since 227 B.C. Sicily was placed under a prætor, who conducted the whole civil and military administration, including that of justice. This was the beginning of those annual viceroyalties with unlimited power which, in course of time, became the terrible scourge of the Roman provinces, and almost neutralized the advantages which, by the inforcement of internal peace, Rome was able to bestow on the countries round the Mediterranean. The Roman nobles could not resist the temptation of abusing, for their own profit, the public authority which was intrusted to them for the government of the provinces; and as long as the Roman republic lasted, it never succeeded, in spite of many attempts, in putting down this great evil.

The consequences of the discontent in Sicily, and of the revolution which followed the death of Hiero, did not assume a threatening aspect till the following year. In the meantime the attention of the Roman senate was absorbed by other things nearer home. Since the censorship of C. Flaminius and L. Æmilius in the year 220, the senate had not been formally reconstituted. The public magistrates, from the quæstors upwards, enjoyed, it is true, the right, after the termination of their office, of joining in the deliberations of the senate, and of voting; but their number was not sufficient, even under ordinary circumstances, to keep the senate at its normal strength of three hundred members, and the censors were therefore obliged, every five years, on the revision of the list of senators, to

Re-consti-
tution of
the Roman
senate.

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admit into the senate a number of men from the general body of the citizens, who had not yet discharged any public office. But now the circumstances were most extraordinary. Many senators had fallen in battle; eighty were said to have perished at Cannæ alone. Many were absent on the public service in various parts of Italy, in Spain, Sardinia, and Sicily. The senate therefore was reduced in numbers as it never had been since the establishment of the republic. Accordingly, when, in 216 B.C., the government had first taken measures for raising new armies, for providing the means of defence, and for prosecuting the war vigorously in every direction, it occupied itself with the task of filling up the numerous vacancies in the senate.¹ It was found necessary to make a wholesale addition of new senators, such as had been made, according to tradition, by Brutus after the expulsion of the kings. For this extraordinary measure the official authority of a regular censor seemed to be insufficient. Recourse was had therefore to the dictatorship, an office which in times of special difficulties had always rendered excellent service to the state. The disastrous year of the battle of Cannæ, 216 B.C., had not yet come to an end, and the dictator M. Junius Pera² was still in office, occupied with organizing the means of defence. As it seemed unadvisable to divert his attention from his more immediate duties, a proposal was made and adopted to elect a second dictator for the special purpose of raising the senate to its normal number—an innovation which shows that, under extraordinary circumstances, the Romans were not entirely the slaves of custom, but could adapt their institutions to the requirements of the time. C. Terentius Varro was called upon to nominate to the dictatorship the oldest of those who had discharged the office of censors before. This was M. Fabius Buteo, who had been consul in 245 B.C., five years before the close of the first Punic war, and censor in 241 at the time when that war was concluded.

¹ Livy, xxiii. 22.² See above, p. 243.

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In the debate which now took place in the senate with respect to the nomination of new members, Spurius Carvilius proposed to admit two men from every Latin town. Never was a wiser proposal made than this, and no season was more suitable than the present¹ for reinvigorating the Roman people with new blood, and for spreading the feeling and the right of citizenship over Italy. The Latins were in every respect worthy to be admitted to a share in the Roman franchise, and without their fidelity and courage Rome would undoubtedly have lost her preponderance in Italy and perhaps her independence. If now the best men from the several Latin towns had been received as representatives of those towns into the Roman senate, a step would have been taken leading to a sort of representative constitution, and tending to diminish the monopoly of legislative power enjoyed by the urban population of Rome, a monopoly which became more and more injurious and unnatural with the territorial extension of the republic. As yet no Latin town had exhibited the least system of discontent or disloyalty, and a generous and conciliatory policy on the part of Rome could not have been looked upon as a result of fear or of intimidation. But the Roman pride revolted now, as it had done more than a century before, and as it did again more than a century later,² at the idea of admitting strangers to an equality with Romans; and Spurius Carvilius was silenced almost as if he had been a traitor to the majesty of Rome. His proposal was treated as if it had not been made, and the senators were bound not to divulge it,³ lest the Latins should venture to hope that hereafter they might possibly gain admission into the sanctuary of the Roman senate.

¹ The Roman sentiment is expressed in the words which Livy puts into the mouth of Q. Fabius (xxiii. 22): 'Nunquam rei ullius alieniore tempore mentionem factam in senatu, quam inter tam suspensos sociorum animos incertamque fidem id tactum, quod insuper sollicitaret eos.'

² In 340 and 90 B.C.

³ Livy, xxiii. 22: 'Si quid unquam arcani sanctive ad silendum in curia fuerit, id omnium maxime tegendum occultandum obliviscendum, pro non dicto habendum esse. Ita eius rei oppressa mentio est.'

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A list of one hundred and seventy-seven new senators was drawn up, consisting of men who had discharged public offices, or proved themselves to be valiant soldiers. As soon as Fabius had performed this formal duty, he abdicated the dictatorship.

Financial
difficulties.

The most difficult task which the reorganised senate had to perform was to restore order in the finances, or rather to provide means for continuing the war. The public treasury was empty, the demands made upon the state for the maintenance of the fleets and armies became greater from year to year, and in the same proportion the resources of the state were diminished.¹ The revenues of Sicily and Sardinia were not even sufficient for the support of the forces necessary for the defence of these islands, and could not therefore be applied to other purposes. A large portion of Italy was in possession of the enemy, and all its produce was lost to Rome. The tithes and rents of the state domains, the pastures, woods, mines, and saltworks in Campania, Samnium, Apulia, Lucania, and Bruttium were no longer paid, or not paid with regularity. Even where the enemy was not in actual possession, the war had reduced the public income. Many thousand citizens and tax-payers had fallen in battle or were in captivity; the scarcity of hands began to tell on the cultivation of the land; the families whose heads or supporters were serving in the army fell into poverty and debt, and the republic had already contracted loans in Sicily and Sardinia which it was unable to repay.² The senate now adopted the plan of doubling the taxes,³ a most unsafe expedient, by which the extreme limit of the tax-paying power of the community could not fail soon to be reached or passed, and which accordingly paralysed this power for the future. But even this measure was not sufficient. Large sums of ready money were wanted to purchase supplies of provisions, clothing, and materials of war for the armies. The senate appealed to the patriotism of the rich, and the con-

¹ Livy, xxiii. 48.

² See above, p. 279, note 2.

³ Livy, xxiii. 31.

sequence was the formation of three companies of army purveyors, who undertook to supply all that was needed and to give the public credit till the end of the war. They only stipulated for freedom from military service for themselves, and required that the state should undertake the sea and war risks¹ of the cargoes afloat. This offer seemed noble and generous; but experience showed that the most sordid motives had more share in it than patriotism or public spirit.

To obtain a supply of rowers for the fleet, the wealthier class of citizens were called upon to furnish, in proportion to their property, from one to eight men, and food for a period of from six to twelve months.² In proposing this measure, the senate gave a proof of its devotion to the common cause; for the senators, as belonging to the richest class in the state, had to contribute most. But the middle class would not be surpassed by the senatorial order. Horsemen and officers refused to take pay,³ and the owners of the slaves who had been drafted for military service waived their right to compensation for their loss. The undertakers of public works and of repairs of temples and public buildings promised to wait till the conclusion of peace before claiming payment; trust moneys were applied to the use of the state:⁴ a universal enthusiasm had seized the whole nation. Every individual citizen looked for his own safety only in the safety of the commonwealth, and to save the commonwealth no sacrifice was held too dear.⁵

One of the financial measures of this time, dating from the year 216 B.C., was the appointment of a commission,⁶ similar, as we may suppose, to that which in the year 352 B.C.⁷ relieved the debts of a great mass of the people by loans on sufficient security. But no satisfactory account

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sion of the
year
216 B.C.¹ Livy, xxiii. 48.² Livy, xxiv. 11.³ Livy, xxiv. 18.⁴ Livy, xxiv. 18.⁵ This conviction is beautifully expressed in the words which Livy (xxvi. 36) puts into the mouth of the consul Lævinus: 'Res publica incolumis et privatas res facile salvus prestat; publica prodendo tua nequicquam serves.'⁶ 'Triumviri mensarii.'—Livy, xxiii. 20.⁷ See vol. i. p. 343.

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is given of the proceedings of this commission, and we may reasonably doubt whether it effected much. It is one of the most difficult, and as yet unsolved, problems of financial skill to procure money where there is none. Paper has been a great temporary resource to modern financiers. But the Romans were innocent of this contrivance, and it is not likely, therefore, that they effected more than the alchemists of the middle ages, who vainly sought the secret of changing base metal into gold.¹

Sumptuary
laws.

In times of extreme danger, when the commonwealth is suffering from an insufficiency of means, it seems unnatural and unjustifiable that private citizens should indulge in an unnecessary display of riches. On the contrary it seems just that private wealth should be made to minister to the necessities of the state. This, at any rate, was the feeling of the Romans when they strained every nerve to make head against Carthage. They hit upon the idea of limiting private extravagance. On the motion of the tribune C. Oppius, a law was passed forbidding the women to apply more than half an ounce of gold for their personal ornaments, to dress in coloured (*i.e.* purple) robes, and to drive within the town in carriages.² This law was enforced; but the Roman ladies found it a great hardship, and submitted to it with a heavy heart as long as the war lasted, but not longer, as we shall see in the sequel.

Amount of
the Roman
levies.

The extraordinary measures adopted for replenishing the public treasury were not superfluous. For the coming year Rome maintained not less than twenty-one legions and a fleet of one hundred and fifty vessels.³ The war assumed larger proportions from year to year, and baffled all the calculations which had been made at its commence-

¹ If, as was afterwards related, one thousand pounds of gold, being the ransom of Rome which Camillus took from the Gauls, had been kept at that time in the temple of the Capitoline Jupiter, it seems that even the priests would have consented to take this sum at present for the service of the state, at least on loan. See vol. i. p. 273.

² Livy, xxiv. 1.

³ Livy (xxiv. 11), it is true, mentions only eighteen legions, but he neglects to speak of the three which were in Spain.

ment, when one consular army in Spain and one in Africa were supposed to be sufficient to resist the power of Carthage. Eight legions alone were required to keep Hannibal in check; three were employed in the north of Italy against the Gauls; one was kept ready near Brundisium to meet the expected attack of the king of Macedonia; two formed the garrison of Rome; two held Sicily, and two Sardinia. Including the army engaged in Spain, the Roman land and sea forces cannot have amounted to less than 200,000 men, that is, one-fourth of the population of Italy capable of bearing arms.

The results accomplished were not what might have been expected from this prodigious display of strength, although Fabius and Marcellus, the two ablest generals that Rome possessed, were elected consuls for the year 214. The events of this year are of trifling importance, and can be summed up in a few words. Hannibal was prevented from gaining more ground in Italy; his attempts to get possession of Neapolis, Tarentum, and Puteoli were thwarted; his lieutenant Hanno, with an army consisting chiefly of Bruttians and Lucanians, was defeated near Beneventum by Gracchus, who commanded the corps of 6,000 slaves raised after the battle of Cannæ, and now rewarded their courage by giving them their freedom.¹ Hannibal, it is alleged,² was repulsed a third time by Marcellus at Nola, and (what was for him the greatest loss) Casilinum was retaken by the Romans, owing to the treason and cowardice of 2,000 Campanian soldiers of the garrison, who, by betraying the town and seven hundred men of Hannibal's troops, sought to purchase their own safety.³

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Recovery
of Casili-
num, and
repulse of
Hannibal
at Nola.

¹ Is it mere chance that it was a Gracchus who erected a temple of 'Liberty' (Livy, xxiv. 16), and again a Gracchus who was the first to enfranchise a great number of slaves?

² Livy, xxiv. 17.

³ Livy's narrative (xxiv. 19) is somewhat obscure. It appears that the 2,000 Campanians surrendered to the consul Fabius on condition of being allowed to leave the town unmolested and to retire to Capua. But when they were in the act of evacuating Casilinum, the consul Marcellus broke the capitulation, penetrated into the town, and ordered an attack upon the retiring garrison. Only 500 Campanians, who had already gained the open country,

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Meanwhile the king of Macedonia did not make the expected attack on Italy. The Gauls, after their great victory over Postumius early in the year 215,¹ remained quiet; several Samnite communities that had revolted were again subdued by the Romans and severely punished. It seemed that Hannibal must soon be crushed by the overwhelming power of his enemies, whilst the reinforcements for which he looked were delayed, and his friends and allies became either lukewarm or weak. Yet the terror of his name was undiminished. He was a power in himself, independent of all co-operation from without, and no Roman general ventured as yet to attack him, even with the greatest superiority of numbers.

Revolution
in Sicily.

Meanwhile a revolution had taken place in Sicily which in an unexpected manner revived the hopes of Carthage. Hiero's grandson and successor, Hieronymus, a boy of fifteen, was entirely guided by a few ambitious men and women, who deluded themselves with the hope of being able to make use of the war between Rome and Carthage for the aggrandisement of the power of Syracuse and of the royal house.² Andranodoros and Zoippos, the sons-in-law of Hiero, and Themistos, the husband of a daughter of Gelon, having put aside, soon after Hiero's death, the council of regency of fifteen members which had been

were safely conducted to Capua by order of Fabius. The rest of the Campanians, and the 700 men of Hannibal's army, were either cut down or sent as prisoners to Rome. The pretext for this action of Marcellus, which looks very much like treachery, was, according to Livy, that 'Casilinum was taken by a sudden assault, whilst the garrison was negotiating for a capitulation and hesitating.' We feel here the want of an independent historian. No doubt a Carthaginian would represent as an act of outrageous perfidy what, even under the skilful colouring of a Roman patriot, appears as a very doubtful transaction. The inhabitants of Casilinum were sent to the neighbouring towns to be kept as prisoners. Here the question arises who these inhabitants were. Of the original inhabitants of Casilinum, those whose loyalty to Rome was suspected had been put to death by the Roman garrison during the first siege (see above, p. 265). The remainder, we may suppose, were faithful to Rome, unless after the taking of Casilinum by Hannibal these were expelled, and new settlers introduced of the Carthaginian party in and about Capua.

¹ See above, p. 271.

² Polybius, vii. 5, § 4.

established by Hiero for the guidance of his youthful successor, persuaded the boy that he was old enough to be independent of guardians and councillors, and thus they practically seized the government themselves. In vain the dying Hiero had conjured his family to continue his policy of a close alliance with Rome, which had so far proved eminently successful. They were not satisfied with simply preserving the government of Syracuse and the small part of Sicily which the Romans had allowed Hiero to retain. Seeing no chance of enlarging the Syracusan dominion by free concessions on the part of the Romans, they directed their hopes towards Carthage, which after the battle of Cannæ seemed to them to have gained a decided superiority.

Hiero had scarcely closed his eyes when Hieronymus opened communications with Carthage. Hannibal, who in the midst of his military operations watched and guided the policy of the Carthaginian government, sent to Syracuse two men who were eminently fitted by their descent and abilities to act as negotiators between the two states. These were two brothers, Hippokrates and Epikydes, Carthaginians by birth and Syracusans by descent, their grandfather having been expelled from his native country by the tyrant Agathokles, and having settled in Carthage and married a Carthaginian wife.¹ They had long served in Hannibal's army, and were equally distinguished as soldiers and as politicians. As soon as they arrived in Syracuse, they exercised unbounded influence as the advisers of Hieronymus. They promised him at first the possession of half the island, and when they found that his wishes went further, they at once agreed that he should be king of all Sicily after the expulsion of the Romans. It was not worth while, the Carthaginians thought, to haggle about the price to be paid to so valuable an ally, especially as the payment was to be made at the expense of the common enemy. These transactions between Hieronymus and

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Negotia-
tions
between
Hannibal
and
Hieronymus.

¹ Polybius, vii. 2.

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Carthage could not be carried on in secret. They became known to Appius Claudius, who, commanding as prætor in Sicily in 215, repeatedly sent messengers to Syracuse, warning the king of any steps which might endanger his friendly relations with Rome.¹ In truth Rome ought to have at once declared war; but she was little inclined, and not at all prepared, in the year after Cannæ to meet a new enemy, and Claudius probably entertained hopes of gaining his end without a rupture, either by intimidation or by an internal revolution in Syracuse.

Repub-
lican
reaction in
Syracuse.

Such hopes were not unfounded; for, immediately after the death of Hiero, a republican party had been formed at Syracuse, headed by the wealthiest and most influential citizens. The turbulent Syracusans had now quietly submitted for an unusually long time to a stable and orderly government. As during Hiero's lifetime all opposition would have been nipped in the bud by the king's popularity, not less than by his prudence and caution, the republicans had not stirred; but Hieronymus inspired contempt by his folly and arrogance, and he provoked the enemies of despotism by showing that he possessed the qualities, not of his grandfather, but of the worst tyrants that had preceded him. Whilst Hiero, in his dress and mode of living, had made no distinction between himself and the simple citizens, Syracuse now, as in the days of the tyrant Dionysius, saw her ruler surrounded by royal pomp, wearing a diadem and purple robes, and followed by armed body-guards. His authority was no longer based on the willing submission of the people, but on foreign mercenaries and on the lowest populace, who had always hailed the advent of tyrants, and hoped from them a share in the spoils of the rich. The better class of citizens desired the overthrow of despotic government and an alliance with the Romans, the natural friends and patrons of the aristocratic party.

Death of
Hierony-
mus.

The fermentation continued during the remainder of the

¹ Polybius, vii. 3. Livy, xxiv. 6.

year 215. One of the conspirators was discovered and cruelly tortured, but died without naming his accomplices. Many innocent persons were put to death, and Hieronymus, thinking himself safe, was prosecuting his schemes for the enlargement of his kingdom in 214, when he was betrayed by one of his own body-guard into the hands of the conspirators, who killed him as he was passing through a narrow lane in the city of Leontini. This deed was the signal for one of those sanguinary civil wars which so often convulsed the unhappy city of Syracuse. Whilst the body of Hieronymus lay neglected in the street at Leontini, the conspirators rushed back to Syracuse, to call the people to arms and to liberty. A rumour of what had happened had preceded them, and when they arrived in the evening, bearing the blood-stained cloak and the diadem of the tyrant, the whole town was in a fever of excitement. When the death of Hieronymus became known for certain, the people rushed into the temples and tore from the walls the Gallic arms which Hiero had received from the Romans as his share of the booty after the victory at Telamon. Sentinels were placed in different parts of the town, and all important posts were secured. In the course of the night the whole of Syracuse was in the power of the insurgents, with the exception of the island Ortygia.

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This small island was the place where the first Greek colonists had settled. As the town increased in population, the inhabitants removed to the adjoining mainland, and the island Ortygia became the fortress of Syracuse. A narrow strip of land connected it with the mainland, but the access was defended by strong lines of wall. Behind these walls the masters of Syracuse had frequently defied their insurgent subjects, and from this stronghold they had issued to regain their authority. For a moment this was now attempted by Andranodoros, who after the death of Hieronymus was the head of the royal family, and was stimulated by his ambitious wife Damarate, the daughter of Hiero, to resist the insurgents and to uphold the cause

Surrender
of Ortygia
by Andra-
nodoros.

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of monarchy. But he found that a part of the garrison of Ortygia was inclined to side with the conspirators, and there was, consequently, nothing left to him but to declare his adhesion to the popular cause and to deliver up to the republicans the keys of the fortress. He even affected zeal in joining the revolutionary party, and was elected as one of the magistrates to govern the new republic. The cause of liberty triumphed, and with it the policy of those sensible and moderate men who wished to remain faithful to the Roman alliance. Hippokrates and Epikydes, the agents of Hannibal, found that their mission had failed, and that they could no longer safely remain in Syracuse. They requested a safe-conduct to return to Italy into Hannibal's camp.

Massacre
of the
family of
Hiero.

But Andranodoros had not given up the hope of preserving the dominion over Syracuse for himself and the family of Hiero. He was suspected, justly or unjustly, of a plan for overthrowing the republican government and for assassinating its chiefs. Impartial inquiry and fair trial were never thought of in the civil broils of Syracuse. The party that brought forward an accusation acted at the same time as judge and executioner, and resorted to violence and treachery without the least scruple. Accordingly, when Andranodoros one day entered the senate with his kinsman Themistos, the husband of Gelon's daughter, they were both seized and put to death. Nor did their death seem a sufficient guarantee for the safety of the republic against a restoration of the monarchy. It was resolved to root out the whole family of Hiero. Murderers were dispatched to the palace, which now became a scene of the most atrocious carnage. Damarate, the daughter, and Harmonia, the grand-daughter, of Hiero, were murdered first. Herakleia, another daughter of Hiero, and wife of Zoippos, who was at that time absent in Egypt, fled with her two youthful daughters into a domestic sanctuary, and in vain implored mercy for herself and her innocent children. She was dragged away from the altar and butchered. Her daughters, besprinkled with their mother's blood, only

prolonged their sufferings by trying to escape, and fell at last under the blows of their pursuers.¹ Thus was destroyed the house of a prince who had ruled over Syracuse for half a century, and had been universally admired and envied as one of the wisest, happiest, and best of men.

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This deed of horror bore evil fruits to the authors. It could not fail to bring about a reaction in public opinion, and consequently when, soon after, two new magistrates were elected in the place of Andranodoros and Themistos, the choice of the people fell on Hippokrates and Epikydes, who, in the hope of some such chance, had prolonged their stay in Syracuse, and had, no doubt, in doing so risked their lives. Their election was evidently to be attributed to the populace and the army, which began to exercise more and more influence in the civil affairs of Syracuse, and a considerable part of which consisted of Roman deserters, who wished at all hazards to bring about a rupture with Rome.² From this moment began the counter-revolution, which was soon followed by the most deplorable anarchy. When the magistrates showed their desire to renew the Roman alliance, and for this purpose sent messengers to the prætor and received Roman messengers in return, the people and the army began to be agitated. The agitation increased when a Carthaginian fleet showed itself in the neighbourhood of Pachynus, inspiring the enemies of Rome with confidence and courage. When, therefore, Appius Claudius, to counteract this movement, appeared with a Roman fleet at the mouth of the harbour, the Carthaginian party thought themselves betrayed, and the crowd rushed tumultuously into the port to resist a landing of the Romans, if they should attempt it.³

Counter
revolution
in Syra-
cuse.

¹ Livy, xxiv. 26.

² Livy, xxiv. 23, 10.

³ Livy, xxiv. 27. We are here involuntarily reminded of the events which in 282 led to the war with Tarentum. In both cases, the Roman fleet came to the support of a Roman party. But in Tarentum it appears that the government was in the hands of the democrats hostile to Rome, while in Syracuse, with the exception of Hippokrates and Epikydes, the magistrates belonged to the Roman party. The Romans might therefore claim a formal right to enter

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ginian
party at
Syracuse.

Thus the unhappy town was torn by two hostile parties; nor was the form of government the only object of contention. The independence and the very existence of Syracuse were involved in the struggle. For a time it seemed that the government, and with it the friends of Rome, would prevail. The greatest obstacles in the way of an arrangement with Rome were the two Carthaginian brothers, who, from being the agents and messengers of Hannibal, had been elected among the Syracusan magistrates. If these two men could be got rid of, the government, it was thought, was strong enough to carry out its policy of reconciliation with Rome. Force could not be employed against men who enjoyed the favour of a great mass of the people and were the idols of the soldiers. But a decent pretext was not wanting. The town of Leontini asked for military protection. Hippokrates was sent thither with a body of 4,000 men. But no sooner did he find himself in possession of an independent command than he began to act in direct opposition to the government. He incited the people of Leontini to assert their independence of Syracuse, and, to precipitate matters, he surprised and cut to pieces a military post of the Romans on the frontier, and thus *de facto* commenced the war with Rome. As yet, however, the government of Syracuse was not compromised by this act of hostility. They disavowed all participation in this violation of the still existing alliance, and offered to put down the rebellion of Hippokrates and the Leontinians in conjunction with a Roman force. The Roman prætor Marcellus, however, did not wait for the co-operation of the Syracusan force, which, 8,000 strong, left Syracuse under the command of their 'strategoi.' Before they arrived Marcellus had taken Leontini by force, and had inflicted severe punishment on the rebels and mutineers. Two thousand Roman deserters who had been taken in the town were scourged and beheaded. Hippokrates and his brother escaped with difficulty to the neighbouring

the harbour of Syracuse, as the allies of the government; but even this plea was wanting in the case of Tarentum.—See vol. i. p. 489 ff.

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fort of Herbessos. Again the Carthaginian party seemed annihilated, but again the cruelty shown by their opponents brought about a reaction. When the Syracusan troops, on their march to Leontini, heard of the storming of the town by the Romans, and of the terrible punishment inflicted on the citizens, and especially on the captive soldiers, they feared that their government would deliver up all the deserters among them to the vengeance of the Romans. They not only refused, therefore, to attack Hippokrates and Epikydes in Herbessos, but, fraternising with them,¹ drove away their officers and marched back to Syracuse under the command of the very men whom they had been sent to capture. In Syracuse an exaggerated report had been spread of the brutality of the Romans in Leontini, and had revived the ill-feeling of the populace towards the Romans. In spite of the resistance of the strategoi the soldiers were admitted into the town, and this was the signal for all the worst horrors of anarchy. The slaves were set free, the prisons broken open and the inmates let loose, the strategoi murdered or expelled, their houses ransacked. Syracuse was now at the mercy of the populace, the soldiers, deserters, slaves, and condemned offenders; the only men enjoying anything like authority and obedience were Hippokrates and Epikydes. The Carthaginian party was completely triumphant, and the Romans, in addition to their numerous difficulties, had now a new and most arduous task imposed on them—the reduction by force of the principal town of Sicily, which in the hands of the Carthaginians made the whole island an unsafe possession, and cut off all prospect of ending the war by a descent on the African coast.

Sosis, one of the expelled strategoi, and a leader of the republican movement from the very beginning, brought to

March of
Marcellus

¹ On this occasion, a corps of 600 Cretans is mentioned, whom Hiero had sent as an auxiliary force to the Romans in 217. These men had been taken prisoners in the battle of the lake Thrasymenus, dismissed by Hannibal, and sent back to Syracuse. They were the first to fraternise with Hippokrates and Epikydes, having served under them, and feeling themselves to be under an obligation to Hannibal.—Livy, xxiv. 30.

BOOK
IV.to Syra-
cuse.

Marcellus the news of what had happened. The Roman general at once marched upon Syracuse, and took up a position on the south side of the town, near the temple of the Olympian Zeus and not far from the great harbour, while Appius Claudius anchored with the fleet in front of the town. The oldest part of Syracuse was in the small island Ortygia, which separates the large harbour in the south from a much smaller one on the north. On this island was the famous fountain of Arethousa, which seemed to gush forth, even from the sea, at a place where, according to a myth, the nymph—who, as she fled from the river-god Alpheios, had thrown herself into the sea from the shores of Elis—had re-appeared above the waters. Such islands, near to the mainland, easy of defence and containing good anchoring-ground, were on all the coasts of the Mediterranean the favourite spots where the Phœnicians used to settle in the primeval period long before the wanderings of the Greeks.

Military
resources
of Syra-
cuse.

On this island accordingly, as in many similar places, a Phœnician settlement had preceded the Greeks; but when here, as on the whole eastern half of Sicily, the Semitic traders retired before the warlike Greeks, the latter soon became too numerous for the islet of Ortygia. They extended their settlement to the mainland of Sicily, and built a new town, called Achradina, along the sea-coast, on the north side of the original town on the islet. Achradina became now the principal part of Syracuse, whilst Ortygia, more and more cleared of private dwellings, became a fortress, containing the palaces of the successive tyrants, the magazines, the treasure-houses, and the barracks for the mercenaries. It was strongly fortified all round, but especially on the northern side, where a narrow artificial neck of land connected it with the nearer portions of Syracuse. It thus formed a formidable stronghold, and its possession was indispensable for those who wished to control the town. During the memorable siege of Syracuse in the Peloponnesian war by the Athenian armament, the town consisted only of the two parts—the island of

Ortygia and Achradina; but at a subsequent period there arose on the western side of the latter two suburbs, called Tyche and Neapolis, each of which was, like Achradina and Ortygia, surrounded with walls and separately fortified. Dionysius the elder considerably enlarged the circumference of the town by fortifying the northern and south-western side of the whole slope called Epipolæ, which, in the form of a triangle, rose with a gradual incline to a point called Euryalus, in the west of Achradina, Tyche, and Neapolis. Thus a large space was included in the fortifications of Syracuse; but this space was never quite covered with buildings, and the population was not large enough, even in the most flourishing period, to man effectually the whole extent of wall, amounting to eighteen miles; but the natural strength of the town made the defence more easy. The walls, which from the northern and southern extremities of the older town ran westward and converged at the fort Euryalus, stood on precipitous rocks, and were therefore easily defended, even by a comparatively small number of troops. Moreover Hiero had in his long reign accumulated in abundance all possible means of defence.¹ The ingenious Archimedes, liberally supported by his royal friend, was in possession of all material and scientific resources for the construction of the most perfect engines of war that the world had hitherto seen. If we recollect how often Hiero in the first Punic war supplied the Romans with munitions of war, and that he gave fifty ballistæ to the Rhodians after the earthquake, we may form an idea of the extensive scale on which machinery of this kind must have been manufactured in Syracuse, and how large a stock must have been there ready for use.

The attempts of Marcellus to take Syracuse by storm failed, accordingly, in the most signal manner. On the

Failure of
the
attempts of

¹ Livy, xxiv. 34. 13: 'Sed ea quoque pars eodem omni apparatu tormentorum instructa erat, Hieronis impensis curaue per multos annos, Archimedis unica arte. Natura etiam adiuuabat loci, quod saxum cui imposita muri fundamenta sunt magna parte ita proclive est, ut non solum missa tormento, sed etiam quæ pondere suo provoluta essent, graviter in hostem inciderent; eadem causa ad subendum arduum aditum instabilemque ingressum præbebat.'

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Marcellus
to storm
Syracuse.

land side the wall-crested rocks defied all the usual modes of attack with ladders, movable towers, or battering-rams. On the sea-front of Achradina sixty Roman vessels, venturing to approach the walls, lashed two-and-two together, and carrying wooden towers and battering-rams, were driven back by an overwhelming shower of great and small missiles from the bastions and from behind the loop-holed walls; some ships, caught by iron hooks, were raised partly out of the water, and then dashed back, to the dismay of the crews, so that at length they apprehended danger when they only saw a beam or a rope on the wall, which might turn out to be a new instrument of destruction invented by the dreaded Archimedes.¹ Marcellus saw that it was of no use to persist in his attacks. Syracuse, which had repeatedly resisted the power of Carthage and the Athenian armada, was indeed not likely to be taken by force.² He therefore gave up the siege, but remained in the neighbourhood in a strong position for the purpose of watching the town and cutting off supplies and reinforcements. It was impossible to blockade Syracuse by a regular circumvallation, on account of the vast extent of her walls; and this would have been useless, even if it had been possible, so long as the harbour was open to the Carthaginian fleet.

Cartha-
ginian ope-
rations in
Sicily.

From the moment when Syracuse passed over from the Roman to the Carthaginian alliance, the chief momentum of the war seemed shifted from Italy to Sicily. The attention of both the belligerent nations was again turned to the scene of their first great struggle, and thither both now sent new fleets and armies. It was Hannibal himself who advised the Carthaginian government to send reinforcements to Sicily instead of Italy.³ The Romans had already a considerable force on the island, and now sent a new legion, which, as Hannibal blocked the land road

¹ Polybius and Livy say nothing of the wonderful reflecting mirrors with which Archimedes is said to have fired the Roman vessels at a distance. The oldest historian to whom this story can be traced is Dion Cassius (Zonaras, ix. 4). It may therefore be considered a fable.

² Livy, xxiv. 34; xxv. 23.

³ Livy, xxiv. 35.

through Lucania and Bruttium, was conveyed by sea from Ostia to Panormus. Of the exact strength of the Roman armies in Sicily we are not informed. The garrisons of the numerous towns must have absorbed a great number of troops, apart from the force engaged before Syracuse. A considerable portion of Sicily was inclined to rebellion, and in several places rebellion had already broken out. The towns of Helorus, Herbessus, and Megara, which had revolted, were retaken by Marcellus and destroyed, as a warning to all those that were wavering in their fidelity. Nevertheless, as at this very time Himilco had landed with 15,000 Carthaginians and twelve elephants at Heraclea in the west of the island, the insurrection against Rome spread, under the protection and encouragement of the Carthaginian arms. Agrigentum, though destroyed in the first Punic war, was still of great importance, from the strength of its position. Marcellus marched upon it in all haste from Syracuse, to prevent its being occupied by the Carthaginians; but he came too late. Himilco had already seized Agrigentum, and made it the base of his operations. At the same time a fleet of fifty-five Carthaginian vessels entered the harbour of Syracuse, and thereupon Himilco, advancing with his army, established his camp under the southern walls of Syracuse, near the river Anapus.

The situation of the Romans, close before the hostile town, and in the immediate vicinity of a hostile army, was by no means satisfactory. But it became still worse when the town of Murgantia (probably in the vicinity of Syracuse) where they had large magazines, was betrayed to the Punians by the inhabitants.¹ The Romans now felt that they were nowhere safe; but, although their suspicions justified not only precaution but even severity, we cannot, even at this distance of time, read without indignation and disgust the report of the way in which the Roman garrison of Enna treated a defenceless population on a mere suspicion of treason. The town of Enna (Castro Giovanni),

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Massacre
of the in-
habitants
of Enna by
L. Pina-
rius.

¹ Livy, xxiv. 36.

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situated in the central part of the island on an isolated rock difficult of access, was of great importance on account of the natural strength of its position. Ancient myths called it the place where Persephonê (Proserpina) the daughter of Demeter, was seized by Hades, the god of the regions beneath the earth. A temple of the goddess was a national sanctuary for all the inhabitants of Sicily, and conferred on Enna the character of a sacred city. In the first Punic war it had suffered much and had been repeatedly taken by one or the other belligerent. It had now a strong Roman garrison, commanded by L. Pinarius. The inhabitants, it appears, felt little attachment to Rome, and probably L. Pinarius had good reason to be on his guard day and night. But fear urged him to commit an act of atrocity which rendered his own name infamous and sullied the honour of his country. He called upon the inhabitants of Enna to lay their requests before him in a general assembly of the people. Meanwhile he gave secret instructions to his men, posted sentinels all round the public theatre where the popular assembly was held, and upon a given signal the Roman soldiers rushed upon the defenceless people, killed them indiscriminately, and then sacked the town, as if it had been taken by storm.¹ The consul Marcellus not only approved of this iniquitous deed but rewarded the perpetrators, and allowed them to keep the plunder of the unhappy town,² hoping, no doubt, thus to terrify the vacillating Sicilians into obedience to Rome.

Results
of the
massacre.

The carnage of Enna reminds us of similar acts of atrocity committed by Italian warriors in Messana, Rhegium, and more recently in Casilinum. But the crime had never been so openly approved and rewarded by the first

¹ Livy's description (xxiv. 39) of this carnage is a masterpiece: 'Milites intenti dudum ac parati, alii superne in aversam concionem clamore sublato decurrunt, alii ad exitus theatri conferti obsistunt. Cæduntur Ennenses cavea inclusi coacervanturque non cæde solum sed etiam fuga, cum alii super aliorum capita ruerent, atque integri sauciis, vivi mortuis incidentes, cumularentur. Inde passim discurretur, et urbis captæ modo fugaque et cædes omnia tenet, nihilo remissione militum ira, quod turbam inermem cædebant, quam si periculum par et ardor certaminis eos irritaret.'

² Of course the plunder included the women and children.

representative of the Roman community. The defenders of Casilinum had acted not only as murderers, but also as brave soldiers; but L. Pinarius and his men were rewarded with the spoils of their victims without showing that they were as brave as they were treacherous, bloodthirsty, and greedy. It seemed that the war rendered more ferocious the minds of the men who were destined to receive and to spread the civilisation of antiquity and to defend it from the barbarians of the north and of the south.

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The cruel punishment of Enna failed to produce the effect which the Romans had expected. Hatred and aversion acted even more powerfully than fear. The towns which had as yet been only wavering in their allegiance joined the Carthaginian side all over Sicily. Himileo left his position before Syracuse, and made expeditions in every direction to organise and support the insurrection against Rome. Thus passed the year 213 B.C. Towards its close, Marcellus, with a part of his army, took up his winter-quarters in a fortified camp five miles to the west of Syracuse, without abandoning, however, the camp previously established near the temple of the Olympian Zeus in the south of the town.¹ Lacking the means of blockading the town, he remained in the neighbourhood only in the hope of obtaining possession of it by some stratagem, or by treason.

The result showed that his calculations were just. The republican party in Syracuse was indeed vanquished and broken up by the soldiers and the populace; and its chiefs,

Siege of
Syracuse
by Mar-
cellus.

¹ The chronological order of the events in Sicily cannot be fixed satisfactorily. It is probable that Marcellus reached Sicily late in the year 214, as in the earlier part of that year he was occupied in Campania (Livy, xxiv. 13 ff.), and afterwards was ill (*ibid.* 20). As he did not advance immediately upon Syracuse, the siege possibly began either quite at the end of 214, or, as seems more likely, in 213. At any rate, the events which followed the fruitless attempts at storming the town belong to the latter year. From Livy's account it would appear that all this took place in 214. This, however, must be an error. See Weissenborn's note to Livy xxiv. 39. According to Polybius (viii. 9, § 6), the siege of Syracuse lasted eight months longer after the plan of taking it by storm was given up. But the town was not taken before the autumn of 212 (Livy, xxv. 26), in the third year after the commencement of the siege (Livy, xxv. 31). The account of Polybius does not agree with this statement; probably the numbers in his text are corrupt.

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the murderers of Hieronymus and of the family of Hiero, were in exile, mostly in the Roman camp. All power was in the hands of the foreign mercenaries and deserters, and Syracuse was *de facto* a Carthaginian fortress under the command of Hippokrates and Epikydes. Nevertheless the republican party found the means of keeping up with the Romans a regular correspondence, the object of which was to deliver up the town into their hands. In fishing boats, hidden under nets, messengers were secretly despatched from the harbour of Syracuse into the Roman camp, and found their way back in the same manner. Thus were discussed and settled the conditions under which the town was to be betrayed. Marcellus promised that the Syracusans should be restored to the same position which they had occupied as Roman allies under King Hiero; they were to retain their liberty and their own laws. All the preparations were already made for carrying out the proposed plan, when it became known to Epikydes, and eighty of the conspirators were put to death. Thus baffled, Marcellus nevertheless persevered in his scheme. By his partisans he was informed of everything that took place within the town. He knew that a great festival was about to be celebrated to Artemis, which was to last for three days. He justly expected that on this occasion great laxity would be shown in guarding the walls. Marcellus had observed that in one part of the fortifications, on the northern side, the wall was so low that it could be easily scaled with ladders. To this place he sent, on one of the festive nights, a party of soldiers, who succeeded in reaching the top of the wall, and, under the guidance of the Syracusan Sosis, one of the conspirators, proceeded to the gate called Hexapylon. Here the drunken guardsmen were found sleeping and quickly dispatched, the gate was opened, and the signal given to a body of Roman troops outside to advance and enter the town. When the morning dawned, Epipolæ, the upper part of the town, was in the hands of the Romans. The suburbs Tyche and Neapolis, which in former times had been protected by

walls on the side of Epipolæ, were now probably open on the west, since Dionysius had constructed the wall which inclosed the whole space of Epipolæ. They could not, therefore, be held for any long time after the Romans were inside the common wall. But on the extreme west point of Epipolæ, the strong detached fort Euryalus defied all attacks. Marcellus was therefore still very far from being master of Syracuse. Not only Euryalus and the island of Ortygia, but Achradina, the largest and most important part of Syracuse, had still to be taken; and these had lost nothing of their strength by the fact that the suburbs were now in the power of the Romans. In truth the siege of Syracuse lasted for some months longer, and the difficulties of the Romans were now doubled rather than diminished. It is, therefore, a silly anecdote which relates that when, on the morning after the taking of Epipolæ, Marcellus saw the rich town spread out before his feet and now within his grasp, he shed tears of joy and emotion.¹ He summoned the garrisons of Euryalus and Achradina. The deserters who kept guard on the walls of Achradina would not even allow the Roman heralds to approach or to speak. On the other hand the commander of Euryalus, a Greek mercenary from Argos called Philodemos, showed himself ready after a while to listen to the proposals of the Syracusan Sosis, and evacuated the place. Marcellus was now safe in his rear and had no longer to apprehend a simultaneous attack from the garrison of the town in front and from an army approaching by land in his rear.² He encamped on the ground between the two suburbs Tyche and Neapolis, and gave these up to be plundered by his soldiers as a foretaste of the booty of Syracuse. Soon after, a Carthaginian army, under Hippocrates and Himilco, marched upon Syracuse, and attacked the Roman camp near the temple of Zeus Olympios, whilst, simultaneously, Epikydes made a sally from Achradina upon the other Roman camp between the suburbs. These

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B.C.¹ Livy, xxv. 14.² Livy, xxv. 26.

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attacks failed. On every point the Romans kept their ground ; and thus the hostile forces within and before Syracuse remained for some time in the same relative position, without being able to make an impression either one way or the other. Meanwhile summer advanced, and a malignant disease broke out in the Carthaginian camp, which was pitched on the low ground by the river Anapus. In times past the deadly climate of Syracuse had more than once delivered the town from her enemies. Under the very walls of the town a Carthaginian army had perished in the reign of the elder Dionysius. Now the climate proved as disastrous to the defenders as it had formerly done to the besiegers of Syracuse. The Carthaginians were struck down by the disease in masses. When a great part of the men and of the officers, and among them Hippokrates and Himilco themselves, had been carried off, the remainder of the troops, consisting for the most part of Sicilians, dispersed in different directions. The Romans also suffered from the disease ; but the higher parts of Syracuse, where they were stationed, were more cool and airy than the low ground on the banks of the Anapus ; and moreover the houses of the suburbs Tyche and Neapolis afforded shelter from the deadly rays of the sun, so that the Roman loss was comparatively small. Nevertheless Marcellus had, as yet, no prospect of taking by storm a town so vigorously defended, nor could he reduce it by famine, as the port was open to the Carthaginian vessels. At this very time Carthage made renewed efforts to supply Syracuse with provisions. Seven hundred transports, laden with supplies, were dispatched to Sicily under the convoy of one hundred and thirty ships of war. This fleet had already reached Agrigentum when it was detained by contrary winds. Epikydes, impatient of delay, left Syracuse and proceeded to Agrigentum, for the purpose of urging Bomilcar, the Carthaginian admiral, to make an attack upon the Roman fleet which lay at anchor near the promontory of Pachynus. Bomilcar advanced with his ships of war ; but, when the Romans sailed to meet him,

he avoided them, and steered to Tarentum, after having dispatched an order to the transports to return to Africa. The cause of this extraordinary proceeding does not appear in the account handed down to us. If it be true, as Livy reports,¹ that Bomilcar's fleet was stronger than that of the Romans, it cannot have been fear which prevented him from accepting battle. Perhaps he thought that his presence at Tarentum was more necessary than at Syracuse; perhaps he quarrelled with Epikydes. At any rate he left to its own resources the town which he was sent to relieve, and thus spread discouragement among its defenders and hastened its fall.

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From this moment the fate of Syracuse was sealed. Epikydes himself probably lost all hope, as he did not return, but remained in Agrigentum. Again the republican party took courage. The leaders of this party renewed negotiations with the Romans, and again Marcellus guaranteed the liberty and independence of Syracuse as the price for surrendering the town. But the friends of Rome were not able to fulfil the promises they had made. The unhappy town was torn by a desperate struggle between the citizens and the soldiers. At first the citizens had the advantage. They succeeded in killing the chief officers appointed by Epikydes, and in electing republican magistrates in their place, who were ready to hand the town over to the Romans. The lawless soldiery seemed overpowered for a moment. But, after a short time, that faction among the troops got the upper hand again who had a just apprehension that their lives were in jeopardy if they fell into the hands of the Romans. The foreign mercenaries were persuaded to resist to the last. Another revolution followed. The republican magistrates were murdered, and a general massacre and pillage signalised the final triumph of the enemies of Rome and of Syracuse. The unhappy town resembled a helpless wreck, drifting fast towards a reef whilst the crew, instead of battling with

Anarchy in
Syracuse.

¹ Livy, xxv. 27.

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Treachery
of Meri-
cus.

the elements, spends its last strength in bloody internecine strife.

Even now Marcellus did not make a direct attempt to take Syracuse by force until he had secured the co-operation of a party in the town. The troops had chosen six captains, each of whom was to defend a certain part of the walls. Among these captains was a Spanish officer of the name of Mericus, who commanded on the southern side of Ortygia. Seeing that the town could not possibly be held much longer, and that therefore it was high time to make his peace if he wished to obtain favourable terms, at least for those soldiers who were not deserters, he entered secretly into negotiations with Marcellus. An agreement was soon made. A barge approached at night the southern extremity of Ortygia, and landed a party of Roman soldiers, who were admitted through a postern-gate into the fortification. On the following day Marcellus ordered a general attack upon the walls of Achradina, and whilst the garrison rushed from all parts, and also from Ortygia to the threatened spot, Roman soldiers landed in several ships unopposed on Ortygia and occupied the place with a sufficient force. Having made sure of the fact that Ortygia was in his power, Marcellus at once desisted from any further attack on Achradina, well knowing that, after the fall of Ortygia, the defence of Achradina would not be continued. His calculation proved correct. During the following night the deserters found means of escaping, and in the morning the gates were opened to admit the victorious army.

Fall and
sack of
Syracuse.

Thus, at length, after a siege that had lasted more than two years, the Romans reaped the fruit of their dogged perseverance. If any town that had ever succumbed to the Roman arms was justified in expecting a lenient, or even a generous treatment, this town assuredly was Syracuse.¹ The invaluable services which Hiero had rendered in the course of more than half a century, could not in

¹ Compare the just remarks of Livy, xxvi. 32.

justice be considered as balanced by the follies of a child, and by the hostility of a political party with which the better class of Syracusan citizens had never sympathized. From the very beginning of the sad complications and revolutions at Syracuse, the true republican party, which was attached to order and freedom, inclined to Rome and wished to continue the foreign policy of Hiero. It was they who conspired to put down the tyrant Hieronymus and his anti-Roman relations and councillors. They had attempted to rid themselves of the emissaries of Hannibal and of their adherents in the army; they were overpowered without renouncing their plans; they had made every effort, in conjunction with their exiled friends who had taken refuge in the camp of Marcellus, to deliver Syracuse into the hands of the Romans; they had resisted the reign of terror exercised by the foreign mercenaries and the Roman deserters, and many of them lost their lives in the attempt to deliver their native town from the tyranny of an armed mob of mutineers and traitors, and to renew the old alliance with Rome. Syracuse had not rebelled against Rome, but had implored assistance from Rome against its worst oppressors. Not only clemency and magnanimity, but even justice, should have prompted the conquerors to look upon the sufferings of Syracuse in this light; and it would have been the undying glory of Marcellus—brighter than the most splendid triumph—if, on obtaining possession, he had shielded the wretched town from further miseries. He would indeed have acted right in punishing with Roman severity the soldiers who had violated the military oath and deserted their colours, and who were the chief cause of the pertinacity of the struggle. But he ought to have spared the citizens of the town, the deplorable victims of hostile factions. He did the very opposite. He allowed the deserters to escape, perhaps with the object of being able to plunder so much the more leisurely, and he treated the town as if it had been taken by storm, handing it over to the rapacity of soldiers maddened to fury by the long resistance and by the

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prospect of plunder and revenge. The noble Syracuse, which had ranked in the foremost line of the fairest cities that bore the Hellenic name, fell never to rise again from that time to the present. Marcellus had indeed promised that the lives of the people should be spared;¹ but how such a promise was kept we may infer from the savage murder of the best man in Syracuse, whose grey hair and venerable, thought-furrowed forehead ought to have shielded him from the steel even of a barbarian. Where Archimedes was slain, because, absorbed in his studies, he did not readily understand the demand of a plundering soldier, there, we may be sure, ignoble blood was shed without stint.² Marcellus was intent only on obtaining possession of the royal treasures, which he hoped to find in the island of Ortygia; but it is hardly likely that much of them had been left by the successive masters of Syracuse during the time of anarchy. On the other hand, the works of art which had been accumulated in Syracuse during the periods of prosperity were still extant. These were all, without exception, taken, to be sent to Rome.³ Syracuse was not the first town where the Romans learnt and practised this kind of public spoliation.⁴ Tarentum and Volsinii had already experienced the rapacity rather than the taste of the Romans for works of art. But the art

¹ Probably an order was issued to the Roman soldiers forbidding that indiscriminate butchery of all the inhabitants which usually followed the storming of a hostile town, according to the detailed and graphic account of Polybius, x. 39.

² Livy, xxv. 31: 'Cum multa iræ, multa avaritiæ fœda exempla ederentur,' etc. Zonaras, ix. 5: 'Εγκρατεῖς δὲ τούτων οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι γενόμενοι ἄλλους τε πολλοὺς καὶ τὸν Ἀρχιμήδην ἀπέκτειναν.

³ Polybius, ix. 10: 'Ἐκρίθη μὲν οὖν διὰ τοῦτο τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις τὰ τῶν Συρακουσῶν πολυτελέστατα κατασκευάσματα πάντα μετὰ τὴν ἄλασιν μετακομίζειν εἰς τὴν ἑαυτῶν πατρίδα καὶ μὴδὲν ἀπολιπεῖν. Cicero indeed says (*Verr.* ii. 2, 2) that Marcellus 'spared the conquered enemies,' and not only preserved Syracuse uninjured, but left it so adorned that it was a monument of his victory and, at the same time, of his clemency. This is not historical evidence, but a rhetorical artifice by which the orator pressed history into his service and shaped it according to his wants. Cicero used Marcellus only as a foil for Verres. His assertion is of no force to contradict Polybius.

⁴ See vol. i. p. 563.

treasures of Syracuse were so numerous and so splendid that they threw into the shade everything of the sort that had been transported to Rome before. It came therefore to be a received tradition that Marcellus was the first who set the example of enriching Rome, at the expense of her conquered enemies, with the triumphs of Greek art.¹

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VIII.

FOURTH
PERIOD,
212-211
B.C.

Fourth Period of the Hannibalian War.

FROM THE TAKING OF SYRACUSE TO THE CAPTURE OF
CAPUA, 212-211 B.C.

By the taking of Syracuse the war in Sicily was decided in favour of the Romans, but not by any means finished. Agrigentum was still held by the Carthaginians, and a great number of Sicilian towns were on their side. A Libyan cavalry general, named Mutines, sent to Sicily by Hannibal, and operating in conjunction with Hanno and Epikydes, gave the Romans a great deal of trouble. But when Mutines had quarrelled with the other Carthaginian generals, and had gone over to the Romans in consequence, the fortune of war inclined more and more to the side of the latter. At length, two years after the fall of Syracuse, Mutines betrayed Agrigentum to the Romans. The consul, M. Valerius Lævinus, who then commanded in Sicily, ordered the leading inhabitants of Agrigentum to be scourged and beheaded, the rest to be sold as slaves, and the town to be sacked. This severe punishment had the effect of terrifying the other towns. Forty of them submitted voluntarily, twenty were betrayed, and only six had to be taken by force.² All resistance to the Roman arms in Sicily was now broken, and the island returned to the peace and slavery of a Roman province. Its principal task was henceforth to grow corn for feeding the sovereign

Surrender of Agrigentum by Mutines, and complete subjugation of Sicily.

¹ Livy, xxv. 40: 'Ceterum inde primum initium mirandi Græcarum artium opera, licentiaque huic sacra profanaque omnia vulgo spoliandi factum est.'—Compare Plutarch (*Marcell.* 21).

² Livy, xxvi. 40.

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IV.Events in
Spain and
Africa.

populace of the capital, and to allow itself to be plundered systematically by farmers of the revenue, traders, usurers, and, above all, by the annual governors.

It was most fortunate for Rome that, by the fall of Syracuse in 212, the Sicilian war had taken a favourable turn. For the same year was so disastrous to them in other parts, that the prospect for the future became more and more gloomy. In Spain the two brothers Scipio had, after the successful campaign of 215,¹ continued the war in the following year with the same happy results. Several battles are reported for this year, in which they are said invariably to have beaten the Carthaginians.² We may safely pass over the detailed accounts of these events, which are of no historical value, from their evident air of exaggeration, and on account of our ignorance of the ancient geography of Spain. Yet, through all misrepresentations, it appears certain that the war was continued in Spain, and that the Carthaginians were not able to carry out Hannibal's plan of sending an army across the Pyrenees and Alps to co-operate with the army already in Italy. How much of this result is due to the genius of the Roman generals and to the bravery of the Roman legions it is impossible to ascertain from the partial accounts of the annalists, who probably derived their information chiefly from the traditions of the Scipionic

¹ See p. 268.

² We cannot read Livy's report without the conviction that a great portion of it rests on fiction or exaggeration. (See p. 275, note 1; and Arnold, *Hist. of Rome*, iii. 260-263). The first alleged victory at Illiturgi (Livy, xxiv. 49) is evidently a repetition of the victory related before (Livy, xxiii. 18), and placed in the preceding year: the circumstances are precisely the same; the difference lies only in the number of the slain, of prisoners and military ensigns taken. In the battle of Munda which now follows, Cn. Scipio is wounded, and thus the Carthaginians are saved from a defeat, but lose, nevertheless, 12,000 dead, 3,000 prisoners, and 57 military ensigns. In a third battle, at Auringis, they lose about half as many, 'because,' as Livy (ibid. 42) adds in explanation, 'there were fewer left to fight.' Thereupon they are beaten a fourth time, with a loss of 8,000 dead, 1,000 prisoners, 58 ensigns, and 11 elephants. If we add up the numbers given by Livy, the Carthaginians lost in the two years 215 and 214, in Spain, not less than 80,000 men. The magnificence of such boasting is apt to inspire admiration.

family. One cause of the failure of the Carthaginians lay no doubt in the frequent rebellions among the Spanish tribes, which the Romans instigated and turned to their own advantage. But the principal cause was a war in Africa with Syphax, a Numidian chief or king, which seems to have been very serious, and which compelled them to withdraw Hasdrubal and a part of their army from Spain for the defence of their home territory.¹ This circumstance operated most powerfully in favour of the Roman arms in Spain, leaving the Scipios almost unopposed, and enabling them to overrun the Carthaginian possessions, and to obtain a footing south of the river Ebro.² In the year 214, the Romans took Saguntum, and restored it as an independent allied town five years after its capture by Hannibal.³ They also entered into relations with King Syphax. Every enemy of Carthage was of course an ally of Rome, and valuable in proportion as he was troublesome or dangerous to Carthage. Roman officers were dispatched into Africa to train the undisciplined soldiers of the Numidian prince, and especially to form an infantry, after the Roman model, which might be capable of resisting the Carthaginians in the field. Such a task as this, however, would have required more time than the Roman officers could devote to it. It seems that Syphax derived no benefit from the attempt to turn his irregular horsemen into legionary soldiers. He was soon after in great difficulties. The Carthaginians secured the alliance of another Numidian chief, called Gula, whose son Masinissa, a youth seventeen years old, gave now the first evidence of a

¹ Appian, vi. 15: Καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦδε (the year 217) οἱ δύο Σκιπίωνες τὸν ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ πόλεμον διέφερον, Ἀσδρούβου σφίσιν ἀντιστρατηγούντος μέχρι Καρχηδόνιοι μὲν ὑπὸ Σύφακος τοῦ τῶν Νομάδων δυνάστου πολεμοῦμενοι τὸν Ἀσδρούβαν καὶ μέρος τῆς αὐτοῦ στρατίας μετεπέμψαντο. τῶν δὲ ὑπολοίπων οἱ Σκιπίωνες εὐμαρῶς ἐκράτουν. (Livy, xxiv. 48). Appian altogether passes over the battle of Ibera. See p. 268.

² Livy, xxiv. 48.

³ Livy (xxiv. 42) states erroneously that Saguntum was seven years in the hands of the Carthaginians. The capture and the restoration of the town to the old inhabitants indirectly shows that it could not have been totally destroyed by Hannibal in 219, as Livy's description would lead us to believe.

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military ability and an ambition destined in the sequel to become most fatal to the Carthaginians. Syphax was completely defeated and expelled from his dominions. He came to the Romans as a fugitive about the same time that Hasdrubal, after the victorious termination of the African war, returned to Spain with considerable reinforcements.

Employ-
ment of
mercena-
ries in
Spain.

The fortune of war now changed rapidly and decidedly. The Scipios, having long been left without a supply of new troops from home, had been obliged to enrol a great number of Spanish mercenaries. Rome now learnt to know the difference between mercenaries and an army of citizens.¹ It was not indeed the first time that such troops had been employed. In the first Punic war a body of Gallic deserters had been taken into Roman pay.² The Cenomanians and other tribes of Cisalpine Gaul, mentioned as serving on the Roman side in the beginning of the Hannibalian war, were no doubt regularly paid, and were, in fact, mercenaries. So were of course the Cretans and other Greek troops whom Hiero had sent as auxiliary contingents on several occasions.³ But it appears that the first employment of mercenaries on a large scale, after the model of the Carthaginians, took place in Spain on the present occasion. Where the Scipios obtained the means for paying these troops we cannot tell. Perhaps they were not able to pay them punctually, and this fact would alone suffice to explain their faithlessness and desertion.

Defeat and
death of
the Scipios.

It was in 212 B.C. that Hasdrubal, the son of Barcas, after the defeat of Syphax, returned to Spain. He found that the Roman generals had divided their forces, and were operating separately in different parts of the country. Their Celtiberian mercenaries had deserted and gone

¹ The defeat of Cn. Scipio suggests to Livy (xxv. 33) the following remark: 'Id quidem cavendum semper Romanis ducibus erit, exempla quæ hæc vere pro documentis habenda, ne ita externis credant auxiliis, ut non plus sui roboris suarumque propriæ virium in castris habeant.'

² See above, p. 102.

³ See above, pp. 200, 226.

home, tempted, it is said, by their countrymen who served in the Carthaginian army. Thus, weakened by desertion and by the division of their strength, the two Scipios were one after another attacked by Hasdrubal, and so thoroughly routed that hardly a remnant of their army escaped.¹ Publius Cornelius Scipio and his brother Cneius both fell at the head of their troops. A poor remnant was saved, and made good its retreat under the command of a brave officer of equestrian rank, called L. Marcius.² But almost

¹ It is difficult to decide whether the defeat of the Scipios took place in 212 or in 211, as Livy contradicts himself. The arguments in favour of the year 211 are stated by U. Becker, *Vorarbeiten zur Geschichte des zweiten punischen Krieges*, p. 113.

² Livy, xxv. 32-40. The exploits of this Marcius were the subject of the most impudent and barefaced exaggerations. It was, as we know from numerous examples, a practice of the Roman annalists to make it appear that every Roman defeat was compensated in a signal manner by some glorious victory. This disingenuous vanity is nowhere more apparent than in the boastful report of the doings of L. Marcius. Whilst Appian (vi. 17) says that Marcius (whom he erroneously calls Marcellus) accomplished so little that the Romans were expelled from almost the whole of Spain and shut up in a small district among the Pyrenees, the annalist Piso—according to Livy (xxv. 39)—reported that Marcius turned round upon the pursuing army under Mago, and killed 5,000 of the enemy. Valerius Antias was not satisfied with this result. According to him, Marcius attacked and took Mago's camp, killed 7,000 Carthaginians, then fought a battle with Hasdrubal, killed 10,000, and took 4,730 prisoners. But the lies of Valerius Antias are modest in comparison with those of another annalist, called Acilius, whose report contained the raw materials for Livy's elaborate description. The number of slain Carthaginians, which was at first 5,000, then 7,000 and 10,000, is swelled here to 37,000 (in the account of Valerius Maximus (i. 6, 2) even to 38,000, but what is a trifle of 1,000 men more or less?) and two Carthaginian camps are stormed in succession. Such victories, gained by the flying remnants of a routed army, belong seemingly to the regions of the miraculous; but we actually meet also with a genuine miracle, for, according to Valerius Antias—quoted by Pliny (*Hist. Nat.* ii. 111) and Livy (xxv. 39)—the head of Marcius, when he addressed his soldiers, was surrounded by a halo. Reading such reports as these, we can fancy that we are still in the time of the Samnite wars. But distance of locality lends almost as much freedom to the story-teller as distance of time. Spain, as we have already noticed (p. 314, note 2), was a fruitful soil for fiction. After this, we become very sceptical about the genuineness of a silver shield of 137 pounds weight, containing a portrait of Hasdrubal, which is said to have been preserved in the Capitol till the great conflagration, 84 B.C. (Livy, *loc. cit.* Pliny, *Hist. Nat.* xxxv. 4). If such a shield existed, could it have come from Spain on the occasion of the imaginary victories of Marcius?

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the whole of Spain was lost to the Romans at one blow. The war which they had vigorously and successfully carried on for so many years, for the purpose of preventing a second invasion of Italy from Spain, had ended now with the annihilation of almost all their forces, and nothing seemed henceforth able to check the Carthaginian general, if he intended to carry out the plan of his brother.

Operations
of Hanni-
bal in
southern
Italy.

The disastrous issue of the war in Spain was the more alarming as in the year 212 Hannibal again displayed in Italy an energy which was calculated to remind the Romans of his first three campaigns after he had crossed the Alps in 218. The year 213 had passed almost as quietly as if a truce had been concluded. Hannibal had spent the summer in the country of the Sallentinians, not far from Tarentum, in the hope of taking by surprise or by treason that city, which was of the greatest importance to him from the facilities which it afforded for direct communication with Macedonia. He obtained possession of several small towns in the neighbourhood; but, on the other hand, he lost again Consentia and Taurianum in Bruttium, while a few insignificant places in Lucania were taken by the consul Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus.¹ On this occasion we learn incidentally that Rome allowed at that time, or rather encouraged, a kind of guerilla warfare of volunteers, not unlike privateering in naval wars, which must have contributed largely to brutalize the population. A certain Roman knight and contractor, called T. Pomponius Veientanus, commanded a body of irregulars in Bruttium, pillaging and devastating those communities which had joined the Carthaginian side. He was joined by a large number of runaway slaves, herdsmen, and peasants, and he had formed something like an army, which, without costing the republic anything, did good service in damaging and harassing her enemies. But this mob was not fit to encounter a Carthaginian army, and it

¹ Livy, xxv. 1.

was accordingly an easy task for Hanno, who commanded in these parts, to capture or cut to pieces the whole band. Pomponius was taken prisoner, and it was perhaps fortunate for him that he thus escaped the vengeance of his countrymen, whose curses he had richly deserved, not only by his incompetence as an officer, but much more by the rascality with which he, in conjunction with other contractors, had robbed the public and jeopardized the safety of the state.

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VIII.FOURTH
PERIOD,
212-211
B.C.

It now became evident that the apparently self-denying patriotism of which, two years before, several large capitalists had made an ostentatious display, was nothing but a cover for the meanest rapacity, selfishness, and dishonesty. The ungovernable craving for wealth which at all times possessed the great men of Rome, joined with their utter contempt of right—the two great evils which the Gracchi in vain endeavoured to check—show themselves for the first time with great distinctness in the trial of the contractor M. Postumius Pyrgensis and his fellow-conspirators in the beginning of the year 212 B.C.

Dishonesty
of Roman
contractors.

This Postumius, like the just-mentioned Pomponius, was a member of a joint-stock company, which in 215 had offered to furnish, on credit, the materials of war necessary for the army in Spain, on condition that the government should insure them against sea risks.¹ Since then the pretended patriots had been discovered to be common rogues and villains. They had laden old vessels with worthless articles, had scuttled and abandoned them at sea, and then claimed compensation for the alleged full value. This act was not merely an ordinary fraud on the public purse, but a crime of the gravest nature, inasmuch as it endangered the safety of the army in Spain. Information of it had been given as early as the year 213; but, as Livy² assures us, the senate did not venture at once to proceed against the men whose wealth gave them

Trial of M.
Postumius
Pyrgensis.

¹ See p. 288.

² Livy, xxv. 3: 'quia patres ordinem publicanorum in tali tempore offensum nolebant.'

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an overpowering influence in the state. Pomponius accordingly remained not only unpunished, but was even appointed to a sort of military command, and allowed to carry on a predatory war on his own account and for his own profit. We can easily understand that men of such reckless audacity and so unprincipled as Pomponius, who commanded bands of armed ruffians, could not easily be punished like common offenders. Yet after Pomponius had fallen into captivity, and his band was annihilated, the government plucked up courage to call his accomplices to account for their misdeeds. Two tribunes of the people, Spurius Carvilius and Lucius Carvilius, impeached Postumius before the assembly of tribes. The people were highly incensed. Nobody ventured to plead in favour of the accused; even the tribune C. Servilius Casca, a relative of Postumius, was kept by fear and shame from interceding. The accused now ventured upon an act which seems almost incredible, and which shows to what an extent, even at the best time of the republic, the internal order and the public peace were at the mercy of any band of desperate villains who ventured to set the law at defiance. The Capitol, where the tribes were just about to give their votes, was invaded by a mob, which created such an uproar that acts of violence would have been committed if the tribunes, yielding to the storm, had not broken up the assembly.

Condemnation of Postumius and his accomplices.

This triumph of lawlessness over the established order of the state was a temporary success which carried the anarchical party beyond their real strength. Rome was not yet so degenerate that a permanent terrorism could be established by the audacity of some rich and influential malefactors. It was rather an outbreak of madness than a deliberate act which prompted Postumius and his accomplices to resist the authority of the Roman people and its lawful magistrates. They were far from forming a political party, or from finding men in the senate or in the popular assembly who would venture to defend or even to excuse them. Their vile frauds were now a small

offence compared with their attempt to outrage the majesty of the Roman people. The tribunes dropped the minor charge, and, instead of asking the people to inflict a fine, insisted upon a capital punishment. Postumius forfeited his bail, and escaped from Rome. The punishment of exile was formally pronounced against him, and all his property was confiscated. All participators in the outrage were punished with the same severity, and thus the offended majesty of the Roman people was fully and promptly vindicated.¹

The villany of the Roman publicani, who abused the necessities of the state to enrich themselves, and whose criminal rapacity endangered the safety of the troops in Spain, is not without parallels in history, and has been equalled or surpassed in modern Europe, as well as in America during the late civil war. We must not, therefore, be too harsh in our judgment, or too sweeping in our condemnation of the Roman people among whom such swindlers could prosper. But we shall do well to remember infamous acts like these, when we hear the fulsome praise often lavished on the civic virtue, the self-denial, and the devotion of the Roman people in the service of the state. The moral and religious elements of the community must have been deeply tainted if, in the very midst of the Hannibalian war, in the agonizing struggle for existence, a great number of men could be found among the influential classes so utterly void of patriotic feeling and conscientiousness, so hardened against public indignation, so careless of just retribution.

Not only public morality, but also the religion of the Romans, felt the injurious effect of the protracted war. It seemed that men gradually lost confidence in their native gods. All the prayers, vows, processions, sacrifices, and offerings, all the festivals and sacred games which had been celebrated on the direct injunction of the priests, had proved to be of no avail. Either the ancestral gods

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B.C.

Roman
civic
morality.Growth of
supersti-
tion in
Rome.¹ Livy, xxv. 4.

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had forsaken the town, or they were powerless against the decrees of fate. In their despair the people turned towards strange gods. The number of the superstitious was swelled by a mass of impoverished peasants, who had left their wasted fields and burnt homesteads to find support and protection in the capital.¹ The streets swarmed with foreign priests, soothsayers, and religious impostors, who no longer secretly, but openly, carried on their trade, and profited by the fear and ignorance of the multitude. Such a neglect of the national religion was, in the eyes of every community in the ancient world, a kind of treason, which, if tolerated, would have brought about the most fatal consequences. No nation of antiquity rose to the conception of a God common to the human race. Every people, every political society, had its own special protecting deity, distinct from the deity of the next neighbour and hostile to the gods of the national enemy. It was of the utmost importance that all citizens should combine in duly worshipping those powers who, in consideration of uninterrupted worship, vouchsafed to grant their protection, and who were jealous of the admission of foreign rivals. It was therefore a sure sign of national decay if a people began to lose confidence in their own paternal religion, and turned hopefully to the gods of their neighbours. The Roman government began to be alarmed. The senate commissioned the magistrates to interfere. Not the priests or pontifices, who might be expected to be more directly concerned in upholding the purity of religion, but a civil magistrate—the prætor—caused the town to be cleared of all the foreign rituals, prayers, and oracles; and it appears that the people submitted to this interference as to a legitimate exercise of civil authority, just as they submitted to the burdens of the war.

Levying of
new
legions.

The condemnation of Postumius took place in the beginning of the year 212, about the time of the consular elections, which placed Quintus Fulvius Flaccus and

¹ Livy, xxv. 1.

Appius Claudius Pulcher at the head of the government. Great difficulties had now been regularly experienced for some time past in the conscription of recruits for the army. The number of twenty-three legions was, however, completed for the impending campaign,¹ and even this enormous force proved by no means too large. In spite of the taking of Syracuse, the year 212 was destined to be one of the most disastrous for the Romans in the whole course of the war.

The first calamity was the loss of Tarentum, which took place even before the opening of the campaign. The Romans had been themselves the cause of it through their short-sighted cruelty. A number of hostages of Tarentum and Thurii, detained at Rome, had made an attempt to escape, but were seized at Terracina, brought back to Rome, and tortured to death as traitors. By this act the Romans had themselves cut the bonds which had thus far held the Tarentines in their allegiance. It was a proceeding intended to inspire terror, like the massacre of Enna; but, like this, it produced the opposite effect, by engendering only a feeling of revenge and implacable hatred. A conspiracy was immediately formed at Tarentum for betraying the town to Hannibal. Nikon and Philodemos, the chiefs of the conspirators, under the pretence of going out on hunting expeditions, found means of seeing Hannibal, who still tarried in the neighbourhood of Tarentum; they concluded a formal treaty with him, stipulated that their town should be free and independent, and that the house of no Tarentine citizen should be plundered by the Carthaginian troops. The situation of Tarentum is known from the history of the first war with Rome.² On the eastern side of the town, where the narrow peninsula on which it lay was joined to the mainland, a large open space within the walls formed the public burial-ground. In this lonely place Nikon and some of his fellow-conspirators hid themselves on a night previously fixed upon, and waited for a fire signal, which Hannibal had promised

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Surrender
of Taren-
tum to
Hannibal.

¹ Livy, xxv. 3, 5.

² See vol. i. p. 486.

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to give as soon as he had reached the neighbourhood. When they saw the signal they fell upon the guards at a gate, cut down the Roman soldiers, and admitted a troop of Gauls and Numidians into the town. At the same moment Philodemos, pretending to return from hunting, presented himself before the postern of another gate, whose guards had been accustomed, for some time past, to open when they heard his whistle. Two men who were with him carried a huge boar. The guard, whilst admiring and feeling the animal, was instantly pierced by the spear of Philodemos. About thirty men were ready outside. They entered by the postern-gate, killed the other guards, opened the main gates, and admitted a whole column of Libyans, who advanced in regular order, under the guidance of the conspirators, towards the market-place. On both points the enterprise had succeeded, and the empty space between the walls and the town was soon filled with Hannibal's soldiers. The Roman garrison had not received the slightest warning. The commanding officer, M. Livius Macatus, an indolent, self-indulgent man, had been spending the evening in revelry, and was in his bed, overpowered with wine and sleep, when the stillness of the night was broken by the noise of arms and by a strange sound of Roman trumpets. The conspirators had procured some of these trumpets, and, although they blew them very unskilfully, they yet succeeded in drawing the Roman soldiers, who were quartered in all parts of the town, into the streets just as Hannibal was advancing in three columns. Thus a great number of Romans were cut down in the first confusion and disorder, without being able to make any resistance, and almost without knowing what the tumult was all about. A few reached the citadel, and among them was the commander Livius, who at the first alarm had rushed to the harbour and succeeded in jumping into a boat.

Proclama-
tion of
Hannibal
to the
Tarentines.

When the morning dawned, the whole of Tarentum, with the exception of the citadel, was in Hannibal's hands. He caused the Tarentines to be called to an assembly, and

made known to them that they had nothing to fear for themselves and their families; on the contrary, that he had come to deliver them from the Roman yoke. Only the houses and the property of the Romans were given up to plunder. Every house marked as the property of a citizen of Tarentum was to be spared; but those who made a false statement were threatened with capital punishment. Probably the Romans were quartered in houses of their own, or in houses of men who were partisans of Rome. The latter were now made to suffer for their attachment to Rome, which was a crime in the eyes of their political opponents.

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The citadel of Tarentum being situated on a hill of small elevation at the western extremity of the tongue of land occupied by the town, could only be taken by a regular siege, and such a siege was hopeless without the co-operation of the fleet. In order, therefore, to secure the town in the meantime from any attacks of the Roman garrison, Hannibal caused a line of defences, consisting of a ditch, mound, and wall, to be made between the citadel and the town. The Romans attempted to interrupt the work. Hannibal encouraged them by a simulated flight of his men, and when he had drawn them far enough into the town, attacked them from all sides, and drove them back into the citadel with great slaughter. The Roman garrison was now so much reduced that Hannibal hoped to be able to take the citadel by force, and he prepared a regular assault by erecting the necessary machines. But the Romans, reinforced by the garrison of Metapontum, sallied forth in the night, and destroying Hannibal's siege-works, compelled him to desist from his enterprise. Thus the citadel of Tarentum remained in the possession of the Romans; and as it commanded the entrance to the harbour, the ships of the Tarentines would have been locked up, if Hannibal had not contrived to drag them across the tongue of land on which the town lay, right through the streets running from the inner harbour to the open sea. The Tarentine fleet was now

Siege of
the citadel
of Taren-
tum.

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able to blockade the citadel, whilst a wall and ditch closed up the land side. The possession of the citadel was of the greatest importance to both belligerents. The Romans therefore made strenuous efforts to defend it. They dispatched the prætor P. Cornelius with a few ships laden with corn for the supply of the garrison, and Cornelius, evading the vigilance of the blockading squadron, succeeded in reaching his destination. Thus Hannibal's hope of reducing the fortress by famine was deferred, and the Tarentines could do no more than watch the Roman garrison and keep it in check.

Alliance of
other
Greek
cities with
Hannibal.

The example of Tarentum was soon followed by Metapontum—from which the Roman garrison had been withdrawn—by Thurii—out of revenge for the murdered hostages—and by Heraclea.¹ Thus the Romans lost by their own fault these Greek towns, which had remained faithful to them for so many years after the battle of Cannæ. The only towns that stood out against Carthage were Rhegium and Elea (Velia), with Posidonia or Pæstum—which in 263 had become a Roman colony—and Neapolis in Campania.² Hannibal had reason to be satisfied with the first results of the campaign of 212. Leaving a small garrison in Tarentum, he now turned northwards.

Roman
designs
against
Capua.

Three years had passed since Capua had revolted to the Carthaginians. Rome had succeeded in preventing the other larger towns of Campania from following her example. Nola, Neapolis, Cumæ, Puteoli had remained faithful and were safe; Casilinum had been retaken; and Capua was hemmed in on all sides, partly by these towns, partly by fortified Roman camps. The time was approaching when the attempt could be made to retake Capua. This was now the principal aim of the Romans in Italy, and the defection of the Greek towns, so far from inducing them to give up this plan, contributed rather to confirm them in it. If Capua could be re-conquered and severely

¹ Appian, vii. 35.

² Livy, xxvi. 39.

punished, they might hope to put an end to all further attempts at revolt on the part of their allies, and they would have destroyed the prestige of Hannibal and the confidence which the Italians might be tempted to place in the power and protection of Carthage.

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FOURTH
PERIOD,
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B.C.

Since their defection the Capuans had had little cause to approve the bold step which they had taken and to rejoice over the results. If at any time they had really entertained the hope of obtaining the dominion over Italy in the place of Rome, they were soon disabused of so vain a notion. They had not been able even to subject the towns of Campania, or to induce them to enter into the alliance of Carthage, and as, in consequence of their own defection, Campania had become the principal theatre of war, they saw themselves exposed to the unremitting attacks of the Romans. Whenever Hannibal left Campania, the Roman armies approached the town from all sides, returning immediately into their strong positions as soon as Hannibal drew near. Such a war as this, while it drained the resources of the country, and interfered with the regular tillage of the land and the commercial intercourse with her neighbours, could not fail soon to reduce to distress a town whose wealth consisted chiefly in the produce of her fruitful soil. People began to repent the step which they had taken. There had always been a Roman party at Capua. With the continued pressure of the war, which this party had endeavoured to prevent, the split among the Capuan citizens became wider every day. As early as the year 213 we hear of a body of one hundred and twelve Capuan horsemen deserting to the Romans with all their arms and accoutrements.¹ Moreover the three hundred horsemen who had been serving in Sicily at the time of the revolt of their native town, and who were looked upon in the light of hostages, abjured their allegiance to the revolutionary government of Capua, and were admitted as Roman citizens to the full franchise.

Condition
of Capua.

¹ Livy, xxiv. 47.

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Request of
the Capuans to
Hannibal
for supplies.

Even if the Carthaginian garrison was not found irksome and onerous to the people of Capua, it was natural that a revulsion of feeling should take place among them.

In the beginning of the year 212 the Capuans perceived that the Romans were about to draw the net round them. As the populous town was not supplied with provisions to resist a long siege, they sent in all haste to Hannibal, who was at that time in the neighbourhood of Tarentum, and conjured him to come to their aid. In truth Hannibal's task was not easy. Being stationed at one extremity of the hostile country, and fully occupied in the enterprise against a strong and important city; having to bestow his constant attention to the feeding and recruiting of his army; called upon to defend a number of allies, more troublesome than useful to him; obliged, moreover, to survey and conduct the whole war in Italy, Spain, and Sicily, to advise the home government, to urge on the tardy resolutions of his ally the king of Macedonia—he was now required to provide for the victualling of Capua. The supplies with which this could be effected he was not able to send for from Africa, and to direct by a safe and easy road to the threatened town. They had to be collected in Italy by violence, or by the good services of exhausted allies; and, being collected, they had to be conveyed by land, on bad and difficult roads, past hostile armies and fortresses.

Capture of
the convoys for
Capua by
the Romans.

In spite of all these difficulties, if Hannibal had been able personally to undertake this task, it would have succeeded without any doubt, for wherever he appeared the Romans slunk back into their hiding-places. But he was not able to leave Tarentum, and therefore intrusted the victualling of Capua to Hanno, who commanded in Brutium. Hanno too was an able general. He collected the supplies in the neighbourhood of Beneventum, and if the Capuans had equalled him in energy and dispatch, and had furnished means of transport in sufficient quantity and in proper time, the hard problem would have been solved before any Roman force would have had time to interfere. But, owing to the remissness of the Capuans,

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a delay took place. The Roman colonists of Beneventum informed the consul Q. Fulvius Flaccus, at Bovianum, that large supplies were being brought together near their town. Fulvius hastened to the spot, and, during the temporary absence of Hanno, attacked the camp, filled and encumbered with 2,000 waggons, an immense train of cattle and a great number of drivers and other non-combatants. The whole convoy was taken.¹ We are not informed if Hannibal succeeded afterwards in repairing this loss and in sending the necessary supplies to Capua. But this seems highly probable, as otherwise we could hardly explain the long duration of the siege. Moreover Hannibal himself appeared soon after in Campania, and entered Capua; so that if he brought a new supply of provisions, the Romans at any rate were not able to intercept it a second time. He had sent a body of 2,000 horse in advance, who fell upon and routed the Romans with great loss as they were engaged in ravaging, according to their custom, the neighbourhood of Capua.² When Hannibal appeared himself and offered battle,³ the two consuls, Fulvius Flaccus and Appius Claudius, instead of proceeding with the siege of Capua, retired hastily, the one to Cumæ, the other into Lucania. Capua this time was delivered, and Hannibal was at leisure to turn southwards once more.

Since the campaign of 215 B.C., Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus had, with his army of liberated slaves, commanded in Lucania, and had been on the whole successful. A portion of the Lucanians had remained faithful to Rome. These and the slave legions carried on a kind of civil war against the revolted Lucanians. The Roman general was now doomed to experience the faithlessness of the Lucanian national character, to which King Alexander of

Defeat and
death of
Sempro-
nius
Gracchus.¹ Livy, xxv. 14.² Livy (xxv. 18) confesses a loss of 1,500 men.³ Livy (xxv. 19) relates that the two armies were actually engaged, but that the battle was soon after broken off on both sides, because during the engagement a body of Roman cavalry appeared in the distance, and was mistaken by Hannibal, as well as by the Romans, for a reinforcement of the enemy. If this report is true, it seems strange that the Romans did not accept battle afterwards, when they found out their error.

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Epirus had fallen a victim.¹ He was drawn into an ambush by a Lucanian of the Roman party, and cut down. His army was dissolved at his death. The slaves, liberated by him, did not consider themselves bound to obey any other leader, and dispersed immediately. The cavalry alone remained, under the quæstor Cn. Cornelius. It seems, however, that some slaves were collected again by the centurion M. Centenius, whom the senate had sent into Lucania with 8,000 men, in order to carry on a war of rapine against the revolted Lucanians, as Pomponius had done in Bruttium. This Centenius had almost doubled his army by collecting volunteers, when—unfortunately for him—he encountered Hannibal, and was so utterly defeated in this unequal contest that hardly one thousand of his men escaped.

Total
defeat of
Fulvius in
Apulia.

After this easy victory, Hannibal hastened into Apulia, where the prætor Cneius Fulvius, the consul's brother, commanded two legions. At Herdonea Fulvius ventured, or was compelled, to offer battle to the dreaded Punian, and paid for his rashness by the loss of his army and camp. Livy reports that no more than 2,000 men escaped out of 18,000.² It was a victory which resembled the days of the Trebia, the Thrasymenus, and the Aufidus, and Rome witnessed again such scenes of consternation and terror as had followed those great national disasters.

Relative
position of
Hannibal
and the
Romans.

Thus had Hannibal in the course of the year 212 made himself again terrible to the Romans, in a manner which could hardly be expected after his comparative inactivity during the last three years. He had taken Tarentum, destroyed two Roman armies, and dispersed a third. Apulia and Lucania were cleared of Roman troops; the Greek cities south of Naples, with the exception of Rhegium and Velia, were held by the Carthaginians. The weight of these disasters was increased by the defeat and death of the two Scipios in Spain, and the loss of all the territory and the advantages which had been gained in five

¹ See vol. i. p. 380.

² Livy, xxv. 21.

campaigns. In Sicily the war continued, even after the fall of Syracuse; and the Carthaginians, or their allies, were in possession of a great portion of the island. Rome was nearly exhausted, and yet the demands made upon the people went on increasing year after year. The government found it more and more difficult to raise money for the public treasury and men for the legions. Nor was it the material resources alone that began to fail. Already many thousands of citizens of the military age had evaded the service, and it had become necessary to proceed against them with the utmost severity and to press them into the legions. The villany of the army purveyors exposed the troops to want and privations. One hope after another seemed to vanish; every resource appeared to fail at last; and not a single great man had as yet appeared, whom the struggling republic might oppose as a worthy antagonist to Hannibal. The Roman generals rose nowhere above mediocrity, and not one of them had been inspired by genius to venture beyond the beaten paths of routine.

Nevertheless the Roman people did not despair. They continued the struggle without a thought of yielding, of reconciliation, or of peace. Every sentiment was repressed which was not a spur to perseverance and which did not intensify the power of resistance. All the pleasures of life, and all possessions, to which Roman hearts clung so tenaciously, were cheerfully sacrificed for the public weal. The bonds of family, of friendship, of social circles were severed at the call of duty. All thoughts, wishes, and actions of the nation tended to one common end—the overthrow of the national enemy; and it was this unanimity, this perseverance, which secured a final triumph.

No sooner had Hannibal left Campania, and marched southwards, than the Roman armies returned to their former position before Capua. The two consuls, Appius Claudius Pulcher and Q. Fulvius Flaccus, each with two legions, and the prætor C. Claudius Nero, with an equal force, advanced from three different points towards the doomed town, and began to surround it with a double line

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of circumvallation, consisting each of a continuous ditch and mound. The inner and smaller circle was intended to keep the besieged within their walls; the outer line was a defence against any army that might come to the relief of the town. In the space between the two concentric circles, camps were erected for an army of 60,000 men. It was not the intention of the Romans to take the town by storm. They relied on the slow but sure effects of hunger, which, in spite of any amount of collected provisions, could not fail to make itself soon felt in a populous town completely cut off from without. The wants of the besieging army were amply provided for. The chief magazine was established in the important town of Casilinum on the Volturnus. At the mouth of this river a fort had been erected, and to this place, as well as to the neighbouring town of Puteoli, provisions were sent by sea from Etruria and Sardinia, to be forwarded on the Volturnus to Casilinum. The several towns of Campania in the possession of the Romans served as outposts and defences to the besieging army, while the communication with Rome was open by the Appian as well as by the Latin road.

Resistance
of the
Capuans.

For a time the Capuans endeavoured to interrupt the work of circumvallation by desperate sallies. The narrow space of a few thousand paces between the walls of the town and the Roman lines became the theatre of numerous engagements, in which, above all, the excellent Capuan cavalry maintained its reputation. But the girdle around the town became from day to day firmer, and the besieged began anxiously to look out upon the heights of the hill of Tifata, where Hannibal had repeatedly pitched his camp, and whence he had but recently pounced upon the Romans, to scatter them in all directions. But Hannibal did not come. After the destruction of the army of M. Centenius in Lucania, and of Cn. Fulvius in Apulia, he had quickly marched upon Tarentum in the hope of surprising the citadel, and, baffled in this enterprise, he had turned, in the same hope, to Brundisium. Here also he

found the Roman garrison warned and prepared, and he now led his overworked troops into winter-quarters. To the Capuans he sent word not to lose courage, promising that he would come to their rescue in the right season, and put an end to the siege as he had done once before.¹

But this time the danger was more serious, and the Romans felt sure of final success. The lines of circumvallation were drawn nearly all round Capua. Before they were quite complete the Roman senate made a last offer to the besieged, promising personal freedom and the preservation of all their property to those who should leave the town before the Ides of March (at that period about mid-winter). The Capuans rejected this offer contemptuously. They were confident of the help that Hannibal had promised; their strength was sufficient to withstand any attack, and the town was apparently well supplied with provisions. There were of course friends of peace and friends of the Romans in Capua, but we can easily understand that they could hardly venture, under the present circumstances, to make their wishes known, and thus to incur the suspicion of cowardice or treason. The government was in the hands of the democratic party, hostile to Rome, and it was supported in its policy of unwavering resistance by the Carthaginian garrison. A man of low birth, called Seppius Lœsius, discharged the chief office of Meddix Tuticus,² and it is probable that the condition of Capua was much like that of Syracuse during the Roman siege. The men in possession of the government were too much compromised to hope for safety from any reconciliation with Rome; they had staked their lives on the great game, and were determined to persevere to the last.

Meanwhile the consuls of the year 211, Cn. Fulvius Centumalus and P. Sulpicius Galba,³ had entered on their office. They were apparently men of no great consideration, and the consuls of the previous year were left as

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condition
of Capua.

Attempts
of Hanni-
bal to re-
lieve
Capua.

¹ Livy, xxv. 22.

² Livy, xxvi. 6.

³ See Arnold, *Hist. of Rome*, iii. 239.

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proconsuls in command of the army before Capua, with instructions not to withdraw from the siege until they had taken the place. After the fall of Syracuse, the Romans justly looked upon the reduction of Capua as the most important object to be attained in Italy. The period when Capua would fall could be calculated with tolerable accuracy. It was determined by the quantity of provisions which the besieged had had time to accumulate before they were entirely cut off from external supplies. Yet there was one hope left. An agile Numidian succeeded in making his way through both Roman lines, and in informing Hannibal of the serious danger in which the town was now placed. Hannibal immediately broke up from the extreme south, with a body of light troops and thirty-three elephants, and advanced by forced marches into Campania.¹ Having stormed at Galatia² one of the outer posts which the Romans had erected all round Capua, he encamped behind the ridge of Mount Tifata, and immediately directed a brisk attack against the outer Roman lines, whilst simultaneously the Capuans made a sally and tried to force the inner circumvallation. A Spanish cohort had already scaled the mound, some elephants had been killed, their bodies filled up the ditch and formed a bridge over it, others had penetrated into one of the Roman camps, and had spread terror and confusion.³ But the Roman forces were so numerous that they were able to keep their ground, and to repel the enemy on both sides. Hannibal was obliged to give up the plan of raising the blockade of Capua by a direct attack on the Roman lines. He at once changed his plan. Whilst the Romans were preparing to meet a second attack, he left his camp at nightfall, gave information to the Capuans of his intention, encouraged them to persevere, and set himself in motion towards Rome.

¹ Livy, xxvi. 5.

² The situation of Galatia, which is called a *castellum* (Livy, xxvi. 5), is not known.

³ Livy, xxvi. 5, § 9. This is a second version mentioned by Livy.

No event in all the wars since the Gallic conflagration produced a deeper impression on the excitable masses of the capital than the appearance of the dreaded Carthaginian before its walls. The most disastrous defeats and the most glorious victories at a distance from Rome could not work upon fear and hope in a manner so direct and powerful as the sight of a hostile camp before their eyes. The terrible words 'Hannibal at the gates!' never vanished from the memory of the Romans; and the fear and anguish with which these words were first heard enhanced the satisfaction which was felt when, by the firmness of the senate and the Roman people, the danger was overcome. For this reason the imagination of narrators was particularly fertile in adorning the story of Hannibal's march to Rome in a manner flattering to the national pride. There arose a number of stories, some altogether fictitious, others suggested by mistakes; and it is consequently impossible for us to harmonise into a consistent narrative the statements of the two principal witnesses, Polybius and Livy, which differ in some essential points. We are compelled to make a selection; and as it appears that the report of Livy, though not free from errors, is, on the whole, more in harmony with the general course of events than that of Polybius, we give the preference to it on this occasion.¹

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¹ According to Polybius, (ix. 3 ff.), Hannibal left his camp before Capua so secretly, and marched so rapidly that he appeared before Rome before the news of his march had arrived. The Romans therefore believed that their whole army in Campania must have been annihilated, like the legions of Varro and Æmilius Paullus at Cannæ; and if by a mere chance two newly raised legions had not been in the town, there would have been no means of defending the walls, except by the citizens themselves. If we bear in mind that Hannibal could not march from Capua to Rome by the straight road (the Via Appia) which was open to the Romans, but that he was obliged to take a circuitous way, we shall think it hardly likely that he could proceed faster with the bulk of his army, through a hostile and mountainous district, than a messenger could ride on the direct way. Hence we may rather follow the account of Livy (xxvi. 7 ff.), according to which the news of Hannibal's march preceded him to Rome, and Hannibal did not use the utmost speed, but purposely delayed his approach several days by laying waste the country. As his object was not to surprise and take Rome, but to draw away the blockading army from Capua, this strategy is perfectly intelligible. In preferring this account to that of Polybius, we agree with Rospatt (*Feldzüge des Hannibal*, p. 80), and differ

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For five days Hannibal had lingered before Capua,¹ trying in vain to raise the siege. In the night following the fifth day he crossed the Volturnus in boats, and marched past the Roman colony of Cales by Teanum on the Latin road to the valley of the Liris, in the direction of Interamna and Fregellæ.² All these towns were held by Roman garrisons, and Hannibal could not think of laying siege to them. Nevertheless he felt so safe in the midst of the hostile fortresses, with an army of 60,000 men in his rear and Rome itself before him, that he leisurely plundered the districts through which he marched, tarried a whole day near Teanum, remained two days at Casilinum and then at Fregellæ, and thus gave time to the Roman army before Capua either to overtake him or to precede him to Rome by the direct road. The former alternative he would probably have preferred, for he sought above all things to bring on a battle, and it was for this reason that he devastated the country without mercy. But the Romans steadily adhered to their plan of avoiding a battle, and allowed him to advance unmolested. From Fregellæ Hannibal marched further north, through the country of the Hernicans, by Frusino, Ferentinum, and Anagnia, and between Tibur and Tusculum reached the river Anio, which he crossed in order to pitch his camp in sight of Rome, and to announce his arrival by the conflagration of the surrounding farms and villages.

Dismay of
the Ro-
mans.

Terror and dismay had preceded him. The fugitives, who had with difficulty escaped the fast Numidian horsemen, and had poured into Rome in vast crowds to find shelter for themselves, their property, and their cattle, spread heart-rending reports of the cruelties committed by the savage Punians. The rich, well-tilled country about

from Vincke (*Der zweite pun. Krieg*, p. 282), Mommsen (*Röm. Gesch.* i. 649; English translation, ii. 169), Peter (*Gesch. Roms*, i. 386), and Arnold (*Hist. of Rome*, iii. 242).

¹ Polybius, ix. 5, § 7.

² The road, as Livy (xxvi. 9) describes it, is unintelligible; it goes right and left, forwards and again backwards. Either the names of places are written wrong, or Livy had an erroneous notion of the situation of the several places between Capua and Rome. See above, p. 172.

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Rome, which since the days of King Pyrrhus had seen no enemy, was now the prey of war. He had arrived at last, this dreaded Hannibal, before whose sword the sons of Rome had fallen fast and thick as the ears of corn before the mower's scythe. The irresistible conqueror, whom no Roman general ventured to encounter, who but a very short time before had annihilated two Roman armies, had now arrived to accomplish his work, to raze the city of Rome to the ground, to murder the men, and to carry away the women and children into slavery far beyond the sea. The city was filled with a tumult and a confusion that were uncontrollable. Seeing a troop of Numidian deserters pass down from the Aventine, the people, demented with fright, thought the enemy was already in the city. Maddened with despair, they thought of nothing but flight, and would have rushed out of the gates if the dread of encountering the hostile cavalry had not kept them back. The women filled all the sanctuaries, poured out their prayers and lamentations, and on their knees swept the ground with their dishevelled hair.¹

Yet Rome was not unprepared. Hannibal's intention of marching upon Rome had been made known by deserters even before he broke up from Capua,² and even without such indirect or casual information his march could not long remain a secret. When the news arrived, the first thought of the senate was, as Hannibal had anticipated, to withdraw the whole army forthwith from Capua for the protection of the capital. But on the advice of the cautious T. Valerius Flaccus, it was resolved to order only a portion of the legions under Fulvius to come to Rome, and to continue the blockade of Capua with the rest. Fulvius therefore broke up with only 16,000 men, and hastened to Rome by the Appian road, arriving either simultaneously with Hannibal or a very short time after him. As proconsul he could not have a military command

Measures
of the
senate.¹ Polybius, ix. 6. Livy, xxvi. 9.² It seems not unlikely that Hannibal himself spread this news, as his object was to draw away the blockading army from Capua.

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in the city of Rome. A decree of the senate, therefore, conferred upon him a command equal to that of the consuls of the year, and provided for the defence of the city. The senate remained assembled on the Forum; all those who had in former years discharged the office of dictator, consul, or censor were invested with the imperium for the duration of the present crisis. A garrison, under the command of the prætor C. Calpurnius, occupied the Capitol, and the consuls encamped outside the town towards the north-east, between the Colline and the Esquiline gates. The two newly raised legions, which happened to be in Rome, joined to the army of the proconsul, were strong enough to baffle any attempt of Hannibal to take the town by storm. Accordingly Hannibal never ventured to make an attack. He approached the city with a few thousand Numidians, and leisurely rode along the walls, eagerly watched, but undisturbed by the awe-struck garrison.¹ It was a triumphal procession, and Hannibal may have felt legitimate pride in the thought that he had so far humbled his enemies. But when he reflected that Rome, though humbled, was still unconquered, all premature exultation must have been suppressed, while his eye was fixed anxiously on the dark future. So far he had realised his own and his country's ardent wishes. With the devastation of Italy and the blood of her sons, Rome had atoned for the wrong which she had done to Carthage; but the spirit of the Roman people was unsubdued, and it stood even this severe test without despairing or even doubting of ultimate success.

Retreat of
Hannibal
from
Rome.

No battle was fought before Rome, as the Romans did not accept Hannibal's challenge.² It could not be un-

¹ According to Pliny (*Hist. Nat.* xxxiv. 15), he threw his spear across the wall. This theatrical performance seems hardly worthy of Hannibal, and the testimony of Pliny does not suffice to make it credible.

² According to Livy (xxvi. 11), Flaccus, on two successive days, drew up his army in battle array in front of the army of Hannibal; but each time a terrible storm compelled both armies to seek shelter in their respective camps, whereupon the weather immediately cleared up. This is evidently a legend, invented for the purpose of clearing the Romans of the reproach of cowardice. Not

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known to Hannibal that a part at least of the blockading army of Capua had been withdrawn, and was now opposed to him. Perhaps he hoped that his plan had succeeded. If he could draw the Romans from their fortified position under the walls of Rome, and beat them, and then return to Capua, it was possible that the Capuans, if they had not yet broken through the Roman lines, would now, in conjunction with his army, repeat a combined attack upon the Roman forces left to continue the blockade, and it was not likely that this time such an attack would fail. In a few days, therefore, he left the immediate neighbourhood of Rome, marching in a north-easterly direction into the country of the Sabines, then to the south-east through the land of the Marsians and Pelignians, to return to Campania by a circuitous route.¹ He marked his road with flames and devastation. The Roman consuls, as he had expected, followed him, trying in vain to protect the land of their most faithful allies. After a march of five days, Hannibal was informed that the Romans had not relinquished the blockade of Capua, and that only a

more authenticated than this legend is the statement that, whilst Hannibal was before the gates of Rome, a reinforcement was sent (Livy, xxvi. 11), or was to be sent (Zonaras, ix. 6), to Spain; and the anecdote that the field where the hostile army was encamped was sold for its full value. If it was added that Hannibal, on hearing this, was so vexed that, out of bravado, he caused the booths of the money-changers in the Roman forum to be put up to auction in his camp, we can only express our surprise and regret that any Roman writer could think Hannibal capable of such childish and impotent spite. The story of the dispatch of auxiliaries for Spain, which is undoubtedly fictitious, shows how proud the Romans were of the alleged fact, that, in spite of Hannibal's advance, they needed no great military force for the defence of the capital. This circumstance throws some doubts on the statement that Fulvius marched with only 16,000 men from Capua for the relief of Rome. No other writer besides Livy mentions it, and we are consequently without the means of testing his trustworthiness by other, independent evidence. But it is not at all improbable that the number was made to appear so small to bring out more forcibly the self-reliance of the Romans. Livy himself gives expression to this sentiment of pride in the words which he attributes to Fabius Maximus (c. 8), for the purpose of dissuading the dispatch of any troops from Capua. If we are entitled to infer that a larger portion of the blockading army really marched from Capua to Rome, we should come to the conclusion that Hannibal's calculation was less faulty than it seems to have been.

¹ Livy, xxvi. 11.

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portion of their army had left Campania. Suddenly he turned round upon the pursuing Romans, attacked them in the night, stormed their camp, and routed them completely. But his plan was nevertheless thwarted. He found out, like Pyrrhus, that he was fighting with the Hydra; the Roman lines round Capua were sufficiently defended; and seeing that there was no prospect of success if he attempted to storm them, he turned aside and left Capua to her fate. By forced marches he hastened through southern Italy, and appeared unexpectedly before Rhegium. But he was foiled in the attempt to surprise this town, and the only result gained was an abundance of booty and prisoners, which rewarded his soldiers for the unusual fatigues they had undergone.

Fall of
Capua.

The fate of Capua was now sealed.¹ The besieged made one more attempt to call Hannibal to their rescue; but the Numidian who had undertaken to deliver the dangerous message was discovered in the Roman camp, and driven back into the town with his hands cut off. The leaders of the revolt now foresaw what they would have to expect. After the Capuan senate had formally resolved to surrender the town, about thirty of the noblest senators assembled in the house of Vibius Virrius for a last solemn banquet, and took farewell of one another, resolved not to survive the ruin of their country. They all swallowed poison and lay down to die. When the gates were thrown open to admit the victorious army, they were beyond the reach of Roman revenge. The other senators of Capua relied on the generosity of Rome. It is probable that all who were conscious of guilt had sought death, and that the survivors were not directly implicated in causing the defection of Capua. In all such revolutions there is a wide difference between leaders

¹ Livy (xxvi. 12) relates that the Roman senate once more offered pardon to the people of Capua if they would now surrender. This statement, unless it is simply a repetition of a previous one, was invented by the annalists to set forth the magnanimity of the Romans and the perversity of the Capuans. Nobody can credit it who knows the true character of the Roman people and government.

and followers. No doubt many of the latter had no choice but to swim with the stream, and among them there must have been many parents or relatives of the young Capuan knights who had either taken no part at all in the revolt, or had gone over to the Romans in the course of the war. Such men were justified in hoping for mercy. But Q. Fulvius thirsted for blood, and Roman policy demanded a terrific example. The Capuan senators were therefore sent in chains partly to Cales, partly to Teanum. In the course of the night, Fulvius broke up with a detachment of cavalry and reached Teanum before dawn. He caused twenty-eight prisoners to be scourged and beheaded before his eyes. Without delay he hastened to Cales, and ordered twenty-five more to be put to death. The awful rapidity with which he went through the work of the executioner, without even the shadow of discrimination or trial, shows that his heart was in it. It is said that, before he had done, he received a sealed letter from Rome, which contained an order from the senate to postpone the punishment of the guilty, and to allow the senate to pronounce their sentence. Guessing the contents of the letter, Fulvius left it unopened until all his victims were dead. If this report is true, and if the Roman senate really intended to act with clemency, they still had ample opportunity, even after the hot haste with which Fulvius had slaked his thirst for revenge. But as the Roman senate, far from exhibiting a spirit of clemency, continued to treat prostrate Capua with exquisite harshness and cruelty, we feel it difficult to credit the report.

That Flaccus had carried out the intention of the Roman government is clear from the treatment of the two small Campanian towns, Atella and Calatia, which had revolted, and were now reduced at the same time as Capua. The leading men of these two places were put to death.¹ Three hundred of the chief citizens of Capua,

Treatment
of Capua
by the Ro-
mans.

¹ Concerning their number, see Weissenborn's note to Livy xxvi. 14

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Calatia, and Atella¹ were dragged to Rome, cast into prison, and left to die of starvation; others were distributed as prisoners over the Latin towns, where they all perished in a similar manner. The rest of the guilty, *i.e.* those who had themselves borne arms against Rome, or whose relations had so done, or who had discharged any public office since the breaking out of the revolt,² were sold as slaves, with their wives and children. Those who were not guilty, *i.e.* those who at the time of the revolt had not been in Campania, or who had gone over to the Romans, or who had taken no active part in the insurrection, lost only their land and part of their movable property, but were left in the enjoyment of personal freedom, and received permission to settle within certain limits away from Campania. The towns of Capua, Atella, and Calatia, and the whole district belonging to them, became the property of the Roman people. The right of municipal self-government was withdrawn, and a prefect, annually sent from Rome, was intrusted with the administration of the district, which, instead of a free community, contained henceforth only a motley population of workmen, farmers of the public land and of the revenue, tradesmen, and other adventurers—a population destitute of all those hallowed associations and feelings of attachment to the soil which to the people of antiquity were the basis of patriotism and all civic virtues. The flourishing city of Capua, once the rival of Rome, was blotted out from among the list of Italian towns, and was henceforth let out by the Roman people ‘like to a tenement or pelting farm.’ We cannot, of course, expect to find among the men that fought against Hannibal that chivalrous spirit and generosity which in general characterise modern warfare. To what extent they acted in the spirit of their contemporaries we can judge most clearly from the manner in which the tender-hearted, humane Livy, two

¹ According to Zonaras (ix. 6), the people of Atella left their town in a body (*πανδημει*) and joined Hannibal.

² Livy, xxvi. 34.

centuries later, spoke of their proceedings. He calls them in every respect laudable. 'Severely and quickly,' he says, 'the most guilty were punished; the lower classes of the people were dispersed without the hope of return; the innocent buildings and walls were preserved from fire and destruction; and, by the preservation of the most beautiful town of Campania, the feelings of the neighbouring peoples were spared, whilst at the same time the interests of the Roman people were consulted.'¹

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The final decision of the fate of Capua, which we have here related, did not follow immediately after the hurried punishment of those who were principally guilty. It was postponed to the year following, and by a decision of the popular assembly intrusted to the senate. Meanwhile Capua was occupied by a Roman garrison and strictly guarded. No one was allowed to leave the town without permission. Yet there were some Campanians at Rome; perhaps the three hundred who at the time of the revolt were serving as horsemen with the Roman legions in Sicily, and who, as a reward for their fidelity, had been received as Roman citizens. These unfortunate men also were now doomed to experience the adverse fate which

Execution
of Capuans
at Rome.

¹ Livy, xxvi. 16: 'Ita ad Capuam res compositæ consilio ab omni parte laudabili: severe et celeriter in maxime noxios animadversum; multitudo civium dissipata in nullam spem reditus; non sævitum incendiis ruinisque in tecta innoxia murosque, et cum emolumento quæsita etiam apud socios lenitatis species, incolumitate urbis nobilissimæ opulentissimæque, cuius ruinis omnis Campania, omnes qui Campaniam circa accolunt populi ingemuissent.' Compare Valerius Maximus, iii. 8, 1. These sentiments scarcely come home to our feelings. What is the value of the 'incolumitas urbis,' which consists in the preservation of stones and timber, whilst the inhabitants were expelled, sold into slavery, or killed? Is it not a mockery of right, if Livy finds it meritorious and laudable that the houses and walls were spared, to the advantage of the Roman state? There is perhaps no greater contrast anywhere between antiquity and modern times than in the range of human sympathies and love. As every nation, and even every city, had formerly its own god and its own religion, there existed no moral and no religious obligation with regard to the members of other communities. It was only when mankind gradually rose to the conception of one God of the universe, and when Christianity taught us to love our enemies as ourselves, that men ceased to look with pleasure or indifference at the sufferings of men differing from them in race, language, or even geographical locality alone.

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seemed inexorably bent on destroying the people of Capua.¹ It happened that a conflagration broke out in Rome, which raged for a whole night and day, destroyed a number of shops and other buildings—among them the ancient palace of Numa, the official residence of the chief pontiff—and which even threatened the adjoining temple of Vesta. The style of building then prevalent at Rome, the narrow streets, and the absence of fire-police and engines, rendered such a calamity no matter for surprise. But the imminent danger which had threatened one of the principal sanctuaries of Rome—a sanctuary on whose preservation the safety of the city depended—spread general consternation, and suggested the idea that the fire was not accidental, but caused by some bitter enemy of the commonwealth. By order of the senate, the consul accordingly issued a proclamation, promising a public reward to any one who would point out the men guilty of the supposed crime. By this proclamation a premium was offered to any villain who might succeed in concocting the story of a plot plausible enough to be credited by the excited populace. An informer was soon found. A slave of some young Campanians, the sons of Pacuvius Calavius,² declared that his masters and five other young Capuans, whose fathers had been put to death by Q. Fulvius, had conspired, out of revenge, to set Rome on fire. The unfortunate young men were seized. Their slaves were tortured to confess that they had caused the fire by order of their masters. This confession under torture, the eternal disgrace of the Roman law procedure, established the guilt of the Capuans to the satisfaction of their judges, and the men were all executed, whilst the informer received his freedom as a reward.

¹ Livy, xxvi. 27.

² See above, p. 260. These young men belonged, in all probability, to the Campanian knights who served in Sicily at the time of the revolt. If this conjecture is true, we can understand why some of the victims of Fulvius hoped for mercy. They expected, as has been suggested in the text (p. 340 f.), that the faithful services of their sons would atone for any transgressions of their own, and at least secure them from capital punishment.

It is not absolutely necessary to assume that this revolting sentence of death was inspired by hatred of the conquered Capuans. The Romans, in their savage ignorance, raged not less fiercely against themselves, and had given a proof of this as late as 331 B.C., by the execution of one hundred and seventy innocent matrons.¹ But the prevailing hatred of Capua caused the story of the wretched informer to be received with ready credulity, just as the English nation, besotted with terror at the time of the Popish plot, greedily swallowed any lies which villains like Oates and Dangerfield were pleased to concoct. The cruel sentence pronounced on the young Capuans in Rome was a worthy introduction to the decrees of the senate which blotted out the old rival for ever. It was a consequence of the municipal constitution of the republic that Rome could not brook another great town besides herself. This was the reason why, even in the legendary period, Alba Longa was crushed, and at a subsequent period Veii was doomed to destruction. It was now the turn of Capua to sink into the dust; and no long period elapsed before that other rival city followed which was now struggling desperately with Rome, under the thorough conviction that she must either conquer or perish. Wherever the republican armies planted their iron foot, they stamped out the life of all towns which might enter into competition with Rome. It was not before Rome itself had bowed her proud head under an imperial master that municipal prosperity returned to the great centres of art, learning, and commerce in the subjected countries.

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PERIOD,
212-211
B.C.Explana-
tion of
Roman
policy.¹ See vol. i. p. 567.

Fifth Period of the Hannibalian War.

FROM THE FALL OF CAPUA TO THE BATTLE ON THE
METAURUS, 211-207 B.C.

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Change in
the charac-
ter of the
war.

The re-conquest of Capua marks the turning-point in the second Punic war. From the time when Hannibal had crossed the Alps to the battle of Cannæ the destructive waves which had inundated Italy had risen higher and higher, had borne down one obstacle after another, and had threatened to engulf the whole fabric of Roman dominion. After the day of Cannæ the waters spread far and wide over Italy; but they rose no higher. Most of the Roman allies, and these the most valuable, resisted the impulse to revolt which carried along the Capuans to their own destruction. The colonies and Rome herself remained firm; and now at length, after a seven years' struggle, a decided turn of the tide took place. Rome had passed through the worst; her safety was secured, and even her dominion over Italy seemed no longer exposed to any serious danger. Henceforth she could continue the war with full confidence in a final triumph.

Dispatch
of Roman
reinforce-
ments to
Spain.

The firstfruit of the victory in Campania was the restoration of Roman superiority in Spain, which had been lost by the reverses and the death of the two Scipios. Spain was justly looked upon as an outlying fortress of Carthage, whence a second attack on Italy might at any time be expected. To prevent such an attack had hitherto been the principal object of the Roman generals in Spain. In the gloomy period after the battle of Cannæ the two Scipios had succeeded in accomplishing this task by the victory over Hasdrubal at Ibera; and it is perhaps no exaggeration to say that by it they had saved Rome from destruction.¹ When the Carthaginians had recovered

¹ See above, p. 268.

from their defeat at Ibera, and had victoriously ended the war with the Numidians in Africa, they had resumed the war in Spain with new vigour, and the consequence was the almost total destruction of the Roman armies in Spain.¹ It was, for Rome, a most lucky coincidence that at this critical season a part of the forces that had besieged Capua became disposable for other purposes. C. Claudius Nero was accordingly summoned from Campania, and in the course of the same summer (211 B.C.) sent, with about two legions,² to Spain, to rally the remnants of the Scipionic army, and to incorporate them with his own. Nero succeeded not only in effectually defending the country between the Pyrenees and the Ebro, but he is said even to have undertaken an expedition far into the Carthaginian possessions, and to have so far out-manceuvred Hasdrubal that he might have made him prisoner with his whole army if he had not been duped by the wily Carthaginian.³ This statement appears to deserve no more credit than the pretended exploits of Marcius.⁴ The situation of the Romans in Spain, even in the following year (210 B.C.), was very critical, and it was resolved in Rome to send thither an additional force of 11,000 men. The command of this reinforcement was intrusted to Publius Cornelius Scipio, a young man only twenty-seven years of age, who had as yet discharged but one public office, viz. that of ædile, and had never before had any independent military command, but who was destined to rise suddenly into distinction, and finally to triumph over Hannibal himself.

Publius Cornelius Scipio was the son of Lucius Cornelius Scipio, and nephew of Publius Cornelius Scipio, the two brothers who had fought and fallen in Spain. His first appearance on the stage of history is marked by a series of events which are startling and somewhat mysterious in their character, and calculated to challenge serious doubts.

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FIFTH
PERIOD,
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Early life
of Publius
Cornelius
Scipio.

¹ In the year 212 or 211. See above, p. 317, note 1.

² He had 12,000 foot and 1,000 horse. Livy, xxvi. 17.

³ Livy, xxvi. 17.

⁴ See p. 317, note 2.

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It does not at all appear that, as regards external attestation, the history of Scipio's exploits stands on a higher level than that of the preceding events. And yet we know that Polybius—the most intelligent, sober, and conscientious investigator of facts in the history of Rome—had close and intimate relations with the house of the Scipios, and that he drew his information directly from C. Lælius, the friend and associate of Scipio himself.¹ But we find, both in Polybius and Livy, statements regarding Scipio which remind us of the time when the Roman annals were full of random assertions, errors, exaggerations, and impudent fictions. We are therefore obliged to sift with particular care all those accounts which refer to Scipio's character, to his military exploits, and the political transactions in which he took a part.

Family influence of the Scipios in Rome.

For some generations the family of the Scipios had belonged to the most prominent of the republic. Since the time of the Samnite wars they were almost regularly in possession of one or other of the great offices of state. Their family pride was intense, and has left lasting monuments in the epitaphs which have come down to us.² It is evident that their influence among the noble families of Rome was very considerable. Cneius Scipio Asina, who, in the fifth year of the Sicilian war, had, by his want of judgment, caused the loss of a Roman squadron, and had himself been made prisoner of war,³ was, in the course of the same war, again appointed to high office. In the Hannibalian war, the influence of this family had risen so greatly that the conduct of the war in Spain was, year after year, confided to the two brothers Publius and Cneius Scipio, in a manner altogether at variance with the regular practice of the republic. The Scipios disposed, in Spain, of the armies and the resources of the Roman people as if they were the uncontrolled masters, and not the servants, of the state; and they conducted the administration of the province, and the diplomatic relations with the Spanish

¹ Polybius, x. 3.

² See vol. i. p. 459; vol. ii. p. 63.

³ See above, p. 55.

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tribes, as they thought proper. It seemed that the senate had intrusted the management of the Spanish war entirely to the family of the Scipios, as in the legendary period the war with the Veientes was made over as a family war¹ to the Fabii. Their command was cut short only by their death, and it was now transferred to the son of one of them, as if it was hereditary in the family. The manner, too, in which this was done was strange in itself, and had on no occasion been known before. Such men as Pomponius and Centenius, it is true, had in the course of the war been intrusted with the command of detachments of troops, without having ever previously discharged any of the offices to which the 'imperium' was attached.² But the troops of these officers were wholly, or for the most part, volunteers and irregulars, and they were bent more on plundering and harassing the revolted allies of Rome than on fighting the Carthaginians. On the other hand, the supreme command of the Roman legions in Spain was a matter of the greatest importance. The senate had not allowed the brave L. Marcius to retain the command of the remnants of the Spanish army, though it was due to him that any portion of it was saved. Nor was it the want of able generals, such as the Romans could boast of, that made it absolutely necessary to place at the post of danger an inexperienced young man, who had not yet given proofs of his ability. C. Claudius Nero, who had rendered good service during the siege of Capua, and who afterwards proved himself a master of strategy in the campaign against Hasdrubal, had already been sent to Spain. There was no reason why he should not be left there, and if there had been an objection to him, there were other tried officers in abundance, fit to take the command. The eulogists of Scipio related a silly story, viz., that nobody came forward to volunteer his services for the dangerous post in Spain,³

¹ A 'famiare bellum,' as it is called by Livy (ii. 48).

² See above, pp. 318-330.

³ Livy, xxvi. 18: 'Primo expectaverant, ut qui se tanto imperio dignos crederent, nomina profiterentur. Quæ ut destituta expectatio est, redintegratus

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and that Scipio, by boldly declaring his readiness to undertake the command, inspired the people with admiration and confidence, and in a manner compelled them to give the appointment to him. The Roman republic would indeed have been in a deplorable condition, if cowardice had restrained even one man capable of command from dedicating his services to the state in a post of danger. It was not so. The appointment of Scipio was due to the position and influence of his family.¹ It was one of the irregularities caused by the war, and a long time elapsed before proconsular command was again conferred on a man who had not previously been consul.

Character
of Scipio.

Scipio was, however, a man far above the average of his contemporaries, and there was in him greatness of mind, which could not fail to rivet general attention.² His character was not altogether of the ancient Roman type. There was in it an element which displeased men of the old school, and which, on the other hand, gained for him the admiration and esteem of the people. His bearing was proud, his manners reserved. From his youth his mind was open to poetical and religious impressions. He believed, or pretended, that he was inspired; but his keen understanding kept this germ of fanaticism within the bounds of practical usefulness to his political purposes. Whether the piety that he displayed ostentatiously, his visions and communions with the deity, were the results of honest conviction, as his contemporaries believed, or whether they were merely political manoeuvres, as Polybius thought,³

luctus acceptæ cladis desideriumque imperatorum amissorum, etc. . . .
'fremunt, adeo perditas res desperatumque de republica esse, ut nemo audeat in Hispaniam imperium accipere; cum subito P. Cornelius . . . professus se petere in superiore unde conspici posset loco constitit,' etc.

¹ This is apparent in his election to the ædileship (Livy, xxv. 2). As ædile he made himself popular by his liberality. Livy, *ibid*: 'Ludi Romani pro temporis illius copiis magnifice facti et diem unum instaurati et congii olei in vicis singulos dati.' In this passage it seems that before the word 'congi,' a number has dropped out of the text. Compare Weissenborn's note.

² Polybius, x. 2, § 2: Τῷ γὰρ σχεδὸν ἐπιφανέστατον αὐτὸν γεγονέναι τῶν πρὸ τοῦ, ζητοῦσι μὲν πάντες εἰδέναι, τίς ποτ' ἦν κ.τ.λ.

³ Polybius, x. 2, § 12: Πόπλιος ἐνεργαζόμενος ἀεὶ δόξαν τοῖς πολλοῖς, ὥς μετὰ

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intended to deceive the populace and to serve his political ends, we can hardly decide with any degree of certainty, as no genuine speeches or writings of his are preserved, which might have revealed the true nature of his mind. But whatever we may think of the genuineness of his enthusiasm, it appears un-Roman in any light. His imaginative mind was powerfully affected by the creations of Greek poetry. It is not incredible that he may himself have believed stories like that of his descent from a god.¹ If he did, he will stand higher in our esteem than if we look upon him as a clever impostor.

In the autumn of the year 210,² Scipio sailed from the Tiber under a convoy of thirty ships of war, with 10,000 foot and 1,000 horse. The second in command under him was the proprætor, M. Junius Silanus; the fleet was under the orders of C. Lælius, Scipio's intimate friend and admirer. As usual the fleet sailed along the coast of Etruria, Liguria, and Gaul, instead of striking straight across the Tyrrhenian Sea. In Emporiæ, a trading settlement of the Massilians, the troops were disembarked. Thence Scipio marched by land to Tarraco, the chief town of the Roman province, where he spent the winter in preparation for the coming campaign.

Departure
of Scipio
for Spain.

The plan of this campaign was made by Scipio with the utmost secrecy, and was communicated to his friend Lælius alone. He had received information that the three

Plans of
Scipio.

τῆς θείας ἐπιβολῆς ποιούμενος τὰς ἐπιβολὰς εὐθαρσεστέρους καὶ προθυμότερους κατεσκεύαζε τοὺς ὑποταττομένους πρὸς τὰ δεινὰ τῶν ἔργων. Livy, xxvi. 19: Fuit enim Scipio non veris tantum virtutibus mirabilis, sed arte quoque quadam ab iuventa in ostentationem earum compositus, pleraque apud multitudinem aut per nocturnas visa species aut velut divinitus mente monita agens, sive et ipse capti quadam superstitione animi, sive ut imperia consiliaque velut sorte oraculi missa sine cunctatione exsequerentur. Ad hoc iam inde ab initio præparans animos ex quo togam virilem sumpsit, nullo die prius ullam publicam privatamque rem egit quam in Capitolium iret ingressusque ædem consideret et plerumque solus in secreto ibi tempus tereret, etc. 'His miraculis nunquam ab ipso elusa fides est, quin potius aucta arte quadam nec abnuendi tale quidquam nec palam affirmandi.

¹ Gellius, *Noctes Atticæ*, vii. 1.

² The time cannot be fixed accurately. See Becker, *Vorarbeiten z. zweiten punisch. Krieg*. p. 113 ff., and Weissenborn's note to Livy, xxviii. 16.

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Carthaginian armies, commanded by Mago and the two Hasdrubals, were stationed at great distances from one another and from New Carthage. This important place was intrusted to the insufficient protection of a garrison of only one thousand men. Thus an opportunity was offered of seizing by a bold stroke the military capital of the Punians in Spain, whose excellent harbour was indispensable to their fleet, and where they had their magazines, arsenal, storehouses, dockyards, their military chest, and the hostages of many Spanish tribes. The preparations for this expedition were made with the greatest secrecy. The very unlikelihood of an attack had lulled the Carthaginian generals into a criminal security, and compromised the safety of the town. If New Carthage were able to hold out only a few days, or if Hasdrubal, who was at a distance of ten days' march, had the least suspicion of Scipio's plan, it had no chance of success. It was bold and ingenious, and is so much more creditable to its author as the sad fate of his father and uncle might have been expected to make him lean rather to the side of caution and timidity than of daring enterprise.

Siege and
capture
of New
Carthage.

In the first days of spring (209 B.C.) Scipio broke up with his land army of 25,000 infantry and 2,500 horse, and marched from Tarraco along the coast southward, whilst Lælius, with a fleet of thirty-five vessels, kept constantly in sight. Arriving unexpectedly before New Carthage,¹ the united force immediately laid siege to the town by land and sea. New Carthage lay at the northern extremity of a spacious bay, which opened southwards, and whose mouth was protected by an island as by a natural breakwater, so that inside of it ships could ride in perfect safety. Under the walls of the town on its western side, a narrow strip of land was covered by shallow water, a continuation of the bay; and this sheet of water extended some way northwards, leaving only a sort of isthmus, of inconsiderable width, which connected the

¹ According to Polybius (x. 9, § 7), in only seven days. This is impossible. The distance from Tarraco to New Carthage is too great; even from the Ebro an army would take longer to march to Carthagena.

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PERIOD,
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B.C.

town with the mainland and was fortified by high walls and towers. New Carthage had therefore almost an insular position, and was very well fortified by nature and art. But it had a weak side, and this had been betrayed by fishermen to the Roman general. During ebb tide the water of the shallow pool west of the town fell so much that it was fordable, and the bottom was firm. On this information Scipio laid his plan, and, in the expectation that he would be able to reach from the water an undefended part of the wall, he promised to his soldiers the co-operation of Neptune. But first he drew off the attention of the garrison to the northern side of the town. He began by making a double ditch and mound from the sea to the bay, in order to be covered in the rear against attacks from the Punic army in case the siege should be postponed and Hasdrubal should advance to relieve the town. Then having easily beaten off the garrison, which had made a foolhardy attempt to dislodge him, he immediately attacked the walls. Having an immense superiority of numbers, the Romans might hope by relieving one another to tire out the garrison. They tried to scale the walls with ladders, but met with so stout a resistance that after a few hours Scipio gave the signal to desist. The Carthaginians thought the assault was given up, and hoped to be able to repose from their exertions. But towards evening, when the ebb tide had set in, the attack was renewed with double violence. Again the Romans assailed the walls and applied their ladders on all parts. Whilst the attention of the besieged was thus turned to the northern side, which they thought was exclusively endangered by the second attack, as by the first, a detachment of five hundred Romans forded the shallow water on the west, and reached the wall without being perceived. They quickly scaled it, and opened the nearest gate from the inside. Neptune had led the Romans through his own element to victory. New Carthage, the key of Spain, the basis of the operations against Italy, was taken, and the issue of the Spanish war was determined.

BOOK
IV.

Roman
regulations
for the
sack of
towns.

On the occasion of the taking of New Carthage, Polybius relates the Roman custom observed in the plundering of a town taken by storm.¹ He tells us that for a time the soldiers used to cut down every living creature they met, not men only, but even brute animals. When this butchery had lasted as long as the commander thought proper, a signal was given to call the soldiers back from it, and then the plundering began. Only a portion of the army, never more than one-half, was allowed to plunder, lest during the inevitable disorder the safety of the whole might be compromised. But the men selected for plundering a town were not allowed to keep anything for themselves. They were obliged to give up what they had taken, and the booty was equally distributed among all the troops, including even the sick and wounded.

Disposal
of the
booty.

The commanding general had a right of disposing of the whole of the booty as he deemed proper. He could, if he liked, reserve the whole, or a part of it, for the public treasury. If he did so, he made himself of course obnoxious, like Camillus in the old legend, to the soldiers; and it seems that, in the time of the Punic wars, it was the general practice to leave the booty to the troops. Only a portion of it—more especially the military chest, magazines, materials of war, works of art, and captives—was taken possession of by the quæstor for the benefit of the state. The rest was given to the soldiers, and served as a compensation and reward for the dangers and hardships of the service, which were very inadequately rewarded by the military pay.

Plunder of
New Car-
thage.

The booty made at New Carthage was very considerable. This town had been the principal military storehouse of the Carthaginians in Spain, and contained hundreds of ballistæ, catapults, and other engines of war with projectiles, large sums of money, and quantities of gold and silver, eighteen ships, besides materials for building and

¹ Polybius, x. 15, § 4: 'Ο δὲ Πόπλιος ἐπεὶ τοὺς εἰσεληλυθότας ἀξιοχρέως ὑπελάμβανε εἶναι, τοὺς μὲν πλείστους ἐφῆκε κατὰ τὸ παρ' αὐτοῖς ἔθος ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει παραγγείλας κτείνειν τὸν παρατυχόντα καὶ μηδενὸς φεῖδεσθαι μηδὲ πρὸς τὰς ὠφελείας ὀρμῶν μέχρις ἂν ἀποδοθῇ τὸ σύνθημα κ.τ.λ.

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equipping ships.¹ The prisoners were of especial value. The garrison, it is true, was not numerous, and had no doubt been reduced by the fight;² but among the prisoners was Hanno, the commander, two members of the smaller Carthaginian council or executive board, and fifteen of the senate, who represented the Carthaginian government in the field. All these were sent to Rome. The inhabitants of the town who had escaped the massacre, 10,000 in number, as it is stated, might have been sold as slaves, according to the ancient right of war, but were allowed by Scipio to retain their liberty;³ several thousand skilled workmen, who had been employed in the dockyards and arsenals, as ship-carpenters, armourers, or otherwise, were kept in the same capacity, and were promised their freedom if they served the republic faithfully and effectually. The strongest of the prisoners Scipio mixed up with the crews of his fleet, and was thus enabled to man the eighteen captured vessels. These men also received the promise that, if they conducted themselves well, they should receive their freedom at the end of the war. But the most precious part of the booty consisted of the hostages of several Spanish tribes, who had been kept in custody in New Carthage.⁴ Scipio hoped by their means to gain the friendship of those subjects or allies of Carthage for whose fidelity they were to be a pledge. He treated them therefore with the greatest kindness, and told them that their fate depended entirely on the conduct

¹ As usual there is a great divergence in the numbers given by the different writers. According to Silenus, the Romans took sixty scorpions (a kind of ballista). Valerius Antias raises this number to 19,000. No wonder that Livy, who could digest a good deal of exaggeration, exclaims (xxvi. 49): 'Adeo nullus mentiendi modus est!'—Compare Livy, xxvi. 47; Polybius, x. 17.

² The same uncertainty as to numbers meets us here again. Polybius states the number to have been 1,000, others 2,000, 7,000, and even as many as 10,000.—Livy, xxvi. 49.

³ Polybius, x. 17, § 8: οἱτοὶ μὲν οὖν ἅμα δακρύνοντες καὶ χαίροντες ἐπὶ τῇ παραδόξῃ τῆς σωτηρίας προσκυνήσαντες τὸν στρατηγὸν διελύθησαν.

⁴ Polybius, x. 18. According to Livy (xxvi. 49), the number of these hostages varies in different authors between 300 and 3,724! No wonder that Livy says, 'Quantus numerus fuerit piget scribere.'

BOOK
IV.Personal
anecdotes
of Scipio.

of their countrymen, and that he would send them all home if he could be assured of the good disposition of the Spanish peoples.¹

The narrative of the conquest of New Carthage is adorned with some anecdotes, the object of which is to extol the generosity, the delicacy of feeling, and the self-control of the great Scipio. According to one of these stories,² there was among the hostages a venerable matron, the wife of the Spanish chief Mandonius, the brother of Indibilis, king of the Iltergetes, and several of the youthful daughters of the latter. These ladies had been treated with indignity by the Carthaginians, but the sense of female modesty at first kept the noble matron from expressing in distinct words her wish that the Romans would treat them more as became their rank, age, and sex. Scipio, with fine discrimination, guessed what she hardly ventured to pray for, and granted the request.

Again, when his soldiers, bringing to him a Spanish lady, remarkable for her dazzling beauty, desired him to take her as a prize worthy of himself alone, he caused the damsel to be restored to her father, subduing a passion which had often triumphed over the greatest heroes, and from which he himself was by no means exempt. This story, related in its credible simplicity by Polybius, was further enlarged and adorned by Livy, who speaks of the lady as the betrothed of a powerful Spanish prince, to whom Scipio, like the hero in a play, restores her unharmed, with all the pathos of conscious virtue and youthful enthusiasm. The rich presents which her parents had brought for her ransom Scipio gives to the happy bridegroom, as an addition to her dowry. The Spaniard reveres Scipio like a god, and finally

¹ Livy (xxvi. 49) makes Scipio address the hostages in the following words: 'Venisse eos in populi Romani potestatem qui beneficio quam metu obligare homines malit exterasque gentes fide ac societate vinctas habere quam tristi subiectas servitio.' How could any Roman, who knew and composed the history of his country, write these words! Had Livy forgotten, what he himself so often relates, that the Romans were in the habit of taking hostages, not only from recently conquered barbarians, but from their old Italian allies? (Compare Livy, xxv. 7; xxix. 3); and what else was it but a 'triste servitium' that drove the subjected people of Sicily and Sardinia to rebellion?

² Polybius, x. 18. Livy, xxvi. 49.

joins the Roman army as a faithful ally, at the head of a picked body of 1,400 horse. If we compare the simple story of Polybius with the little novel into which it is worked up by Livy, we may in some measure understand how many stories were expanded by a natural process of gradual growth and development. The characteristics of fiction are often unmistakable, but it is not often possible to lay them bare by documentary evidence. If our sources could be traced even beyond Polybius, we should perhaps find that the whole story of Scipio's generosity towards captured ladies emanates from the desire of comparing him with Alexander the Great, who in a similar manner treated the family of Darius after the battle of Issos.¹

In the narrative of the great Hannibalian war, which was carried on simultaneously in so many different parts, we cannot sometimes avoid shifting the scenes suddenly, and turning our attention away from events before they have reached a sort of natural conclusion. The taking of New Carthage determined the fate of the Carthaginian dominion in Spain, which now rested on the distant town of Gades

Effects of
the fall of
New Car-
thage.

¹ That this comparison is at the bottom of the whole story seems to result from a passage of Gellius (vi. 8, 3): 'Lepida questio agitari potest, utrum videri continentiore par sit, Publiumne Africanum Superiorem, qui Carthagine, ampla civitate in Hispania, expugnata, virginem tempestivam forma egregia, nobilis viri Hispani filiam, captam perductamque ad se, patri in-violatam reddidit; an regem Alexandrum, qui Darii regis uxorem, eandemque eiusdem sororem, praelio magno captam, quam esse audiebat exsuperanti forma, videre noluit, produciue ad se prohibuit.' That the alleged occurrence is not a historical fact, but a mere fiction, follows from the freedom with which Valerius Antias (not a very trustworthy author, it is true) relates (according to Gellius, *loc. cit.*) the very opposite, viz.: 'Eam puellam non redditam patri, sed retentam a Scipione atque in deliciis amoribusque ab eo usurpatam.' It appears that Scipio's virtue was, even in his own lifetime, not in good odour. If his friends tried to give vouchers for it, by such stories as the one in question, his enemies gave them a wrong turn, which made them prove the very opposite; and they could refer as to an admitted fact, φιλογύνην εἶναι τὸν Πόπλιον (Polybius, x. 19, § 3; compare Gellius, vi. 8), a circumstance without which the whole story would be without a point. In conclusion, let us remark that it is difficult to see where and how the 'Roman youths' got possession of the noble Spanish lady. If she was one of the hostages, as we may infer, she could not, as a chance captive, fall into the hands of some chance captors, but was, by her position, secured from the brutal treatment to which Scipio's young friends destined her.

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alone; but before we can trace the sequel of events which led to the total expulsion of the Carthaginians, we must watch the progress of the war in Italy, where, as long as Hannibal commanded an unconquered Punic army, the Romans had still most to fear and the Carthaginians to hope.

Disposition of the Italian towns.

The re-conquest of Capua in 211 B.C. was by far the most decisive success which the Roman arms had gained in the whole course of the war. With Capua Hannibal lost the most beautiful fruit of his greatest victory. He had now no longer any stronghold in Campania, and was in consequence obliged to retire into the southern parts of the peninsula. It became more and more difficult for him to maintain the Italian towns that had joined him. The Italians had lost confidence in his star. Everywhere the adherents of Rome gained ground, and the temptation became greater to purchase her forgiveness by a timely return to obedience, coupled, if possible, with a betrayal of the Punic garrisons.

Difficulties of Hannibal's position.

Thus Hannibal's ingenious plan of overpowering Rome with the aid of her allies had failed. How could he now hope, after the fall and dreadful punishment of Capua, to win over the smaller Italian towns which had hitherto remained faithful to Rome? Those who had previously rebelled he could protect only by strong detachments of his army from internal treason and from the attacks of enemies without. But he could not spare the men necessary for such a service, and he did not like to expose his best troops to the danger of being betrayed and cut off in detail. It seemed, therefore, advisable rather to give up untenable towns voluntarily than to risk the safety of valuable troops in their defence.

Betrayal of Salapia to Marcellus.

The necessity of such measures became apparent by the treason which in the year 210 delivered Salapia into the hands of the Romans. Salapia, one of the larger towns of Apulia, had joined the cause of Hannibal soon after the battle of Cannæ. It contained a garrison of five hundred picked Numidians. After the fall of Capua, the Roman

party in Salapia regained confidence and strength, and succeeded in betraying the town to the consul Marcellus, on which occasion the brave Numidians were cut down to the last man.¹ Marcellus, who was consul for the fourth time,² had the conduct of the war in Italy, whilst his colleague, M. Valerius Lævinus, brought the war in Sicily to a close by the conquest of Agrigentum.³ After gaining possession of Salapia, he marched to Samnium, where he took a few insignificant places, and the Carthaginian magazines which they contained.⁴

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Whilst he was here occupied with operations of little moment, and apparently paid little attention to Hannibal's movements, and to acting in concert with the prætor Cn. Fulvius Centumalus, who commanded two legions in Apulia, the latter officer and his army paid dearly for the negligence and unskilful strategy which again marked the divided command of the Roman generals. He lay encamped near Herdonea, a town of Apulia, which, like Salapia, had joined the Punians after the battle of Cannæ. By the co-operation of the Roman party in the place, he hoped to gain possession of it. But Hannibal, far away in Bruttium, had been informed of the peril in which the town was placed. After a rapid march he appeared unexpectedly before the Roman camp. By what stratagem he succeeded in drawing Fulvius from his safe position, or in forcing him from it, we are not informed. It is not at all likely that, as Livy relates, the Roman prætor voluntarily accepted battle, confident in his own strength.⁵ By a most extraordinary coincidence, it happened that, in the same place where, two years before, Hannibal had

Defeat of
Cn. Ful-
vius Cen-
tumalus
at Herdo-
nea.

¹ Livy, xxvi. 38.

² This is correct, if the consulship of 215 is reckoned, which Marcellus was obliged to lay down immediately after his election, as 'vitio creatus.'

³ See above, p. 313.

⁴ These places—Marmorea and Meles (Livy, xxvii. 1)—are not mentioned anywhere else.

⁵ Livy, xxvii. 1: 'Pari audacia Romanus copiis raptim eductis confligit.' The reason why Fulvius could not avoid a battle may perhaps be looked for in the circumstance mentioned by Livy (*loc. cit.*), that the Roman camp was 'nec loco satis tuto posita nec præsidiis firmata.'

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defeated the proprætor Fulvius Flaccus, he was now again opposed to a Fulvius. The happy omen which lay in this casual identity of name and place was improved by Hannibal's genius to lead to a second equally brilliant victory. The Roman army was utterly routed, the camp taken, 7,000 men, or, according to another report, 13,000 men, were slain, among them eleven military tribunes and the prætor Cn. Fulvius Centumalus himself. It was a victory worthy to be compared with the great triumphs of the first three glorious years of the war. Again it was shown that Hannibal was irresistible in the field, and again Rome was plunged into mourning, and people looked anxiously into the future when they reflected that not even the loss of Capua had broken Hannibal's courage or strength, and that he was more terrible now and in the possession of a larger part of Italy than after the day of Cannæ.

Destruction of
Herdonea
by Hannibal.

Yet Hannibal was far from overrating his success. He saw that, in spite of his victory, he was unable to hold Herdonea for any long time. Accordingly he punished with death the leaders of the Roman faction in the town, who had carried on negotiations with Fulvius. He then set the town on fire, and removed the inhabitants to Thurii and Metapontum.¹ This done, he went in search of the second Roman army in Samnium, under the command of the consul M. Claudius Marcellus.

Operations
of Mar-
cellus.

Whether Marcellus might have prevented the defeat of Fulvius is a question which we do not venture to decide. But it is quite evident, even from the scanty and falsified reports of his alleged heroic exploits, that, after the disaster, he did not venture, with his consular army of two legions, to oppose Hannibal. The boastful language with which Livy introduces these reports seems to indicate that they were taken from the laudatory speeches preserved in the family archives. Marcellus, it is said, sent a letter to Rome, requesting the senate to dismiss all fear, for that

¹ Livy, xxvii. 1.

he was still the same who after the battle of Cannæ had so roughly handled Hannibal; he would at once march against him, and take care that his joy should be short-lived.¹ The hostile armies met indeed at Numistro, an utterly unknown place—perhaps in Lucania²—and a fierce battle ensued, which, according to Livy, lasted without a decision into the night. On the following day, it is further reported, Hannibal did not venture to renew the struggle, so that the Romans remained in possession of the field and were able to burn their dead, whilst Hannibal, under cover of the subsequent night, withdrew to Apulia, pursued by the Romans. He was overtaken near Venusia, and here several engagements took place, which were of no great importance, but on the whole ended favourably for the Romans.

It is much to be regretted that the account of these events by Polybius is lost. Yet we are not altogether deprived of the means of rectifying the palpable boastings of the annalists whom Livy followed. Frontinus, a military writer of the first century after Christ, has by chance preserved an account of the battle of Numistro, from which we learn that it ended, not with a victory, but with a defeat of Marcellus.³ So barefaced were the lies of the family panegyrists even at this time, and so greedily and blindly did the majority of historians, in their national vanity, adopt every report which tended to glorify the Roman arms! The whole success of which, in truth, Marcellus could boast was, in all likelihood, this—that his army was spared such a calamity as had befallen Flaccus and Centumalus. The year passed away without further military events in Italy. But at sea the Romans sustained a reverse. A fleet with provisions, destined for the garrison of the citadel of Tarentum, and convoyed by thirty ships

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Defeat of
the Roman
fleet by the
Taren-
tines.

¹ Livy, xxvii. 2: 'Eundem se, qui post Cannensem pugnam ferocem victoria Hannibalem contudisset, ire adversus eum, brevem illi lætitiā quā exultet futuram.'

² Pliny, *Hist Nat.* iii. 15.

³ Frontinus, *Strategem.* ii. 2, 6: 'Hannibal apud Numistronem contra Marcellum pugnaturus cava et præruptas vias obiecit a latere ipsaque loci natura pro munimento usus clarissimum ducem vicit.'

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of war, was attacked by a Tarentine squadron under Demokrates, and completely defeated.¹ Yet this event had no essential influence on the state of things in Tarentum. The Roman garrison of the citadel, though pressed very hard, held out manfully, and by occasional sallies inflicted considerable loss on the besiegers. We must presume that provisions were from time to time thrown into the place. Under these circumstances the Romans could calmly maintain their position, whilst the populous town of Tarentum, whose trade, industry, and agriculture were paralysed, felt the garrison of the citadel like a thorn in the flesh.

Pressure of
the war on
the Ro-
mans.

The year 210, as we have seen, had produced no material change in the situation of affairs in Italy. The re-conquest of Salapia and a few insignificant places in Samnium was amply compensated by the defeats which the Romans sustained by land and sea. Hannibal, though driven out of Campania, was still master of southern Italy. The Romans had indeed put two legions less into the field—twenty-one instead of twenty-three—but a permanent reduction of the burdens of war was out of the question as long as Hannibal held his ground in Italy unconquered and threatening as before. The war had now lasted for eight years. The exhaustion of Italy became visibly greater. All available measures had already been taken to procure money and men. The foremost senators now set the example of contributing their gold and silver as a voluntary loan for the purpose of equipping and manning a new fleet.² At length the government appropriated a reserve fund of 4,000 pounds of gold, which had in better times been laid by for the last necessities of the state.³

¹ Livy, xxviii. 39.

² Livy, xxvi. 35.

³ Livy, xxvii. 10. The 'aurum vicesimarum' consisted of the proceeds of a tax of five per cent. of the value of manumitted slaves, which had been imposed 357 B.C., in an extraordinary manner, by a popular vote, according to tribes in the camp before Sutrium. That the proceeds of this tax were intended to be used for the formation of a reserve fund was not mentioned previously, but comes out casually on the present occasion. There is something strange, not to say mysterious, about the whole story. Again, there is

As long as the undaunted spirit of Roman pride and determination animated the state, there was hope that all the great sacrifices had not been made in vain. Up to the present moment this spirit had stood all tests. The defection of several of the allies seemed only to have the effect of uniting the others more firmly to Rome, especially the Roman citizens themselves and the Latins, who on all occasions had shown themselves as brave and patriotic as the genuine Romans. But now, in the year 209, when the consuls called upon the Latins to furnish more troops and money, the delegates of twelve Latin colonies formally declared that their resources were completely exhausted, and that they were unable to comply with the request. This declaration was no less unexpected than alarming. When the consuls made their report to the senate of the refusal of the twelve colonies, and added that no arguments and exhortations had the least effect upon the delegates, then the boldest men in that stubborn assembly began to tremble, and those who had not despaired after the battle of Cannæ almost resigned themselves to the inevitable downfall of the commonwealth. How was it possible that Rome should be saved if the remaining colonies and allies should follow the example of the twelve, and if all Italy should conspire to abandon Rome in this hour of need?¹

The fate of Rome was trembling in the balance. Hannibal's calculations had so far proved correct that now even the Roman senate feared that his plan must be realised. The fabric of Roman power had not, it is true, yielded to one blow, nor even to repeated blows; but the miseries of a war protracted through so many years had gradually undermined the foundations on which it rested, and the moment seemed approaching when it would collapse with a sudden crash.

Everything depended on the attitude which the

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Refusal of
twelve
Latin colo-
nies to
contribute
men and
money for
the war.

Serious-
ness of the
crisis.

no mention of the Gaulish ransom, which Camillus is reported to have recaptured and deposited on the Capitol—a certain proof that no such sum existed. See vol. i. p. 273.

¹ Livy, xxvii. 9.

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Fidelity of
the re-
maining
eighteen
Latin
colonies.

remaining eighteen Latin colonies would assume. If they followed the example of the twelve, it was clear that no further reliance could be placed on the other allies, and Rome would be compelled to sue for peace. But fortunately this humiliation was not in store for her. Marcus Sextilius of Fregellæ declared, in the name of the other colonies, that they were ready to furnish not only their customary and legal contingent of soldiers, but even a greater number, if necessary; and that at the same time they were not wanting in means, and still less in the will, to execute any other order of the Roman people.¹ The deputies of the eighteen colonies were introduced into the senate by the consuls, and received the thanks of that venerable assembly. The Roman people formally ratified the decree of the senate and added its own thanks; and indeed never had any people more cause for gratitude, and never was the expression of public thanks more amply deserved than by the eighteen faithful colonies. Their firmness saved Rome, if not from utter destruction (for no doubt Hannibal would now, as after the battle of Cannæ, have been ready to grant peace on equitable terms), at any rate from the loss of her commanding position in Italy and in the world. The names of the eighteen colonies deserved to be engraved in golden letters on the Capitol. They were Signia, Norba, and Saticula, three of the original cities of old Latium; Fregellæ, on the river Liris, the apple of discord in the second Samnite war; Luceria and Venusia, in Apulia; Brundisium, Hadria, Firmum, and Ariminum, on the east coast; Pontia, Pæstum, and Cosa, on the western sea; Beneventum, Æsernia, and Spoletium, in the mountainous district of the interior; and, lastly, Placentia and Cremona on the Po, the most recent colonial foundations, which since Hannibal's appearance in Italy had been in constant danger, and had bravely and successfully resisted all attacks. What caused the division among the thirty Latin colonies is not reported by our

¹ Livy, xxvii. 10.

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informants, nor are we able to guess. We find that, on the whole, it was the older colonies, lying nearer to Rome, which refused further service. These were Ardea, Nepete, Sutrium, Alba, Carseoli, Sora, Suessa, Circeii, Setia, Cales, Narnia, and Interamna. Is it possible that, because they were nearer to the capital, more services had been required of them during the war? or did they feel more keenly than the more distant colonies their exclusion from the full Roman franchise? We remember that, in the third year of the war, Spurius Carvilius proposed in the senate to admit members to that body from the Latin colonies. This wise proposal had been rejected with Roman haughtiness and even indignation. It is not improbable that Spurius Carvilius, before he recommended the admission of Latins into the Roman senate, had convinced himself that the colonists also felt themselves entitled to a privilege which they regarded as their right. Perhaps if his counsel had been taken, the Romans would never have heard of a refusal of their allies to bear their share of the burdens of the war. But, in the total absence of direct evidence, we cannot be sure that any such discontent caused the disobedience of the twelve colonies. The reason which Livy assigns seems inadequate. He relates¹ that the remnants of the routed legions of Cannæ and Herdonea were punished for their bad behaviour by being sent to Sicily and condemned to serve to the end of the war without pay, under conditions that were onerous and degrading. The majority of these troops, says Livy, consisted of Latins; and as Rome called for new efforts and sacrifices year after year, for more soldiers and more money, whilst she kept the veterans in Sicily, the discontent of the colonists swelled to positive resistance. The severity, or rather the cruelty, of Rome towards the unfortunate survivors of the defeated armies may well have called forth bitter feelings; yet, as Rome treated her own citizens with the same severity as the Latins, and, as

¹ Livy, xxvii. 9.

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far as we know, made no difference among the various Latin contingents, we fail to discover why twelve colonies out of thirty considered themselves more especially ill-treated and called upon to remonstrate.

The thanks of the senate and the Roman people awarded to the staunch and faithful eighteen colonies was the only reproof which at present was addressed to the remonstrances of the others. With wise moderation Rome refrained from punishing them. The negotiations with them were broken off. Their delegates received no answer of any kind, and left Rome with the painful feeling that they had indeed carried their point, but that they had done so at the risk of a severe retaliation at some future time, which could be averted only by speedy repentance and redoubled zeal in the service of Rome.

Roman
prepara-
tions for
the re-
conquest of
Tarentum.

The great object of the campaign in Italy was now the re-conquest of Tarentum. Not less than six legions were deemed necessary to accomplish this end, viz., the armies of the two consuls of 209—Q. Fabius Maximus and Q. Fulvius Flaccus—and a third army of equal strength under Marcellus. Besides these forces there was in Bruttium a body of 8,000 men, mostly irregular troops, a motley band of Bruttian deserters, discharged soldiers, and marauders, who, after the ending of the war in Sicily, had been collected there by the consul Valerius Lævinus and sent into Italy to be let loose upon the allies of Hannibal. There were, therefore, altogether not less than 70,000 men in the south of Italy, a force sufficient to crush by its mere weight any other enemy of the numerical strength of the Carthaginian army. But, even with this vast superiority of strength, the Roman generals were far from trying to bring on a decisive battle. The events of the past year had too much revived the memory of Cannæ, and no Roman as yet ventured to run the risk of a like disaster. The plan of the consuls accordingly was to avoid pitched battles, and to retake one by one the fortified places which had been lost—a process by which Hannibal would be confined more and more within a contracted territory. This

was the plan which had been successfully adopted after Cannæ. Every deviation from it had proved dangerous. It was a slow process; but, owing to the preponderance of the Romans in material resources and to their dogged perseverance, it was sure in the end to lead to victory.

Whilst the consul Q. Fabius Maximus was watching Tarentum, his colleague Fulvius and the pro-consul Marcellus had orders to occupy Hannibal elsewhere. Fulvius marched through the country of the Hirpinians, and took a number of fortified places, the inhabitants of which made their peace with Rome by delivering up the Punic garrisons. Marcellus, exhibiting more courage than discretion, ventured to advance against Hannibal from Venusia; but he was so badly handled in a series of small engagements that he was obliged to take refuge in Venusia, and so crippled that he was unable to undertake anything for the remainder of the year.¹

Whilst Hannibal was confronting Marcellus in Apulia, a Roman force of 8,000 men had issued from Rhegium to

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of Fabius
and Mar-
cellus.

Capture of
the Ro-
man army

¹ This is the bare truth, which all the rhetorical skill of Livy (xxvii. 12-14) and Plutarch (*Marcell.* 25) cannot hide. According to the narrative of the annalists, Marcellus fought three times with Hannibal. The first battle was undecided; in the second he was defeated; on the day following he was victorious, but sustained such a heavy loss in killed and wounded that he could not pursue Hannibal, but returned to Venusia. A victory on the day after a defeat—surely the most difficult and the most glorious feat of arms, especially in a war with Hannibal—would have been an event in the military annals of Rome which would have secured for Marcellus not only the grateful acknowledgment of his countrymen, but immortal fame. But, instead of this, we find (Livy, xxvii. 20) that Marcellus was forthwith accused in Rome, by the tribune C. Publicius Bibulus, of incompetency in the management of the war, and that he found it necessary to hasten from Venusia to Rome, in order to justify himself, and to prevent the passing of a vote of censure, by which he was to be deprived of his command. Bibulus asserted (c. 21) that his army was twice defeated, and was now passing the summer in inactivity at Venusia. Marcellus had so much influence in Rome that he succeeded in clearing himself of the charge, and even secured his election for the consulship of the ensuing year (208); nevertheless it is clear that the charge would not have been preferred if he had been victorious against Hannibal. We shall again have occasion to point to the impurity of the sources from which the reports of the exploits of Marcellus have been drawn.

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before
Caulonia
by Hanni-
bal.

Betrayal of
Tarentum
to the
Romans.

attack the city of Caulonia in Bruttium.¹ As Frederick the Great, in the eventful year 1756, turned with the rapidity of lightning from one defeated enemy to defeat another, so Hannibal suddenly appeared before Caulonia, and, after a short resistance, captured the whole of the besieging army. This done, he immediately hastened towards Tarentum, which he hoped would hold out against Fabius Maximus until he had repulsed the other hostile forces.

Marching night and day, he reached Metapontum, where he received the mournful intelligence that Tarentum had been betrayed into the hands of the Romans. Fabius had attacked Tarentum on the land side with great vehemence, but without success. The Tarentines, knowing full well what they had to expect from Rome if their town should be retaken, defended it with desperate courage. A Punic garrison under Carthalo, strengthened by a detachment of Bruttians, shared the defence with the citizens. There was no prospect of taking the town by force, and any day a Punic fleet or Hannibal's army might be expected before the town to raise the siege. Under these circumstances the cautious old Fabius tried the same arts by which two years before Hannibal had gained Tarentum. The officer in command of the Bruttians was bribed to let the Romans secretly into the town. Fabius ordered a general night-attack on Tarentum from the citadel, the inner harbour, and the open sea, whilst on the land side, in the east of the town, where the Bruttians were stationed, he waited for the signal agreed upon. While the attention of the besieged was directed to the three parts of the town which were apparently most in danger, the Bruttians

¹ One half of this army consisted of the criminals, marauders, and robbers whom Lævinus had in the preceding year collected in Sicily, and sent over to Bruttium. See Livy, xxvi. 40: 'Quatuor milia hominum erant, mixti ex omni culluvione exules, obæratī, capitalia ausi plerique . . . per latrocinia et rapinam tolerantes vitam. Hos neque relinquere Lævinus in insula tum primum nova pace coalescente velut materiam novandis rebus satis tutum ratus est, et Rheginis usui futuri erant ad populandum Bruttium agrum, adsuetam latrociniiis quærentibus manum.' Compare Polybius, ix. 27. This highly characteristic passage shows how extensively and systematically the banditti war was carried on.

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opened a gate; the Romans rushed in, and now, after a short and ineffectual resistance of the Tarentines, followed the promiscuous massacre which usually accompanied the taking of a hostile town by Roman troops.¹ The victors put to the sword not only those who still resisted, like Niko, the leader of the treason by which Tarentum had fallen into the hands of Hannibal two years before, and Demokrates, the brave commander of the Tarentine fleet, so recently victorious over that of the Romans, but also Carthalo, the commander of the Punic garrison, who had laid down his arms and asked for quarter. In fact they slew all whom they met, even the Bruttians who had let them into the town, either, as Livy observes, by mistake, or from old national hatred, or in order to make it appear that Tarentum was taken by force, and not by treason.² The captured town was then given up to be plundered. Thirty thousand Tarentines were sold as slaves for the benefit of the Roman treasury.³ The quantity of statues, pictures, and other works of art almost equalled the booty of Syracuse. All was sent to Rome; only a colossal statue of Jupiter, the removal and transport of which proved too difficult, was left by the generous Fabius. He would not, he said, deprive the Tarentines of their patron deities, whose wrath they had experienced.⁴

Thus Tarentum, which was, after Capua, the most important of the Italian cities that had joined Carthage, was again reduced to subjection. The limits were contracting more and more within which Hannibal could range freely. The whole of Campania, Samnium, and Lucania, almost all Apulia, were lost. Even the Bruttians, the only

Position of
Hannibal
after the
fall of
Tarentum.

¹ See above, p. 354.

² Compare Plutarch, *Fabius*, 22.

³ Possibly the slaves found in Tarentum are included in this number.

⁴ According to Livy's description (xxvii. 16), Fabius took only smaller statues and pictures, but no colossus. But Plutarch (*Fabius*, 22) tells us that he caused a colossal statue of Hercules to be transported to Rome, and to be put up on the Capitol. This statement is confirmed by Pliny (*Hist. Nat.* xxxiv. 7), who adds that he left untouched a colossus of Jupiter, the work of Lysippus, on account of its size and the difficulty of moving it. Compare vol. i. p. 563, note 3.

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one of the Italian races that had not yet made their peace with Rome, began to waver in their fidelity to him. Tarentum had been betrayed to the Romans by the Bruttian corps of the garrison; and the tempting offers of Fulvius, who promised pardon for the revolt, were readily listened to by several chiefs of this half-barbarous people.¹ Rhegium, the important maritime town which kept open the communication with Sicily, and, in conjunction with Messina, closed the straits to the Carthaginian ships, had always remained in the possession of the Romans. The impoverished Greek towns and the narrow strip of land from Lucania to Sicily were all that was left to Hannibal of the promising acquisitions made after the first few brilliant campaigns. Pushed back into this corner, like the Duke of Wellington behind the lines of Torres Vedras, the unconquered and undaunted Hannibal waited for the moment when, in conjunction with his brother, whom he expected from Spain, he could with renewed vigour assail Rome and force her to make peace.

Fifth
consulship
of Marcellus.

The taking of Tarentum at the same time with the fall of New Carthage was a compensation for the efforts and losses of the year 209. The remainder of this year passed 'without any further military events, and for the succeeding year, as has been already stated, Marcellus was for the fifth time raised to the consulship. His colleague was T. Quinctius Crispinus, one of the many Roman nobles whose names call forth no distinct pictures in our imagination, because they mark nothing but the average mediocrity of their class. The campaign of this year had for its object, as it appears, the re-conquest of Locri, the most important of the towns still in Hannibal's possession. The Romans steadily adhered to their plan of avoiding battles as much as possible, and of depriving the enemy of his means for continuing the war in Italy by taking from him the support of fortified places. Seven legions and a fleet were destined to operate for this end in the south of Italy.

¹ Livy, xxvii. 15.

Whilst the two consuls, with two consular armies, covered in the rear by a legion in Campania, occupied Hannibal, Q. Claudius, who commanded two legions in Tarentum, was ordered to advance on Locri by land, and L. Cincius was to sail from Sicily with a fleet and attack Locri from the sea side. Hannibal, who was opposing the combined armies of the consuls, was informed of the march of the Roman army along the coast from Tarentum to Locri. He surprised it in the neighbourhood of Petelia and inflicted a severe defeat, killing several thousands and driving the remainder in a disorderly flight back to Tarentum.¹

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Thus, for the present, Locri was out of danger, and Hannibal was at leisure to turn against the two consuls, whom he hoped to force to accept a decisive battle. But Marcellus and Crispinus were resolved to be cautious. They were not going to allow Hannibal to try one of his stratagems and to catch them in a trap, as he had so often done with less experienced or less careful opponents. The sexagenarian Marcellus himself headed a reconnaissance, accompanied by his colleague, his son, a number of officers, and a few hundred horsemen, to explore the country between the Roman and the Carthaginian camps. On this expedition the brave old soldier met his death. From the wooded recesses of the hills in front and in the flank, Numidian horsemen rushed suddenly forward. In a moment the consuls' escort were cut down or scattered; Crispinus and the young Marcellus escaped, severely wounded, and Marcellus fell fighting like a brave trooper, closing his long life in a manner which, though it might befit a common soldier, was hardly worthy of a statesman and a general. His magnanimous enemy honoured his body with a decent funeral, and sent the ashes to his son.

Death of
Marcellus.

If we calmly examine what is reported of the virtues of Marcellus, we shall come to the conclusion that he is one of those men who are praised far beyond their merits. This is caused partly by the circumstance that, owing to

Character
and ability
of Marcellus.¹ Livy, xxvii. 26.

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the scarcity of men of eminent abilities, the Roman historians were almost driven to speak in high praise of men scarcely raised above mediocrity, because otherwise they would have had nobody to compare with the great heroes and statesmen of Greece, by whose greatness they loved to measure their own. If it happened that a Roman possessed a little more than the average amount of national virtues—if by family connexions, noble birth, and wealth he was marked out for the high offices of state, and if he was fortunate enough to find on the occasion of his funeral a sufficiently skilful and not too bashful panegyrist, his fame was secured for ever. All these favourable circumstances were combined in the case of Marcellus. He was a brave soldier, a firm intrepid patriot, and an unflinching enemy of the enemies of Rome. But to extol him as an eminent general, or even as a worthy opponent of Hannibal, argues want of judgment and personal or national partiality. He was not much better than most of the other Roman generals of his time. The reports of his victories over Hannibal are one and all fictitious. Thus much is evident from what has been said before, for the tissue of falsehood is after all so thin that it covers the truth but imperfectly; but it can also be proved from the statement of Polybius. This historian says, evidently for the purpose of refuting assertions current in his own time, that Marcellus never once conquered Hannibal.¹ After such emphatic evidence as this, we are allowing a great deal if we admit that, perhaps once, or even on several occasions, Marcellus succeeded in thwarting the plans of Hannibal, by beating off attacks or withdrawing from a conflict without the total rout of his army. Something of this sort must have supplied the materials for exaggerations for which there may have been some pretext or excuse. Accordingly, if Cicero calls Marcellus fiery and

¹ Plutarch (compare *Pelopid. et Marcell.* 1): *Αντίβαν δὲ Μάρκελλος, ὥς οἱ μὲν περὶ Πολύβιον λέγουσι, οὐδὲ ἅπαξ ἐνίκησεν.* Compare Cornelius Nepos, *Hannib.* 5: 'Quamdiu in Italia fuit (Hannibal) nemo ei in acie restitit, nemo adversus eum post Cannensem pugnam in campo castra posuit.'

dashing,¹ he no doubt speaks the truth; but if he extols his clemency towards the conquered Syracusans, it is clear that he only employs him as a foil for the purpose of placing in a more glaring light the horrible villany of Verres.² How Marcellus treated the Sicilians we learn from the events which followed the capture of Syracuse. He was, in truth, a merciless destroyer and insatiably greedy. When the Sicilians heard that, in the year 210, he was again to take the command in their island, they were distracted with terror and despair, and declared, in Rome, that it would be better for them if the sea were to swallow them up, or if the fiery lava of Mount Ætna were to cover the land; they assured the senate that they would much rather leave their native country than dwell in it for any time under the tyranny of Marcellus.³ So vigorous and so just was the protest of the Sicilians that Marcellus was obliged to exchange provinces with his colleague Valerius Lævinus, and to take the command in Italy instead of Sicily, which had been awarded to him by lot. That he exceeded the limits of Roman severity is evident from the decree of the senate, which, though it does not exactly censure his proceedings in Syracuse, or annul the arrangements which he had made, yet enjoined his successor Lævinus to provide for the welfare of Syracuse, as far as the interest of the republic allowed.⁴ The old Fabius Maximus was surely a genuine Roman, but he acted very differently from Marcellus. He warmly

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¹ Cicero, *De Repub.* v. 8: 'acer et pugnax.'

² Cicero, *Verr.* ii. 2, 2. Compare above, p. 312, note 3.

³ Livy, xxvi. 29.

⁴ Livy, xxvi. 32: 'Ut quod sine iactura rei publicæ fieri posset, fortunis eius civitatis consuleret.' It appears, however, that the wretched people of Syracuse did not gain much by this humane injunction. For when Scipio came to Syracuse in 205 B.C., he was assiduous in protecting them from the continued rapacity of individual Romans, to which they had been exposed. Livy, xxix. 1: 'Græci res a quibusdam Italici generis eadem vi, quia per bellum ceperant, retinentibus concessas sibi a senatu repetebant. Scipio omnium primum ratus tueri publicam fidem, partim edicto partim iudiciis etiam in pertinaces ad obtinendam iniuriam redditus suas res Syracusanis restituit.' We may perhaps doubt if this put an end to the oppression of Syracusans by Italians.

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pleaded in the senate in favour of the Tarentines whom he had reduced, and he shielded them from the rapacity and revenge of men who, like Marcellus, delighted in venting their evil passions on helpless foes.¹ We can see clearly that public opinion no longer declared it to be a Roman virtue to treat conquered enemies with excessive severity, that feelings of humanity began to influence the more refined minds, and that the panegyrists (those, for example, of the Scipios) found it necessary to throw over their heroes the colour of kindness and clemency.²

Source of
the exag-
gerations
in the
story of
Marcellus.

It would be interesting to know from what source the vast exaggerations and fictions are derived which have the praises of Marcellus for their object. Perhaps we shall not go wrong in supposing that their fountain-head was the funeral speech delivered, according to Livy, by the son of Marcellus.³ This document seems, however, not to have met with unconditional credence at first, as may be inferred from the quoted declaration of Polybius, and from Livy himself.⁴ But when the Emperor Augustus had selected M. Claudius Marcellus, the descendant of the conqueror of Syracuse, for the husband of his daughter Julia, a new period of glorification began for the family of the Marcelli. A careful search was now made for everything that redounded to the praise of the ancestors of the young man in the glorious times of the older republic. Augustus himself composed an historical work on this subject,⁵ and we cannot fail to perceive that Livy wrote under the influence of the Augustan court. He treats Marcellus as a favourite hero, and even in Plutarch we can trace this preference accorded to Marcellus. If we deduct all that family conceit and national pride have invented about

¹ Livy, xxvii. 25. Compare also the proceedings of Cornelius Cethegus in Sicily, who supported the accusations directed against Marcellus.

² Mommsen (*Röm. Gesch.* i. 621; English translation, ii. 140) has a much higher opinion of Marcellus than we can subscribe to.

³ Livy, xxvii. 27.

⁴ According to Livy (xxvii. 27), Cælius rejected the evidence of young Marcellus.

⁵ Plutarch, *Marcell.* 30. Id, *comparatio Pelop. et Marcell.* 1.

Marcellus, there remains, indeed, the image of a genuine Roman of the old type, of an intrepid soldier, and an energetic officer; but the parallel between Marcellus and Pelopidas seems inappropriate, and all comparison between him and Hannibal is absurd.

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The death of Marcellus and that of his colleague Crispinus, who very soon after died of his wounds, appears to have paralysed the action of the two consular armies for the whole of the campaign, though they had remained intact when their leaders were cut off. It is very strange that the Roman people, which year after year found new commanders-in-chief, now allowed four legions to remain inactive for at least half a year because both consuls had by chance fallen in the field. If it be indeed true, as is related, that the armies suffered no further losses—in other words, that after the death of Marcellus they were not attacked and beaten by Hannibal—the strategy of the Romans appears in a sorry light. One of the two armies retired to Venusia, the other even as far as Campania, and they left the Carthaginian general at liberty to put an end to the siege of Locri, which had been again undertaken. The prætor Lucius Cincius had obtained from Sicily a great quantity of engines necessary for a siege, and had attacked Locri vigorously, both by land and sea. Already the Punic garrison was much reduced, and despaired of being able to hold the town much longer, when Hannibal's Numidians showed themselves in the neighbourhood and encouraged the garrison to make a sally. Attacked in front and rear, the Romans soon gave way, left all their siege engines behind, and took refuge on board their ships. Locri was saved by the mere arrival of Hannibal.¹

Raising of
the siege of
Locri.

Through the failure of the attack on Locri, the campaign of 208 proved entirely fruitless to the Romans, and all further military proceedings were suspended. For the first time since the establishment of the republic both consuls had fallen in battle. The commonwealth was

Prospects
of the
Romans.

¹ Livy, xxvii. 28.

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bereaved, and religious fears and scruples no doubt contributed to paralyse military action for the time. It was most fortunate for Rome that, in consequence of her indefatigable perseverance and gigantic efforts, Hannibal had been pushed into the defensive, and was no longer able to carry on the war on a large scale. For at this very time the signs of discontent and disobedience multiplied among the subjects of Rome in Italy, whilst the news that arrived from Spain, Massilia, Africa, and Sicily left little doubt that the time had come at last when the long prepared expedition of Hasdrubal from Spain into Italy might be looked for as imminent. It seemed as if the war, which had now lasted ten years, instead of gradually flagging and drawing to a close was to begin afresh with renewed vigour.

Discontent
in Etruria.

The refusal of the twelve Latin colonies to bear any longer the burdens of the war could not fail to produce an effect on the other allies of Rome. Soon after there appeared most alarming signs of growing discontent in Etruria. This country had hitherto been almost exempt from the immediate calamities of war. Hannibal, it is true, had in his first campaign touched a part of Etruria, and had on Etruscan soil fought the battle of Thrasymenus. But, as he wished to conciliate the allies of Rome and to appear as their friend, he had probably spared the country as much as possible. In the succeeding years the theatre of war had been shifted to the south of Italy, and whilst Apulia, Lucania, Campania, and, above all, Bruttium were exposed to all the horrors of war, and whilst the African, Spanish, and Gaulish barbarians in Hannibal's army penetrated with fire and sword into the interior of Samnium and Latium, nay even to the very gates of Rome, Etruria had heard the storm rage at a distance, and had, almost without interruption, enjoyed practically the blessings of peace. The countryman had securely tilled his field, the shepherd had tended his flock, the artisan and the tradesman had each plied his craft. In its fidelity to Rome, Etruria had hitherto remained unshaken. It was an Etruscan cohort from

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Perusia, which, side by side with one from Præneste, had heroically resisted the Carthaginians in the protracted siege of Casilinum.¹ Without any doubt the Etruscans had supplied their full contingents to all the armies and fleets of the Romans, and nothing but the customary injustice of the Roman annalists has ignored this co-operation of their allies.² Financially, too, the rich towns of Etruria had helped to bear the burdens of the war. Of especial importance were the supplies of grain that came from this country. We cannot suppose that the Roman treasury was in a condition to pay for this grain in cash, and probably the price was fixed very low, in the interest of the state. Thus it was that Etruria also began to feel the pressure of the war; and the desire for peace showed itself naturally in an unwillingness to comply with further demands on the part of Rome. As early as 212 B.C. the first symptoms of discontent had become apparent. On that occasion a Roman army was sent to Etruria to keep the country in check.³ Three years later the agitation became much more critical. It showed itself especially in Arretium, a town which at one time was reputed as one of the foremost of the Etruscan people,⁴ and which, as an old friend and ally of Rome,⁵ might consider itself entitled to be treated with some degree of preference and indulgence. Marcellus, who, immediately after his election to the consulship of 208 B.C., was sent to Arretium, succeeded for the moment in quieting the people; but when he had set out on his campaign in the south of the peninsula, where he was soon afterwards killed in ambush, the Etruscans again became troublesome, and the senate now dispatched C. Terentius Varro, the consul of 216, with military authority, to Arretium. Varro occupied the town with a Roman legion, and required hostages from the Arretine senate. Finding that the senators hesitated to comply with his

¹ See above, p. 265.² See vol. i. p. 276.³ Livy, xxv. 3.⁴ Livy, ix. 37; x. 37.⁵ Livy, ix. 32.

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order, he placed sentinels at the gates and along the walls, to prevent anybody leaving the place. Nevertheless seven of the most eminent men escaped with their families. The property of the fugitives was forthwith confiscated, and one hundred and twenty hostages, taken from the families of the remaining senators, were sent to Rome. The unsatisfactory state of Etruria seemed, however, to require a better guarantee than a few hostages from a single town. The senate therefore dispatched a legion to back the measures which were everywhere taken for keeping the country in subjection and for crushing in the bud every attempt at revolution.¹

Events in
Spain.

This growing discontent among a considerable portion of the most faithful and valuable allies caused the more anxiety in Rome as about the same time disquieting news arrived of the movements of Hasdrubal. As early as two years before (in 210 B.C.) the admiral M. Valerius Messala had sailed from Sicily with fifty vessels to Africa, to obtain accurate information about the plans and preparations of the Carthaginians. He returned after an absence of thirteen days to Lilybæum, and reported that the Carthaginians were making armaments on a large scale to increase Hasdrubal's army in Spain and to carry out at last the plan of sending him with a strong force across the Alps to Italy.² This news was confirmed by the Carthaginian senators taken prisoners by Scipio at New Carthage,³ who, as commissioners of the Carthaginian government, were necessarily well informed of the plan of war and of the progress of the armaments in Carthage.⁴ It was now of the utmost importance, just as in the beginning of the war, to detain Hasdrubal in Spain;⁵ and after the decided progress which the Roman arms had made in Spain during the last year, after the conquest of

¹ Livy, xxvii. 21.

² Livy, xxvii. 5.

³ See p. 355.

⁴ Livy, xxvii. 7.

⁵ This was probably the order of the senate which Lælius conveyed to Scipio (Polybius, x. 37, § 6). Compare Vineke, *Der zweite punische Krieg* p. 312.

New Carthage and the revolt of numerous Spanish peoples from the Carthaginians, this appeared a comparatively easy task for so enterprising a general as Scipio. He had been enabled, by means of the hostages found in New Carthage, to gain the friendship of many Spanish chiefs, among whom Indibilis and Mandonius are especially mentioned as the most powerful and hitherto most faithful allies of Carthage.¹ After such results it seems strange that Scipio remained inactive for almost a whole year before he thought of moving southwards from Tarraco. Where the three Carthaginian generals were during all this time, and what they did, we do not know.² All the events that took place in Spain during the whole war are hidden in such obscurity that, by comparison with them, the campaigns in Italy and Sicily appear as in the clear light of historical truth. The Romans were so ignorant of the geography of Spain, the distance of that country from Rome was so great, and the intercourse so limited, that fancy ranged freely in all the narratives of Spanish affairs.

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We have already seen, on a former occasion,³ how the annalists made use of this circumstance, and we have now again an opportunity for noticing the same thing. They reported that Scipio encountered Hasdrubal at Bæcula, a place situated probably between the Bætis (Guadalquivir) and the Anas (Guadiana), and defeated him with a loss of 20,000 men.⁴ One might suppose that such a decisive victory as this would have led to the most important results, and would at any rate have paralysed all further enterprises of Hasdrubal; but we find that Hasdrubal was able immediately after this battle to carry into execution the plan which had been delayed by adverse circumstances

Battle of
Bæcula and
march of
Hasdrubal.

¹ Livy, xxvii. 17.

² What is related of their want of agreement (Polybius, x. 37, § 2) seems to be a vague and unfounded report, and is contradicted by the narrative of the arrangements which, according to Livy (xxvii. 20), they concerted among themselves for the continuation of the war upon a common plan.

³ See above, pp. 314, 317.

⁴ Livy, xxvii. 18, 19. Polybius, x. 39.

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for eight years. From the battle-field he marched unpursued, with his defeated and crippled army (if Roman accounts are to be trusted), through the centre of the peninsula, crossed the Pyrenees by one of the western passes,¹ and had actually reached Gaul, while Scipio, in total ignorance of his movements, was in hopes that he could stop his march somewhere between the Ebro and the Pyrenees, on the road which Hannibal had taken ten years before. It is hard to understand how, under such circumstances, the battle at Bæcula can have resulted in a Roman victory. Perhaps it was only an insignificant encounter of the Carthaginian rear-guard with the Roman legions, which, after their usual fashion, the Roman annalists magnified into a great battle and glorious victory.² Anyhow the strategic success was entirely on the side of the Carthaginians, and Scipio had to confess that he was not equal to the task which he had undertaken; it was his fault that Italy was exposed to a new invasion, and that on Italian soil a struggle was renewed on whose doubtful issue depended not only the supremacy but the very existence of Rome.³

¹ Appian, vi. 28.

² According to Polybius (x. 39, § 7), Hasdrubal broke off the fight (*τὸ ψυχομαχεῖν μέχρι τῆς ἐσχάτης ἐλπίδος ἀπεδοκίμασε*), sent forward his elephants and his military chest, and marched northwards. According to Livy (xxvii. 19), Hasdrubal had sent on the elephants and the money before the battle, and was therefore already on his march, in which he was not interrupted by the Romans. We can hardly help being reminded of the encounter between the Roman and the Carthaginian cavalry on the Rhone in 218 B.C. It appears that on both occasions the Carthaginian generals avoided a serious engagement, which would have interrupted their march. The two victories of the father and the son have a striking family likeness.

³ The panegyrists of Scipio explained this in the following manner (Livy, xxvii. 20): The Carthaginians despaired of successfully encountering Scipio in Spain on account of the influence he exercised over the minds of the Spaniards; they saw that it was absolutely necessary to shift the scene of the war either to the uttermost parts, near the ocean, which yet knew not the Romans ('*ignaram adhuc Romanorum*'), or else to Italy, in order that Hasdrubal might be able to withdraw his soldiers from beyond the magic circle of Scipio's name ('*ut Hispanos omnes procul ob nomine Scipionis ex Hispania abduceret*'). Thus the expedition to Italy, which was part of the original plan of the Carthaginians, and which the Romans had so long tried to baffle, is represented as a casual expedient, adopted by Hasdrubal because Scipio's

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B.C.Anxiety in
Rome.

In Italy the approaching danger called forth the most serious apprehensions.¹ The combined assault of the two sons of Hamilcar on Italian soil, which the senate had been so anxious to elude, was now imminent. The military history of the preceding year was not calculated to inspire much confidence. The siege of Locri had failed. The consuls with their combined armies had not been able to keep Hannibal in check, and both had actually fallen. Their legions had retired to the shelter of fortified places, and Hannibal was undisputed master of Bruttium and Apulia. The twelve remonstrating colonies still refused to furnish troops. Etruria was discontented, almost in open rebellion; the Gauls and Ligurians were ready to make another inroad into Italy. The news from Spain, even if it was coloured as favourably as it appears in Livy's narrative (a circumstance much to be doubted), could not deceive the senate on the subject of Scipio's real success. There was not the slightest doubt that Italy would again have to bear the brunt of war, and that now, after ten years of exhausting warfare, she would scarcely be able to resist a double assault. The Romans might well ask, what gods would watch over their town in such perilous times,² when, in spite of all their prayers and all their vows and sacrifices, the paternal deities had shown themselves inexorable or else powerless to ward off the devastation of Italy and disasters like those of Thrasymentus and Cannæ. Again—as always happens in days of extreme danger—the popular mind, tortured by religious terrors, saw everywhere signs of the divine anger; and, in the effort to avert this anger, it gave itself up to horrid delusions,

ascendancy over the Spaniards left him no other choice. We are really at a loss to decide which is more extraordinary, the boldness of this conceit or its utter stupidity. Heeren (*Ideen*. ii. 1, p. 291) observes very justly: 'If Hasdrubal had not succumbed to the Roman arms in Umbria, the deified Scipio would have been deprived of his glory.' Mommsen implies the same (*Röm. Gesch.* i. 643) when he says: 'The gods covered the faults of their favourite with laurels.' We see from Livy (xxviii. 42) that Scipio's proceedings in Spain were sharply criticised in Rome.

¹ Livy, xxvii. 35: 'Periculosissimus annus imminere videbatur.'

² Livy, xxvii. 40: 'Quos tam propitios urbi atque imperio fore deos, ut eodem tempore utroque res publica prospere gereretur.'

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and to the cruelty of superstition.¹ Again it rained stones, rivers ran with blood, temples, walls, and gates of towns were struck by lightning. But more than usual terror was caused by the birth of a child of uncertain sex, and so large that it seemed to be four years old.² Soothsayers were specially sent for from Etruria, and at their suggestion the wretched creature was placed in a box and cast into the sea far from the coast. Then the pontifices ordained the celebration of a grand national festival of atonement. From the temple of Apollo before the town, a procession marched through the Porta Carmentalis, along the Vicus Jugarius to the Forum. At the head of the procession walked two white cows, led by sacrificial servants; behind them were carried two statues of the royal Juno, made of cypress wood; then followed three times nine virgins in long flowing garments, walking in a single line and holding on to a rope, singing to the measured time of their footsteps, in honour of the goddess, a hymn, which Livius Andronicus, the oldest Roman poet, had composed for this special occasion, and which later generations—justly, no doubt—considered a specimen of ancestral rudeness. At the end of the procession came the ten officers who presided over sacrificial rites (*decemviri sacris faciundis*), crowned with laurel and clothed in purple-bordered togas. From the Forum the procession went, after a short pause, through the Vicus Tuscus, the Velabrum, and the Forum Boarium, up the Clivus Publicius, to the temple of Juno on the Aventine. Here the two cows were sacrificed by the ten sacrificial priests, and the statues were put up in the temple of the goddess. This simple and dignified solemnity is interesting, not only because, being taken from the priestly archives, the narrative is no doubt authentic and trustworthy, but because it shows, in a very clear and unmistakable manner, to what extent the Roman mind was at that period already penetrated by

¹ Livy, xxvii. 37.

² Livy, *loc. cit.*: 'Liberatas religione mentes turbavit rursus nuntiatum Frusinone natum infantem esse quadrimo parem, nec magnitudine tam mirandum, quam quod incertus, mas an femina esset, natus erat.'

Greek ideas. The Roman pontifices arrange a festival in honour of a Roman deity, Juno the Queen. The religious procession, with rhythmical walking and singing, is likewise Roman, but the procession starts from the temple of the Greek Apollo; the ten officers, the keepers of the Sibylline oracles of the same god, perform the sacrifice, while a poet of Greek extraction, Andronikos, who sixty-four years before had been dragged into slavery from conquered Tarentum, composed the solemn hymn, which, in spite of its hard and uncultivated language, marked, no doubt, an immense progress when compared with the old and scarcely intelligible litanies of the Romulean 'fratres arvaes.' In the very midst of a war which threatened Rome and Italian culture with ruin, we can watch the signs of the increasing ascendancy of the Hellenic mind.

Amidst their prayers for divine protection, the Romans did not forget to take measures for confronting the impending danger. The number of the legions was increased from twenty-one to twenty-three. The conscription was enforced with the greatest severity; even the maritime colonies, which had hitherto been exempt from service, were compelled to furnish troops. Ostia and Antium alone remained exempt, but were ordered to keep their contingents in constant readiness.¹ From the Spanish legions 2,000 foot and 1,000 horse were detached and sent to Italy, besides 8,000 Spanish and Gaulish mercenaries; from Sicily came 2,000 slingers and archers. The two legions of liberated slaves, which, since the death of Gracchus, had been neglected, were re-organised and completed, and thus a military force was set on foot large enough to take the field as well against Hannibal as Hasdrubal.

The consuls selected for the momentous year 207 were Caius Claudius Nero and Marcus Livius Salinator. The former—the great grandson of the celebrated censor Appius Claudius the Blind—had, immediately after the taking of Capua in 211 B.C., been sent as proprætor with an army to

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measures
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Romans.

Consul-
ship of C.
Claudius
Nero and
M. Livius
Salinator.

¹ Livy, xxvii. 37.

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Spain, to retrieve the fortunes of war in that country after the destruction of the Roman armies under the two Scipios. His alleged successes over Hasdrubal are either entirely fictitious or greatly exaggerated. It was said that he had outmanœuvred the Punic general, and might have made him prisoner with his army, but allowed himself to be delayed by negotiations about an armistice until the whole hostile force had had time gradually to escape from its critical position. In his command in Spain he was superseded, in 210, by the younger Scipio. In what manner he so gained the confidence of the people as to be intrusted with the consulship in 207, we are not told. His colleague, Livius Salinator, was a tried old soldier, who twelve years before had conducted the Illyrian war successfully, and ended it with the last triumph that Rome had witnessed. But from that time he had been lost to his country. He had been accused and condemned for an unjust distribution of the Illyrian booty,¹ and had felt so hurt at this indignity that he had retired into the country, had allowed his beard and hair to grow, and had refused for eight years to take part in the affairs of state, until in the year 210 the consuls Marcellus and Valerius induced him to return into the town. The censors of the same year Veturius and Licinius re-introduced him into the senate, from which he had probably been expelled in consequence of his public condemnation; still his wrath was not appeased. He never took part in the discussions, but sat moodily listening in silence, until at last the accusation of one of his relations, M. Livius Macatus, who by his negligence had caused the loss of Tarentum, induced him to speak. Now, when the people needed a good general, they bethought themselves of the tried old soldier, and, in spite of his remonstrances, elected him as the colleague of Claudius Nero. But a difficulty had still to be overcome before the intention of the people could be realised. Nero and Livius were personal enemies. How was it possible to intrust the welfare of the state in

¹ Frontinus, *Strateg.* iv. 1, 45.

such a critical period to men who hated one another? It was not enough to separate the consuls in their command, by sending one southward against Hannibal, and the other against Hasdrubal into the north of the peninsula. The division of the supreme command among two men, which had so often been the source of weakness in the wars of the Roman republic, was surely ruinous if such an enemy as Hannibal were opposed by men who hated one another. It was absolutely necessary not only to reconcile the two consuls, but to unite them by cordial friendship. This arduous task was accomplished by the senate. Both Nero and Livius overcame their personal feelings of resentment, and this triumph of patriotism over personal passion was a happy augury and almost a guarantee of the final triumph over the foreign enemy.

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The Romans were far from having finished their preparations for the ensuing campaign when the allied Massilians brought the news of Hasdrubal's march through Gaul, and made it evident that he would cross the Alps in the early part of the spring. He had marched from the western Pyrenees right across southern Gaul to the Rhone, had been hospitably received by the Arverni and other tribes, had enlarged his army by newly enlisted mercenaries, and, after passing the winter in Gaul, was preparing to cross the Alps by the same road which his brother had taken eleven years before. It was evident that neither the difficulties of the Alpine passes nor the hostilities of the mountaineers would deter him. The passes offered no insurmountable difficulties in the good season, and the inhabitants of the Alps had learnt by experience that the Carthaginian armies had not come to make war on them, but only to march through their country. If the Romans wished to avoid the mistake of 218, and to meet the Carthaginians at the foot of the Alps, the utmost dispatch in the movement of their armies was imperatively demanded. Every step that Hasdrubal made in a southerly direction, after crossing the Alps, brought him nearer to his brother

Has-
drubal's
march
through
Gaul.

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of Hanni-
bal.

and increased the danger which the union of the two brothers threatened to bring upon Rome.

Hannibal had probably wintered in Apulia,¹ and at the beginning of spring marched into Bruttium to collect and organise the troops in that country. Thereupon he started northwards, and encountered the consul, Claudius Nero, who, with an army of 40,000 foot and 2,500 horse, was posted near Grumentum, in Lucania, to stop his advance. An engagement took place, in which Nero claimed the victory, and Hannibal is reported to have lost 8,000 dead and 700 prisoners.² But this seems not to agree with the statement that Hannibal continued his march and soon after halted near Venusia. Here he paused, hardly, as it would appear, because he was afraid of the Roman army which followed him, and which, at the worst, was able only to annoy, but not to harm, him; he was probably waiting for news from his brother, in order to be sure on which road and at what time he should march northwards to meet him. On receiving no news of any sort, he turned back again to Metapontum, to join another reinforcement which his lieutenant Hanno had in the meantime collected in Bruttium. Whether it was his intention to induce the Roman consul to follow him southwards, or to draw him into an ambush, we cannot tell. Nero followed him closely, and when Hannibal soon after turned again northwards and encamped at Canusium, in the neighbourhood of the glorious battle-field of Cannæ, Nero had again

¹ This may be inferred from the circumstance that, according to Livy (xxvii. 40), Hannibal, quite in the beginning of the campaign, marched through the district of Larinum, into the country of the Sallentinians, *i.e.* from north to south. The remark of Arnold (*Hist. of Rome*, iii. 363) is very much to the point: 'At no part of the history of this war do we more feel the want of a good military historian than at the opening of this memorable campaign. What we have in Livy is absolutely worthless; it is so vague as well as so falsified that the truth from which it has been corrupted can scarcely be discovered.'

² Summing up all the killed and prisoners which Hannibal is said to have lost in these marches, we get a total of about 15,000 men. Very properly, Arnold (*loc. cit.*) calls these statements 'absurdities in which we cannot but recognise the perversions of Valerius Antias, or some annalist equally untrustworthy.'

taken up his position close to him, and from the mounds of their respective camps the Roman and the Carthaginian sentinels were idly watching each other whilst, at a distance of a few days' march further northwards, the fate of Rome and Carthage was decided.

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Having crossed the Alps, Hasdrubal had met with no Roman army in Cisalpine Gaul. The prætor L. Porcius Licinus, who commanded two legions, either came too late or did not venture to penetrate far beyond the Po. Reinforced by Gauls and Ligurians, Hasdrubal tried to take Placentia by storm, but was soon compelled to give up this enterprise, for which he had neither means nor time; and he now advanced southwards on the Flaminian road by Ariminum. It was his intention to meet Hannibal in Umbria, and then to march with the combined armies upon Narnia and Rome.¹ He communicated this plan to Hannibal in a letter, which he dispatched by the hands of four Gaulish and two Numidian horsemen through the whole length of Italy, across a thickly-peopled hostile country, where at every step they ran the risk of being discovered and hunted down. The undaunted horsemen made their way as far as Apulia, but could not find Hannibal, and, roaming about in search of him in the neighbourhood of Tarentum, were at last discovered and made prisoners. Thus Nero was apprised of Hasdrubal's march and of his plans, whilst Hannibal was waiting in vain for news from his brother. Now was the time for forming a quick and bold resolution—such a resolution as, under ordinary circumstances, was quite beyond the conception of a Roman general.² It was necessary to deviate from the ordinary routine and from the prescribed order. Apulia and Bruttium had been assigned as the provinces

Capture of
the mes-
sengers of
Hasdrubal.

¹ Livy, xxvii. 43.

² 'Claudius non id tempus esse rei publicæ ratus quo consiliis ordinariis provinciæ suæ quisque finibus per exercitus suos cum hoste destinato a senatu bellum gereret; audendum aliquid improvisum, inopinatum, quod cæptum non minorem apud eives quam hostes terrorem faceret, perpetratum in magnam lætitiâ ex magno metu verteret.'—Livy, xxvii. 43.

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of Nero; it was his task to keep Hannibal in check, whilst his colleague, Livius Salinator, confronted Hasdrubal in the north. Should he take upon himself to leave the province assigned to him, to encroach upon the province of his colleague, and to offer an uncalled-for aid? If the haughty Livius, who had only just subdued his old animosity at the call of his country, should reject the proffered aid—if he should come too late—if Hannibal should discover his march, pursue and overtake him—if from any other cause the enterprise should fail, Claudius Nero was doomed to be for ever branded as the author of the greatest calamity that could befall his country, and Rome would be given up to the mercy of the conquerors. By silencing all scruples and taking upon himself the weighty responsibility, Nero showed a moral firmness and strategic ability which far surpassed the average qualifications of which Roman generals could boast. Even the failure of his plan would not have sufficed to condemn him before the impartial tribunal of history; but, fortunately for Rome, his just calculations and his bold resolve were destined to be crowned with complete and overwhelming success.¹

March of
Nero.

Nero informed the senate of Hasdrubal's plans, and of what he himself was resolved to do. He recommended the government to send two legions which were stationed at Rome up the Tiber to Narnia, for the purpose of blocking up that road in case of necessity, and at the same time to replace them in the capital by one legion, which was stationed in Campania under the command of Fulvius. He then selected out of his army 7,000 of the best foot

¹ According to the narrative, as transmitted to us, Nero formed his resolution of marching to the assistance of Livius on the strength of the information which he casually obtained respecting Hannibal's march from the six intercepted messengers. But we can hardly suppose that Nero had no direct news from Livius of the direction of Hasdrubal's march. There was nothing to prevent the two Roman generals from keeping up a continuous correspondence with one another, for they were not separated by any hostile forces. It would surely have been an unpardonable negligence if Nero had heard of his colleague's dangerous position only by a despatch of the enemy, which a mere accident had thrown into his hand.

soldiers and 1,000 horse,¹ and left his camp so quietly that Hannibal did not perceive his march. The inhabitants of the country through which he passed, the Larinians, Frentinians, Marrucinians, and Præstutians²—had been informed of his approach, and called upon to furnish provisions for his troops as well as horses, draft cattle, and vehicles for the transport of the baggage and of the men that might break down on the road. The sentiments of the population of Italy now became unmistakably apparent in a genuine outburst of enthusiasm and of devotion for the cause of Rome, which was the cause of all Italy. Every man was eager to help, to contribute something towards putting down the common enemy. Old and young, rich and poor, hurried to the places where Nero's soldiers were expected to pass, supplied them with food and drink, warmed them by their sympathies, followed them with the most ardent wishes for victory, while thousands of young men and veteran soldiers joined the army as volunteers.³

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The march was pressed on without delay. The soldiers would scarcely indulge in so much rest as nature imperatively required; they were inspired by their enthusiasm with superhuman strength. In the neighbourhood of the colony of Sena, to the south of the river Metaurus, Nero found his colleague Livius, and not far from him the

Battle of
the
Metaurus.

¹ According to Frontinus (*Strateg.* i. 1, 9) he took with him a force of 10,000 men.

² The order in which Livy mentions these peoples (xxvii. 43) is not correct, and furnishes another proof of his ignorance of the geography even of Italy.—Compare above, p. 172, and p. 336, note 2.

³ It is worth while to read the description of Livy (xxvii. 45), one of the best in his whole work: 'Per instructa omnia ordinibus virorum mulierumque undique ex agris effusorum inter vota et preces et laudes ibant: illos presidia rei publicæ, vindices urbis Romanæ imperiique appellabant; in illorum armis dextrisque suam liberorumque suorum salutem ac libertatem repositam esse. Deos omnes deasque precabantur, ut illis faustum iter felixque pugna ac matura ex hostibus victoria esset, damnarenturque ipsi votorum, quæ pro iis suscepissent, ut quemadmodum nunc solliciti prosequerentur eos, ita paucos post dies læti ovantibus victoria obviam irent. Invitare inde pro se quisque et offerre et fatigare precibus, ut quæ ipsis iumentisque usui essent, ab se potissimum sumerent; benigne omnia cumulata dare.'

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prætor L. Porcius Licinus, each encamped with two legions opposite Hasdrubal. In the stillness of the night Nero and his troops were received into the consular camp, and distributed into the tents of their comrades, so that the area of the camp was not enlarged. It was the intention of the Roman consuls to withhold from Hasdrubal the knowledge of the arrival of reinforcements, in order to induce him the more readily to accept battle. At any rate a battle must be fought before Hannibal should become aware of Nero's march and hasten to support his brother. On this depended the success of the whole campaign. In case of need the consuls would have been compelled to attack the Carthaginian camp. Hasdrubal, however, was not long ignorant that both consuls were confronting him. The double signals which he heard from the Roman camp since Nero's arrival left no doubt of the fact, and the troops which had just arrived exhibited manifest signs of a long and fatiguing march. Hasdrubal could explain the arrival of the second consul only by supposing that Hannibal's army was defeated and annihilated, and he resolved accordingly to return into the country of the Gauls, and there to wait for accurate information. In the same night he gave orders to retire beyond the Metaurus. But, by the faithlessness of his guides, he missed the way, wandered long up and down the river without finding a ford, and when morning dawned, saw his disordered and exhausted troops pursued and attacked by the Romans. He had no longer time to cover himself by throwing up fortifications for a camp. In the most disadvantageous position, with a deep river in his rear, he was obliged to accept battle, and, from the very first, he felt the necessity of either conquering or dying.¹ The battle lasted from morning till noon. The Spaniards on Hasdrubal's right wing fought with the inborn bravery of their race against the legions of Livius. The Gauls on

¹ Polybius, xi. 1, § 3: προδιελθὼς ὅτι δεῖ κατὰ τὸν παρόντα κίνδυνον νικᾶν ἢ θνήσκειν.

the left wing occupied an unassailable position. Nero, on the right wing of the Roman line, saw that he had no chance of producing an impression on them; he therefore shifted his position, marched with his men behind the rear of the Roman line to the left, and attacked the Spaniards in flank and rear. This manœuvre decided the battle. The Gauls on Hasdrubal's left wing appear to have behaved very badly. They did not avail themselves of Nero's retreat for the purpose of pushing forward, but gave themselves up to sloth and rioting, and were afterwards found lying for the most part drunk and helpless on the ground, so that they could be slaughtered without offering resistance. When Hasdrubal saw his best troops falling under the overwhelming attack of the Romans and that all was lost, he rushed into the thickest throng of battle and was slain. Nothing was wanting to make the Roman victory complete. Ten thousand of the enemy, for the most part Spaniards, fell in the battle.¹ The Gauls and Ligurians fled in the utmost disorder, and tried to gain their respective homes. Of ten elephants six were killed, four taken. The Carthaginian army was destroyed; and, for the first time in the course of the war, the Romans could boast that they had on Italian soil revenged the fatal day of Cannæ.

Nero's plan of marching northward had become known in Rome; the town had not ceased to be agitated with feverish excitement. Everybody felt that a decisive moment was approaching, and there were many who were far from approving Nero's bold resolution.² The senate

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B.C.Effect of
the victory
on the
Romans.

¹ According to Polybius (xi. 3), the Carthaginians lost 10,000, the Romans 2,000. It is impossible to reconcile with this statement that of Livy, who (xxvii. 49) speaks of 56,000 Carthaginians killed and 5,400 taken, and estimates the loss of the Romans at 8,000. These numbers are probably too high. It was the intention of some Roman annalists to contrast the battle of the Metaurus with that of Cannæ (Livy, *loc. cit.*: 'reddita æqua Cannensi clades videbatur'), and they were therefore prone to exaggerate rather freely. The numbers of Polybius seem to deserve more credit, though we must not forget that his partiality for the Scipios may have induced him somewhat to depreciate the victory of Nero and Livius. Compare Appian, vii. 32.

² Livy, xxvii. 44.

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remained assembled, day after day, from early morn until evening, supporting and counselling the civic magistrates; the people thronged the streets and especially the Forum; all the temples resounded with the prayers of the women. Suddenly an uncertain rumour ran through the crowd that a battle had been fought and a victory gained. But the hopes of the people had been deceived so often that they refused to believe what they wished for with agonising eagerness. Even a written despatch of Lucius Manlius, sent from Narnia, met with but partial credit. At last the news spread that three men of senatorial rank, delegated by the consuls, were approaching the city. The excitement of impatience now reached its highest point, and masses of the population rushed out of the gates to meet the messengers. Every man was anxious to be the first to hear certain news, and as the crowd picked up scraps of information from the messengers or their attendants, the joyful tidings travelled fast from lip to lip. Still no formal announcement was made, and slowly the messengers rode onwards through the swelling throng to the Forum. It was with difficulty that they could penetrate to the senate-house. The crowd pressed after them into the building, and could scarcely be kept from invading the sacred precincts where the senate was assembled. The official report of the consuls was at length read in the senate, and then Lucius Veturius stepped out into the Forum and communicated to the people the full tidings of victory—that the two consuls and the Roman legions were safe, the Punic army destroyed, and Hasdrubal, its leader, slain. Now all doubts were removed, and the people gave themselves up to boundless joy. The first feeling was that of gratitude to the gods. At last they had heard the prayers of their people, had overthrown the national enemy and saved Italy. The senate decreed the celebration of a public thanksgiving, which was to last three days. The Roman people, tired and sick of war, fondly nourished the fairest hopes of peace, and seemed almost to forget

that Hannibal still occupied Italian soil, unconquered and terrible as ever.¹

From the field of battle on the Metaurus Nero marched, with the same rapidity with which he had come, back into his camp near Canusium,² where Hannibal was still waiting for news from his brother. This news was now brought in an unlooked-for manner. Hasdrubal's head was cast by the Romans before the feet of his outposts, and two Carthaginian captives, set free for this purpose by Nero, gave him an account of the disastrous battle which had wrecked all his hopes. When Hannibal recognised the bloody head of his brother he foresaw the fate of Carthage.³ He immediately broke up with his army, and marched southward into Bruttium, whither his victorious opponent did not venture to follow him. The war in Italy was now to all appearances decided. It was in the highest degree unlikely that Carthage would repeat the enterprise of another invasion of Italy, which had just signally failed. After the loss of Sardinia and Sicily, soon to be followed by that of Spain, it seemed to be of little use, in a military point of view, to retain any longer a corner of Italy, especially as an attack upon the Carthaginian possessions in Africa might now be expected. Nevertheless Hannibal could not make up his mind to leave of his own accord a country which had been the theatre of his great deeds, and where alone, as he was convinced, a mortal blow could be dealt at Rome. For four years longer he clung with astounding tenacity to the hostile soil, and for all this time his name and his unconquered arms continued to strike terror throughout Italy.

At the close of the year which determined the successful issue of the war, Rome had, for the first time after a long interval, days of national rejoicing, and the consuls celebrated a well-deserved triumph. After the fall of Syracuse

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Plans of
Hannibal.

Triumph
of the
consuls.

¹ Livy, xxvii. 50, 51.

² According to Livy (xxvii. 51), Nero took no more than six days for this march of about 250 miles, which seems utterly impossible.

³ Livy, xxvii. 51: 'Hannibal tanto simul publico familiarique ictus luctu agnoscere se fortunam Carthaginis fertur dixisse.'

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the senate had refused to accord to Marcellus the triumph which he eagerly coveted, and an ovation on the Alban mount was but a poor substitute for the usual display of triumphal pomp within the walls of Rome. Fabius indeed had triumphed when he had been fortunate enough to get possession of Tarentum by the treachery of the Bruttian garrison. But, in spite of the great show of treasures and works of art which he displayed before the gazing multitude, nobody was deceived as to his real merits in a military point of view. Now at length Roman generals had fought a pitched battle and had overcome an enemy second in reputation only to Hannibal. The senate decreed that both consuls, as they had fought side by side, should be united in their triumph. They met at Præneste, Livius at the head of his army, Nero alone, as his legions had been ordered to remain in the field to keep Hannibal in check. Livius entered the city on the triumphal car, drawn by four horses, as the real conqueror, because on the day of battle he had had the auspices, and the victory had been gained in his province. Nero accompanied him on horseback; but, though the formal honours accorded to him were inferior, the eyes of the crowd were chiefly directed on him, and he was greeted by the loudest applause, as the man to whose bold resolution the victory was principally due.¹

Sixth Period of the Hannibalian War.

FROM THE BATTLE ON THE METAURUS TO THE TAKING OF
LOCRI, 207–205 B.C.

Character
of Cartha-
ginian and
Roman
conquests
in Spain.

From the beginning of the war to the great victory at Cannæ the star of Carthage had been in the ascendant. The defection of Capua, Syracuse, Tarentum, and numerous other allies of the Romans was the fruit of this rapid

¹ Livy, xxviii. 9: 'Itaque iret alter consul sublimis curru multiugis, si vellet, equis: uno equo per urbem verum triumphum vehi, Neronemque etiam si pedes incedat, vel parta eo bello vel spreta eo triumpho gloria memorabilem fore . . . Notatum eo die plura carmina militaribus iocis in C. Claudium quam in consulem suum iactata.'

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succession of victories. But the fortunes of Carthage did not rise higher, and soon the re-conquest of Syracuse, of Capua, and of Tarentum marked the steps by which Rome gradually rose to her ancient superiority over her rival. The annihilation of Hasdrubal's army was the severest blow which she had yet inflicted, and it proved the more disastrous to the cause of Carthage as Hasdrubal's expedition into Italy had been effected only at the price of the virtual abandonment of Spain. Whatever may have been the tactical result of the battle of Bæcula,¹ in which Scipio claimed the victory, its results were, as far as he alone and the campaign in the Spanish peninsula were concerned, those of a great military success; for the best and largest portion of the Carthaginian forces in Spain withdrew immediately after and left him almost undisputed master of all the land from the Pyrenees to the Straits of Calpe (Gibraltar). An additional advantage for Scipio was, that on the withdrawal of the Punic army more and more of the Spanish tribes embraced the cause of the Romans, whose dominion had not yet had time to press heavily on them, and through whose help they hoped, in their simple-mindedness, to recover their independence.² This vacillation of the Spanish character explains to some extent the sudden and wholesale vicissitudes of the war in that country. Nothing appeared easier than to conquer Spain; but nothing was, in reality, more difficult than to keep permanent possession of it. Thus the first Carthaginian conquests in Spain, under Hamilcar Barcas and his son-in-law Hasdrubal, had been effected with wonderful rapidity, owing to internal divisions among the Spanish tribes. Hannibal had, on his march to Italy, subdued, as he thought permanently, all the country between the Iberus and the Pyrenees; but the mere appearance of the Roman legions under the Scipios had swept away this acquisition, and in their very first campaigns the two

¹ See above, p. 379.

² Livy, xxvii. 17: 'Velut fortuita inclinatio animorum Hispaniam omnem averterat ad Romanum a Punico imperio.'

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Roman generals penetrated far to the south, into the heart of the Carthaginian possessions. When the Carthaginians were entirely expelled from Spain, it took the Romans two hundred years of hard fighting before they could say that the whole of Spain was in their possession and pacified.¹ In the first ten years of the Hannibalian war they persistently reinforced their armies in Spain at the greatest cost, and their perseverance was not without its effect; for they held that the Carthaginians had on Spain was materially weakened, and they could no longer draw from it the large supplies of soldiers and treasure which they had received from that country in the beginning of the war. It lost accordingly much of the importance which it had had in their eyes. Yet it was not entirely given up by them, even after Hasdrubal had evacuated it with the best part of the Carthaginian forces. Another Hasdrubal, the son of Gisgo, a very able general, and Hannibal's youngest brother Mago remained still at the head of respectable armies in Spain, and were receiving reinforcements from Africa. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to perceive that the power of Carthage was now on the wane. Not a single vigorous effort was made to regain what had been lost. The theatre of war was transferred more and more southward, into the neighbourhood of Gades, the last town of any importance which had remained of the whole of the Punic possessions in the peninsula. It seemed that the Carthaginians placed all their hopes of final success on the issue of the war in Italy, and that from the victory of the two sons of Barcas in Italy they expected the recovery of Spain as a natural consequence.

Alleged
exploits of

Under such circumstances the task of Scipio was comparatively easy; and however much his panegyrists

¹ No terms can be more to the point than those by which Livy (xxiv. 42) characterises the Spaniards as a 'gens nata instaurandis reparandisque bellis.' This was felt not only by the Romans, but in modern times by the French. Equally appropriate is Livy's expression at another place (xxviii. 12): 'Hispania non quam Italia modo, sed quam ulla pars terrarum bello reparando aptior erat locorum hominumque ingeniis.'

endeavoured to extol his exploits in Spain and to represent him as a consummate hero, they have not succeeded in convincing us that, in a military point of view, he had an opportunity of accomplishing great things. We see clearly that the glory of Scipio is the engrossing topic of the writers who record the progress of affairs in Spain. His individual action is everywhere conspicuous. We can almost fancy that we are reading an epic poem in his honour, and some of the scenes described unmistakably betray their origin in the poetical imagination of the original narrator or in an actual poem.¹ It is not difficult to discover these traces of poetry. But as we possess no strictly sober and authentic report of events by the side of the poetically coloured narrative, we are unable to separate fiction from truth by any but internal criteria, and in many instances this separation must be left to the tact and individual judgment of the critical reader.

On his first appearance in Spain, Scipio had won the hearts of the people. When, after the capture of New Carthage, they had seen his magnanimity and wisdom, their admiration for the youthful hero rose to such a height that they began to call him their king. At first Scipio took no notice of this. But when, after the battle of Bæcula, he liberated the prisoners without ransom, and the Spanish nobles, seized with enthusiasm, solemnly proclaimed him their king,² Scipio met them with the declaration that he claimed indeed to possess a royal spirit, but that, as a Roman citizen, he could not assume the royal title, but was satisfied with that of Imperator. Polybius makes this the opportunity for extolling Scipio's moderation and republican sentiments, and he expresses

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B.C.Scipio in
Spain.Popularity
of Scipio
in Spain.

¹ Such a passage is that where the meeting of Scipio and Masinissa is described (Livy, xxviii. 35): 'Cœperat iam ante Numidam ex fama rerum gestarum admiratio viri substitueratque animo speciem quoque corporis amplam ac magnificam: ceterum maior præsents veneratio cepit; et præterquam quod suapte natura multa maiestas inerat, ornabat promissa cæsaries habitusque corporis non cultus munditiis sed virilis vere ac militaris et ætas in medio virum robore,' etc.

² Polybius, x, 40. Livy, xxvii. 19.

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surprise that he stretched out his hand to seize a crown neither on this occasion nor at a later period when, after the overthrow of Carthage and Syria, he had reached the height of glory, and 'had free scope to obtain royal power in whatever part of the earth he wished.'¹ This opinion, so unhesitatingly expressed by Polybius, is in the highest degree strange and startling. It proves beyond dispute that in his time, *i.e.* in the first half of the second century before our era, the establishment of monarchical government was a contingency which the imagination of the Romans did not place beyond the reach of possibility; that at any rate distinguished members of the nobility were reputed capable of aspiring to a position above the republican equality which befitted the majority of citizens. It is true we find this idea expressed by a Greek, who perhaps had no conception of the deep-seated horror with which a genuine Roman looked upon the power and the very name of a king, and whom the history of his own nation since the time of Alexander the Great had made familiar with the assumption of royal dignity by successful generals. Moreover, Polybius intimates that, in his

¹ The passage of Polybius (x. 40) is of great significance, and deserves to be quoted at full length: Διὸ καὶ συναθροίσας τοὺς Ἰβηρας βασιλικὸς μὲν ἔφη βούλεσθαι καὶ λέγεσθαι παρὰ πᾶσιν καὶ ταῖς ἀληθείαις ὑπάρχειν βασιλεὺς γε μὴν οὔτε ἐθέλγειν εἶναι οὔτε λέγεσθαι παρ' οὐδενί. Ταῦτα δ' εἰπὼν παρήγγειλε στρατηγὸν αὐτὸν προσφωνεῖν. Ἴσως μὲν οὖν καὶ τότε δικαίως ἂν τις ἐπεσημήνατο τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν τῶνδ' ἄνδρων, ἢ κομιδῇ νέος ὢν καὶ τῆς τύχης αὐτῶ συνεκδραμούσης ἐπὶ τοσούτον, ὥστε πάντας τοὺς ὑποταπτομένους ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τε ταύτην κατενεχθῆναι τὴν διάληψιν καὶ τὴν ὀνειμασίαν, ὅμως ἐν ἑαυτῷ διέμεινε καὶ παρηγεῖτο τὴν τοιαύτην ὁρμὴν καὶ φαντασίαν. Πολὺν δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ τις θαυμάσειε τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς περὶ τὸν ἄνδρα μεγαλοψυχίας βλέψας εἰς τοὺς ἐσχάτους τοῦ βίου καιροὺς, ἡνίκα πρὸς τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν ἔργοις κατεστρέφατο μὲν Καρχηδονίου καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ κάλλιστα μέρη τῆς Λιβύης ἀπὸ τῶν Φιλαινῶν βωμῶν ἕως Ἡρακλείων στηλῶν ὑπὸ τὴν τῆς πατρίδος ἐξουσίαν ἤγαγε, κατεστρέψατο δὲ τὴν Ἀσίαν καὶ τοὺς τῆς Συρίας βασιλεῖς καὶ τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ μέγιστον μέρος τῆς οἰκουμένης ὑπήκουον ἐποίησε Ῥωμαίοις, ἔλαβε δὲ καιροὺς εἰς τὸ περιπονήσασθαι δυναστείαν βασιλικὴν ἐν οἷς ἂν ἐπιβάλοιτο καὶ βουλευθεῖη τόποις τῆς οἰκουμένης. With these startling words we may compare Dion Cassius (frgm. lvii. 36): ὅτι (Σκιπίων) μείζων τῆς κοινῆς ἀσφαλείας ἐγεγόνει . . . ὅπως μὴ ἑαυτοῖς τύραννον αὐθαίρετον ἐπασκῆσωσιν (Ῥωμαῖοι), and Zonaras (ix. 11): οἱ δὲ ἐν τῇ Ρώμῃ . . . φόβῳ μὴ ὑπερφρονήσας τυραννίσῃ ἀνεκαλέσαντο αὐτόν.

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opinion, Scipio might have made use of his influence and of circumstances to obtain royal authority, not in Rome, but in Spain, Asia, or elsewhere. Perhaps he thought such a regal or vice-regal position not incompatible with the duties of a Roman citizen and general, much, perhaps, as the men of the house of Barcas had been *de facto* kings in Spain, and had yet continued to serve the Carthaginian state as dutiful subjects; but, in spite of all these considerations, the judgment of Polybius, with regard to Scipio's refusal of the royal title, must be looked upon as a sign of the times. It is the first faint shadow which coming events cast before them. The dominion of Rome over the provinces made it necessary to confer upon individuals from time to time monarchical powers; and these temporary powers were the steps to the throne of the Roman emperors. Spain was the first country that witnessed the autocratic power of Roman nobles; and it was in the family of the Scipios that this became first apparent. It grew from generation to generation, and under its weight the republic was crushed. There had been a time in Rome, and it was not far back, when not even the thought of the possibility of monarchical power could have been entertained by any one. In the Samnite wars, in the war with Pyrrhus, and in the first war with Carthage, the soul of every Roman was filled by the republican spirit alone. Another form of government than that of the free republic was inconceivable in Rome, just as it is inconceivable at the present day in Switzerland and in the United States of America. All the accusations brought by the Roman annalists against Spurius Cassius, Spurius Mælius, and Marcus Manlius, for alleged attempts to seize monarchical power, are nothing but inventions of a later period. But this period begins, as we now see, after the Hannibalian war, when a writer like Polybius could find reason to praise Scipio for refusing the royal title and for abstaining from the assumption of royal authority.

In spite of the republican sentiments and the moderation which Scipio displayed with regard to the offer of the

Magnificence and power of Scipio.

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royal title, his conduct and demeanour showed a kind of royal bearing and of conscious superiority over his fellow-citizens. He was surrounded by something like a court on a small scale. His first confidential adviser and most trusty servant was Caius Lælius,¹ who was employed especially to execute delicate commissions and deliver messages in Rome, to sound Scipio's praise and to keep together his friends in the senate. Besides this diplomatic agency he was also intrusted with military duties, like Scipio's elder brother Lucius, and like Caius Marcius, the brave tribune who in the year 212 had saved the remnants of the Roman army from utter destruction. Even the proprætor Marcus Junius Silanus received orders from him as if he were an imperial legate,² whilst the commander-in-chief directed the movements of his inferiors from his head-quarters at Tarraco.

Capture of
Oringis
by the
Romans.

The year 207 B.C., which was so decisive for the war in Italy, seems not to have been marked by any noteworthy events in Spain. After Hasdrubal had marched with his army across the Pyrenees and Alps, it appears that the Carthaginians did not feel strong enough for any offensive operations, and Scipio too was weakened, as he had sent a part of his forces for the protection of Italy.³ He remained stationary in Tarraco, where he had wintered, and we hear only of a march of Lælius to Bætica in the extreme south of the peninsula, where he encountered and worsted Hannibal's brother Mago, and captured a Punic general named Hanno. The only other event assigned to this year is the taking of a place called Oringis,⁴ by Scipio's brother Lucius, on which occasion 2,000 enemies and not more than ninety Romans are said to have fallen.⁵

¹ Polybius, x. 3, § 2: Γάιος Λαίλιος ἀπὸ νέου μετεσχηκὸς αὐτῷ παντὸς ἔργου καὶ λόγου μεχρὶ τελευτῆς.

² Livy (xxvi. 19) calls him Scipio's 'adiutor ad res gerendas.'

³ See above, p. 383. Nevertheless Livy says (xxviii. 1) that in Spain 'renatum subito par priori bello,' which is merely an empty phrase.

⁴ Whether this place is identical with Auringis, mentioned before by Livy (xxiv. 42), and where it was situated, we do not know.

⁵ Livy, xxviii. 3.

The succeeding year, 206 B.C., witnessed the total extinction of Punic dominion in Spain. Scipio had probably again reinforced his army after the battle on the Metaurus. The news of that victory produced a great effect in Spain, and gained new allies for the Romans. Scipio marched again southwards, and met a second time at Bæcula a large Carthaginian army under Hasdrubal, the son of Gisgo, which, after a severe struggle, he compelled to retreat into its camp, and drove further and further south shortly after.¹ Hereupon he returned by slow marches to Tarraco, leaving Silanus behind to pursue the broken hostile army. This army, it appears, dwindled away fast. The Spanish troops deserted and went to their respective homes, while the Punians retreated to the island town of Gades. Thus the war was brought to an end on the continent of Spain. Here, as well as in Sicily and Sardinia, the superior strength and perseverance of Rome had prevailed over the Carthaginian armies, which were apparently better led, but composed of worse materials.

The contagion of defection, which in great part had caused the loss of Spain, now began to attack the native African troops, which, more than any other portion of the

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Second
battle of
Bæcula.

Overtures
of Masi-
nissa to
Scipio.

¹ This second victory of Bæcula is exposed to as serious historical doubts as the first. Even the name of the locality is uncertain; for Livy (xxviii. 12) mentions the name Silipa, besides Bæcula; the manuscripts of Polybius have Elinga, which has been corrected into Ilipa; and Appian calls the place by the strange name of Karmon. Great victories make even insignificant places, such as Cannæ, celebrated; and it seems, therefore, to be rather a questionable triumph of which not even the locality is fixed and known. It can further be shown that Scipio's friends were guilty of great exaggerations. Livy, who is not generally inclined to understate the results of Roman feats of arms, says that the army of Hasdrubal was 54,000 strong, but that some writers made it 20,000 more. He does not mention Polybius; but, by chance, a fragment of this historian has been preserved (xi. 20 ff.) in which the battle is very fully related, and from which it appears that he is the authority for the greater number. This statement, accordingly, may be considered to be based on family traditions of the Scipios. Lastly, the reported issue of the battle is such that it betrays the false colouring to anyone slightly accustomed to judge such reports. The numbers of the killed and captured Carthaginians are not given; the battle is said to have been interrupted by a sudden thunder-storm, and the Carthaginians, as well as the Romans, retire into their neighbouring camp. After this, what remains of the alleged victory?

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Carthaginian armies, had hitherto been the terror of the legions. Masinissa, the brave Numidian prince, who a few years before had fought against the rebellious Syphax, and had since then rendered the most important services in Spain with his excellent cavalry, was beginning to find out, with the native shrewdness of a barbarian, that the cause of his friends and patrons was lost, and he was anxious, before it should be too late, to secure for himself a safe retreat into the camp of the conquerors. He was shut up in Gades with the remnant of the Carthaginian army, but found an opportunity of treating with Silanus,¹ and is even related to have had a secret interview with Scipio himself, in which the terms of an alliance between him and Rome were discussed, and his co-operation was promised in case the war should be carried into Africa.² Thus the first preparations were made for the execution of the plan which Scipio was already maturing in his mind, viz., of bringing the war to a conclusion in that country, where the most deadly blows could be inflicted on Carthage.

Relations
of Scipio
with
Syphax.

But before Masinissa's help was quite secured, Scipio endeavoured to restore and to strengthen the amicable relations which for several years had existed between Rome and Syphax, the most powerful prince of the western Numidians or Massæsylians. In the year 215 Syphax had, in the hope of aid from Rome, taken up arms against Carthage. But he seems to have been left to his own resources, and the few Roman officers whom the two Scipios had sent to him from Spain³ had proved unable to convert his unruly Numidians into anything like a regular and steady infantry. He was accordingly worsted and expelled from his kingdom by the Carthaginians and their allies, the Numidians, under King Gula and his son Masinissa. Under what conditions the Carthaginians

¹ Livy, xxviii. 16.

² Livy, xxviii. 35. It seems hardly probable that Scipio, merely for the purpose of conferring secretly with Masinissa, went from one end of Spain (Tarraco) to the other (Gades). The meeting of Scipio and Masinissa is probably only a poetical pendant to the meeting with Syphax, which is equally fictitious.

³ See above, p. 315.

afterwards made peace with him and allowed him to return into his country, we are not informed. We hear only that, with the subtle treachery of a barbarian, he sent an embassy to Rome in 210, to assure the senate of his friendship, whilst he was in amicable relations with Carthage. The secret intrigues carried on with him and with Masinissa are not known to us. It may be that Scipio wished to gain the friendship and alliance of both. But it was in the nature of things that neither Rome nor Carthage could be on good terms with one of the two rivals without making an enemy of the other. The two Numidian chiefs could not be on the same side, for each of them aimed at obtaining exclusive possession of the whole of Numidia. As long as Masinissa was faithful in the service of the Carthaginians, Syphax tried to keep on good terms with Rome; but as soon as he heard that Masinissa had betrayed his friends and gone over to the Romans, it was no longer possible for him to remain in a neutral or even hostile position to Carthage. If one of the two Numidian chiefs turned to the right, it was necessary for the other to turn to the left. It was therefore a vain attempt on the part of Scipio to secure the co-operation of Syphax in the war with the Carthaginians after he had detached Masinissa from their side.

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Livy gives a long and graphic description of a dangerous voyage of Scipio to a Numidian port; of his meeting, by an extraordinary coincidence, with Hasdrubal, the son of Gisgo, in the very house and at the table of Syphax; of negotiations there conducted, on which occasion Scipio's personal qualities again drew forth the admiration of his enemies, and lastly of an alliance concluded with Syphax.¹ The whole of this narrative belongs, in all probability, to the domain of fiction. It looks like a rhapsody in the epic poem of the great Scipio. The facts related are nothing but the personal adventures of a few heroes; they have not the slightest influence on the course of events, and cannot even

Alleged
meeting
of Scipio
with
Syphax.

¹ Livy, xxviii. 18.

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be made to harmonise with it. The alleged treaty with Syphax¹ turns out to be a fable, and the Quixotic voyage to Africa cannot be fitted chronologically into the year 206.² If therefore negotiations really took place between Scipio and Syphax, it is probable that Lælius, or some other confidential agent, was the negotiator, and not the commander-in-chief himself.³

Story of
the funeral
games at
New Car-
thage.

Not a whit more authentic, and not a whit more interesting as bearing on the course of events, is the detailed narrative given by Livy⁴ of the magnificent funeral games which Scipio celebrated in New Carthage in honour of his father and his uncle. The gladiatorial combats on this occasion were not of the kind usually exhibited in Rome at the funerals of great men. Instead of hired gladiators, free and noble Spaniards, who had offered themselves voluntarily and with a chivalrous zeal, fought with one another to do honour to the great Scipio. Nay, the mortal combat was turned into an ordeal. Two kinsmen, rival claimants of a disputed crown, resolved to decide their quarrel by an appeal to arms, and at the same time to enhance the brilliancy of Scipio's funeral games by their

¹ Livy (xxviii. 18): 'fœdusictum.'

² Compare Weissenborn's note to Livy xxviii. 16. The fact is, too many events are crowded into the year 206; first, the march of Scipio from Tarraco into the valley of the Bætis (Andalusia) and the battle of Bæcula; this alone takes, according to Livy (*loc. cit.* § 10), at least five months; secondly, the voyage to Numidia (Livy, xxviii. 17); thirdly, the taking of Illiturgi, Castulo, and Astapa (ch. 19 ff.) which presupposes a second expedition from the north of Spain into Andalusia; fourthly, the funeral games (ch. 21); fifthly, Scipio's illness and the mutiny of the army (ch. 24-29); sixthly, the campaign across the Ebro against Mandonius and Indibilis (ch. 31 ff.); seventhly, Scipio's journey to Masinissa, being the third expedition into Andalusia (ch. 35); eighthly, Scipio's journey to Rome before the end of the year, for the purpose of securing his election to the consulship of 205. Weissenborn proposes to apportion some of these events to the year 207; but even if this were done, there would still remain a good deal to be apportioned to the limbo of fiction.

³ An analogous case of misrepresentation occurs at a later period of the war. In the year 203 B.C., negotiations again took place between Scipio and Syphax (Livy, xxx. 3), which, according to the general account of the annalists, were conducted by messengers. But here again one writer—Valerius Antias, not notorious for his veracity—preferred a more striking account, and related a personal interview in Scipio's camp, for which, of course, he had to draw on his imagination.

⁴ Livy, xxviii. 21.

personal encounter. Scipio's refined humanity was of course revolted at this singular and atrocious suggestion; he sought to persuade the rivals to desist from their intention, but, being unable to do so, he consented at last to this singular trial by battle, which was at the same time a show for his troops, and in which one of the two princes was killed after a severe, and no doubt interesting, fight. What are we to think of historians who gravely accept such wild flights of imagination as actual facts, to be recorded in sober historical prose, and who dwell upon them with visible satisfaction? A single chapter of such history as this is sufficient to cast doubt on other stories connected with Scipio's doings, even though they should not in themselves be fantastic or ridiculous.

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When the Carthaginians had evacuated all Spain with the single exception of Gades, there remained nothing for Scipio to do but to make war upon those of the former Carthaginian allies who might not be found willing to exchange the dominion of one foreign and alien power for that of another, or upon those tribes which had distinguished themselves by their hostility to Rome. To the latter belonged the town of Illiturgi on the river Bætis. The inhabitants of this place, formerly subject to Carthage, had joined the Romans in the beginning of the war, but after the defeat of the two Scipios they had made their peace with Carthage, by killing the Roman fugitives who had fled into their town from the battle-field.¹ This cruel treachery now called for vengeance. Illiturgi was taken by storm. All the men, women, and children were killed indiscriminately, and the town was levelled with the ground.²

Storming
of Illiturgi.

¹ Livy, xxviii. 19.

² Livy, xxviii. 20: 'Tum vero apparuit ab ira et ab odio urbem expugnatam esse: nemo capiendi viros, nemo, patentibus ad direptionem omnibus, prædæ memor est: trucidant inermes iuxta atque armatos, feminas pariter ac viros, usque ad infantium cædem ira crudelis pervenit. Ignem deinde tectis iniiciunt ac dirunt quæ incendio absumi nequeunt.' The evident satisfaction with which Livy paints this scene, and which is hardly disguised by the qualification of *ira* as *crudelis*, shows that the barbaric practices of ancient warfare caused little compunction even to the humanity and refinement of the Augustan age.

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IV.Destruction of
Astapa.

The neighbouring town of Castulo was treated less severely, because, terrified by the fate of Illiturgi, it had surrendered to Marcius and delivered up a Punic garrison.¹ Marcius then marched upon Astapa (the modern Estepa, south of Astigi). This unfortunate town became the scene of one of those horrible outbreaks of frenzied patriotism and despair of which the natives of Spain in ancient and modern times have given several examples. The men of Astapa raised in their town a huge funeral pile, cast all their treasures on it, killed their wives and children, and let the flames consume all, whilst they themselves rushed against the enemy and fell in battle to the last man.² They had had no choice left between this terrible end and the still more terrible one of Illiturgi, and they thought that the bitterness of death would be less at the hands of sacrificers than of butchers.

Illness of
Scipio and
mutiny of
troops.

Hitherto Scipio had met with uninterrupted success. The Carthaginians were driven out of Spain; all the native peoples were subdued or had voluntarily joined the Roman cause; negotiations had been entered into with the two most powerful Numidian chiefs, who promised their assistance in the further prosecution of the war in Africa, when suddenly the promising result was jeopardised—for Scipio, the man on whom everything depended, was suddenly taken ill. Even the bare rumour of this calamity, exaggerating his illness the further it spread, caused disquietude in the whole province; and not only the fickle Spanish allies, but even the Roman legionary soldiers, unexpectedly evinced a spirit of insubordination and even mutiny.³ A body of eight thousand Roman soldiers, stationed near Sucro, had even before this time been animated by a bad spirit; they had complained that their pay was withheld, that they had been forbidden to despoil the Spaniards, and that they were kept too long

¹ This was probably the remnant of the broken-up Carthaginian army.

² On a similar deed of the Saguntines, see Livy, xxi. 14.

³ Livy, xxviii. 21: 'Apparuitque quantam excitatura molem vera fuisset cladis cum vanus rumor tantas preceps excivisset.'

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on foreign service. Now, when the news of Scipio's illness had reached them, their discontent broke out into open resistance to the orders of the legionary tribunes; they elected two private soldiers as their leaders,¹ plundered the surrounding country, and seemed to be about to imitate the example of the Campanian legion in the war with Pyrrhus, in renouncing the authority of Rome, and in establishing somewhere an independent dominion of their own. As yet, however, they had not been guilty of any open act of violence and bloodshed, and had ventured on no outrage against the majesty of Rome beyond the violation of military discipline and subordination, when the news arrived that Scipio was not dead, nor hopelessly ill, but that he had recovered, and that he ordered them to march to New Carthage, for the purpose of receiving the pay that was due to them. They obeyed, and were soon brought to their senses. Scipio caused them to be surrounded and disarmed by faithful troops, the ringleaders to be seized and executed, and order and discipline to be restored without further difficulty. The danger disappeared as if by magic, and it was shown again what a power Scipio possessed over the minds of his soldiers.²

The mutiny of the army being suppressed, the rebellious Spaniards were soon punished. Scipio crossed the Ebro, penetrated into the land of the Ilergetes and Laretani, on the north side of this river, defeated the brothers Mandonius and Indibilis, and forced them to submission and to the payment of a sum of money.

Defeat of
Mandonius
and Indi-
bilis.

Before the year closed, Gades fell into the hands of the Romans. For a regular siege of this strong island town, Scipio would have needed not only a considerable army but also a large fleet. But he could not avail himself of his ships, as he had taken the rowers from them to employ

Fall of
Gades.

¹ The names of these men were C. Atrius and C. Albius, *i.e.* John Black and John White (Livy, xxviii. 24), and they seem hardly historical.

² The story of the mutiny at Sucro contains nothing that is improbable in itself; but the intention is evident to glorify Scipio as the upholder of Roman discipline. At any rate too much has been made of the affair.

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on land service. He sought, therefore, to gain the town by treason, a plan which had succeeded in so many instances, and which promised an easier and speedier result. Negotiations were begun. In Gades, as well as in all places occupied by the Carthaginians, it was easy to find traitors who declared their readiness to deliver the town, as well as the Punic garrison, into the hands of the Romans.¹ But the plot was discovered, and the ring-leaders were seized and sent to Carthage, to await their punishment. Nevertheless, the Carthaginians seem to have despaired of holding Gades permanently. The inhabitants were Punians, but not Carthaginians. They were in the condition of subject allies, a condition which was, no doubt, felt to be burthensome and unsatisfactory. They took very little interest in the struggle for supremacy between Rome and Carthage, for neither the one state nor the other allowed them an independent position. Perhaps the commercial rivalry of Carthage was considered to interfere with the prosperity of Gades,² whilst nothing was to be apprehended from Rome on this score; and the whole trade in the western seas was, after the humiliation of Carthage, sure to fall into the hands of Gades, under the protection of the Romans. Such dispositions as these, on the part of the population of Gades, would explain the severity with which Mago was ordered by the home government to treat the town—a severity which could aim not at maintaining possession of Gades, but at exacting from it mercilessly the means for continuing the war with Rome, and then giving it up. Mago plundered not only the public treasury and the temples,³ but even private citizens, and then left the port of Gades with the whole fleet and all the forces. In this undignified way the Carthaginians abandoned the last hold they still

¹ Livy, xxviii. 23.

² With shortsighted selfishness the Carthaginians had sacrificed the interest and prosperity of the provincial towns for the benefit of the capital (see above, p. 11), just as the maritime powers of modern Europe formerly did with regard to their colonial possessions.

³ Livy, xxviii. 36.

had on Spanish soil. Gades, of course, opened its gates to the Romans, and obtained favourable conditions of peace, under which it continued for a long time to flourish, as an allied city, subject indeed to Rome, but enjoying perfect freedom in the management of its own local affairs.¹

Thus Spain was lost, not in consequence of a great decisive battle, but by the gradual retreat and exhaustion of the Carthaginians. The last effort for the defence of Spain had been made when Hasdrubal Barcas appeared with the Spanish army on Italian soil. It was on the Metaurus that the Romans conquered Spain, and Scipio had nothing to do but to follow the traces of the wounded lion to the last recesses, and to scare him away. Before the year closed, he could look upon this task as done. He intrusted the chief command to his legate, M. Junius Silanus,² and returned to Rome, accompanied by Lælius, to secure his election for the consulship of the ensuing year, and to mature his plans for carrying the war into Africa.

The hopes which Hannibal had entertained from the alliance and co-operation of King Philip of Macedon had not been realised. Instead of taking an active part in the operations in Italy, where his excellent Macedonian troops would infallibly have decided the war in favour of the allied powers soon after the battle of Cannæ, Philip attacked those countries on the east of the Adriatic for which he had stipulated as his share of the booty after the defeat of Rome,³ taking it apparently for granted that, even without his help, Hannibal would be able to accomplish the conquest of Italy. He succeeded in gaining considerable advantages in Illyria, and, regarding himself as already undisputed master of the countries north of the Ambracian Gulf, he seemed to be bent on changing the influence which he enjoyed, as the protector of some of the Greek states, into a real dominion over all. He laid aside more

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Signifi-
cance of
the battle
of the
Metaurus.

Policy of
Philip of
Macedon.

¹ Livy, xxviii. 37; xxxii. 2. Cicero, *Pro Balbo*, 15, 34; 18, 41.

² Polybius, xi. 33, § 8.

³ See above, p. 230.

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and more the qualities of a leader of the Greeks, and assumed those of an Asiatic despot. The amiable character which he had exhibited in his youth gave way to low voluptuousness, falsity, and cruelty when he had become a man. He forfeited the confidence and attachment of his best friends, the Achæans, when he endeavoured, by cunning and cruelty, to keep possession of Messenia. The royal debauchee was not ashamed, whilst he was a guest in the house of his old friend Aratos, to dishonour the wife of his son, and, when Aratos reproached him, to cause his death by poison. The old jealousy and all the passions and internal disputes of the Greeks, which were to have been buried for ever by the peace of Nau-paktos, in 217,¹ revived at once, and it was not difficult for the Romans to kindle again the flames of war, and then to leave the king of Macedonia so much to do in his own country that he was obliged to give up the attempt of a landing in Italy.

Condition
of the
Greek
states.

There is little use in attempting to determine who was guilty of having caused the interference of Rome in the internal affairs of Greece. Owing to the prevalence of small independent states, the spirit of nationality could not embrace all the Greek peoples, and bind them durably together for common action against any enemies whatever. No abstract considerations of public morality or national duty ever prevented any Greek community from seeking the alliance of a foreign power; they accepted it without the least scruple, if it promised immediate material advantages. Few Greeks ever felt patriotic scruples in availing themselves of Persian money or Macedonian troops to strike down their own immediate neighbours and Hellenic compatriots. Even the great national struggle against Asiatic barbarism, under Miltiades and Themistokles, had not united all the Greeks in their common cause, and since that time no equally grand national enthusiasm had raised them above the petty

¹ See above, p. 278.

jealousies of local interests. A short time before the interference of the Romans, the Achæan league had appealed to the Macedonians, and made them the arbitrators in the internal affairs of Hellas. If, therefore, on the present occasion, the Ætolians called in the Romans, we can only condemn them of having committed a sin against their own nation which none of the other Greeks would have scrupled to commit, a sin which is the inevitable curse of internal division in every nation of ancient or modern times.

Nevertheless we must acknowledge that the league which the Ætolians now concluded with the Romans was distinguished by peculiar turpitude. It was an engagement by which the whole Ætolian people became Roman mercenaries, and stipulated that their hire should be the plunder of the neighbouring Greek cities. They agreed to make common cause with the Romans, like a band of robbers. The Romans were to furnish ships, the Ætolians troops; the conquered countries and towns were to become the spoil of the Ætolians, the movable booty that of the Romans. If we recollect that this 'movable booty' included the inhabitants who might fall into the hands of the conquerors, and who would consequently be sold into slavery, we shall duly appreciate the sense of national dignity that could animate the Ætolians and induce them to conclude so disgraceful an alliance with foreign barbarians for the enslaving of their countrymen. And even this conduct might perhaps have been excused or palliated to some extent if extreme danger, or the necessity of self-defence, had urged the Ætolians, as a last resource, to secure foreign help on these terms. But it was, in truth, nothing but their native robber instinct that induced them, instead of honestly cultivating their fields, to plough with the spear and to reap with the sword. They succeeded by their league with the Romans once more in setting Greece in a blaze of war, in filling the whole length and breadth of the land with untold misery, and in preparing for subjection to a foreign yoke the nation

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between
the Æto-
lians and
the
Romans.

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which would not submit to the discipline of a national state. Our indignation at their conduct is mingled with a feeling of satisfaction when we remember that they were the first to feel the weight of this yoke, and that they were almost driven to despair and madness when they felt how galling it was.

Effects of
the league
with the
Ætolians.

After the fall of Syracuse and Capua, M. Valerius Lævinus crossed over to Greece with a fleet of fifty ships and one legion,¹ and made his appearance in the popular assembly of the Ætolians, the leading men of which had been previously persuaded to favour the Roman proposals. He found no difficulty in prevailing upon them to renew the war with Philip, as he held out the prospect of conquering the Acarnanian country, which they had coveted for a long time, and of regaining the numerous towns taken from them by the Macedonians. It was supposed that all would join the alliance who, from their own interest, or from old hostility, were the natural enemies of Macedonia, such as the Thracian barbarians in the north, the chiefs Pleuratus and Skerdilaidas in Illyria, the Messenians, Eleans, and Lacedæmonians in Peloponnesus; lastly, in Asia, King Attalus of Pergamum, who, feeling unsafe in his precarious position between the two great monarchies of Macedonia and Syria, welcomed the Romans as his patrons, and thus made an opening for their diplomacy to interfere in the political affairs of the distant East. Valerius promised to assist the Ætolians with a fleet of at least twenty-five ships, and both parties engaged not to conclude a separate peace with Macedonia. Thus the Romans had let loose upon Philip a pack of hounds, numerous enough to keep him at bay in his own country and to prevent him from thinking of an invasion of Italy. They were relieved from all anxiety on this score, and were not even obliged to make great efforts for the defence of their eastern coast.

War between the

It is not necessary for us to follow in detail the course of

¹ Livy, xxvi. 1, 24.

the war in Greece. It was marked, not by great decisive actions, but by a number of petty conflicts and barbarous atrocities, by which the strength of the nation was sapped and wasted. The source of the greatest calamities was this, that the hostile territories were not compact masses, separated from one another by a single line of frontier, but detached pieces, scattered about irregularly, and intermingled in the Peloponnesus, in central Greece, and on the islands. Thus the war was not confined to one locality, but raged simultaneously in every quarter. In the Peloponnesus the Achæans were harassed continuously by the Ætolians and the Lacedæmonians, who, in this last period of their independence, had exchanged their venerable hereditary monarchy and their aristocratic constitution for the government of a tyrant. The proud Spartans, formerly the sworn enemies and opponents of tyranny in all parts of Greece, had at last succumbed to a tyrant themselves. Machanidas, a brave soldier, had made himself their master, and exercised a military despotism in a state which at one time appeared to the wisest of the Greeks the model of political institutions. The coasts of the Corinthian Gulf and the Ægæan Sea were visited by Roman, Ætolian, and Pergamenian fleets, that plundered and devastated the towns and carried away the inhabitants into slavery. From the north, hordes of barbarians broke in upon Macedonia. Philip was compelled to hasten from one place to another. When he was confronting the Thracians, he was called away by messengers to protect his Peloponnesian allies; and scarcely had he marched southwards, when his hereditary dominions were invaded by Illyrians and Dardanians. He conducted this difficult war not without vigour and ability, and succeeded, by his restless activity and quickness, in showing himself superior to his enemies in every part, in driving back Pleuratus and Skerdilaidas in Illyria, in beating the Ætolians (210 B.C.) near Lamia, and chasing them into their own country. Attalus of Pergamum was surprised by Philip, near the town of Opus, which he had taken and

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was just in the act of plundering. Barely managing to escape captivity, he returned into Asia, and, being occupied in disputes with his neighbour, King Prusias of Bithynia, paid no more attention to the affairs of Greece. The Romans took very little part in the war. Under these circumstances, some of the neutral powers, the Rhodians and the king of Egypt, almost succeeded, as early as 208 B.C., in bringing about the restoration of peace between King Philip and the Ætolians. But the Romans made the negotiations abortive by now resuming the war with increased vigour on their part.¹ After a short armistice, hostilities were continued; and if Philip had possessed a respectable fleet,² he would have had no difficulty in reducing the exhausted Ætolians to submission. In 206 B.C. he penetrated a second time to Thermon, the capital of their country. His allies, the Achæans, under the command of the able general Philopœmen, gained a decisive victory over the Spartans, in which the tyrant Machanidas was killed; and as the Romans neglected more and more to render the services to which they had bound themselves in the treaty, the Ætolians were compelled at last, in 205 B.C., to conclude a separate peace with Macedonia, in formal violation of their engagements with Rome.

Return of
Scipio to
Rome.

On his return from Spain in the year 206, Scipio entertained not unfounded hopes that, at an age when other men began to prepare themselves for the higher military commands and offices of state, he would be rewarded with a triumph, the greatest distinction to which a Roman citizen could aspire, as the crowning honour of a life devoted to the public service. He had not indeed been invested with a regular magistracy. Without having been prætor he had been sent to Spain, with an extraordinary command as proprætor; nor had any but the regular magistrates ever celebrated a triumph. But the Hannibalian war

¹ Livy, xxviii. 30.

² He resolved in the year 208 to build a hundred ships of war; but we do not know if this plan was ever carried into execution.—Livy, xxviii. 8.

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had made people familiar with many innovations, and among these innovations, Scipio's extraordinary command was so prominent that the concession of a triumph, as a natural consequence of it, seemed hardly likely to meet with any serious opposition. In the temple of Bellona¹ accordingly, before the walls of the city, Scipio enumerated before the assembled senate all his exploits in Spain; he told them how many battles he had fought, how many towns he had taken, what nations he had brought under the dominion of the Roman people, and, though he did not distinctly ask for a triumph, he expected that the senate would of its own accord decree the honour he so much coveted. But he was disappointed. His opponents insisted that there was no valid reason for departing from the old custom, and Scipio had to content himself with displaying as much pomp and show as he could when he made his entry into Rome as a private citizen, without the solemn formalities of a triumph.² Hereupon the consular elections for the next year took place amidst unusual activity on the part of the people. From all parts the Roman citizens came in great numbers, not only to vote, but simply to see the great Scipio. They thronged round his house, followed him to the Capitol, where, in fulfilment of a vow made in Spain, he offered a sacrifice of a hundred oxen. He was unanimously elected consul by all the centuries, and in their imagination the people saw him already carrying the war into Africa and ending it with the destruction of Carthage.

But the senate was far from exhibiting the enthusiasm and unanimity of the people. The friends and adherents of Scipio found themselves opposed by independent men who did not possess unbounded confidence in him, and who thought there was too much risk in an attack upon Africa so long as Hannibal had not evacuated Italy. At the head of these men was the aged Q. Fabius Maximus.

Debates on
the expedi-
tion to
Africa

¹ Livy, xxviii. 38.

² Appian (vi. 38) inaccurately calls this entry into Rome a triumph: *Kal Σκίπλων μὲν θαυμάζομενος εἰσπράμβευεν.*

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His system of a pertinacious defensive warfare and of a slow and cautious advance to the offensive had so far proved eminently successful. By it Hannibal had gradually been compelled to give up central Italy and to fall back upon the narrow peninsula of Bruttium. Fabius could see no cause why this system should now be abandoned. It was to be expected that, if it was persisted in for some time longer, Hannibal would lose Thurii, Locri, and Croton, the last strongholds in his power, and would thus be compelled to retire from Italy. But if, in order to carry the war into Africa, Italy were drained of troops, it might be apprehended that Hannibal would again sally forth from Bruttium and threaten Samnium, Campania, or Latium. The plan of Scipio and his party was, without any doubt, grander and more worthy of the Roman people. It was reasonable to expect that a vigorous attack on the Carthaginians in Africa would at once lead to the recall of Hannibal from Italy. Moreover it had ever been the custom of the Romans to attack their enemies in their own country. It was thus that they had warred in ancient times with the Etruscans, the Latins, and the Samnites. They had gone as far as Heraclea and Beneventum to meet Pyrrhus. In the first Punic war they had made Sicily the battle-field, and in the second they had sent out their armies and fleets to Spain and across the Adriatic. It is true they had not forgotten the Caudine passes, nor the rout of Regulus in Africa; but, after all, the greatest calamities had broken upon Rome when her enemies had been allowed to approach her too near, on the Allia, near the Thrasymenus, and at Cannæ. The time had come at last when they could attempt that expedition to Africa which had been part of the original plan of the Romans, and which the consul Sempronius had actually been commissioned to undertake in the first year of the war. At that time Hannibal's invasion of Italy had thwarted this well-considered plan. But now Hannibal was so enfeebled that two consular armies were sufficient to keep him in check; he barely maintained himself in Bruttium; the remainder of Italy

was free from danger; in Sicily, Sardinia, and Spain the war was practically at an end; in Macedonia, where it had never been serious, it could at any time be ended by the conclusion of peace. It was therefore most assuredly the time now to abandon the Fabian principle of cautious defence, which was calculated to prolong indefinitely the excitement, the disquiet, and the sufferings of the war, and to gather up the whole energy of the nation for a bold decisive blow, as the previous generation had done with glorious success in the Sicilian war.

It cannot be doubted that the most weighty arguments brought forward against this plan were based on the presence of Hannibal in Italy, who, though terribly exhausted and left almost without resources, still shielded his country by the mere terror of his name. If personal satisfaction and his own glory, so distinctly acknowledged by his enemies, could have been a compensation to him for the wreck of his hopes, he must surely have been consoled and even gratified in watching this involuntary tribute to his greatness. But it was his ambition to establish the greatness of his country, and he knew no personal glory apart from the prosperity and independence of Carthage.

The majority in the senate were not favourable to Scipio's plans. He had foreseen this, and he was prepared to carry out his project without the consent, and, if necessary, against the will, of the senate. It was rumoured that he intended to avail himself of the favourable disposition of the masses, and to obtain, without the authority of the senate, a decision of the popular assembly by which he would be commissioned to carry the war into Africa and to raise the necessary forces. Such a procedure would not have been unconstitutional, but it would have been contrary to the usual practice, which had almost the power of law, and by which the chief direction of the war, and especially the distribution of the provinces, was left entirely to the discretion of the senate. This body was therefore thrown into great consternation when Scipio showed himself resolved, as a last resource, to set their

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mise
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authority at naught, and to appeal to the decision of the people. Violent debates took place, and at last the plebeian tribunes effected a compromise by which Scipio abandoned the idea of provoking a decision of the people, and promised to be guided by a decree of the senate, on the understanding, however, that the senate would not oppose his plan in principle. Hereupon the senate resolved to give permission to Scipio for crossing over from Sicily into Africa;¹ but they voted means so inadequate for carrying out this plan that Scipio was obliged first to create for himself an army and a fleet before he could hope to carry out his design with any chance of success. By this decision, the obstructive party in the senate had, at any rate, postponed his expedition, and they might hope that in the meanwhile events would happen to make a landing in Africa unnecessary.

Voluntary
contribu-
tions for
the fleet
and army
of Scipio.

Scipio's colleague in the consulship was Publius Licinius Crassus, who, being at the same time pontifex maximus, was not permitted to leave Italy. He was therefore commissioned, in conjunction with a prætor, and at the head of four legions, to operate in Bruttium, where he had to watch and keep Hannibal in check, but where, during the whole course of the year, nothing of importance took place. Scipio had assigned to him only thirty ships of war and the two legions composed of the fugitive troops of Cannæ and Herdonea.² No conscription was ordered for new troops to serve under Scipio; but he was allowed to enlist volunteers, and to call upon the towns of Etruria to contribute materials for the fitting out of a fleet.³ Thus a force of about 7,000 men was collected, especially in Umbria, the country of the Sabines,⁴ Marsians, and Pelig-

¹ Livy, xxviii. 45: 'permissum, ut in Africam, si id e re publica esse censeret, traiceret.

² See above, p. 365.

³ No measure was so much calculated to raise the Roman nobles to a position above that of private citizens, and to prepare the advent of monarchy, as the permission given them to collect armies of volunteers, and to use their private means and their credit for equipping ships of war. Men like Wallenstein cannot permanently remain subjects.

⁴ Livy (xxviii. 45) enumerates particularly the towns of Nursia, Rente, and

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nians. The town of Camerinum, in Umbria,¹ alone sent a cohort of 600 men. Other towns contributed arms, provisions, and various articles for the fleet; Cære gave corn, Populonia iron, Tarquinii sail-cloth, Volaterræ timber² and corn. Arretium, with a liberality and zeal prompted perhaps by the desire of proving its doubted fidelity, supplied thousands of helmets, shields, lances, various utensils, and provisions; Perusia, Clusium, and Rusellæ gave corn and timber. It is an agreeable surprise for us to find these towns, some of which appeared to have fallen into decay or oblivion, taking an active part in the war; and the inference is justified that Etruria had, in comparative obscurity, enjoyed some of the blessings of peace.

By their contributions Scipio was enabled to order the building of thirty new ships,³ and he went to Sicily, there to complete his preparations. Besides the two legions from Cannæ and Herdonea, he found in Sicily a great number of the old soldiers of Marcellus,⁴ who after their discharge had apparently remained in Sicily of their own accord,

State of the
Roman
troops.

Amiternum, and besides them he names 'Sabinus omnis ager.' This expression is very strange, as the three towns just named were precisely the principal places of this very 'Ager Sabinus.' From the most ancient times there prevailed great vagueness with regard to the geographical limitation of the Sabine country. (See vol. i. p. 103). The Sabines, who, on the termination of the third Samnite war, were received into the second class of Roman citizens (see vol. i. p. 474). appear not to have been the people of Nursia, Reate, Amiternum, and 'Sabinus omnis ager,' for Livy in our present passage (xxviii. 45) evidently refers only to those volunteers who were *not* Roman citizens. Where in all the world those Sabines had their local habitation is a mystery that I cannot solve. I am inclined to think that Livy's (*Epit.* xi.) statement, according to which the Sabines were reduced by Curius Dentatus in the same year as the Samnites, is one of the frequent duplications of the same fact which the compiling historians are so fond of, and that it was caused by the circumstance that some annalists called the people conquered by Curius Dentatus the Samnites, others the Sabinites, Saunites, or Sabines. This would explain, or rather get rid of, the strange fact, that the Sabines, who were not mentioned in the history of Rome for a century and a half, suddenly reappear on the stage by the side of the Samnites as conquered enemies.

¹ Livy, ix. 30. See Weissenborn's note.

² 'Interamenta.' See Weissenborn's note to Livy xxviii. 45.

³ On this occasion the ships were again built, as in the first Punic war (see above, p. 53, note 4) with almost miraculous rapidity, being finished in forty-five days.—Livy, xxviii. 45.

⁴ Livy, xxix. 1.

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had squandered the booty made in war, and, disdaining to return to a life of honest toil and civil order, were ready to try again the fortune of battle. The long war could not fail to create a kind of professional soldiery, consisting of men who had become unfit for agriculture and other peaceful pursuits and who began to look upon war as their trade. The licentiousness and savagery into which some portions of the Roman armies had by that time fallen had been shown by the mutiny of Scipio's soldiers in Spain; but the doings of these mutineers were soon thrown into the shade by atrocities of a far more hideous and alarming character, which betrayed the existence of the most dangerous elements in the ranks. The incidents in Locri formed only, as it were, an *intermezzo* in the grand drama of the war, and did not essentially influence the course of events and the final issue; but they are too highly characteristic of the public morals of the time to be passed over in silence, especially as it is of far more importance for us to form a picture of the moral and intellectual status of the Roman people than to follow the details of battles, to which, for the most part, little credit is to be given.

Surprise
and cap-
ture of
Locri.

In spite of the attempts to take Locri which the Romans had made since 208, it was still in Hannibal's possession, and was now his principal base of operations in Bruttium. The Roman partisans among the Locrians had fled from the town when it revolted to the Carthaginians, and had betaken themselves chiefly to the neighbouring town of Rhegium. From that place they opened communications with some of their countrymen at home, and the latter promised to admit Roman troops by means of ladders into the citadel. The treason was carried into effect in the usual way. As soon as the citadel was in the power of the Romans, the town joined their cause; the Punic garrison retired into a second citadel in another part of the town, where it was at last compelled to surrender. This successful surprise was planned and executed not by the consul Licinius, who commanded in Bruttium, but by Scipio, who was at that time commanding in Sicily,

because Hannibal and his army, standing between Locri and the four legions in Bruttium, prevented Licinius from penetrating into the neighbourhood, whilst the nearness of Rhegium and Messana favoured the plan of making an attack upon Locri from Sicily.

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Thus it happened that Scipio had the good fortune and the merit of gaining an important advantage beyond the limits of his own province. With this step, however, he also took upon himself the responsibility of the further proceedings at Locri, and these were of such a nature that they offered an occasion to his enemies for questioning his ability as a general in one essential point. He caused the chiefs of the Carthaginian party in Locri to be put to death, and their property to be distributed among their political opponents. If he had stopped here, nobody would have blamed him, for, according to the prevailing principle of justice, he had not been guilty of undue severity. But such a measure of punishment did not satisfy the rapacity of his troops. These troops, treating Locri like a town taken by assault, not only plundered it, but indulged against the wretched inhabitants of both sexes their beastly lusts and their sanguinary ferocity.¹ At last they broke open the temples and ransacked even the sanctuary of Proserpina, which, though lying unprotected before the town, had hitherto been respected by enemies and even by vulgar robbers.² The legate Pleminius, who had been intrusted by Scipio with the command in Locri, not only permitted all these atrocities, but took his share in the plunder and protected the plunderers. Two legionary tribunes, called Sergius and Matienus, who were under his orders, strove to check the violence of the soldiers.³

Atrocities
of the
Roman
soldiers
after the
capture of
Locri.

¹ Livy, xxix. 8: 'In corpora ipsorum (i.e. the Locrians), in liberos, in coniuges infandæ contumeliæ editæ.'

² According to a tradition, Pyrrhus had despoiled it; but the ships in which the treasures were laden, were wrecked on the neighbouring coast; and Pyrrhus, under the impulse of religious scruples, caused all the treasures to be restored.—Valerius Maximus, i. 1, ext. 1. Appian, iii. 12.

³ This is Livy's report (xxix. 9). Diodorus, on the other hand, says (fragm. libr. 27, p. 108, Tauchnitz) that they acted not from a feeling of indignation

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A fight took place between the soldiers of the two tribunes and the rest. Pleminius openly took the part of the licentious plunderers, ordered Sergius and Matienus to be seized, and was on the point of causing them to be executed by his lictors when their soldiers arrived in larger numbers, rescued the tribunes, ill-treated the lictors, seized Pleminius, slit up his lips, and cut off his nose and ears. All bonds of military discipline were cast aside, and the Roman soldiers had become a riotous rabble.

Measures
of the
Roman
senate and
people on
the com-
plaints of
the
Locrians.

Upon the news of these disgraceful and alarming proceedings, Scipio hastened from Messana to Locri, re-established order, and, acquitting Pleminius of all guilt, left him in command at Locri, whilst he ordered the tribunes Sergius and Matienus to be seized as ringleaders of the mutiny and to be sent to Rome for trial. This done he immediately returned to Sicily. He was scarcely gone when Pleminius gave full vent to his revenge, and, instead of sending the two tribunes to Rome, caused them to be scourged and put to death, after exquisite tortures. Then he turned with the same barbarous fury against the most distinguished citizens of Locri, who, as he was informed, had accused him before Scipio. Some of these unfortunate men escaped to Rome. They threw themselves in the dust before the tribunal of the consuls in the Forum, imploring protection for their lives and property, and mercy for their native town. The senate was greatly moved by proceedings so dishonourable to the Roman name. It seemed that Scipio himself could not be free from guilt. He was certainly responsible for the discipline of his soldiers, and he seemed tacitly to approve of the atrocities of Pleminius, which he had not punished. It was not the first time that such disorders had broken out among troops under his command, though the insubordination of his soldiers in Spain was trifling compared with what had happened now. His political

at the wrong committed, but because they found that they did not get their proper share of the spoils. Τοῦτο δ' ἐπραττον οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῖς γενομένοις ἀγανακτοῦντες ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῷ τὸ μέρος μὴ εἰληφέναι τῶν σεσυλημένων χρημάτων ἐγκαλοῦντες τὸ πλημμέλημα. On this supposition we can explain Scipio's severity against the tribunes, which otherwise would be unjustifiable.

enemies, numerous and influential in the senate, charged him with corrupting the spirit of the army, and insisted that he should be recalled from his command. The lamentations of the wretched Locrians called forth general sympathy, and their undeserved sufferings demanded redress and satisfaction. After a long and angry discussion, Scipio's friends at last were so far successful that he was not condemned without a previous investigation. The prætor Marcus Pomponius was dispatched to Locri with a commission of ten senators to send Pleminius and the associates of his guilt for trial to Rome, to restore to the people of Locri the plunder which the soldiers had taken, more especially to set free the women and children, who had been treated as slaves, to replace doubly the treasures taken from the temples, and to appease the anger of Proserpina by sacrifices; moreover to inquire if the lawless actions of the troops in Locri had been committed with the knowledge and consent of Scipio, and if this should be proved, to bring back Scipio from Sicily, and even from Africa, to Rome. For this purpose two tribunes of the people and an ædile were added to the commission, who, by virtue of their sacred office, should, in case of necessity, seize the general, even in the midst of his troops, and convey him away. When the commission had reached Locri, and, after discharging the first part of their duty, had expressed to the Locrians the regret and sympathy of the Roman senate and people, as well as the assurance of their friendship, the Locrians did not further insist on their charges against Scipio, and thus saved the commission a delicate and perhaps difficult task. It is not stated, but we may perhaps be justified in supposing, that this generous resignation on the part of the Locrians was the result of an expressed or implied wish on the part of the commissioners, and could be obtained by a very gentle pressure, even if the Locrians did not see how desirable it was to avoid the hostility of a powerful Roman noble like Scipio, and of his party. The commission therefore came to the conclusion that Scipio had no share in the crimes com-

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mitted at Locri, and Pleminius only was brought to Rome, with about thirty of his accomplices. The trial was conducted with great laxity, and Scipio's friends hoped that the excitement of the public would gradually cool down, and that by delaying the decision as much as possible they would in the end secure impunity for the accused. But this intention was foiled by Pleminius himself, who, in his audacious recklessness, went so far as to cause some ruffians to set fire to Rome in several places during a public festivity, in the hope of escaping in the general confusion.¹ The conspiracy miscarried, and Pleminius was thrown into the dismal Tullianum, the prison vault under the Capitol, from which he never came forth again. He was dead before his trial in the popular assembly came on. Whether he died of hunger, or by the hands of the executioner, and what became of his accomplices, is not known.

Prepara-
tions of
Scipio for
the descent
on Africa.

The senatorial commission proceeded from Locri to Sicily, to be convinced by their own eyes of the condition of Scipio's army. Here they found everything in good order, and they were able to report to Rome that nothing was omitted to secure the success of the African expedition. Scipio had done all in his power to organise and to increase his army, and to furnish it with all the materials of war. For this purpose he disposed of the resources of Sicily without the least limitation,² but, owing to the obstructive economy of the Roman senate, and its evident disapproval of the African expedition, he was prevented from making his preparations as fast as he wished.³ The whole of the year 205 passed away before he was ready. In the course of it Lælius had sailed with thirty ships to

¹ This was the account given, according to Livy (xxix. 22), by an annalist, called Clodius Licinius.

² Livy, xxix. 1: 'frumentum Siculorum civitatibus imperat.'

³ For this reason the great hurry in the building of the new ships of war is hardly intelligible (see above, p. 419). If these ships reached Sicily so early, they were useless for a long time. Perhaps the statement of the forty-five days belongs to the poetical fancies with which the story of Scipio's exploits was decorated.

the African coast, probably for the purpose of concerting measures with Syphax and Masinissa for the impending combined attack on Carthage. But the two Numidian chiefs, as was to be expected,¹ had ranged themselves on two opposite sides. As soon as Masinissa had openly declared himself in favour of Rome, Syphax was not only reconciled with Carthage, but closely allied with it;² and the first use he made of this accession of strength was to make war upon his troublesome rival Masinissa, and to expel him from his country. Accordingly, when Lælius landed at Hippo, he found Masinissa, not as he had hoped, in the position of a powerful ally, but of a helpless exile, wandering about at the head of a few horsemen, and so far from being able to render active help, that he implored the Romans to hasten their expedition into Africa, in order to rescue him from his position. We do not know what impression this alteration in the state of things produced on Lælius and Scipio. By it the hope of Numidian support was considerably reduced; especially when Syphax soon afterwards formally announced his alliance with Carthage, and warned Scipio against an undertaking

¹ See above, p. 402 f.

² These vicissitudes in the relations of Syphax and Masinissa to Carthage furnished the materials for the romances of the beautiful Carthaginian lady, Sophonisbe, the daughter of Hasdrubal Gisco. It is hardly necessary to say that all these stories are part, not of history, but of those poetical fictions with which the exploits of Scipio Africanus have been adorned. As before, in the story of the fair Spanish captive (see p. 356), so we find here also a gradual growth and development of the fiction from a simple narrative to one more complicated and elaborate. According to a version, which seems to be the older one, Sophonisbe was given in marriage to Syphax, in order that he might be gained for the Carthaginian cause. This is in itself not improbable. The Carthaginian lady was an honorary present for the royal harem, whereby the barbarian must have felt flattered. It was then added (Appian, viii. 10) that Sophonisbe had been previously betrothed to Masinissa, that Masinissa loved her passionately, and, to revenge himself on Carthage for her loss, became the ally of Scipio. At a later period of the war, it was said, Masinissa's love for Sophonisbe revived; after the defeat of Syphax he took her to wife, and when Scipio, fearing the influence of her Carthaginian patriotism on the mind of her husband, demanded that she should be given up to him, Masinissa made her drink poison. The whole of the story is a fit subject for a tragedy, and has frequently been dramatised.

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of Mago
from
Minorca.

in which he would have to encounter not only the Carthaginians, but also the whole power of Numidia.¹

These incidents were in themselves calculated to show the difficulties and dangers of an African expedition, and to justify the hesitation of those cautious men of the Fabian school who shrunk from the bold plan of Scipio. At the same time the Carthaginians made another desperate effort to keep the Roman forces at home for the defence of Italy. It does not indeed appear from our sources that they sent direct reinforcements to Hannibal, but they would attain the same object if they repeated the attempt of penetrating with an army into the north of Italy, and thus threatening Rome from two sides. For this purpose Mago, Hannibal's youngest brother, after the evacuation of Spain, spent the winter from 206 to 205 in the island of Minorca, occupied in raising a new army; and in the summer of 205, whilst Scipio was busy in Sicily with the preparations for his African expedition, he sailed with 14,000 men to the coast of Liguria, took Genoa, called upon the Ligurians and Gauls to renew the war with Rome, swelled his army with volunteers from their ranks, and marched into Cisalpine Gaul, in order to advance from thence southwards as from his base of operations. In Rome nothing less was apprehended than a repetition of the danger from which the unexpected victory on the Metaurus had saved the republic. Again were two sons of Hamilcar Barcas in Italy, determined, with united strength, to accomplish the object which they had set before themselves as the chief task of their lives. Carthage, far from pursuing the suicidal policy, as has since been asserted, of leaving Hannibal without support, strained every nerve to carry out his plans, and even at this moment, when Africa was threatened with invasion, despatched to Mago a reinforcement of 6,000 foot and eight hundred horse. From the Roman point of view it was therefore not an unreasonable wish to keep together as

¹ Livy, xxix. 23.

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B.C.Embarka-
tion of
Scipio at
Lilybæum.

much as possible the military strength of exhausted Italy, so that at all risks Rome might be covered before a decisive attack should be directed against Carthage.

The decision and firmness of character which Scipio exhibited in his opposition to all hindrances and difficulties mark him as a man of unusual power. He was capable of bold conceptions, and without heeding secondary considerations, he went on straight to the object he had proposed to himself. By this concentration of his will he accomplished great things, though in other respects he did not rise far above the average level of the military capacity displayed by Roman generals. The African expedition was due to him and to him alone. He had planned it when he was in Spain, and he carried it out in spite of the determined resistance of a powerful opposition in the senate. Half a year had been taken up with preparations. Now, in the spring of 204 B.C., the army and the fleet were collected at Lilybæum. Four hundred transports and forty ships of war crowded the port. The statements of the strength of the army vary from 12,500 to 35,000 men.¹ According to the annalist Coelius, quoted by Livy, the number of men who went on board the transports was so great that it seemed that Sicily and Italy must be drained of their population, and that, from the cheering of so many thousands, the birds dropped from the air on the ground.² It can hardly be doubted that such bombastic phrases were taken from some poetical narrative of the embarkation. The same poetical colouring can be traced in other features of Livy's account. When all the ships were ready to sail, Scipio caused a herald to command silence, and pronounced a solemn prayer to all the gods and goddesses,³ wherein

¹ Livy, xxix. 25.² Compare Valerius Maximus, iv. 8, 5.³ Livy, xxix. 27: "Tum Scipio silentio per præconem facto, "Divi divæque," inquit, "qui maria terrasque colitis, vos precor quæsoque, uti quæ in meo imperio gesta sunt, geruntur, postque gerentur ea mihi populo plebique Romanæ, Sociis nominique Latino, qui populi Romani quique meam sectam imperium auspiciumque terra, mari, amnibusque sequuntur, bene verruncent, eaque vos omnia bene invetis, bonis auctibus auxitis; salvos incolumesque, victis perduellibus victores, spoliis decoratos, præda onustos triumphantesque mecum domos reduces sis-

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he implored them to grant him protection, victory, spoils, and a happy and triumphant return, after inflicting on the Carthaginian people all those evils with which they had threatened the commonwealth of Rome. Then he cast the crude entrails of the sacrificial animal into the sea, and ordered the trumpets to give the signal for departure. The walls of Lilybæum and the whole coast on the right and on the left were lined with spectators, who had assembled from all parts of Sicily, and followed the fleet with their hopes and forebodings until it vanished on the horizon. Many squadrons had left Lilybæum in the course of the war, but never such an armada, which carried with it the vows of all Italy for the speedy termination of the struggle. Yet, compared with the colossal fleets of the first Punic war, the fleet of Scipio was almost insignificant. When the two consuls Marcus Regulus and Lucius Manlius sailed with their combined armies to Africa in 256 B.C., the ships of war alone equalled in number the total of Scipio's fleet, and the army was then twice or three times as large as now. But in the year 256 Italy had not been wasted, as in 204, by a war of fourteen years, and no Roman army had then perished in Africa. Now it was known what dangers the legions might have to encounter, and their fears were consequently intensified for the much smaller force which had undertaken to revenge Regulus and Rome.

Landing
of Scipio
in Africa.

In spite of the long preparations for the African expedition, which were well known in Carthage, in spite of the certainty that it would sail from Lilybæum, and in spite of the apparent ease with which from the port of Carthage a fleet might have sailed to intercept the passage of the

tatis; inimicorum hostiumque ulciscendorum copiam faxitis; quæque populus Carthaginienſis in civitatem noſtram facere molitus eſt, ea ut mihi populoque Romano in civitatem Carthaginienſium exempla edendi facultatem detis." This characteristic prayer, if not literally ſpoken by Scipio, is no doubt ſuch as might have been ſpoken. It exhibits a language as careful and precise as that of a lawyer's contract, quite in the ſpirit of the Roman religion, which regulated the intercourse between the gods and their people on the legal footing of ſtipulations, ſervices, and obligations binding both parties.

numerous transports and to overpower the forty ships of war, Scipio met no resistance on the part of the Carthaginians, and landed undisturbed, on the third day, near the Fair Promontory, close to Utica.¹

CHAP.
VIII.

SEVENTH
PERIOD,
204-201
B.C.

Seventh Period of the Hannibalian War.

THE WAR IN AFRICA TO THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE,
204-201 B.C.

The details of the short war in Africa would, if faithfully recorded, be amongst the most attractive and the most interesting of the whole struggle. We should learn from them more of the conduct of the Carthaginian people than from all the campaigns in Italy, Sicily, Sardinia, and Spain. A veil would be lifted, so that we could look into the interior of that great city, where the nerves of the widely extended state met as in a central point. We should see how nobles and people, senate, officials, and citizens thought, felt, and acted at the near approach of the final decision of the war. We should become acquainted with the spirit which moved the Carthaginian people, and should be able in some measure to judge what the fate of the old world would have been if Carthage, instead of Rome, had been victorious. But in place of a history of the African war, we have only reports and descriptions of the victorious career of Scipio, drawn up by one-sided Roman patriotism. Only the great and

Character
of the war
in Africa.

¹ The poetical narrative of Cælius (Livy, xxix. 27) dwelt on the dangers of the sea, told of storms and shipwrecks, and related that at last the crews abandoned the sinking vessels and gained the land in boats. Livy's account also is clearly incorrect. He says that Scipio intended to land on the coast of the Emporiæ, i.e. in the Lesser Syrtis, and that he lost his course, owing to fogs and contrary winds. We cannot imagine it possible that Scipio intended to begin his campaign at so great a distance from Carthage as the coast of the Emporiæ. But if he did, then he would surely not have given up his plan, and have begun his operations from a place to which mere chance had brought him. It seems certain that it was Scipio's intention to begin with taking Utica, and thus to gain a commodious port for his communication with Sicily, and a basis of operations for his advance upon Carthage. It was for this purpose that he took a complete siege train with him (Livy, xxix. 35, 8), which would have been of no use to him in the Syrtis.

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leading events are ascertainable with any degree of certainty. The details, which might have enabled us to judge of the manner in which the war was conducted, of the plans, exertions, sacrifices, and losses of both belligerents, are either entirely lost, or are disguised by party spirit. At no period of the war do we more keenly feel the want of a Carthaginian historian.¹

Plans of
Scipio.

Scipio's object, in the first instance, was the gaining a strong position on the coast, where, by means of a secure communication with Sicily, he could establish a firm basis for his operations in Africa. For this purpose he selected Utica, the ancient Phœnician colony allied with Carthage, and situated on the western side of the wide Carthaginian gulf. During the war with the mercenaries Utica had fallen into the hands of the enemies of Carthage, but after the suppression of the rebellion she was again most intimately connected with Carthage. In spite of the burdens which the campaigns of Hannibal imposed on the Carthaginians, as also upon their allies and subjects, we hear of no revolt or discontent on their part, such as broke out in Italy among the Capuans and among many others. Up to the time of the landing of Scipio, it is true, the Romans had only appeared on the African coast now and then, to ravage and plunder rather than to make war. No Roman Hannibal had established himself in the interior of the country, or challenged the allies to revolt from Carthage. For this reason Scipio might entertain the hope that, after the great exhaustion and the innumerable troubles of the war, the subjects of Carthage would be ready to revolt now, as they had been during the invasions of Agathokles and Regulus. Perhaps he thought thus to obtain easy possession of Utica.

Siege of
Utica.

But it appears that the state of things in Africa was this time different. The reason is unknown to us; but the fact is certain that Scipio found among the Carthaginian subjects no readiness for revolt or treachery.

¹ Arnold (*Hist. of Rome*, iii. 449) says justly, 'Wherever the family of Scipio is concerned, the impartiality of Polybius becomes doubtful.'

Utica had to be besieged in due form, and it offered such determined resistance that the siege—which lasted, with occasional pauses, almost to the conclusion of peace, that is, nearly two years—remained without result. If Scipio had been so fortunate as to take Utica, many particulars of this remarkable siege would no doubt have been preserved. But the Roman chroniclers passed briefly over an undertaking which contributed in no way to swell their national renown, and the Carthaginian writings, which would have exhibited in a proper light the bravery of the Uticans, are unfortunately lost. We know therefore but little of an event which was of the very greatest importance to the war in Africa, and what has been preserved cannot be considered authentic in detail, because it comes from Roman sources.

After Scipio had landed his army, he took up a strong position on a hill near the sea, and repulsed the attack of a troop of cavalry, which had been sent out from Carthage to reconnoitre, on the news of a hostile landing.¹ He then sent his transport ships, laden with the spoils of the surrounding open country, back to Sicily, and advanced to Utica, where, at the distance of about a mile from the town, he established his camp.² After a short time the transport ships returned from Sicily, bringing the remainder of the siege train, which Scipio, from want of room, had not been able to take with him before. The siege was now begun,³ and it appears to have lasted the whole summer without

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PERIOD,
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B.C.Vigorous
resistance
of the
Uticans.

¹ Some writers made of this single engagement two battles, in each of which a Carthaginian general of the name of Hanno was taken. On this occasion Livy (xxix. 35, 2) remarks: '*Duos eodem nomine Carthaginiensium duces duobus equestribus præliis interfectos non omnes auctores sunt, veriti, credo, ne falleret bis relata eadem res.*' Cœlius and Valerius knew how to get over this difficulty. They related that one of these Hannos was not killed, but made prisoner, and afterwards exchanged for Masinissa's mother. This old lady had to play her part in the fables of the African war. She was a prophetess, and helped to discover a conspiracy against Scipio.—Zonaras, ix. 12.

² Livy, xxix. 34, 3.

³ Livy, xxix. 35, 6: '*Ad oppugnandam Uticam omnes belli vires convertit, eam deinde si cepisset sedem ad cetera exsequenda habiturus.*' Compare Appian, viii. 16.

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any considerable interruption.¹ Scipio took up his position on a hill close to the walls of the town, and attacked them with all the appliances of the ancient art of siege. The trenches were filled up by mounds of earth; battering-rams were pushed forward under protecting roofs to open breaches, and at the same time ships were coupled together and towers for attacking the sea walls were erected on them. But the defence was still more vigorous than the attack. The Uticans undermined the mounds, so that the wooden structures on them were thrown down; by letting down beams from the walls they weakened the blows of the battering-rams, and made sallies to set the works of the besiegers on fire. The whole of the citizens were inspired by the spirit which, half a century before, had rendered Lilybæum impregnable. When towards the end of the summer, as it appears, the Carthaginian army under Hasdrubal² advanced, united with a Numidian army under Syphax, Scipio found himself obliged to raise the siege. He confined himself now, as Marcellus had done before Syracuse, to occupying a fortified camp in the neighbourhood, from whence he could observe Utica, and at any time begin a fresh attack. This camp, known even in Cæsar's time as the 'Cornelian

¹ Livy's statement, that it lasted forty days, is probably to be understood of the period of actual assault, and does not include the time required for the preliminary works.

² This was Hasdrubal (Gisgo's son), who distinguished himself in the Spanish campaign, and was, after Hannibal and his brothers, the most eminent of all the Carthaginian generals. It is highly characteristic of the sources from which the account of the war in Africa is taken, that Appian (viii. 9) seriously reports that the Carthaginians, upon the news of Scipio's armaments in Sicily, dispatched this Hasdrubal to hunt elephants (ἐπὶ θῆραν ἐλεφάντων ἐξέπεμπον). Mommsen accepts this statement as simple truth (*Röm. Gesch.* i. 662; English translation, ii. 182) as if the Carthaginians had had no better employment for their principal general than to go out on a hunting expedition. To judge of the probability of the fact, we should bear in mind that elephants are found wild only in that part of Africa which is south of the great desert of Sahara. The Carthaginians obtained their supply probably from the Senegal, by ship. In spite of the statements of Ælian (*Nat. Animal.* x. 1) and of Pliny (*Hist. Nat.* viii. 11), we cannot believe that elephants were ever found in a wild state in Mauritania. The climate and vegetation of the country make it impossible.

camp,' was on the peninsula which runs eastward from Utica towards the sea. Scipio here drew his ships ashore to protect them, and so he passed the winter uncomfortably enough, enjoying only this advantage, that, being in communication with Sicily and Italy, he was preserved from want by the continual conveyance of supplies, arms, and clothing, and was enabled to collect together means for the next campaign. Hasdrubal and Syphax encamped in the neighbourhood, and it appears that during the winter (204 to 203) nothing of importance was undertaken on either side.

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B.C.

On Scipio's landing in Africa, Masinissa immediately joined him, at the head of only two hundred horsemen.¹ He was, as has been already mentioned, expelled from his kingdom by Syphax and the Carthaginians. His adventures, which Livy relates in detail,² correspond exactly to the circumstances under which the Berber races lived for centuries, and live still. Some chief holds hereditary authority over a tribe. A dispute with a neighbour drives him, after a short struggle, to take flight into the desert. He returns with a few horsemen, collects a troop of followers around him, and lives for a time on plunder. His band grows, and with it grows his courage. The men of his tribe, and the old subjects of his family, flock around him. The struggle with his rival begins anew. Cunning, dissimulation, treachery, courage, fortune decide who shall keep the mastery, and who shall suffer imprisonment, flight, or death. Such a struggle is never decided until one of the two combatants is killed; for no dominion is established on a firm basis, and the personal superiority of the one who is to-day vanquished may, without any material cause, become to-morrow dangerous to the conqueror. Thus Masinissa, although a dethroned prince, was nevertheless a welcome ally to the Romans. In addition to this, he was not a mere barbarian. To the cunning and

Alliance of
Masinissa
with
Scipio.

¹ Livy, xxix. 29. According to some statements he had 2,000 men with him. This divergence is a sample of the unsatisfactory character of the sources for the narrative.

² Livy, x. ix. 29, 33.

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cruelty, to the perseverance and the wild audacity of the barbarian, he added a knowledge and experience of the arts of war which gave him an immeasurable superiority over others of his class. He had been brought up in Carthage, had served for several years under the best generals in Spain; he knew the military organisation and politics of the Carthaginians, their strength and their weakness, and he had long foreboded their inevitable downfall. For this reason, and not, as has been said, out of chagrin at the loss of a Carthaginian lady-love, he espoused the cause of the Romans. He knew that only from them he could obtain the secure possession of his paternal heritage, and an extension of his power over the Numidians; and he never doubted the realisation of his plan, even when, as related, he lay defeated and wounded in a cavern of the desert, and when his life was saved only by the devoted attentions of a few faithful followers.

Destruction of the
African
camps.

The value of the advice and assistance of Masinissa was soon made evident to the Romans. He alone could have originated the scheme of setting fire in the night to the enemy's camp. Masinissa knew the style of building adopted in the Numidian and Carthaginian camps, which consisted of wooden huts covered with rushes and branches, and he, as a Numidian, knew best how to surprise and attack the Numidians. Hasdrubal and Syphax were encamped, during the winter, at a short distance from each other and from Utica, and awaited, as it appears, the opening of the campaign by Scipio, whose fortified camp they dared not attack. The strength of the Carthaginian army is reported to have been 33,000 men, that of the Numidians 60,000, among whom were 10,000 horsemen. Scipio pretended that he wished to enter into negotiations for peace, and sent during the truce his most skilful officers as messengers to the camp of Syphax, who had undertaken to act as mediator between the Romans and Carthaginians.¹

¹ According to Valerius Antias, quoted by Livy (xxx. 3), Syphax came himself into the camp of Scipio. The stories of such personal interviews were in great favour with a certain class of writers. They afforded excellent

But the negotiations were a mere pretence. Scipio wished to get accurate information as to the position and arrangements of the enemy's camp. He now gave notice of a renewal of hostilities, and acted as if he were going to renew the attack upon Utica. Seeing the enemy in perfect security, he made a night attack, first on the Numidian and then on the Carthaginian camp. He succeeded in setting fire to both, in penetrating to the interior, and causing a terrible slaughter, killing, according to Livy's report, 40,000 men, and capturing 5,000. Polybius¹ represents the success of the Romans as still greater, saying that of the 93,000 Carthaginians and Numidians only 2,500 escaped, and calling this the grandest and boldest exploit that Scipio ever carried out.²

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VIII.SEVENTH
PERIOD,
204-201
B.C.Defeat of
Hasdrubal
and
Syphax.

If the losses of the Carthaginians had been anything like the numbers reported by the Scipionic accounts, we should expect that Utica must have surrendered immediately. But Utica remained firm, and in the course of thirty days, a new Numido-Carthaginian army of 30,000 men, under Hasdrubal and Syphax, stood in the field.³ Among these there were 4,000 Spanish mercenaries, who had only just arrived in Africa. Scipio was obliged once more to interrupt the siege of Utica and to march against this army. He gained a complete victory on the so-called 'Large Plains,'⁴ after which Syphax, with his Numidians,

opportunities for composing speeches and displaying rhetorical skill. They culminate in the interview of Scipio and Hannibal before the final battle of Zama. Compare above, p. 403.

¹ Polybius, xiv. 5.

² This opinion is rather strange, as it seems to place the surprise near Utica above the great victory of Scipio over Hannibal at Zama. The night attack was, after all, not an honest open fight, but a stratagem worthy of a barbarian like Masinissa; and the losses of the Carthaginians are palpably exaggerated. Unless we suppose that they were not only struck deaf and blind, but at the same time paralysed and unable to run away, we cannot understand how 40,000 (not to speak of the 90,000 of Polybius) could be killed like sheep in a pen. There were, however, several divergent reports of the whole affair. According to Appian (viii. 19-23) Scipio attacked only the camp of Hasdrubal; while Syphax, who was encamped at a short distance, hearing of Hasdrubal's disaster, retreated on the following day without loss. Compare also Zonaras, ix. 12.

³ Livy, xxx. 7.

⁴ Polybius, xiv. 8, 2; *Μεγάλα πεδία*. Livy, xxx. 8: 'Magni campi.' The locality is unknown.

BOOK
IV.Capture of
Syphax by
Masinissa.

separated himself from the Carthaginians, and returned to his own dominions.

The time had now come when Masinissa could prove his value as an ally. Strengthened by a Roman detachment under Lælius, he followed Syphax to Numidia. The eastern part of this country, the land of the Massylians, which was contiguous to the Carthaginian frontier, was Masinissa's paternal kingdom. Here he was welcomed with enthusiasm by his former subjects and companions-in-arms. From an exile he became, all at once, again a powerful sovereign. His power grew daily. He had the good fortune not only to conquer Syphax,¹ but (what was of much more importance) to take him prisoner, and thus with one blow to put an end to the war in Numidia.² The importance of this event can hardly be rated too high. Up to this time Scipio's success, in spite of the two victories, had been far from decisive. Now, however, the power of Numidia was no longer arrayed against him, but ranged on his side, and Carthage was obliged to carry on the war against two allies, each of which alone was a match for her.

Defeat of
Scipio's
fleet by the
Cartha-
ginians.

Notwithstanding this unfortunate turn of affairs, the war continued with unabated vigour, and only a few voices in Carthage were heard wishing for peace. Hannibal, the invincible, was still in Italy with his army, and his brave brother Mago was in Gaul, ready to co-

¹ According to Appian, Masinissa and Syphax met in single combat. Compare what has been said p. 434, note.

² Cirta, the capital of Numidia (the modern town of Constantine) surrendered when Syphax was exhibited before the walls in chains. In Cirta, the royal treasures fell into the hands of the conqueror, as well as Sophonisbe, the Carthaginian consort of Syphax. The tragical story of this second Helen went on to relate that Masinissa, upon seeing her, felt his old love revive, and took her to wife forthwith; that Scipio feared that her influence on Masinissa would estrange him from the cause of Rome, just as she had converted Syphax from an enemy to be a friend of Carthage; that Scipio accordingly demanded her surrender, and that, to prevent it, Masinissa offered her the poisoned cup, which she drank with dignity and courage. It is much to be regretted that the ancient historians dwelt with particular predilection and at full length on such vagaries of fancy, whilst they relate the most important events superficially and negligently. Compare above, p. 425, note 2.

operate with him. During the long time since his landing Scipio had not even been able to conquer Utica. How could he think of attacking the mighty Carthage? It is true, a detachment of the Roman army had advanced into the neighbourhood of Carthage and had taken possession of Tunes, which the Carthaginians had voluntarily evacuated; but this march upon the capital of the empire made no more impression on it than Hannibal's appearance before Rome had made upon the Romans. While Scipio lay in Tunes, a fleet of a hundred ships¹ left the harbour of Carthage, to attack the Roman fleet before Utica, and Scipio was obliged to return thither with all haste. As he had applied his ships of war to carry the machines employed in the siege, and had thus made them useless for a naval battle,² he could not go to meet the Carthaginian fleet, but had to keep on the defensive. He lashed his ships of burden together in a line four deep, and manned them, like a sort of camp rampart, with his land troops. Of the result of the battle that ensued we have but a garbled report, made for the purpose of representing the losses of the Romans as slight as possible. Livy says that about six Roman ships of burden were detached and carried away; according to Appian one ship of war and six ships of burden were lost.³ The losses of the Romans must, however, have been much more considerable, as Scipio found it advisable to relinquish entirely the siege of Utica.⁴ Having made an attempt to take Hippo, and meeting with no

¹ Appian, viii. 24. This fleet carried also a detachment of land troops.

² Livy, xxx. 10: 'Qui enim restitissent agili et nautico instrumento aptæ et armatæ classi naves, tormenta machinasque portantes, et aut in onerariarum usum versæ aut ita appulsæ ad muros ut pro aggere ac pontibus præbere ascensus possent?'

³ It is clear that Appian's statement (viii. 30) has reference to the fight in question. There existed, however, another report still less unfavourable to the Romans, of which Appian has also availed himself (viii. 25). According to this report, the Carthaginians suffered great losses and retired, towards evening, in total exhaustion, whereupon the Romans issued from the port, and towed away as prize an abandoned Carthaginian vessel. Zonaras (ix 12) makes the battle last two days, which enables him to utilise both reports; on the first day, he says the Romans beat off the attack of the Carthaginians, but on the second they were considerably worsted (πολὸν ἡλλαττώθησαν).

⁴ It is only Appian that relates this (viii. 40). The omission, by Livy, of

BOOK
IV.Negotia-
tions for
peace.

better success, he set fire to all his siege-works and engines, and occupied himself for the remainder of the year in marching through the Carthaginian territory, and enriching his soldiers with the spoils.

In spite of the late success against the Roman fleet, the conviction, since the defeat and capture of Syphax, became more and more general in Carthage, that the resistance against Roman invasion could no longer be continued with the existing forces.¹ The democratic war party was obliged to retire from the government, and to leave to the opposition the task of negotiating with Rome for peace. The successes of Scipio had not up to this time been such as to enable him to oppose the conclusion of a peace on fair terms. He possessed the natural and just ambition not to leave to his successor the glory of bringing the long war to a close, and he therefore agreed with the Carthaginian ambassadors on preliminaries of peace, which were to be presented for approval to the senate and people of Rome as well as of Carthage. It was agreed that the Carthaginians should give up all prisoners of war and deserters, should recall their armies from Italy and Gaul, resign Spain and all the islands between Africa and Italy, deliver all their ships of war but twenty, and pay 5,000 talents as a contribution of war, and moreover a sum equal to double the annual pay of the Roman army in Africa.²

It is plain that, in this preliminary treaty, the conditions

this most significant circumstance suffices to give a wrong colouring to the whole narrative.

¹ Livy, xxx. 16: 'Carthaginienses non brevi solum, sed prope vano gaudio ab satis prospera in præsens oppugnatione classis perfusi, post famam capti Syphacis, in quo plus prope quam in Hasdrubale atque exercitu suo spei reposuerant, perculti . . . oratores ad pacem petendam mittunt.'

² There is some difference in the statements of the terms proposed, with regard to the sum of money. Appian gives it as 1,600 talents. Livy says (xxx. 16): 'Pecuniæ summam quantam imperaverit, parum convenit: alibi quinque millia talentum, alibi quinque millia pondo argenti, alibi duplex stipendium militibus imperatum invenio.' Whereas 5,000 talents would be more than a million pounds, 5,000 pounds of silver would be about 15,000*l*. What the double pay for the troops amounted to is doubtful, especially as the length of time for which the pay was to be given by the Carthaginians is not stated. From the analogy of other instances, we may guess that a year's pay

of a peace and those of an armistice have been mixed up together. The demand of pay for the Roman troops for the duration of a truce had long been customary. This money was paid immediately by the Carthaginians.¹ In the same manner the evacuation of Italy by the Carthaginian army was certainly a condition preliminary to the negotiations for peace, *i.e.* a condition of the armistice. It could not possibly be the intention of the Romans that, while the armies were at rest in Africa, the war should still be carried on in Italy. We know very well that the greatest desire of the Roman people was the withdrawal of Hannibal from Italy.² We also know that the senate, on principle, negotiated with no enemy for peace so long as hostile troops were in Italy.³ It is therefore certain that the recall of Hannibal and Mago, which in a treaty of peace was a matter of course, belonged not to the conditions of peace but to those of an armistice, and this supposition is absolutely necessary if we wish to understand the conduct of the Carthaginians on the renewal of hostilities, which took place soon after.

When the Carthaginian ambassadors reached Rome, Lælius had just been there with the captive Syphax and an embassy from Masinissa, and both senate and people had convinced themselves, by personal observation, that Carthage, deprived of her most powerful ally, would not be in a position to carry on the war much longer. This accounts for the contemptuous treatment which the Carthaginians met with in the senate. Although the Roman prisoners had been already released, in the expectation that the conditions

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B.C.Conditions
of the
armistice.Reception
of the Car-
thaginian
ambassa-
dors at
Rome.

was demanded. Such a payment was the usual condition of an armistice.—See Livy, viii. 2; viii. 36; ix. 41.

¹ Appian, viii. 31.

² When Hannibal did leave Italy, a thank-offering of 120 large animals was made, and a festival of five days celebrated (Livy, xxx. 21), and the senate and people voted to the old Fabius a crown of grass.—Pliny, *Hist. Nat.* xxii. 5, 10.

³ According to Zonaras (ix. 13) the senate refused to admit the Carthaginian ambassadors until this condition should be complied with.—Compare Dion Cassius, *frgm.* ix. 153.

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of peace would be accepted,¹ the ambassadors were not admitted before the senate till after the departure of Hannibal and Mago from Italy.² Then new difficulties were raised. According to the report of Livy the peace was not ratified, and the Carthaginian ambassadors returned home almost without an answer.³ Polybius says that the senate and people in Rome approved the conditions of peace.⁴ If this last report be true, some alterations in the treaty must have been proposed in Rome, on the acceptance of which by Carthage the peace depended. On this supposition only can we understand how in Rome and in the Scipionic camp the peace could be considered to be concluded, while in point of fact the war continued up to the time when Carthage would have consented to the proposed alterations.

Recall and
death of
Mago.

In Carthage there had been for some time past a growing opinion that Hannibal ought to be recalled from Italy,⁵ but before entering into negotiations for peace with Scipio the senate had adhered strictly to its old plan of keeping the enemy occupied in his own country. When the Roman expedition to Africa was in contemplation, Mago had received a considerable reinforcement,⁶ had marched from Genoa over the Apennines, and had again roused the Gauls to renew the war against Rome. He met in the country of the Insubrians a Roman army of four legions, under the prætor P. Quintilius Varus and the proconsul M. Cornelius Cethegus; and in the battle which ensued the Romans could hardly have been victorious, as they own to heavy losses and do not boast of having taken any prisoners. Mago, however, was severely wounded, and this mishap was sufficient to cripple his movements. Under these circumstances the order reached him from Carthage to leave Italy. He returned to Genoa and embarked his

¹ According to Livy (xxx. 16) the Carthaginians restored only 200 prisoners; according to Dion Cassius (frgm. 153) they sent them *all* back.

² This is particularly evident from the narrative of Dion Cassius (frgm. 153)

³ Livy, xxx. 23: 'Legati pace infecta ac prope sine responso dimissi.'

⁴ Polybius, xv. 1, 4, 8.

⁵ Livy, xxx. 9.

⁶ See above, p. 426.

army, but died, in consequence of his wounds, before he reached Africa.¹ His army, however, arrived, without hindrance or loss, clearly under the protection of the armistice.

The time had now come when Hannibal was at last obliged to renounce his long-cherished hopes of overthrowing the Roman power on Italian soil. The last three years brought him one bitter disappointment after another. After the defeat and death of Hasdrubal and the loss of Spain, one faint hope still remained—a vigorous participation in the war on the part of Macedonia. But this hope also disappeared. King Philip did nothing to carry the war into Italy, and confined himself to keeping the chief power in Greece and conquering a part of Illyria. The Romans had since 207 devoted but little attention to affairs on the east of the Adriatic Sea, and when, in the year 205, they could not prevent the hard-pressed Ætolians from concluding a peace with Philip,² they did the same, and in order to satisfy the Macedonian king, they resigned to him a part of their possessions in Illyria.³ After this, a new prospect opened for Hannibal. The march of Mago to the north of Gaul was the last attempt which Carthage made to carry out Hannibal's original plan. It was undertaken with great energy, and seemed to promise success, when the negotiations for peace put an end to it. As for Hannibal's strategy in the last years of the war, it

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Relations
of Hanni-
bal with
the king
of Mace-
donia.

¹ Whoever is tolerably familiar with the character of Roman descriptions of battles cannot fail to see that Mago was victorious in his last engagement with the Roman legions. Livy (xxx. 18) finishes with the remark 'that the battle would have lasted longer if, by the wound of the Carthaginian leader, victory had not been acknowledged to be on the Roman side.' No lost battle ends like this. If the severely wounded Mago had been defeated, it is quite evident that the four legions must have pursued and overtaken him on the long march from the Milanese to Genoa. But the Carthaginians were not even harassed on their march. This can be explained only by the circumstance that their march was undertaken in consequence of an order from home, and not of a defeat. According to Livy's narrative, it happened by the merest chance that the order to return reached Mago, when he had already determined to return, and was actually engaged in embarking his troops. Such a coincidence is possible, but hardly probable.

² See above, p. 414.

³ Livy, xxix. 12.

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was confined to defending that corner of Italy which he still occupied, and the area of which was growing less from year to year. How Locri was lost has already been related. Hannibal's last stronghold was Croton. From that place he still defied the Roman legions, and succeeded, when hard pressed, in inflicting serious losses.¹ At no period does the generalship of Hannibal appear in a more brilliant light.² How he succeeded, with the scanty remnants of his victorious army, with the pressed Italian recruits, emancipated slaves and fugitives, without any other resources than those which the small exhausted land of the Bruttians afforded, in keeping together an armed force, animated with warlike spirit, severely trained to discipline and obedience, supplied with arms and other necessities of war—an army which was capable not only of steady resistance, but which repeatedly inflicted on the enemy bloody repulses—this the Roman annalists have not related. If they had been honest enough to represent in true colours the greatness of their most formidable enemy in his adversity, they would have been obliged also to paint the incompetence of their own consuls and prætors, and to confess with shame that they had not one single man able to cope with the great Punian.

The bronze
tablets of
Hannibal.

Hannibal, as if he had had a foreboding of his enemies' love of detraction, made use of the leisure which their fear granted him to record his exploits in Italy. Like all great men, he was not indifferent to the judgment of posterity, and he foresaw that this judgment must be unfavourable to him if it rested on Roman reports alone.

¹ Livy, xxix. 36, 4. 'The Roman writers have recorded victories over Hannibal too mendacious for themselves to believe' (Arnold, *Hist. of Rome*, iii. 443). A sample of such lies is found in Livy xxx. 19, where the author is honest enough to remark: 'Obscura eius pugnae fama est. Valerius Antias quinque millia hostium caesa ait, quæ tanta res est, ut aut impudenter ficta sit, aut negligenter prætermitta.' In the spirit of the oldest annals, the same event is related several times; for instance, the taking of Consentia three times (Livy, xxv. 1; xxix. 38; xxx. 19); that of Clamptia twice (Livy, xxix. 38; xxx. 19).

Livy does not say a word too much in the beautiful passage (xxviii. 12) in which he expresses this opinion.

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He therefore caused to be engraved on bronze tablets in the temple of Juno on the Lacinian promontory, near Croton, an account of the principal events of the war, in the Greek and Punic languages. These bronze tablets Polybius saw and made use of, and we may be sure that the most trustworthy accounts of the second Punic war were taken from this source. Unfortunately the history of Polybius is completely preserved only for the period ending with the battle at Cannæ. Of the latter books of Polybius we have mere fragments, the only complete and connected account of the Hannibalian war being that of Livy, who unhesitatingly made use of the most mendacious Roman annalists, such, for instance, as the impudent Valerius of Antium. Thus the memoirs of Hannibal are for the most part lost to us, owing to the same cruel fate which persecuted him to his death and even after his death; and Rome not only prevailed over her most formidable enemy in the field, but her historians were enabled to obtain for themselves alone the ear of posterity, and thus to perpetuate to their liking the national triumph.

Thus alone can it be explained that historians, even up to the present day, have recorded, as Hannibal's last act in Italy, a crime, which, if it deserved credit, would place him among the most execrable monsters of all times. It is affirmed that he ordered those Italian soldiers¹ who declined to follow him into Africa to be murdered in the sanctuary of the Lacinian Juno, and that he thus violated with equal scorn all human feelings and the sanctity of the temple.² We have had already an opportunity of refuting charges such as these,³ and we do not hesitate to call this accusation a gross calumny. The act cannot be reconciled with Hannibal's character. He was not capable of

Slanderous
charges
against
Hannibal.

¹ According to Diodorus (xxvii. p. 111, Tauchnitz) their number was 2,000. Livy (xxx. 20) says they were 'many.'

² Appian (vii. 58) adds that Hannibal caused those Italian towns which were still in his possession to be plundered, for the purpose of satisfying his army, and that this gave occasion to murders, violation of women, the capture of men, and all the horrors to which towns taken by storm are exposed.

³ See above, p. 252.

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gratuitous cruelty, and it would have been nothing but gratuitous cruelty¹ to massacre the poor Italians, who could have been of no use to him in Africa, and could do him no harm if left in Italy. We cannot believe that Hannibal, who before his march over the Pyrenees dismissed many thousand Spaniards to their homes because they showed unwillingness to accompany him, would now have acted so differently in Italy. If Italian soldiers met their death in the sanctuary of Juno, it was much more likely that they were men who, like the noble Capuans before the taking of the town, preferred to die a voluntary death rather than allow themselves to be tortured by the Romans in punishment of their rebellion.²

Recall of
Hannibal
from Italy.

Hamilcar Barcas, obeying the call of his country, had, forty years before, left the theatre of his heroic deeds, unconquered. If, with heavy heart, he discharged a mournful duty, he had at least hopes of a better future for his people. He devoted his life to bring this better future about. Now his son, greater and mightier than he, had sought, in a fifteen years' struggle, to solve the father's problem, and the end of his efforts and of his glorious victories was that he also had to bow his head before an inexorable fate. The anguish of his soul can be imagined only by those unhappy men who have seen before them the downfall of their fatherland, and who loved it and lived for it like Hannibal. He obeyed the order which recalled him, and was ready now, as ever, again to try the fortune of battle; but when he surveyed the progress of the war, and contemplated the continually increasing preponderance of

¹ According to Appian (vii. 59) indeed he butchered these men, lest they should ever become useful to the Romans.

² The speech which Livy (xxx. 20) makes Hannibal deliver on his departure from Italy, is too absurd to deserve serious criticism. Nevertheless it has found a place in almost all histories of the war, and it may therefore be worth while to refer to it at least in a foot-note. In it Hannibal laments that the Carthaginian government, from jealousy and envy, left him without support, and had not shrunk from risking even the safety of Carthage itself, so that they might overthrow him. The whole course of the war is an uninterrupted refutation of these views, which have been sufficiently discussed above, p. 151, note 1.

power on the side of Rome, he could scarcely entertain any other hope than that of mitigating to some extent the fate which was inevitable.

With the best men of his army Hannibal sailed from Croton in the autumn of the year 203. He held his course, not direct to Carthage, but, probably in consequence of a formal stipulation in the armistice, to Leptis, almost on the extreme southern boundary of the Carthaginian territory, where he was as far as possible removed from the Roman and Numidian armies and from the capital. To the same place, as it seems, came the army of Mago from Genoa, and Hannibal spent the winter there in completing his army and providing it with horses, elephants, arms, and all necessities, so that, in case of a failure of the peace negotiation, he could renew the war in the following year.

The peace was not concluded. We have already seen that the Roman senate delayed the Carthaginian embassy until the hostile armies had left Italy, and then ratified the treaty of peace only after introducing certain alterations. This intelligence reached Carthage before the embassy itself had returned.¹ All hopes of peace at once vanished, and instead of complete reconciliation the greatest animosity was felt. The democratic party had been in favour of war from the beginning, had conducted it vigorously in spite of the opposition of an aristocratic minority, and had reluctantly submitted to the necessity of accepting conditions of peace. Now this party again had the upper hand, after the more moderate men and the friends of peace had been foiled in their attempt to make peace with Rome on equitable terms. It has often happened that in a supreme crisis, when foreign enemies have threatened the existence of a state, an internal revolution has suddenly broken out, and that a nation, believing itself betrayed, has fallen a victim to ungovern-

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Landing of
Hannibal
at Leptis.

Failure of
the peace
negotia-
tions.

¹ This follows from a comparison of events in their internal connexion of cause and effect.

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able fury and blind passion.¹ It was thus in Carthage. The advocates of peace were now persecuted as traitors and foes of their country, and the government fell again entirely into the hands of the fanatical enemies of Rome. Hasdrubal, the son of Gisgo, according to all appearance a moderate man and by no means on principle an opponent of the family of Barcas, had till now conducted the war. After Hannibal he was the most distinguished general that Carthage possessed, and it was necessary that the negotiations for peace with Scipio should be conducted by him. The people, disappointed in their hope of peace, now turned their rage against this man.² He was recalled from the command and condemned to death, on the charge of having mismanaged the war and of having had treacherous dealings with the enemy. The high-minded patriot suffered the iniquitous sentence to be passed, and continued, although condemned and outlawed, to serve his country. He collected an army of volunteers, and carried on the war on his own account. But after all he fell a victim to the unreasonable hatred of the populace. He ventured to show himself in the town, was recognised, pursued, and fled to the mausoleum of his own family, where he eluded his pursuers by taking poison. His body was dragged out into the street by the populace, and his head carried about in triumph on the top of a pole.

Shipwreck
of a

After such an outbreak of fury against supposed in-

¹ An illustration in point is the murder of the brothers De Witt in Holland in 1672; and whilst these lines are written (September 8, 1870) we can witness the action of the same force in Paris: the defeat of Napoleon is followed by an internal revolution.

² This combination, it must be confessed, rests on conjecture alone. According to Appian (viii. 24) Hasdrubal's trial took place earlier, viz., after the catastrophe which befell him in conjunction with Syphax, when his camp was burnt (p. 434 f.). But this statement is evidently false, for Polybius and Livy speak of Hasdrubal as commanding the Carthaginian army in the battle on the 'Large Plains' (p. 435, note 4), a battle which Appian does not refer to. Neither Polybius nor Livy relate the accusation and death of Hasdrubal, but their silence would not justify us in condemning the detailed narrative of Appian as entirely fictitious. Livy has passed over many interesting details, and the narrative of Polybius may be among the lost chapters.

ternal enemies, it may easily be imagined that the populace of Carthage were not very conscientious in the observance of the law of nations towards the Romans. The truce, as the Roman historians report, had not yet expired when a large Roman fleet, with provisions for Scipio's army, was driven against the coast in the Carthaginian bay, and wrecked before the eyes of the people. The town was in a state of the greatest excitement. The senate consulted as to what was to be done. The people pressed in among the senators and insisted on plundering the wrecked vessels. The government determined, either voluntarily or under compulsion, to send out ships to tow the stranded vessels to Carthage. Whether and how this resolution was carried out may be doubtful; but thus much is certain, that the Roman ships were plundered, perhaps by the licentious populace, without the authority or approval of the government. Scipio sent three ambassadors to Carthage, demanding satisfaction and compensation. The embassy received a negative answer, and the attempt was even made on the part of Carthage to detain them as hostages for the safety of the Carthaginian ambassadors who were still in Rome.¹ This attempt failed. The three Romans escaped, with much difficulty. Scipio, instead of retaliating, allowed the Carthaginian ambassadors, who shortly afterwards fell into his hands on their return from Italy, to leave his camp unmolested. After all hopes of an immediate peace had vanished, he prepared for a renewal of the war, which now, since Hannibal was opposed to him, had assumed a far more serious character.²

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Roman
convoy in
the bay of
Carthage.¹ Appian, viii. 34.² No event in the war has been so thoroughly misrepresented as the so-called breach of the truce by the Carthaginians. Some Roman writers were anxious to show, by a striking example, that the charge of faithlessness, so universally brought against the Punians, was well founded, and in their patriotic zeal they vied with each other in making the most atrocious charges. Though Polybius (xv. 2, § 15) and Livy (xxx. 25, 8) admit that the Roman ambassadors returned safe to Scipio, Appian (viii. 34) relates that some of them were killed (*καὶ τῶν πρέσβεων τινες ἐκ τοξευμάτων ἀπέθανον*). As there were only three ambassadors, the expression 'some of the ambassadors' can hardly be justified, and the reading is probably corrupt. Perhaps *πρέσβων* has to be

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of Hanni-
bal against
Masinissa.

What has been said already with regard to our imperfect knowledge of the war in Africa applies especially to the period between the landing of Hannibal and the battle at Zama.¹ Livy and Polybius say nothing at all about it, so that we cannot understand how the hostile armies, at the distance of a five days' march, encounter each other to the west of Carthage. Fortunately we find some indications in Appian and Zonaras, derived from an independent source, which enable us to form a proximate notion of the course of the campaign. It appears from these indications that the war was brought to a close through the Numidians and in Numidia. From Leptis Hannibal had marched to Hadrumetum, where he spent the winter. But instead of marching from this place to Carthage, and against Scipio, he turned in a southerly direction, towards Numidia. He considered it his first duty to restore Carthaginian influence in this territory, to weaken Masinissa, and to draw off its forces to the Carthaginian side. Hannibal secured the support of some Numidian chiefs, especially of Vermina, the son of Syphax; he succeeded in defeating Masinissa, in taking several towns, and in laying waste the country. Hereupon Scipio marched from Tunes, where he had taken up his position for the second time, and came to relieve his ally, threatening Hannibal on the east, whilst the Numidians were

changed into ἐπιβατῶν. It would take too long to point out all the contradictions in the several statements. They strike even the superficial reader. If we had the Carthaginian version, we should probably learn that the Romans were not so innocent as the lamb in the fable, and that the Carthaginians were not so demented as to give their overpowering enemies a pretext for renewing a war the termination of which they were prepared to purchase with great sacrifices. We surmise that the Carthaginians did not provoke hostilities until they knew the resolution of the Romans to continue the war; and we have no reason to doubt that a state like the Carthaginian respected the law of nations at least as much as the Romans, and that accordingly the alleged violation of it by the populace of Carthage was justified by acts on the part of the Romans. If we recollect the story of the Caudine Passes, we shall feel persuaded that Rome did not scruple to accept the benefits of an armistice without performing the conditions stipulated in it.

¹ Compare U. Becker, *Vorarbeiten zu einer Geschichte des zweiten punischen Krieges*, p. 186 ff.

advancing against him from the west. Hannibal was worsted in a cavalry engagement near Zama, one of his commissariat trains was cut off by the Romans under the legate Therminus, and, after fruitless negotiations for peace, the decisive battle at last was fought.¹

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The so-called
battle of
Zama.

The uncertainty of the history of this last year's campaign is strikingly characterised by the fact that neither the time nor the place of this battle is exactly known. One thing is certain, that the battle of Zama, as it is called in history, was fought, not at Zama, but several days' march to the west of it, on the river Bagradas, at a place the name of which is given differently by different authors, and which was *perhaps* called Naraggara. The date of the battle is also uncertain. Not one of the extant historians names even the season of the year. On the authority of a statement in Zonaras² that the Carthaginians were terrified by an eclipse of the sun, the 19th of October has been fixed upon as the day of the battle, as, according to astronomical calculations, an eclipse of the sun, visible in North Africa, took place on that day in the year 202 B.C.³ This calculation agrees perfectly with the course of events as it appears probable from the narratives of Appian and Zonaras; for the campaign in the wide deserts of Numidia may very well have lasted through the whole summer of that year.

The battle of Naraggara, which, in order to avoid a

¹ The story of an interview of the two leaders is probably nothing but one of the idle inventions in which the history of the Punic war abounds, from the time that Scipio took a leading part in it. It is not taken from the contemporary annals, but from one of the poetical or rhetorical works on the subject. If more was preserved of the poems of Ennius than the few scanty fragments which were noted down by the later grammarians for the curious or antiquated words they contained, we should probably be able to trace back to him a great number of these fictions. They originated, for the most part, in the family circle and among the clients of the Scipios, and had already gained consistency when Polybius obtained in this quarter his materials for the history of the Hannibalian war.

² Zonaras, ix. 14.

³ This date agrees with the statement of Livy (xxx. 36), according to which the Numidian chief Vermina attacked the Romans *after* the battle, on the first day of the Saturnalia, *i.e.* in the month of October.

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misunderstanding, we must call the battle of Zama, is described in detail by Polybius and by Livy. After what we have said above, of the inaccuracy of these authors as to the war in Africa, it would hardly be worth while to copy their battle-pieces here, however much we may desire to have a true picture of this battle, which, though it did not decide the issue of the seventeen years' war—for this had been long decided—yet brought the long struggle to a close. But the battles of the ancients, compared with those of modern times, were so easy to survey; their battle-fields, even when the greatest forces fought, were so small, and the battle array and tactics of their troops so uniform and simple, that it was not impossible to obtain a clear conception of the course of a battle; and where there was no intention to deceive, the accounts of eye-witnesses may be received as, on the whole, trustworthy.

Disposition of the
opposing
forces.

According to Appian¹ Hannibal brought into the field 50,000 men and eighty elephants, Scipio 34,500, without counting the Numidians whom Masinissa and Dacamas, another Numidian chief, had brought to his aid. According to the account of Polybius,² both armies were equally strong in infantry. Hannibal's army consisted of three different corps, drawn up one behind the other in a treble line of battle. In the first rank were placed the mercenaries, the Moors, the Gauls, the Ligurians, the Balearic contingent, and the Spaniards; then, in the second line, the Libyans and the Carthaginian militia; and in the third line the Italian veterans, mostly Bruttians. The eighty elephants, drawn up before the front, opened the attack on the Romans. In cavalry the Romans were superior to Hannibal, by the aid of their Numidian auxiliaries.³ It appears that Hannibal's Numidian ally Vermina had not arrived with his troops on the day of the battle.⁴ He did not attempt an attack on

¹ Appian, viii. 41.

² Polybius, xv. 14, § 6.

³ Besides his Italian cavalry, Scipio had 4,000 Numidian horse, under Masinissa.—Livy, xxx. 29.

⁴ The untrustworthiness of the Numidians, as of their allies in general, and of their mercenaries, was the principal element of the weakness of the Carthaginians. What strong reasons Hannibal had for mistrusting the Numidians

the Romans until after the battle, and was then defeated with a loss of 16,000 men.¹

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The order
of the
Roman
legions.

The Roman legions were generally drawn up in three lines, in manipuli or companies of 120 men each, in such a manner that the manipuli of the second line, the principes, came to stand behind the intervals left by the manipuli of the first line, the hastati, and that on advancing they could form one unbroken line with them. The manipuli of the third line, the triarii, were half as strong as those of the two first—sixty men each; but they were formed of veterans, the most trusty soldiers in the legion. They were again disposed so that in advancing they filled up the intervals in the second line. The different manipuli were therefore drawn up like the black squares of a chess-board. The light troops, armed with spears and intended to open the battle, skirmished before the first line and retired into the intervals between the manipuli, as soon as more serious fighting began. The cavalry stood on both wings. This battle array was almost as invariable as the order of the camp, and the Roman generals had but little opportunity for the development of individual tactics. Still Scipio is said to have deviated from the usual rules at Zama. Instead of drawing up his manipuli like the black squares of a chess-board, he placed them one behind the other, like the rounds of ladders. This was intended to leave straight openings, through which the elephants might pass without trampling down or tearing asunder the infantry battalions. The elephants seem to have been of little use to the Carthaginians; but we do not know whether on account of this manœuvre, or for some other reason, a number of them, driven aside by the Roman skirmishers,

is evident from the statement of Appian (viii. 33), that he caused 4,000 Numidians, who had joined him as deserters from Masinissa, to be put to death. May we not presume that, even after such a harsh and wholesale punishment, there were still traitors in his army? During the battle, 300 Spaniards and 800 Numidians deserted to the enemy (Appian, viii. 48). Such a treason *during the battle*, is alone sufficient to account for the defeat of Hannibal. We hear also that in the battle the foreign mercenaries turned upon the Carthaginians.—Polybius, xv. 13, § 4. Livy, xxx. 34.

¹ Livy, xxx. 36.

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threw the Carthaginian cavalry into such disorder that they were unable to resist the attack of the Roman and Numidian horse. After a long and obstinate conflict, the first Roman line, the hastati, threw the Carthaginian mercenaries back upon their reserves, the Libyan and Punic troops. It is even said that the latter came to blows with the fugitives, either in consequence of mutual distrust, or treason, or because by Hannibal's orders the national troops tried to drive the venal and cowardly mercenaries back into the fight. At any rate the confusion which thus ensued was most fortunate for the Romans. Scipio advanced with his second and third lines, and attacked Hannibal's veterans, who alone preserved good order and were able to offer further resistance. The combat raged long and fiercely and without approaching a decision, until the Roman and Numidian cavalry, returning from the pursuit of the Carthaginians, fell upon the enemy's rear and thus decided the battle.

Complete
defeat of
the Cartha-
ginians.

The defeat of the Carthaginians was complete. Their army was not only routed but destroyed. Those who escaped from the horrible slaughter were for the most part surrounded and taken prisoners by the victorious cavalry. The battle was in many respects a parallel to that of Cannæ, and it was especially by the bravery of the legions of Cannæ that this victory was gained, and that the military honour of the Roman soldiers was retrieved.¹ For Scipio the battle of Zama was a double success. It put an end to the war, and it secured for him the glory and the triumph. If the decision had come only a short time later, Scipio would have been obliged to share the

¹ Not more probable than the personal interview of Hannibal and Scipio *before* the battle is their meeting hand to hand during the battle, and the single combat of Hannibal and Masinissa, both of which are seriously related (Appian, viii. 45, 46; Zonaras, ix. 14). We can see that the writers of historical romance omitted no opportunity for discovering and painting poetical situations. The statements of the losses on both sides vary as usual, and are not to be trusted. According to Polybius (xv. 14, § 9), the Romans lost more than 1,500 killed, the Carthaginians more than 20,000, and almost as many prisoners. According to Appian (viii. 48), the Romans lost 2,500 men, Masinissa somewhat more; the Carthaginians 25,000 killed, 8,500 prisoners, and 1,100 deserters.

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command-in-chief in Africa with his successor. Tiberius Claudius Nero, one of the consuls for the year 202, was already on his way with a consular army, and only bad weather had delayed his passage.¹ Hence it appears certain that, even if the battle of Zama had ended differently, the war might indeed have been prolonged, but the final result would have been the same. The Carthaginians had indeed long been overcome, and in all their battles and exertions of the last few years, especially since the battle at the Metaurus, they were prompted more by the recklessness of despair than by well-founded hope of victory.

Hannibal had not seen his native town since he had gone to Spain with his father as a boy nine years old. He was not destined, after an absence of six-and-thirty years, when he had filled the world with his glory, to come back as a triumphant victor.² He returned, after the destruction of the last Carthaginian army, to tell his fellow-citizens that not only the battle but the war was lost. His task was now to secure the most favourable conditions in the unavoidable peace. His return, and the continuance of his authority and influence in Carthage, sufficiently prove that he had always acted by the orders and had entered into the views of the Carthaginian government. If it had been true that he had begun and carried on the war out of personal motives, or even against the wish of his fellow-citizens, he would hardly have dared now to appear in a city where unsuccessful generals, even when not guilty of criminal contumacy, were in danger of crucifixion.

Return of
Hannibal
to Car-
thage.

From Zama, Scipio had marched directly upon Carthage, whilst a fleet of fifty ships which had just arrived under Lentulus threatened the town from the sea. But the siege of so well-fortified a town as Carthage could not be extemporised, and Scipio's attacks on Utica and Hippo could hardly have given him hopes of rapidly ending the

Policy of
Scipio.

¹ Livy, xxx. 39.

² This is the more general statement, with which, however, a passage in Livy (xxi. 3) does not agree, according to which Hannibal spent his youth in Carthage, until his brother-in-law, Hasdrubal, after the death of Hamilcar Barca, sent for him to come to Spain.

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war by the capture of Carthage. The importance of a fortified capital was much greater in ancient than in modern times. How often, for instance, had the wave of an invading army been broken by the walls of Syracuse, after the Syracusan armies had been routed, and the whole of their territory overrun. Thus even Carthage, trusting in the strength of her position, could now enter into negotiations with Rome as a power not yet subdued. Scipio was prepared, more than any other Roman could be, to grant favourable conditions; for he knew that a hostile party in the Roman aristocracy was endeavouring to bring about his recall before the conclusion of the treaty, in order to deprive him of the honour of ending the long war¹ by a glorious peace. This party was supported, not by the people of Rome, but by the senate, and could easily now, as on a former occasion, retard the negotiations and finally make them abortive. In the beginning of the year a vote of the people had intrusted Scipio with the command-in-chief in Africa, but nevertheless the senate had, on its own authority, dispatched the consul Tiberius Claudius Nero with a fleet, and had co-ordinated him with Scipio in the command.² Nero had been detained by contrary winds, and had not reached Africa. The same opposition against peace and against Scipio was again exhibited after the battle of Zama. The newly elected consul Cn. Lentulus was impatient to undertake the command in Africa,³ and whilst Scipio was conducting the peace negotiations, violent discussions and dissensions took place in Rome, which at last led to the decision that Lentulus should be intrusted with the command of the fleet, and that, if peace was not concluded with Carthage, he should sail to Africa and there undertake the command-in-chief of the fleet, whilst Scipio should retain the command of the land forces.

State of
parties in
Carthage.

In Carthage also there were, even after the battle of

¹ For Rome the war had lasted sixteen years (218–202 B.C.), for Carthage one year longer, if the siege of Saguntum is reckoned.

² Livy, xxx. 27.

³ Livy, xxx. 40.

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Zama, some fanatics who would still have continued the war with Rome. We are told that Hannibal with his own hands pulled down from the platform one of these demagogues that was attempting to inflame the populace, and that the people forgave its deified hero this military contempt of civil order. It is equally creditable to Hannibal and the democratic party in office during the whole of the war and to their political opponents, the aristocratic peace party, which had now to conduct the negotiations with Rome, that they arrived at a friendly understanding, and joined in common measures for the public weal.

We hear of no revolution in Carthage, not even of outbreaks of rage and despair directed against the supposed authors of the national calamity. The senate sent a deputation to Scipio, and it seems that the negotiations were resumed without any difficulty on the basis of the conditions which had once already been accepted. In some points, certainly, they were made more severe. Scipio required of Carthage the surrender of all elephants, of all ships of war but ten, the payment of 10,000 talents in ten years, a hundred hostages between fourteen and thirty years of age, and (what was most serious of all) the engagement that she would wage no war either in Africa or elsewhere without the permission of the Roman people. By the acceptance of this condition Carthage evidently renounced her claim to be an independent state, and admitted that her safety and her very existence were at the pleasure of Rome.

Terms of
peace.

Still the chance of battles had decided, and after the preliminaries of peace had been accepted, Scipio granted a truce for three months, which Carthage had to purchase with a sum of 25,000 pounds of silver, ostensibly as a compensation for the Roman ships that had been plundered during a former truce. In addition to this the Carthaginians had to pay and provision the Roman troops during the truce, while the latter in return refrained from plundering the Carthaginian territory.¹ Hereupon a Carthaginian

Truce for
three
months.

¹ On this, as on a former occasion (compare above, p. 439), the conditions of peace are not kept sufficiently distinct from the terms of the armistice.—Livy, xxx. 37.

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embassy was sent to Rome for the purpose of obtaining for this peace the sanction of the senate and of the Roman people.

Joy in Rome on the tidings of Scipio's victory.

The news of Scipio's victory at Zama had been received in Rome with boundless enthusiasm. When the legate L. Veturius Philo had delivered his message to the senate, he was obliged to repeat it on the Forum before the assembled people, as on a former occasion the messengers had twice to proclaim the news of the victory on the Metaurus. All the temples of the town were opened for a festive rejoicing of three days. The crowd had long desired peace in vain, and now came peace accompanied by victory. The new consul Cn. Lentulus and his party in the senate vainly attempted once more to delay the conclusion of peace.¹ The pressure exerted by the popular party and by Scipio's adherents was too great. The people did not wish to be cheated out of their hopes of peace, nor would they allow their favourite Scipio to be deprived of the credit of victory. They resolved, on the motion of two tribunes of the people, that the senate should conclude the peace with Carthage through P. Scipio, and that none other than he should bring back the victorious army to Rome. A commission of ten senators was at once sent to Africa to communicate this decision, and to give to Scipio their counsel and assistance. As a proof that with the conclusion of peace all hatred and dissension were to be put aside, the Carthaginian ambassadors were allowed to choose two hundred of their countrymen who were in Rome as prisoners and to take them home without any ransom.

Destruction of the Carthaginian fleet.

In Carthage the news of peace was not received with equal joy, however desirable it might appear to the people. The surrender of the Roman prisoners to the number of 4,000 was no act of free generosity, but a confession of defeat that had been extorted from them. The pecuniary sacrifices which they had to make were felt still more

¹ Livy, xxx. 43: 'Inclinatis omnium ad pacem animis, Cn. Lentulus consul, . . . senatus consulto intercessit.'

painfully. But when the Carthaginian fleet was towed out of the harbour and fired within sight of the town, such a lamentation arose as if, with these wooden walls of the mistress of the seas, the town itself were delivered to the flames.¹

For Scipio nothing remained to be done in Africa but to dispense reward and punishment. Directly after the victory over Syphax he had, before the assembled army, decorated Masinissa with the crown, sceptre, and throne, with the embroidered toga and tunic, as ally and friend of the Roman people.² The senate approved of this distinction by a regular resolution.³ Scipio now added the most valuable gift to these splendid and glittering decorations, by bestowing on Masinissa a part of the kingdom of Syphax, which they had conquered together, and its capital, Cirta. But the cautious Roman politicians could not place full confidence in the barbarian. They found it advisable to leave a rival by his side, and therefore they restored to Vermina, the son of Syphax, a part of his father's kingdom, in spite of his hostility during the late war. The punishment of the deserters delivered up by Carthage formed the bloody epilogue to this war. The Latins amongst them were beheaded, and the Roman citizens, deemed deserving of a severer penalty, were crucified.⁴

Scipio's journey to Rome was an uninterrupted triumphal procession. From Lilybæum he sent a considerable part of his army by sea to Ostia; he himself travelled by land through Sicily and southern Italy. Everywhere the people of the towns and villages came out to meet him, and welcomed him as victor and deliverer. His entry into Rome was celebrated by thousands of Roman soldiers whom he had delivered from Carthaginian captivity, and who loudly extolled him as their saviour. It must remain doubtful

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Rewards
bestowed
on Masi-
nissa.

Triumph
of Scipio.

¹ Livy, xxx. 43.

² Livy, xxx. 15.

³ Livy, xxx. 17.

⁴ Livy, xxx. 43. Valerius Maximus, ii. 7, 12. It is possible that the Romans borrowed from the Carthaginians the Oriental punishment of crucifixion.

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whether the Numidian king Syphax walked before his triumphal car; for, though Polybius affirms this, Livy states distinctly that he had previously died at Tibur.¹ On the other hand we may take for granted, even without any particular testimony, that the legions of Cannæ, which had been so undeservedly punished, more for their misfortune than their fault, now brilliantly established themselves in the esteem of their fellow-citizens, as they marched as conquerors behind the triumphal chariot of the general who by their arms had obliterated the disgrace of Cannæ.

¹ Livy, xxx. 45.

CHAPTER IX.

GENERAL REMARKS ON THE HANNIBALIAN WAR AND THE
CORRESPONDING PERIOD.

THE second Punic or Hannibalian war has always justly attracted the special attention of historians. Apart from the thrilling events, the grand military operations and efforts both of the Romans and of the Carthaginians, and the surprising vicissitudes of this great war—apart from the personal sympathy which Hannibal's deeds and sufferings inspire, and the dramatic interest which is thus imparted to the narrative, we cannot fail to see that this struggle has been of the greatest importance in the history of human civilization, and therefore deserves the most careful study. Not only did this war, the second of the three waged between Rome and Carthage, bring about the irrevocable decision, but by this decision the question was settled whether the states of the ancient world were to continue to exist separately, in continual rivalry, in local independence and jealousy, or whether they should be welded into one great empire, and whether this empire should be founded by the Græco-Italic or by the Semitic-Oriental race. It cannot be doubted that, if Rome instead of Carthage had been completely humiliated, the Punic empire and Punic civilization would have spread to Sicily, to Sardinia, and probably even to Italy,¹ and that for centuries it would have determined the history of Europe. What would have been the result of this consummation, whether the development of the human race would have

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Real significance of the second Punic war.

¹ Polybius, xv. 9, § 5: Οὐ γὰρ τῆς Λιβύης αὐτῆς, οὐδὲ τῆς Εὐρώπης ἔμελλον κυριεῦειν οἱ τῇ μάχῃ (as Zama) κρατήσαντες ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μερῶν τῆς οἰκουμένης, ὅσα νῦν πέπτωκεν ὑπὸ τὴν ἰστορίαν.

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been impeded or advanced, we cannot attempt to decide. Our imperfect knowledge of the national mind and character of the Carthaginians prevents us from giving an opinion. Historians are generally satisfied with the supposition that the victory of Rome was equivalent to the deliverance of the Græco-Italic mind from Oriental stagnation and intellectual oppression, and this conviction, which at any rate is consoling, may make our sympathy with a great and glorious nation less painful; but it can in no way diminish the importance which we justly ascribe to the Hannibalian war. We must pronounce Livy¹ right in his opinion, that, of all wars that had ever been waged, this was the most noteworthy; and, as Heeren justly remarks, the nineteen centuries that have passed since Livy wrote have not deprived it of its interest.²

The narra-
tives of
Livy,
Polybius,
and other
historians.

This interest is owing in great part to the fortunate circumstance that for the Hannibalian war the continuous narrative of Livy and the valuable fragments of Polybius enable us, more than hitherto in Roman history, to examine the inner working of the powers which this war put in motion. Having parted with Livy before the close of the third Samnite war, at the end of his tenth book, we have missed his not always trustworthy, but still useful, guidance during the war with Pyrrhus, and also during the first Punic and the Gallic and Illyrian wars, where we found a most valuable substitute in the short sketches of Polybius. Then with the siege of Saguntum, we take up again the narrative of Livy in the twenty-first book of his voluminous work, ten books of which relate the events of every year to the conclusion of peace, sometimes with unnecessary breadth and with rhetorical verbosity, and not without omissions and errors, but still with conscientious use of such historical evidence as he had at his command, and in language the beauty of which is unsurpassed in the historical literature of Rome. For the first two years of the war we have, in addition to Livy's narrative, that of Polybius,

¹ Livy, xxi. 1: 'Bellum maxime omnium mirabile quæ unquam gesta sunt.'

² See Heeren, *Staaten des Alterthums*, p. 396.

which leaves hardly anything to be desired as regards clearness, credibility, and sound judgment, but of which, unfortunately, for the remainder of the war, only a few detached fragments are preserved. There are also many particulars to be gleaned from the fragments of Dion Cassius and the abridgment of his work by Zonaras. Even Appian's narrative, though based on false views and full of the grossest exaggeration, is not useless when critically considered. In addition to these, Diodorus, Frontinus, and others occasionally help us; but, in spite of this comparative abundance of authorities, we are conscious that in the Hannibalian war there remain many unsolved problems and difficulties with respect to numbers, places, and secondary events, and also that we are in the dark as to many of the conditions of success, and as to the intentions and plans which determined on a large scale the action of both the belligerent powers.

The main cause of the superiority of Rome over Carthage¹ we have found in the firm geographical and ethnographical unity of the Roman state as compared with the chequered character of the nationalities ruled over by Carthage, and in the disjointed configuration of its territory, scattered over long lines of coast and islands. The history of the war shows us clearly how these fundamental conditions acted. Whilst Carthage, by the genius of her general and by the boldness of her attack, thwarted the Roman plans and destroyed one army after another, the fountain of the Roman power, the warlike population of Italy, remained unexhausted, and flowed more freely in proportion as Carthage found it more and more difficult to replenish her armies. Thus the war was in reality decided, not on the field of battle, as the Persian war was decided at Salamis and at Plataea, nor through the genius of a general and the enthusiastic bravery of the troops, by which small nations have often triumphed over far superior foes. It was decided long before the battle of Zama by the inherent momentum of these two states, which entered the lists and continued to fight, not with a part of

Real
causes of
Roman
superiority.

¹ See above, p. 6.

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their forces only, but with their whole strength. As, often, between two equally matched pugilists, the victory is decided not by one blow or by a succession of blows—the question being who can keep his breath longest and remain longest on his legs—so, in the conflict between Rome and Carthage, not skill and courage, but nerve and sinew, won the victory.

The
Italian
fortresses.

The advantage involved in the geographical conformation of Italy was increased by the surprising number of strong places, and by the circumstance that the capital of the country, the heart of the Roman power, was situated, not at one extremity, but in the centre of the long peninsula. The difficulties which the Italian fortresses opposed to Hannibal's progress appear on every page of the history of the war. These difficulties were the more serious as the art of siege was comparatively unknown in antiquity, and particularly in Carthage. Thus we see how, even in Gaul, the cities of Placentia, Cremona, and Mutina, though hardly fortified, defied the enemy during the whole course of the war, and formed a barrier towards the north. Of the many Etruscan cities, not one fell into Hannibal's power. After the battle at the lake Thrasymenus even the small colony at Spoletium could resist him. In Apulia, in Samnium, Lucania, and Bruttium we hear of a great number of fortified places, otherwise unknown, but which in this war, if they did not fall by treason, were able to disturb the march of the victorious enemy. We know more of the Greek towns, and of the fortresses in Campania; and if we remember how Hannibal's attacks on Naples, on Cumæ, Nola, and Puteoli failed, and how the little place of Casilinum could for months oppose a desperate resistance to the besieging army, we can easily understand that the conquest of Italy was a very different undertaking from that of the Carthaginian territory, where, with the exception of a few seaports, there were only open towns, a rich and easy spoil for any aggressor.

The importance of the central position of Rome is self-evident. That position prevented Hannibal from cutting off

the whole of Italy at once from Rome, and at the same time uniting all the peoples against Rome. He had to choose either the northern or the southern part of the peninsula as a basis of operations; and when he took up a position in Apulia and Bruttium he lost his communication with Gaul. The maintenance of this communication was rendered extremely difficult by the narrowness of the peninsula; and thus we see why the transport of Gallic auxiliaries for Hannibal's army ceased after the first years of the war, and how Hannibal had then to rely upon the resources of the south of Italy alone. We need hardly remark how useful this central position of Rome was in the decisive moment of the war, during Hasdrubal's invasion, nor how it facilitated the victory on the Metaurus. The same circumstances were repeated after Mago's landing at Genoa, and it may well be doubted whether, even under the most favourable conditions, Mago would have been able to effect a junction with Hannibal for the purpose of making a combined attack on Rome.

If we can hardly suppose that the Carthaginians were ignorant of these circumstances, which were all in favour of Rome, the undeviating persistency with which they continued to attack Rome from the north of Italy is the more surprising. That it was impossible, or even dangerous, to transport an army by sea to the south of Italy we cannot suppose. The landing of Mago on the coast of Liguria would completely invalidate such a supposition, and still more the landing of Scipio's army in the immediate neighbourhood of Utica. The ships of the ancients drew so little water that they could approach almost any part of the coast, and it was by no means necessary to be in possession of a fortified harbour before they could venture to disembark troops. The ships could be drawn on shore and protected from attacks of the enemy; and, indeed, the Roman fleet had, during the three years' war in Africa, no other protection but that which was afforded by such a fortified camp of ships. We can think of no other reason for the attacks of Hannibal,

Reasons
for the
Cartha-
ginian in-
vasions of
Italy from
the north.

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Naval
inactivity
of the
Cartha-
ginians.

Hasdrubal, and Mago from the north of Italy but the hope of gaining Gallic auxiliaries, and this very circumstance betrays the scantiness of the resources upon which Carthage drew for the recruiting of her armies.

It is more difficult to understand why she almost entirely abstained from vigorously carrying on the war at sea. In the first war several great naval battles were fought, and the decision was brought about by the victory of Catulus near the *Ægatian Islands*; but in the second Punic war the importance of the fleet appears surprisingly diminished, both on the Roman and on the Carthaginian side. Not one great battle was fought at sea. Even the number of ships which Rome employed on the wide battlefield on the coasts of Spain, Gaul, Liguria, Italy, Sicily, Corsica, Sardinia, and in the East, was in no year equal to the number of those that fought at Ecnomus alone. Further, whilst in the Sicilian war the quinqueremes had almost entirely taken the place of the triremes, we now again find triremes frequently mentioned. Repeatedly we hear of the ships being withdrawn from service, and the troops that manned them being employed for the war on land. If we are surprised to hear this of the Romans, who owed so much to their former success at sea, and who were so justly proud of it, it is still more surprising with regard to Carthage. The Romans had been attacked and could not determine whether land or sea should be the theatre of the war. They were obliged to meet Hannibal on land, and as long as they remained on the defensive they could not pay much attention to the naval war; but why Carthage neglected her fleet, and did not make better use of her superiority as mistress of the seas, the absence of Carthaginian historians makes it impossible for us to explain. It must have been possible, we might suppose, to intercept the Roman transports of troops and materials of war that were sent from Italy to Sardinia and to Spain, and particularly those that were destined for Africa, or at any rate to make this conveyance very difficult. Yet we hear but little of the capture of Roman

convoys by Carthaginian ships.¹ The Roman fleets sailed in every direction almost unmolested. In the decisive operations of the war, the Carthaginian navy made no attempt to take an active part. In fact during the siege of Syracuse their fleet actually declined a battle with the Romans, and thus brought about the loss of that important town. Further, we find Scipio landing unopposed almost within sight of Carthage, and if the Roman transports sometimes suffered from storms, they were never attacked by Carthaginian cruisers. They sailed with the greatest regularity, almost as in times of peace, and during the first winter provided the Roman army with all necessities at a time when it must have perished without such supplies. The minute description of unimportant naval conflicts, as for instance that of one Carthaginian quinquereme and eight triremes against one Roman quinquereme and seven triremes, is an indirect proof of the decay of both navies.² Nor is this an exceptional case. In the Greek states the old naval superiority had long disappeared. The Achæans and the royal successors of Alexander could launch no fleet that would bear comparison with those of the Hellenic republics when at the height of their power. It produces a melancholy impression when we read how the Achæan league sent out a fleet of ten ships against the pirates of Illyria, and that King Philip, having borrowed five war ships of them,³ at length determined to build a fleet of a hundred ships.⁴ Whilst the old rulers of the sea retired exhausted, the barbarian pirates became bolder and bolder, and their armed boats swept the seas and the coasts where once the proud triremes of the free Greeks had reigned supreme.

In the absence of all information which might enable us to account for the diminished importance of the Carthaginian fleet, this neglect of their naval force may perhaps be explained partly by the fact that Hannibal and

Probable reasons for the decay of the Carthaginian navy.

¹ Compare p. 213.

² Livy, xxvii. 30.

³ Livy, xxviii. 36.

⁴ Livy, xxviii. 8.

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his brothers, and even, before them, Hamilcar Barcas, the chief movers and leaders of the war, had devoted themselves by preference to the war by land, and excelled in this branch of military science. They were persuaded that Rome must be attacked and subdued in Italy. They therefore naturally advocated the application of all the national resources to the army, and their advice was always followed in Carthage. No doubt they were right in this, and Carthage would probably have been exhausted much sooner if she had divided her strength between the army and the fleet more than she actually did.

Roman
military
organisa-
tion.

The military system and organisation of the Romans underwent no important changes during the Hannibalian war; but a war which put so great a strain on the national resources could not fail to bring about some innovations. We see more clearly than before the first signs of a standing and of a mercenary army, and the gradual formation of a class of professional soldiers distinct from the civil population; and, in connexion with this, we find serious symptoms of moral decay. In the first Punic war it was still the rule to disband and dismiss the legions at the end of the summer campaign. This system, rendered inconvenient by the great distance of the theatre of the war in Sicily, could not be universally carried out without abandoning the island during the winter to the Carthaginian armies and garrisons. But still the Roman military system, which required every citizen to serve in turn, made it necessary periodically to reconstitute the legions; and, in the absence of higher considerations, the peasants and artisans were not withdrawn from their families for more than one or two campaigns.

Length-
ened
term of
military
service.

The carrying out of this arrangement became more and more difficult during the Hannibalian war, first because the exhausting levies made it impossible regularly to relieve the troops, then because the peril of the republic whilst Hannibal was in Italy called for a standing army, and lastly because the regular renewal of the legions in distant

Spain would have caused too much expense. In addition to this, the legions defeated at Cannæ and at Herdonea were sent to Sicily with the intention of punishing them for their conduct, by retaining them under arms until the end of the war. Whilst the legions stationed in Italy were less frequently relieved than formerly, the armies of Spain and Sicily consisted chiefly of veterans, of whom many had served as much as fourteen years. These soldiers were, evidently, very different from the old militia. They had become estranged from civil life; war had become their profession, and from war alone they derived their support and hoped for gain. The Roman pay was not, as with a mercenary army, a remuneration intended to induce men to enlist and to reward them for their services. It was only a compensation, and a very insufficient compensation, paid by the state to the citizen who was taken from his calling and burdened with a public duty. Even the troops levied only for a short time reckoned more upon the booty than on their pay, and as a rule the movable booty was appropriated by a victorious army.

Though the Roman soldiery were thus accustomed from the very beginning to rely on plunder, the demoralisation which necessarily resulted from this practice remained within narrow limits so long as the soldiers did not make the service a profession, and so long as they fought only against foreign enemies, and not against rebellious subjects or allies. All this was changed in the Hannibalian war. The Roman soldiers, now serving for years together, became naturally more and more estranged from a life of labour, and adopted the habits of soldiers, which naturally lead to the destruction and violent seizure of property. For the indulgence of such propensities Italy during the Hannibalian war offered the most favourable terms. A great number of Roman subjects had joined the invader. All these revolted towns and villages were gradually reoccupied by the Romans, and the soldiers could

Recognition of plunder as a supplement for inadequate payment of soldiers.

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Ferocity
consequent
on the
licence of
pillage.

at the same time indulge in their desire for pillage and inflict chastisement on a rebellious population.

In what manner this was done we learn from the disgraceful scenes that took place in Locri—scenes which were certainly no isolated instances of such ferocity, but which probably owe their notoriety to the mutiny to which the pillage gave rise. At that time the prosperity of whole districts of Italy was destroyed for many years—a prelude to that desolation which continued down to the imperial epoch. That the havoc made by the Roman soldiery in Sicily was even greater, the horrors of Leontini, of Enna, and of Syracuse are sufficient evidence. In Spain the same rapacity led to insubordination and mutiny. What Appian relates of the conquest of the town of Locha in Africa shows that the Roman soldiers ventured to satisfy their thirst for blood and love of plunder in utter defiance of military discipline, and under the eyes of the commander himself.¹ If this could happen with troops levied from the population of Rome and of the Latin and allied towns, and serving in the Roman legions, how much more reckless must have been the conduct of the irregular troops to whom Rome had recourse under the pressure of her disasters? When, after the fall of Syracuse, the prætor Valerius Lævinus endeavoured to restore Sicily to order and to the occupations of peace, he collected all the bands of marauders that were devastating Sicily, and sent them over to Italy, in order to molest the Bruttians as much as possible.² In like manner, the two notorious publicans and swindlers Pomponius and Postumius waged war on their own account, but with the sanction of the senate. Then,

¹ Appian viii. 15: Πολιορκούσι δ' αὐτοῖς πόλιν μεγάλην, ἥ ὄνομα ἦν Λόχα, καὶ πολλὰ δεινὰ πάσχουσι, οἱ μὲν Λοχαῖοι προστιθεμένων τῶν κλιμάκων ἐπεκηρυκεύοντο ἐκλείψειν τὴν πόλιν ὑπόσπονδοι. Καὶ ὁ Σκιπίων ἀνεκάλει τῇ σάλπιγγι τὴν στρατιάν· ἥ δ' οὐχ ὑπήκουεν ὑπὸ ὀργῆς ὧν ἐπεπόνθεσαν, ἀλλ' ἐπιβάντες τοῖς τείχεσι καὶ γυναῖα καὶ παῖδια κατέσφαττον· ὁ δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἔτι ὄντας Λοχαίων ἀφήκεν ἀπαθεῖς, τὴν δὲ στρατιάν τὴν λείαν ἀφείλετο· καὶ τοὺς λοχαγούς, ὅσοι συνεξήμαρτον ἐκλήρωσεν ἐν τῷ μέσῳ καὶ τρεῖς τοὺς λαχόντας ἐκόλασε θανάτῳ.

² Livy, xxvi. 40.

again, the slaves who had been enlisted as soldiers, and dispersed after the death of Gracchus, can have lived only by plunder, and must have contributed to the misery and wretchedness into which years of war had plunged the whole population of Italy.

That the mercenaries and foreign troops, employed in great numbers by the Romans, exercised a pernicious influence on the discipline and bearing of the Roman soldiers, is a fact which cannot be doubted. The first traces of foreign mercenaries in the Roman armies we have noticed already in the first Punic war.¹ In the second war the instances are very numerous. These troops were partly Greek mercenaries sent by Hiero, partly deserters from the Punic armies, partly Gallic, Spanish, and Numidian auxiliaries, and partly genuine mercenaries enlisted by Roman agents. All these troops were animated, not by patriotism or a sense of duty, but by the hope of gain; and if we are justified in assuming that the Roman, Latin, and Sabellic soldiers were originally inspired by higher motives, still they could not fail to be affected by the character of their mercenary comrades.

Influence
of merce-
naries on
the regular
armies of
Rome.

But it was by no means the common soldiers alone who became more and more habituated to plunder. It seems that even the superior officers set the example to their men. In Locri, Pleminius conducted himself as a bare-faced robber, and his quarrel with the two military tribunes arose only from their having disputed the booty with the commander-in-chief. When Scipio had taken New Carthage, his friends, as we are told, brought him the most beautiful maiden they could find as a choice article of booty, and his refusal of this present was deemed an act of exceeding magnanimity and self-denial. How Marcellus acted in Syracuse we can judge from the complaints of the Syracusans.² In fact it was an inveterate vice of the Roman aristocracy, that they always surpassed the populace in greed, and in skill in plundering. Hence, in the old

Character
of the
Roman
military
officers.

¹ See above, p. 102.

² See above, p. 373.

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IV.

times, the charge that Camillus illegally appropriated the spoil of Veii, whilst the exceptional praise bestowed upon Fabricius for his abstinence only proves the general rule. But the most striking proof of the systematic robbery of the Roman nobility is their wealth. This wealth was gained, not by labour and economy, not by commerce and enterprise, but by plunder. It grew with every new conquest; and since Rome had possessions out of Italy, the wealth accumulated in certain hands attained princely dimensions, and raised its possessors higher and higher above republican equality and above the laws. Whilst the commanders of armies openly and by force seized upon whatever they chose, another class of men carried on the same craft with quite as much skill under the protection of legal forms. These were the contractors and merchants who followed in the wake of the armies, as the jackal follows the lion, to gather up the fragments left by the haste or satiety of those who had gone before them. The soldiers could seldom make use of the booty that fell into their hands, and they sought to convert it into ready money as quickly as possible. For this purpose they had recourse to the traders, who, it seems, regularly accompanied them, and knew how to take advantage of the ignorance or impatience of the troops. These men bought valuables and all kinds of plunder, but particularly the prisoners, and for what they had purchased at a low figure in the camp they found a good market in Rome and elsewhere. Their business was of course most lucrative, as they were obliged to share danger and hardships with the soldiers. That they should be, as a rule, consummate rascals is natural, and this circumstance contributed to brand the merchants of Rome as a set of unprincipled impostors and as a species of thieves.

The
usurers
and specu-
lators.

Another class of traders were the usurers and speculators, who settled everywhere in the conquered countries, and brought down the curse of the provinces on the name of Italians. The worst of these were the farmers of the customs and revenues; but their practices belong more to

the long years of peace, and their system of oppression could not be fully developed during the continuation of the war. On the other hand it was precisely during the war that the army contractors flourished. These speculators formed joint-stock companies and carried on a most lucrative trade. There may have been honest people among them who became rich without stealing; but when we think of the infamous acts of which a Postumius could be guilty,¹ we cannot doubt that the practice of robbing the state was then as general with these people as it has been with the same class in modern times in all cases where they have not been subjected to strict control.

The consequence of every war is an increased inequality in the distribution of property. Whilst war greatly enriches a few, it impoverishes the mass of the people. The two principal conditions of peace—productive labour and legal order—are, in every war, more or less set aside by destruction and violence. The former reduces the total amount of capital, and the latter brings about an unequal and unfair distribution of it. This is the case particularly in a predatory war; and in a certain sense all the wars of antiquity, and particularly the wars waged by the Romans, were predatory. A war so great as that which Hannibal waged against the Romans, and which, after long suffering and privation, bestowed upon the victors so immense a booty, could not but exercise a momentous influence upon Roman society and the Roman state. On the one hand pauperism, and thereby the democratic element, were increased; on the other hand, the power and wealth of the reigning families grew more and more; and we already see the predecessors of those men whose personal ambition and love of power could no longer be kept within bounds by the laws of the republic.

We can form only an approximate idea of the devastation of Italy at the close of the Hannibalian war, as we do

Influence
of war on
the distribu-
tion of
property.

General
devastation
of
Italy.

¹ See above, p. 319.

BOOK
IV.

not know the thousandth part of the detail. Surely the dream had come to pass which, according to the narrative of Livy,¹ Hannibal had dreamt before his departure from Spain. On his march from the north of the peninsula to its southern extremity he had been followed by the dreadful serpent which crushed plantations and fields in its coils, and which was called the 'desolation of Italy.' The southern portion in particular had been visited most dreadfully by the scourge of war. In Samnium, in Apulia, Campania, Lucania, and Bruttium there was hardly a village that had not been burnt down or plundered, hardly a town that had not been besieged or stormed. Those fared worst that fell alternately into the hands of the Romans and of the Carthaginians. The most flourishing cities, and especially almost all the Greek towns, were in this position, on which the fate of Capua is a memorable commentary. But the great sufferings of this town must not divert our attention from the misfortunes that befell other less prominent communities. Great tracts of land were entirely deserted, whole populations of certain towns were transplanted to other abodes. Forfeitures and executions followed upon the reconquest of every rebellious township. A great part of Italy was for the second time confiscated by the conquerors, and considerable tracts of land became the property of the Roman people. Yet it was by no means the rebellious Italians alone that felt the scourge of war. The trusty allies, the Latins, and the Roman citizens themselves suffered as they had never suffered before. Whilst the lands remained untilled, and the hand of the husbandman grasped the sword instead of the plough, whilst the workshops stood empty, the families were necessarily exposed to want, even if they had not had to suffer under the pressure of an increased taxation. The decrease of the population is the surest sign of the effect of the war on the citizens of Rome. Whilst in the year 220 the number of

¹ Livy, xxi. 22.

citizens on the census lists amounted to 270,213, it had fallen in 204 to 214,000. We may certainly assume that the Hannibalian war cost Italy a million of lives.

CHAP.
IX.

Multiplication of
Roman
festivals.

It seems strange, at first sight, that the great sufferings of the Roman people should have been the cause of new festivities and popular rejoicings. But festivals and games were religious ceremonies, designed to pacify the gods. The plague of the year 364 had been the cause of the introduction of scenic games,¹ and thus, in the course of the Hannibalian war, the number of public festivals increased, in apparent contradiction to the public distress. To the ancient 'Roman' or 'great games,' which had originated in the regal period, and to the 'plebeian games' introduced at the commencement of the republic, there were added in the year 212 the 'Apollinarian games' celebrated every year from 208 downwards; and in the year 204 the 'Megalesian games' were introduced, in honour of the great mother of the gods. Besides these the celebration of games of Ceres is mentioned in the year 202,² and very frequently the several games were renewed and extended for longer periods.³

Character
of Roman
amuse-
ments.

Naturally such festivals, even if at first they bore a religious character, could not fail to encourage the love of pleasure. The numerous processions, the gorgeous funerals, and the funeral games arranged by private persons at their own expense had the same tendency. For this latter purpose the inhuman combats of gladiators, which seemed destined to root out all the nobler and tenderer sympathies of man and to extinguish all respect for the dignity of the human race, had been imported from Etruria as early as the year 261, the first year of the war in Sicily. This element of demoralisation was introduced simultaneously with the humanising art and poetry of Greece, as if it had been intended to counteract its influence; and thus grew the taste for the most abominable and disgusting sights by which men have ever

¹ Vol. i. p. 569.

² Livy, xxx. 39.

³ Livy, xxiii. 30; xxvii. 6, 21, 36; xxviii. 10; xxix. 11, 38; xxx. 26, 39.

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IV.

Character
of Roman
art and
literature.

corrupted and killed within themselves all the higher instincts of humanity.

A people that revelled in the dying agonies of a man, murdered for their brutal pleasure before their eyes, could not really feel the ennobling influence of pure art. We cannot therefore wonder that Greek poetry never took deep root in the Roman mind, but only covered its coarseness with outward ornament, just as the Greek mythology was patched on to the unimaginative religion of Italy as an external addition. It is eminently characteristic of the literature now developed among the Romans, that it was transplanted and never fully acclimatised on the foreign soil. Instead of passing through a natural growth, as in Greece, and advancing gradually from epic to lyric poetry, and from lyric poetry to the drama, poetry was imported into Italy complete, and all its branches were cultivated at the same time. We may consider Livius Andronicus, from Tarentum, of whom we have already mentioned a lyric composition, as the oldest poet of Rome.¹ His chief strength lay in the drama, and at the same time he also made the Romans acquainted with the epic poetry of Greece by a translation of the *Odyssey*. It is surprising that the Romans, from the very beginning, received with such favour those Greek subjects which their poets treated in the Latin tongue. They were certainly not acquainted with the overflowing wealth of Greek myths and fables which formed the subject of the poems now transplanted to Italy; yet they listened with breathless attention not only to the adventures and sufferings of Ulysses, which in their simplicity are easy to understand, but also to the tragic fate of the sons of Atreus and of Laios, and to the crimes of Thyestes, Aigisthos, and Tereus, which, in their dramatic form, roused the deepest emotion of the Greeks simply because they were so generally known. We see here most clearly how the marvellous influence of Greek fancy prevailed even over barbarians, and took by storm an intel-

¹ See above, p. 383.

lectual field hitherto uncultivated. Almost from the first moment that the Romans were touched with the magic wand of Greek poetry, they had lost their taste and affection for the first rude beginnings of their own poetic literature. The Saturnian and Fescennine verses and the Atellanian plays were cast aside and despised by the educated. The Latin language was forced into Greek rhythms, and the whole Greek apparatus of poetical conceptions, phrases, and rules was slavishly adopted. A confusion of ideas was the consequence. The simple Romans were often unable fully to understand what filled them with wonder and astonishment. It was not possible for them to absorb and assimilate at once the varied products of a foreign civilization, which had been the growth of centuries, and to master at once the different philosophical systems from the old simple mythology down to Epicurism and Euëmerism. It was long before they found their way in this flowery maze; but from the beginning their delight was great, and the victory of the Hellenic mind over the Italian was decided.

The successor of the Greek Livius Andronicus was Nævius, most likely a native of Campania. He also pursued the same path, but he seems to have given to his poems a more national colouring. Like his predecessor, he wrote tragedies and comedies according to the Greek pattern and filled with Greek subjects; but he also selected materials from the national history, and chose the first Punic war as the subject of an epic poem. In thus entering upon the domain of real life and leaving that of mythology, he acted in accordance with the tendency of the Italian mind,¹ which had based the oldest dramatic poetry on experience, and retained this principle in the satires, the only branch of poetic literature which is native on Italian soil. Nævius was also a satirist; he persecuted with venomous irony the powerful nobles destined by fate to become consuls in Rome, and paid for his audacity by

Livius
Androni-
cus and
his suc-
cessors.

¹ Vol. i. p. 570.

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IV.

exile. The third and most eminent of those men who endeavoured to acclimatize Greek poetry in Rome was the half-Greek Ennius, born at Rudia in Calabria, a district which, from its nearness to Tarentum, had become partly Greek. Like his predecessors, Ennius was versed in several kinds of poetry. He wrote tragedies, comedies, and heroic poems, and it was he who first introduced the Greek hexameter for the latter, and thus finally banished the old Saturnian verse from Roman poetry. His 'Annals,' in which he treats of the history of Rome from the foundation of the town down to his own time, in eighteen books, have been of great importance to the historians. As in England many, even educated, people derive their views of English history in the middle ages from Shakespeare's 'Histories,' so the Romans, who read the 'Annals of Ennius' much more diligently than those of the pontifices, often derived their first impressions of the old times and heroes from his poetical descriptions; and even the annalists, who undertook to write the history of the Roman people in the period intervening between the Punic wars and the time of Livy, could not free themselves from the influence which a popular poet like Ennius exercised upon them. This is most striking in those parts of the second Punic war in which Scipio plays a prominent part. Evidently a considerable portion of this so-called history belongs to the domain of fiction. Unfortunately, however, we are unable to ascertain from the scanty fragments of the poems of Ennius whether the chief source of these poetic ingredients was his *Annals* or a separate heroic poem which he composed to the glory of Scipio.¹

Greek
influence

Like literature, religion also felt the influence of Greece during the Punic wars. The direct evidence of this is

¹ The history of Roman literature concerns us only in so far as it can be shown that the political and social condition of the Roman people was influenced by it. A detailed examination of the various literary productions belongs to the history of literature, not to the political history of Rome. We avoid therefore all purely linguistic, æsthetic, and literary disquisitions, just as we avoid on principle everything which properly belongs to a handbook of antiquities, archæology, chronology, &c.

CHAP.
IX.on the re-
ligion of
the
Romans.

found in the adoption of Greek deities, as for instance the great mother of the gods, in the increasing importance of the worship of Apollo, of the Sibylline books, and of the Delphic oracle, and in the decline of ancient superstitions under the influence of free-thought. It is true the old auguries and the yoke of ceremonial law, with its thousand restrictions and annoyances, were not yet cast off, but they ceased to trouble the consciences of the Romans. Scepticism had reached a considerable height when a Roman consul could venture to say that 'if the sacred fowls refused to feed, they should be cast into the water, that they might drink.' What Livy relates about C. Valerius Flaccus is also very significant.¹ This man had in his youth quarrelled with his brothers and other kinsfolk, owing to his own irregular and dissolute mode of life, and was considered altogether a man lost to decent society. But in order to save him from utter perdition, the chief pontifex, P. Licinius, ordained him, against his wish, to the office of priest of Jupiter (*flamen dialis*), and under the influence of the sacred office this rake became not only a respectable but even an exemplary man, and succeeded in regaining the official seat in the senate which his predecessors in office had lost through their unworthiness. Nothing can be more characteristic of the spirit of the Roman religion, and of the total absence of a morally sanctifying element, than this appointment of a notorious profligate as priest of the supreme god. It was a fabric of formulæ without meaning, a dish without meat. The religious cravings were not satisfied, and men were carried either to the schools of Greek philosophy or to the grossest

¹ Livy, xxvii. 8: 'Flaminem dialem invitum inaugurari coegit P. Licinius, pontifex maximus, C. Valerium Flaccum . . . Ob adolescentiam negligentem luxuriosamque C. Flaccus flamen captus a P. Licinio pontifice maximo erat, L. Flacco fratri germano cognatisque aliis ob eadem vitia invisus. Is, ut animum eius cura sacrorum et ceremoniarum cepit, ita repente exiit antiquos mores, ut nemo tota iuventute haberetur prior nec probatior primoribus patrum, suis pariter alienisque, esset. Huius famæ consensu elatus ad iustam fiduciam sui, rem intermissam per multos annos ob indignitatem flaminum priorum repetivit, in senatum ut introiret, etc.'—Compare Valerius Maximus, vi. 9, 3.

BOOK
IV.

and meanest superstition. Hence it ceases to be a matter of wonder that in times of danger, as in the Gallic (225 B.C.) and in the Hannibalian war (216 B.C.), the Roman people should return to the barbarous rite of human sacrifices, that the town should be filled with magicians and prophets, that every form of superstition should be readily received by the common people, and that religion and morals should cease to make an effectual stand against selfishness and vice.

Increasing
poverty of
the lower
classes of
Roman
citizens.

The increasing love of pleasure in Rome, and the growing splendour of the public festivals and games, cannot be considered as a proof of a general increase of wealth in the capital, and still less in the whole empire. The treasures collected in Rome had not been earned by labour, but captured by force of arms. The peaceful exchange of goods, which is the result of productive labour and legitimate commerce, enriches the buyer and the seller, and encourages both to renewed exertion. But when brute force takes the place of a free exchange, both the robbed and the robber become enervated. The curse of barrenness cleaves to stolen goods. Who would gladly toil in the field or in the workshop, and earn a scanty livelihood in the sweat of his brow, if he has once revelled in the spoils of a conquered foe? The Roman soldiers lost in the long war the virtues of citizens. What they had gained, they rapidly squandered, and they returned home to swell the impoverished crowd that daily increased in the capital, attracted by the amusements and still more by the hope of sharing the profits of the sovereign people through the exercise of their sovereignty. Whilst, on the one hand, the love of sight-seeing was nourished, we hear already of those demoralising distributions of corn which destroyed, more than anything else, the spirit of honourable independence and of self-help. Already, in the year 203,¹ a quantity of corn, that had been sent from Spain, was distributed at a low price by the curule ædiles. This was

¹ Livy, xxx. 26.

the most convenient way of keeping the populace in good humour, and opposing those reformers who advocated the restoration of a free peasantry by means of assignments of land on a large scale. At the close of the Hannibalian war there was the best opportunity, and at the same time the most urgent necessity, for a radical agrarian reform. Great tracts of land in Italy were deserted, while thousands of people were impoverished and without employment. It was possible and even easy to remedy both evils at once, and to spread over Italy a free and vigorous population, such as had existed at the beginning of the war. If this was now neglected, a future revolution and the fall of the republic became inevitable.

That it was neglected was the fault of the nobility. A few colonies, it is true, were founded, and a certain number of veterans received grants of land. But these measures were not carried out in the spirit of the Flaminian distribution of lands in Picenum.¹ The estates of the nobility grew larger, and slaves took the place of a free peasantry. The Licinian law, restricting the right of inclosure and of using the common pasture—a law which had always been infringed more or less—now became gradually obsolete. By degrees these various causes brought about that state of things which two generations later converted the Gracchi into demagogues, and which, after the failure of reform, led to the establishment of the monarchy. The course which the development of the Roman state thus took, can be ascribed neither to particular men nor to a particular class. It was the necessary consequence of the fundamental form of the political and social institutions of Rome. The growth of the republic involved the emancipation of the ruling class from all public control.

The periodical admission of all citizens to the public offices, which constitutes the real essence of republican freedom and equality, was naturally checked by the supremacy of one city over great districts; while the inequality in the division of wealth, which impoverished and

Lawless
enrich-
ment of
the
Roman
nobility.

Prepon-
derance of
the senate.

¹ See above, p. 126.

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IV.

crowded the mass of the sovereign people, raised the ruling classes above the authority of the laws. At the time of the Hannibalian war this process was completed, and the theory of the constitution no longer agreed with the practice. The senate had ceased to be merely a deliberative body, and the people had only a nominal control of the legislative and executive power. The senate reigned exactly as a sovereign reigns in a state which has only a sham constitution. The officers of the state were its submissive servants, and the people were used as a tool to give the stamp of legality to the edicts of the senate. The ruling nobility was fully developed. The government was in the hands of a small number of noble families, to which it was all but impossible to gain admission. During the whole course of the Hannibalian war we find no instance of a 'new man' having been chosen for any high republican office. The names of the Cornelii, Valerii, Fabii, Sempronii, Servilii, Atilii, Æmilii, Claudii, Fulvii, Sulpicii, Livii, Cæcilii, Licinii fill the consular fasti of the period. Even the most brilliant personal merit no longer sufficed to admit a man who was not a member of the nobility to the higher offices of state. The knight L. Marcius, who after the fall of Cn. and Publius Scipio, had saved the remainder of the Roman army in Spain, and had afterwards been employed by the younger Scipio in the most important operations of the war, was shut out, in spite of his merits, from all high office, because he was not of noble descent,¹ and this was at a time when military ability was more important than any other. Even Lælius, Scipio's staunch friend and confidant, obtained admittance to the high offices of state with great difficulty, after he had failed in his first candidature for the consulship, in spite of the intercession of his powerful friends (192 B.C.). This jealousy of the nobility with regard to interlopers was by no means due only to ambition and to a desire to serve the

¹ Livy, xxviii. 42: 'Dux tumultuarius ille L. Marcius militari suffragio ad tempus lectus, ceterum *si nobilitas ac justī honores adornarent* claris imperatoribus qualibet arte belli par.'

state. The extension of the Roman republic had rendered the honorary public offices sources of profit to their holders to an extent which the old patricians had never anticipated when they consented to share them with their plebeian rivals. There can be no doubt that it was even then chiefly the prospect of pecuniary profit that increased the obstinacy of the conflict for the possession of office. But in the olden time religious conservatism, and the fear of the profanation of the auspices by the plebeians, had also exercised a considerable influence. Now there was no longer any pretext for religious scruples, and the families that were once in office excluded all outsiders chiefly because they did not feel inclined to share the booty with them.

One of the most effectual means of excluding new candidates was the burden laid on the ædiles, who were now required to furnish in part the cost of the public games. At first the state had borne the expenses, and these had remained within reasonable limits. But when the passion for public amusements increased, whilst at the same time the conduct of the wars and the administration of the provinces brought immense wealth to the noble houses, the younger members of the nobility used this wealth to win popularity for themselves, by increasing the splendour and prolonging the duration of the games at their own expense, and thus acquiring a claim to the consulship and proconsulship, and the means of enriching themselves.¹ There is no economy more pernicious or more costly than that of paying the public servants badly or not at all. The consequence is that they indemnify themselves, and that they cease to consider fraud, theft, and robbery as serious crimes. Thus the political life of Rome moved continually in a narrowing and destructive circle, and approached more

Modes of
courting
popularity.

¹ Polybius (x. 5) says of Scipio Africanus: *ὑπάρχων εὐεργετικὸς καὶ μεγαλόδωρος καὶ προσφιλεὶς κατὰ τὴν ἀπάντησιν συνελογίστατο τὴν τοῦ πλήθους πρὸς αὐτὸν εὐνοίαν.* Livy (xxv. 2) says of his ædileship: *Ædilia largitio hæc fuit: ludi Romani pro temporis illius copiis magnifice facti, et diem unum instaurati et congii olei in vicos singulos dati.*—Compare Weissenborn's note.

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IV.

and more to the fatal catastrophe. Corruption led to office and to wealth, and this wealth again made corruption possible.

Growing
preponder-
ance of the
nobility.

The calculating avarice of the great, and the venality of the impoverished mass, were both engaged in bringing about the ruin of the state, at first timidly and on a small scale, but with constantly increasing boldness and recklessness. Even in the Hannibalian war we find traces of that cynical spirit which a dominant party does not exhibit until it has lost both the fear of rivalry and the fear of disgrace. It was even then not customary to measure by the same standard the crimes of the nobility and those of the common people. Whilst the soldiers who fled at Cannæ were punished with the greatest severity and condemned to serve in Sicily without pay, the young nobles, who had certainly not behaved with exceptional gallantry, had risen step by step to the highest offices of the republic. Cn. Cornelius Lentulus had been military tribune in the battle, and had escaped through the fleetness of his horse: he became quæstor in the year 212, then curule ædile, and at last even consul in 201. P. Sempronius Tuditanus, who had also been military tribune at Cannæ, became curule ædile in 214, prætor in 211, censor in 209, proconsul in 205, and consul in 204. Q. Fabius Maximus, the son of the celebrated Cunctator, was in a similar position; he became successively curule ædile, prætor, and consul. Even L. Cæcilius Metellus, who was said to have formed the plan of leaving Italy after the battle of Cannæ, and was therefore the object of violent attacks from those who, like Scipio and Tuditanus, claimed for themselves the credit of greater bravery, became, after his return, quæstor and tribune of the people. But, above all others, P. Cornelius Scipio himself, the conqueror of Zama, was, in spite of his flight at Cannæ, loaded with honours and distinctions. It would surely have been natural if the really ill-treated soldiers of Cannæ had, in the prayer for justice which they addressed to Marcellus, made use of the words put into their mouth by Livy: 'We have heard

that our comrades in misfortune in that defeat, who were then our legionary tribunes, are now candidates for honours, and gain them. Will you then pardon yourselves and your sons, Conscript Fathers, and only vent your rage against men of lower station? Is it no disgrace for the consul and the other members of the nobility to take to flight when no other hope is left? and have you sent us alone into battle for certain death?'¹

If this contemptuous and overbearing spirit of the nobility had been general at that time, the Roman people would certainly not have borne the struggle with Carthage as bravely and as successfully as they did. But these instances of political degeneracy were as yet isolated. In the year 212, for instance, the nobility did not dare to protect the incapable prætor Cn. Fulvius Flaccus, who had lost the second battle of Herdonea, from an accusation and from condemnation,² after the fugitive troops had been punished by being sent to serve in Sicily. In spite of the intercession of his brother Quintus, who had already been three times consul, and who was at that moment besieging Capua as proconsul, a capital charge was brought against him, and he escaped the sentence only by going, as a voluntary exile, to Tarquinii.

In spite therefore of some marks of decay already visible in the political and social life of Rome, the period of the Hannibalian war was still the zenith of the republican constitution and the heroic age of the Roman people. From this time conquest followed upon conquest with surprising rapidity. Within two generations Rome had attained an undisputed sovereignty over all countries

Rapid
growth of
Roman
power.

¹ Livy, xxvi. 2. In a similar manner, the tribune of the people C. Sempronius Blaesus expresses himself in the impeachment of Cn. Fulvius Flaccus, who had been disgracefully beaten by Hannibal, and whose men were treated just like the fugitive legions of Cannæ. 'Cn. Fulvio fugam ex prælio ipsius temeritate commisso impunitam esse, et eum in ganea lustrisque, ubi iuventam egerit, senectutem acturum; milites qui nihil aliud peccaverint, quam quod imperatoris similes fuerint, relegatos prope in exilium ignominiosam pati militiam: adeo imparē libertatem Romæ diti ac pauperi, honorato atque inhonorato esse.'

² Livy, xxvi. 2-4.

BOOK
IV.

bordering on the Mediterranean. But the increase of wealth and the decay of the old republican virtues kept pace with the extension of the Roman power. We turn now to the consideration of the easy victories over the degenerate Hellenic states, before describing the great struggles that preceded the transition of the republic into the monarchy.

APPENDIX.

THE POPULATION OF ITALY IN THE THIRD CENTURY B.C.

The numbers as given by Polybius (ii. 24) are the following :—

I. The field army, 156,800 men, namely—

a. Roman citizens :

	MEN
Four legions of 5,200 foot and 300 horse each	= 22,000

<i>b.</i> The auxiliaries of the said four legions— 30,000 foot, 2,000 horse	= 32,000
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<i>c.</i> Two legions of which we are not told whether they were Romans or confederates—8,400 foot and 400 horse	= 8,800
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d. Allies :

1. Etruscans and Sabines—50,000 foot, 4,000 horse	= 54,000
2. Umbrians and Sarsinates (no division of foot and horse)	= 20,000
3. Cenomanians and Venetians (no division of foot and horse)	= 20,000

II. Reserves 53,500 men, namely—

<i>a.</i> Romans—20,000 foot, 1,500 horse	= 21,500
<i>b.</i> Auxiliaries—30,000 foot, 2,000 horse	= 32,000
	210,300

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	MEN
Brought forward	210,300
III. Besides these, the muster-rolls name 558,000 men, namely—	
<i>a.</i> Romans and Campanians—250,000 foot, 23,000 horse	= 273,000
<i>b.</i> Allies, namely—	
1. Latins—80,000 foot, 5,000 horse	= 85,000
2. Samnites — 70,000 foot, 7,000 horse	= 77,000
3. Iapygians and Messapians — 50,000 foot, 16,000 horse	= 66,000
4. Lucanians — 30,000 foot, 3,000 horse	= 33,000
5. Marsians, Marrucinians, Frentanians, Vestinians — 20,000 foot, 4,000 horse	= 24,000
	} = 285,000
The whole armed force	<u>768,300</u>

These statements are no doubt based on an official enumeration, but leave much to be desired as regards accuracy and clearness.

Three distinct divisions are made: Romans, auxiliaries, and allies. But only in the first two classes are given, besides the numbers of the troops in the field, the muster-rolls of those liable to military service. Thence it appears that the states allied with Rome as equals kept no muster-rolls, and levied their auxiliary forces, not *ex formulâ*, but according to special agreement. With the Cenomanians and Venetians this is self-evident; but it must also have been the case with the Umbrians and Etruscans. How the Sabines come to be named in this class is inexplicable, as already in the year 290 B.C. they were made Roman citizens *sine suffragio*. It may perhaps be supposed that a part of them remained free and became a *civitas fœderata*. Now, if of the Etruscans and the Umbrians we are informed that they furnished a field force of 74,000 men, we are not justified in supposing that these comprised the whole population capable of bearing arms. If we could assume that here the field force bore the same proportion to the number of those still liable to service as in Rome and in the auxiliary or confederate states (*socii*), namely, 116,300 :

¹ See above, p. 418, note 4.

558,000 or about 1 : 5, we should find for Etruria and Umbria the number of 370,000 liable to service, in addition to the 74,000 in the field, and we should arrive at a sum total of 444,000 men capable of bearing arms. If we allow five children, old men, and women to each man liable to serve, *i.e.* to each man between seventeen and forty-five years of age, we shall have to estimate the free population of these countries at 2,664,000, a number which seems not too great if compared with the population of the remainder of Italy.

2. In Polybius' enumeration of the peoples of Italy, we miss the Bruttians. Now it is possible that they may have been a *civitas foederata*, and we may perhaps explain this omission in the list by the fact that they were thus not obliged to keep muster-rolls, nor to furnish a contingent for the Gallic war, because of their southerly position. We are therefore left to conjectures as to the population of this tract of country.

3. The same is the case with regard to the free confederate towns, such as Tibur, Præneste, Nola, Nuceria, Camerinum, Iguvium, and all Greek towns from Naples to Tarentum. We can only guess at their population.

4. The numbers in Polybius are exact only for the troops actually placed in the field. For the remainder he gives only round numbers. We do not know whether, for the sake of simplification, these numbers have been rounded off by the historian who took them from official lists, or whether they are the result of approximate estimates, in which case they would deserve little credit. With two peoples, the Umbrians and the Cenomanians, the proportion of the infantry to the horse is not stated. It would certainly be a mistake to suppose¹ that the 20,000 Cenomanians were all foot soldiers.

5. As the Cenomanians and the Venetians dwelt beyond the then acknowledged boundaries of Italy, they must be omitted in an estimate of the military forces of that country. We cannot even consider them as permanent allies of the Romans, for their alliance with Rome accidentally resulted from their feud with the Insubrians.

6. On the other hand, in an estimate of the Roman forces, Sicily ought to be taken into consideration. Here the Romans had, besides their province, two allies—the Mamertines and Hiero of Syracuse.

7. Polybius does not state whether the two legions stationed in Sicily and in Tarentum were made up of Roman citizens or of auxiliaries ; and this is an important defect in the whole statement.

¹ As Wietersheim does (*Geschichte der Völkerwanderung*, i. 193).

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It thus becomes impossible to determine the proportion which the contingents of the Romans and their confederates (*socii*) bore to their respective populations. The remaining Roman troops amount to 43,500, and those of the confederates to 64,000. Now, if we add the 8,800 men of the two legions in question to the Roman forces, we find 51,000 Romans in the field, with 64,000 confederates. If, on the other hand, we add them to the latter, we find 43,500 Romans and 72,800 confederates. It is evident that this makes a very considerable difference, for the muster-rolls of both show an almost equal number—273,000 Romans and 285,000 confederates. Lange¹ supposes that 64,000 auxiliaries in the Roman armies were furnished entirely by the Latins, and calculates $(85,000 + 64,000, \text{ or } 149,000 : 64,000 = 100 : 42\frac{142}{149})$ that the Latins therefore had to furnish nearly 44 (or rather nearly 43) per cent. of their population capable of bearing arms, whilst the Romans furnished only 16 per cent., *i.e.* four legions at 22,000, four legions at 21,500, and the two legions in Sicily and Tarentum, which Lange therefore supposes to have been Roman; therefore altogether 52,300 Roman soldiers drafted out of $273,000 + 52,300$, or 325,300 on the muster-rolls.

How is it possible to believe that 43 per cent. of the men qualified for military service could be drafted off to the war at the same time?

8. It may appear doubtful whether the lower classes of the census—the proletarians and the *capite censi*, who were free from the duties of military service—were included in the number of men capable of bearing arms. Our estimate of the population will vary very much according to the result we arrive at respecting this question. If the proletarians and the *capite censi* were not counted, we should have to add a considerable number to the sum total of the population, for the class of the poorest citizens was very numerous. Still it is most probable that the proletarians and the *capite censi* were counted, as already in the first Punic war they were regularly drafted as rowers for the fleet, and therefore belonged to the effective population; further, because, in the dangers of the Gallic war, they would, in case of necessity, have been armed, and their numbers must therefore have been known.

9. Other defects in the list are of less importance; *e.g.* it is uncertain whether those exempt from military service are passed over, and,² further, those unfit for military service on account of bodily infirmities. Wietersheim is certainly wrong in estimating these at 25 per cent. of the population. Though in Prussia

¹ *Römische Alterthümer*, ii. § 103, p. 137. ² Wietersheim, *loc. cit.* p. 196.

one-half of the conscripts are found unfit to serve, and in other countries two-thirds or three-fourths, that proves nothing for ancient Rome. Sickly children were exposed by the nations of antiquity. In the rural population of Italy, which formed by far the greater part of the army, there were few weakly persons to be found, and the ancients knew nothing of our parade exigencies or of our medical examinations.

10. In the calculation of Polybius, those troops that were already levied and formed into legions (the field army of 62,800 Romans and auxiliaries, and the 53,500 reserves, altogether 116,300 men) are added to the number of Romans and allies contained in the muster-rolls (558,000 men). Thus Polybius arrives at the sum of 674,300 men fit to bear arms, which, with the addition of the 94,000 men of the Umbrians, Etruscans, and Cenomanians would make 768,300, or, in round numbers, 770,000 men.

We may well ask whether this manner of calculation be correct; that is to say, whether the number of soldiers in the field ought to be added to the number of those liable to serve, contained in the muster-rolls, in order to obtain the sum total of all persons capable of bearing arms; and whether it is not more likely that the number of troops already levied is contained in the number of those liable to serve. In other words we must consider whether these muster-rolls were only supplementary lists, prepared after a part of the army had been already levied, or whether they were intended to furnish a statistical basis for this enrolment. The latter plan would seem to be the only rational one, especially as the Romans had no standing army, but one which was recruited every year out of the mass of the citizens capable of serving, and which was merged again in the mass of the people. If this view of the matter be correct, the number of fighting men of the Romans and their allies amounted not to 674,300, but only to 558,000; to which must be added the forces of the allies (Etruscans and Umbrians) consisting of 74,000 men in the field, or $5 \times 74,000 = 370,000$ fighting men. Thus the sum total of the armies of Italy (with the exception of the Cenomanians and Venetians) would be 928,000. Now if we add 72,000—certainly not too high an estimate—for the contingents of the free towns and of the Bruttians, we shall find in round numbers a million of fighting men for Italy proper, from the Sicilian straits to Liguria and Cisalpine Gaul; and if for each fighting man between seventeen and forty-five, we allow five as the proportion for old or sickly men, and for women and children, we shall arrive at a free population of 6,000,000. How many aliens and slaves there were, in addition to the free population, we cannot calculate;

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but taking 50 per cent. of the free population, the total population of Italy would amount to 9,000,000. According to Kalb's 'Statistics' (1865), the population in Naples, the territories then reckoned as the States of the Church, the Marches, Umbria, and Tuscany, was 10,694,252.

It may further be asked, how many out of a given number of fighting men can actually be summoned to do military service. This depends upon the state of civilisation in the country. The more a people has advanced on the path of civilisation, the fewer of its members it can afford to place in the only class which destroys instead of producing. In a barbarous people every grown-up man is a warrior. The field labour, the tending of the cattle, and all indoor work, are left to women, children, and old men. According to Cæsar's account every fourth individual of the Helvetii was a fighting man.¹ The Gaelic clan of Glencoe numbered, before its extermination under William III., three hundred members and fifty fighting men, *i.e.* one for every six individuals. Where slavery prevails, even in a more advanced stage of civilisation, a large proportion of the free men are available for war. This was the case in antiquity, and in the Southern States during the American Civil War. It seems that in Rome it was a great exertion to send one-tenth of the eligible population into the field, and the same proportion to the reserve forces. This would be about the proportion given in the list of Polybius: 62,800 in the field, 53,000 in the reserves drawn out of 674,300, or, according to our opinion, 558,000. The same is seen in the course of the war, *e.g.* in the year 216, when about 100,000 men were serving in the field, *i.e.* 10 per cent. of the said million of fighting men, and probably not much less in the reserve force.

These were the forces of a people whom Hannibal ventured to attack in the year 218 B.C.

¹ *Bell. Gall.* i. 29.

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